disunit/, political islamism late - espace.library.uq.edu.au202995/uq202995_oa.pdf · gerakan ini...

Robert E. Elson

Disunit/, distance, disregard:The political failure of Islamism in late

colonial Indonesia

Islamisme adalah satu bentuk pemikiran Islam ynng menempntkan agama

pada posisi sentral dalam kehidupan masyarakat, termasuk bidang politik'dan

kenegaraan. Islam dalam konteks ini dijadiknn sebuah narasi utnma

yang,selaindipatenknnsebagaisebuahideologi,iugadipahnmisebagaiartikulasi /erjuangan politik yang memiliki spectrum beragam. lnlur yang

ditempuh oleh para pengusungnya (kaum Islamis) tersebar utamanya

melalui pembentukan hegemoni moral dan intelektual untuk mempengn-

ruhi wilayah ciail society. Padaleztel indiaidukitabisa mencqtat misalnya

muncul Alimin, anggota sI yang banyak terpengaruh ide-ide komunis,

sementara padn tingknt kelembagaan tercatat pernn beberapa partai na-

sionalis-kebangsann seperti Partai Nasional lndonesia (PNI) didirikan

pada 1927; semuanya menentang segala proses hegemoni dnn pergeraknn

knlangan Islsmis di Indonesia

oitam sejarah Indonesin, gerakan islamis mendapatkan momentum

kebangkitannya seiring munculnya Sarekat Islam (SI) yang didirikan

di solo 17 Noaember 1912. Pada perkembangannya, organisasi yang

merupaknn bentuk lanjut dari syariknt Dagang Islam (sDl)-didirikan

obh k.U. Samanhudi tahun 1-905-ini, bermetamorfosis ke dalam Partai

sarekat lstam (PSI) yang dibentuk tahun L927 , sebelum akhirnya berubah

menjadi Partai sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSil) pada 1929. Melaluibebera-

pa tiokoh utamanya seperti Hnji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934)''

H aj i Agus S alim ( L 8 B 4-1 g 5 4) or g anis nsi ini b er up ay a mendis s emin asiknn

gagasa"n-gagasan keislamanny a. salim misalnya sangat gencar mengkritik"niion tiri, yang dianggapnya sangat rentan jatuh pada imperialisme

dan kolonialisme B ar nt'

L Studia Islamika, VoL 15, No. 1, 2009

2 Robert E. Elson

Dan dari sinilah cerita diskursus ideologibermula. Indonesia yang kalaitu sedang berada dalam proses pencarian bentuk idearnya sebagai sebuahnegar a-b ang s a, disemar aknn p er gulat an dua kutub ideilo gis-Js ehin ko-munis- yakni kalangan pengusung lslamisme (Islam potitilc) di satu sisidan mereka yang umum disebut sebagai knrangan nasionar sekurer (pseu-do-secular nationalists) di sisi lain. Maka, aroma pertarungan ideologi ter_s ebut t erus menj al ar hin g g a b eb er ap a d e c a d e s er anj ut ny al Rent an g i ahun1920-an, pihak nasionalis kembali membuka alur perdibatan ters;ebut de-ngan menuduh Agus sarim sebagai indiuidu pemecah belahkalangan pri-bumi lawa. Terlebih ketika pada tahun 1928, beberapa murid Ag)s salimyang awalnya bergabung daram long laua, mendirikan long IsramietenBond (IIB/ Ikatan Pemuda Isram) yang juga menjad.i prnrgi, Isramismedi Indonesia.

selain sI, organisasi rain yang juga turut menegasknn eksisistensigerakan ini adalah Persatuan Islam (persis). Didirikan di Bandung ta-hun 1923, organisasi ini sedari awal menolak secara tegas nasionalisme.Dalam pandangan persis-seperti disuaraknn oreh pindirinya AhmadHasan- konsep nation-state sangat berbahaya bagi eksistensi komunitasmuslim global. Islam dalam pandangannya meraring setiap orang untukterlibat bahkan bergabung dalnm setiap gerakan nasionalis yang

"*rrupo-

knn sebuah bentuk kemurtadan. serain itu, ada juga persatian"MusliminIndonesia (Permi) yang didirikan tahun 1930 olei Ilyas ya,qub dan HajiMucht nr Luthfi'pt 6uany a mer up akan rulusan Mesir-s eL ag ai bentuklanjut dari perkembangan gerakan sumatera Thawalib di sumitera.

selain melalui beberapa organisasi tersebut, isramisme juga mencoba ditumbuh-kembangkan melalui ranah media-terkhusus meiia cetak-se-perti surat kabar, majalah, pamflet, brosur ataupun buku-bukw keisraman.Penting di catat di sini adalah kemunculan majatah pembelq Islam terbit_nn Persis ataupun Suara Muslim, yang akhirnya sangat berperan pentingbagi terjadinya disseminasi pemikiran keislqmalan saat itu:. Melalui me-dia-media itulah, Mohammad Natsir, murid Agus sarim, Haji Rosut (HnjiAhmad Karim Amrullah), serta beberapa kaum Islamis lainnya melibatknndiri dalam pusnran perdebatan dengan pihak nasionaris ataupun pihak lainyang gencar mengritik pemikiran_pemikiran kaum islamis.

Akhir tahun 1g20an, saat dimana nasionarisme memuncak dan Isramberhasil menjadi sebuah ide pemersatu, gerakan Islamisme tak sepenuhnyadapat memanfaatkan moment yang ada. Alih-arihberhasil mewarnai ben-tuk bangunan Indonesia, geraknn ini justru larut dalam pusaran konflikinternal. Geraknn Islamisme terlihat sangat lemah jika dibanding organt-sasi lain yang menjadi oposisinya.

Studin lslamika, VoL 16, No. 1, 2009

Robert E. Elson

Disunity, distance, disregard:The political failure of Islamism in latecolonial Indonesia

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3 Studia lslamikn, VoL 16, No. 1,2009

4 Robert E. Elson

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Studia Islamikn, VoL 16, No. 1, 2009

. Disunity, distance, disregard: The potiticat t'ailure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia 5

t took Islamism-by which I mean the belief that Islamic val-

ues must systematically guide and interpenetrate the state and,

as a consequence, society at large-until the third decade of the

twentieth century to assert itself politically in Indonesia. Even then,

Islamism remained underdeveloped and vague in idea and pur-

pose. In the late 1920s, however, with the destruction by the colo-

.riul gorr"ttt*ent of its major oPPonent, the Indonesian Communist

Partl,, there seemed to be an opportunity for Islamism to make a

decisive advance and perhaps even to fill the political space vacated

by populist Marxism'- rnat opportunity was never taken up effectively. For the most

part, the list decade or so of the colonial period witnessed Islamism's

intellectually unsophisticated, internally divided and counter-pro-

ductive efforts to progress its agenda. This article examines the

failure of Islamism to make a greater political impact in Indonesia

through these years. That failure would have decisive ramifications

for the future shape of the Indonesian state, in that it left Islamism

politically and intellectually impoverished and politically margin-

arcea in ihe face of the dominant claims of pseudo-secular national-

ists. In part, its failure flowed from organisational and administra-

tive weakness, but it was centrally rooted in the strategic, political

and intellectual shortcomings of Islamist politicians'

An Islamist Sarekat Islam

In the late1920s,while it no longer dominated the political scene

as it had in the mid-1910s, the sarekat Islam (Islamic Association)

movement remained easily the largest political grouping in the

Indies. No longer a broad umbrella for Muslims of every stripe, itnow identified itself as the Partai sarekat Islam (sarekat Islam Party

- psD, and had moved, as a consequence of its long and debilitat-

ing competition with the Communists, to adopt a firmly Islamist

po"sition. But the party faced numerous problems. The_ ideologi-

cal narrowing resulting from its Islamist turn had weakened the

populist image of its charismatic leader, Umar said Cokroaminoto;;'Hull Cokt o';, il was said, "is no longer the Cokroaminoto of old"'1

There were allegations of corruption against the party leadership,

financial management was weak and ineffective. The bulk of the

party,s 20,000-odd members were purely nominal and inanimate,

ir, ,o*" places its numbers were in decline, and the party was no-

tably unsuccessful in establishing institutions like cooperatives and

Studia Islamikr, VoI. 16, No 1, 2009

6 Robert E. Elson

unions to improve the economic circumstances of the masses.2 Aswell, Indonesian Islamists were only slowly coming to terms withthe dismal reality of the final collapse of the pan-Islamic caliphatemovement inI927.3

The greatest challenge confronting the psl and Islamism in gen-eral, however, was the sudden emergence and surging popularityof the arresting new idea of Indonesia: the notion that the territoryof the Netherlands East Indies was a modern nation-in-becomingand that it should be free from the grip of Dutch colonialism. Thatidea had developed only slowly through the 1910s and had previ-ously been expressed most unequivocally amongst the tiny groupof Indonesian students in the Netherlands and latlr in a smill fllrn:ber of study clubs at home.a It became firmry institutionalised onlyin7927 with the founding of sukarno's Indonesian National party(Perserikatan (later Partai) Nasional Indonesia - pND. Growingconsciousness of the national, combined with the simple, deeplv atltractive idea of freedom, inevitably meant that the -"rrug"^oi th"idea of Indonesia was cast in terms of broad inclusiveness and unitybased solely upon commitment to the imagined nation. As sukarnohimself put it, "the existence of different languages and religionsneed be no hindrance to the forming of a nation".s Indeed, he mad.e itclear that the PNI "would be closed to religion, because [otherwise].... not only would important groups which would be able to givenecessary support in the construction of the Fatherland be exclud-ed, but at the same time there would be wrangling and discord".6 AChristian newspaper correspondent echoed that view: nationalism"requires a complete cooperation of the nationalists, setting asideall religions. only then can the goal of nationalism, nationa-l inde-pendence, be easily achieved".T perennially trapped between localand universalistic dimensions of its beliefs-including the notionthat Islam was "super-territorial"8-Islamism found great difficultyin accommodating its profound sense of ,,being Muslim,, with thesurging pre-eminence of the rapidly gestating, ieligiously non-spe-cific idea of Indonesia.

Defensive exclusivism

By the end of the 1920s, the PSI, in the words of petrus Blumberger,"thought Islam to be the means par excellence to awaken the popu-lar spirit and to keep it alert; they can conceptualise no democracy,socialism or nationalism separate from Allah and his religion".e But

Studia lslamika. Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009

Disunity, distance, disregard: The political failure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia 7

the party's mood bore few signs of confidence or assurance. Its atti-tude was characterised by a mood of stubbornly defensive, assertive

resentment towards the religiously-neutral politicians who had rid-den the rising tide of the idea of Indonesia and rapidly established

themselves as the core of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

There emerged amongst Islamists a sense that Muslims were being

boycotted, ignored, not accorded their due, their ideas not consid-

ered worthy or relevant, not embraced and employed by their fel-

lows. Thus, asked Pembela Islam, the monthly journal of the IslamistPersatuan Islam (Islamic Unity - Persis) specifically established to

defend Islam in the face of attack, "does not that [religious] neutral-ity narrow the means for uniting itself with the religious group?

Does not that neutrality become a hatred of religion, especially the

religion of Islam?"1o Further, it asked of "those who do not like reli-gion, who are opposed to the religion of Islam, the religion of most

people in Indonesia .... what is a people without soul? What does a

people or a country mean which has no spirit? And if the religion of

Islam is not acknowledged, upon what does marriage stand, whatis the basis of life and heritage?"LlPSI leader Haji Agus Salim feltimpelled to ask whether the adoption of religious neutrality by a

nationalist youth grouP was a statement to the effect that "religiousprinciples among the young are dead".12 In response to Sukarno'sassertion of his great regard for Islam and other religions, Pembela

Islam asked "how can people hold Islam in high regard if they do

not apply Islamic principles?"13Nonetheless, the PSI found itself forced to seek some common

ground with the surging, even dominant, power of the nationalistmessage. By late L929, there were more than 5,000 PNI members inBandung alone, three times that location's membership earlier that

year.la Salim remarked on "the growth of the spirit of an Indonesian

unity, which is felt more and more as a need in the Indonesian na-

tion that is coming to be and which, indeed, is also beginning to liveamongst the broad swath of the people".1s The idea of Indonesia,

in short, was a powerful idea that could not be ignored and had to

be engaged. "Don't think", remarked a prominent PSI figure, S.M.

Kartosoewiryo, "that we in the nationalist group which is based

on Islam and Islamic matters do not dream of a free Indonesia".16

Pembela Islsmremarked that the PSI had "never been afraid to jumpinto the breach for nationalist associations and leaders, irrespectiveof religious , racial or party differences".lT

Studia lslamikn, Vol. 15, No. 1,2009

8 Robert E. Elson

Islamism's developing desire to embrace the idea of Indonesiawas expressed most obviously in the addition of the word"Indonesia" to PSI's name in1929; it became the Sarekat Islam Partyof Indonesia (PSII).18 Indeed, as early as lg27l Cokroaminoto hadincluded a special section on nationalism, edited by Sukarno andSartono, in the PSII newspaper Bandera lslam.le Even far away inMecca and Cairo,Indonesian Muslims were appropriating the dis-course of "Indonesia".2o Bttt Islamist efforts to demonstrate Islam'scompatibility with the national struggle and, indeed, the necessityfor Islamic thinking to leaven nationalism,2l were generally guardedand restrained; its engagement with religiously-neutral nationalismwas one in which Islam's ascendancy was always deemed upper-rnost and it was underlined by a strong suspicion that the national-ists were essentially anti-Islamic.22 While Salim asserted that "we area dead people, and will become a stinking corpse if we do not strivefor national freedom",23 and while the young Kasman Singodimejoargued that "nationalism and internationalism cannot be separatedfrom each other .... Islam considers nationalism as one of its obliga-liorrs" ,24 Cokroaminoto remarked that "we can.... strive for freedom,but our greatest goal remains Islam".25 "Nationalism",he later re-marked, "cannot bring freedom, that can only be obtained by meansof Islam".26 Kasman himself remarked that "ihe best means of unity.... is Islam",27 and thought of Islam as "the national religion", add-ing that "the obligation rests on our leaders, in every case, to knowthis religion, even if they are not themselves Muslim, for certainly80"/" of the Indonesian people are Muslims".28

Moreover, Islamists saw freedom essentially as the means to im-prove faith and devotion. Leaders spoke of "the striving in a legalmanner towards the freedom of 'hrdonesia' as the major conditionfor an undisturbed prosperity and growth of the Muslim religion andfor the lifting up of land and people on a democratic-religious basis".2eCokroaminoto thought of Indonesia's freedom as the "first conditionfor the free and undisturbed faith in the Muslim religion",3o whilemaintaining that "in order for 'Freedom' to be obtained as speed-ily as possible, members need to develop the conviction they mustfeel themselves subject only to God".31 Wondosudirjo (later knownas Wondoamiseno), a senior PSII figure, asserted that "we want ourown law, handed down in the Qur'an and hadith, applied in relationsbetween man and women/ between brothers, between nations"/ evenas he recognised the specific authority of government, "on which wedo not want to tread" .32 Cokroaminoto asserted that the PSII not only

Studit Islamikt, VoL 16, No. 1, 2009


strove "for independence but also wished that the Muslims of the

whole world should stand under one flag".33 For the West java PSII

leader, Aruji Kartawinata, the goal was "freedom from slavery, rais-

ing up of Islam, and the freeing of 'Indonesia"'.34 SuryoPranoto/ a

veteran labour leader and PSII notable, remarked that the PSII "inthe first place strives for what Islam prescribes but after that stands

in great sympathy for action for a free Indonesia".3s For Pembela lslam,

Indonesia was, above all else, " aland of Islam"'36

Despite this fixity of idea, PSII shared some ideological similari-ties with nationalist grouPs. Like some of them, it adopted a policyof non-cooperation with the colonial government (which meant,

most of all, the refusal to serve in various colonial advisory coun-

cils), which it termed its hijrah policy; it signified its wish, as Salim

remarked, to remain "exclusively independent in its work of feeding

the people".37 Like many of the nationalists, PSII opposed capitalismand imperialism which "must be uprooted root and branch",38 and

which "just like Satan are enemies of Islam".3e According to PSII no-

table Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo, who had been in 1925 chair of the sec-

ularist Perhimpunan Indonesia student group in the Netherlandsand who was close to the nationalists, Islam's goal of creating a

"'peaceful world" implied the struggle against those things like"capitalism, imperialism, colonialism and so on" which disturbedthat peace.aO For Cokroaminoto himself, the certain fall of imperi-alism and capitalism would "facilitate and accelerate the achieve-

ment of our goal: to obtain the freedom of the Community (Ummat)(National freedom) in its fullness".al In the context of the nationalistinsistence on popular sovereignty, sukiman asserted that the PSII

too "honours democratic principles and strives for brotherliness".a2

But such similarities masked deep and abiding contradictions withthe thinking of the non-religious nationalists.

The end of the embrace

The PSI's efforts at engagement with the nationalists includedinvolvement with the PPPKI (Permufakatan PerhimPunan-Per-

himpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia), the confederation of na-

tionalist parties created by sukarno in 1927 to strive for enhanced

unity within the movement. While the PSI had initially welcomedthe PPPKI initiative, and sukiman had been an active architect inits organisation, the relationship was an unhappy and reluctant

one almost from the start.a3 The fact that the unity signified by the

Studia Islamika, VoI. 16, No. 1, 2009

l0 Robert F. Elson

PPPKI was always more symbolic than real, that member organisa-tions could maintain their specific stances, and that the unanimityof all members was required for the framing of policy, served bothto deaden and marginalise the federation's impact.aa Its unity, ac-cordingly, was built "on loose sand".as Pembela Islam provided itsown resentful description of a PPPKI conference, remarking on

the behaviour of "Indonesian leaders", of "Mr,s" with their sturdyand gallant appearance, eyes glowing with nationalist fire, quick ofmovement and sharp of word; and then the "Dr,s", with penetratmgeyes which stare into space, full of the highest ideals, oi the fines-ifeelings .... and of the two lowly people, representatives of the p.S.I. atthe congress, surrounded by all those "neutrals" who do not like Islam.... yes, who hate Islam.a6

PSII members, notably Salim, were suspicious of what they sawas the PPPKI's false unity, its secularist core, its anti-Islamic tenden-cies,aT its lack of responsiveness to PSII complaints, and the com-petition its dominant ideas offered to those of the pSII, and werequick and regular in their criticism of it.48 Thus wounded, pppKlsupporters were quick to respond to these attacks with their ownvitriol; Mohammad Husni Thamrin spoke of the "self-centredness,,of the PSII,ae while Samsi Sastrowidagdo penned a brochure entitled"Defending the P.P.P.K.I.".50 One critic of the PSII thought it fancifulto link religion with nationalism: "Religion is imperialistic, hege-monic .... and just causes discord".sl Another asserted that " a politi-cal association with Islam as its basis will bring division and willfind adherents only amongst serious Muslims".s2

By early 1930, the relationship was such that the pSII con-gress sought to withdraw from the PPPKI, restrained only byCokroaminoto himself. But the extreme bitterness that arose as aconsequence of a series of anti-Islamic pieces that appeared inSoeara Oemoem, the journal of another body attached to the pppKl,Sutomo's Indonesian Study Club-they suggested, amongst othercriticisms of the hajj, that it was preferable to go to Boven Digulas a political prisoner of the Dutch than to make the pilgrimage toMeccas3-together with Sutomo's own uncompromising attitudetowards the PSII,sa further deepened PSII suspicion of non-religiousnationalism. PSII leader A.M. Sangaji, indeed, likened that nation-alism to aggressive, expansionist and enslaving Western national-ism and drew a contrast with the truth, peace and right of Islamicnationalism.ss The party turned further in on its Islamist core andfinally withdrew from the PPPKI at the end of 1930.56

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Disunity, distance, disregard: The political t'ailure of Islamism in late colonial lndonesia 11

From the PSII's point of view, of course, the party was in no wayanti-nationalist. It opPosed, rather/ the "anti-religious camP" in the

nationalist group,s7 such as those PNI leaders who condemned childmarriage and polygamy.tu A vague attempt to rejoin the PPPKI inMarch 1931 came to nothing when the federation refused the PSII's

request to remove mention of "the IndonesianNation" from PPPKI's

regulations as a condition of PSII re-entry.se PSII also refused to par-

ticipate in the PPPKI's "Indonesia Raya" (Great Indonesia) congress;

in Salim's eyes, the congress represented " only a parade of unity. Ifpeople want to hold a real national congress, then it must be an

'all party congress' in which decisions can be taken by a majorityof voices".60 Such developments were evidence of the growing es-

trangement between the PSII and the secular nationalist movement;

as one newspaper put it, "the national movement of Indonesia has

come to a phase in which the religious associations take their ownroad .... the national parties can now work freely to achieve theirgoal, without worrying about the limiting rules of religion".61 Salim,

for his part, thought an independent PSII would be "more produc-tive than working together with other associations which have

different goals".62 Indeed, the growing sense that the nationalistswere a dangerous threat, and that Muslim solidarity essential, saw

Sukiman and Syam (Raden Syamsurijal) commissioned to study

whether that realisation should be acted upon; Syam concluded that

the PSII should no longer seek association with the nationalists butrather pursue alliances with other religious movements, "which no

matter how bad they were still better than the anti-Islam-mindednationalists".63

That strengthening sense of the Muslim community was reflect-

ed in the rebirth of the Al-Islam congress, the first since 1926 and

the eighth overall.6a The congress itself was notable for what had

by now become a characteristic sense of Muslim apprehension and

defensiveness and a high degree of sensitivity to anti-Islamic senti-

ment. A scathing attack on the Prophet by a Jesuit priest in Muntilan,followed by a similarly fierce slander by a writer, Oei Bee Thay, ina Surabaya rnagazine,65 prompted the Surabaya PSII branch to forma local Al-Islam committee, and similar committees sPrang up else-

where, under PSII auspices, which "at public meetings [gave] voice

to the indignation aroused among Muslims".66 In mid-yeat, at a

meeting of forty-eight associations, PSII initiated the establishment

of a permanent Al-Islam Central Committee, intended to combat

and rebut "attacks and insults on the religion of Islam", to defend

Studia Islamifu, VoI. 16, No. 1,2009

12 Robert E. Elson

the name, purity and truth of Islam, and to connect the Indonesianummat with the ummnt overseas.6T Those efforts were followed byanother Al-Islam congress the following year in Malang, attendedby about 4,000 people,68 before the congress "shared the ingloriousfate of many other P.S.I.I. initiatives"6e and faded from view, notto be revived until 7938.70 PSII's version of Muslim solidarity waspremised on its leadership and direction; it had no strong sense ofthe need for broader intellectual or political collaboration with oth-er Muslim groupings and remained essentially isolated from them.The party was, in its own view, sufficient unto itself.

Sumatra: a new approach

PSII's efforts to realise it goals were mainly ]ava-based. InSumatra, however, where modernising reformers had made thegreEtest progress, a new kind of Muslim vision was emerging, inlarge part in response to the need for a more aggressive politics tocombat the government's efforts to control religious instructionthrough its Curu Ordinance.Tl In May 1930, the thriving and radi-cally-minded Sumatera Thawalib school systemT2 transformed itselfinto a politicalparty, the Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (IndonesianMuslim Union - Permi); it aimed to combine, just as PSII was at-tempting to segregate them, the concepts of nationalism and reli-gion. Permi pretended to a national, all-Indonesian, not just a re-gional presence and influence, despite being almost entirely limitedto Sumatra. It was, as the Dutch Islam advisor Gob6e reported, anexpression of "a striving for development in a nationalist sense".73Henceforth, one Dutch report opined, "the education at Sumatera-Thawalib schools will be religious-nationalistic".Ta

In striking contrast to the PSII, Permi consciously modelled it-self on the secular national parties; it based itself upon "Islam andnationalism, parallel roads of politics",Ts and was particularly closeto the thinking of Sukarno. When Dutch officials searched Permi'sschools and premises in 1933, they found " a great quantity of politi-cal propaganda of a radical nationalist kind", including such materi-al as Sukarno's Mencapai Indonesia Merdeka, writings of MohammadHatta and Muchtar Luthfi, PNI publications, and newspapers andjournals of the nationalist movement.T6 Sukarno himself laudedPermi efforts to emphasise the nationalist aspects of the Islamicstruggle; "the two had a common ground in their obsession withnational urrity".77 Much more than their fellows in the PSII, these

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Disunita, distince, disregard: The political t'ailure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia 13

Sumatran intellectuals had been captivated by the idea of Indonesia,"they already accept the name Indonesians".T8

Permi's attempt to synthesise nationalism and Islam contrastedsharply with the rejection of nationalism by PSII and by Persis, asmall but influential body established in Bandung in 1923 and in-tellectually shaped by the Singapore-born Tamil, Ahmad Hassan,Te

which focussed on spreading its ideas directly rather than on devel-oping institutional strength.8o Permi, strengthened by the additionof a number of Minangkabau activists returning from their studiesin Cairo and Mecca, was especially inspired by the thought of IlyasYa'kub. As a student in Cairo, he had closely studied the experi-ence of the Egyptian nationalist movement before his return in early1930 and he privileged the nation as the key modern political for-mat.81 Permi sought to combine the power of the idea of Indonesiawith Islam in new ways which gave apPropriate emphasis to whathad hitherto been contending streams of thinking. Its explicit ideo-logical foundations were Islam and nationalism (kebangsaan); each

needed the other for humankind's full development.82 As one Permileader put it, "Men, no matter in whatever age or place they live,always have the feelings of religion and nationality. Religion is aspiritual feeling in our heart .... nation is a group of people who are

bound together by various social and cultural ties".83 In that sense,

"Islam and nationalism are not to be divided and love for the landof one's birth is a part of belief .... Indonesians are one and the same

people".s4 The preamble to Permi's August 1930 statutes noted thatIndonesia's population was predominantly Muslim, and asserted

that Indonesian Muslims, "basing their struggle on the principle ofIslam and their nationality .... are striving for progress in order tofight for ltheir] human rights [which] are expressed in their socialorder and welfare and dignity".85 In 1931, the return of MuchtarLuthfi, whose own experience in Cairo had fortified his preferencefor national, rather than pan-Islamic solutions, strengthened this in-tellectual tendency, as well as giving it a powerful new voice.86 "Inour opinion",Ilyas remarked early in 193I, "there is no differenceor conflict between the goals of these two groups. Although theybase [their struggles] on two different principles, they both wantto lead on to direct our people toward the achievement of Progressand human dignity". The Permi synthesis was the means to end this"ltagic situation".87

Permi's position attracted sharp and immediate rebuttal.Muhammadiyah figures like Haji Rasul (whose educational cen-

Studia Islamikn, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009

14 Robert E. Elson

tre had given rise to Sumatera Thawalib in the first place)88 andHamka, outraged at Permi's reconciling conceptualisation,se sawIslam as completely providing all necessary elements and thus al-ready encompassing the concept of nation; to look outside Islam tonation was itself blasphemous.eo Mohammad Natsir, young discipleof Hassan, wrote that Permi leaders were not "satisfied with theirIslam. They seem to feel that Islam is not enough, that they deem itnecessary to add [something else]",e1 and argued that such a posi-tion would mean, in time, that nationalism would assume ascen-dancy over religion.

Such criticism brought important containment to Permi's think-ing. Thereafter, Permi leaders stressed that their sole ideologicalfoundation was indeed Islam-not the nation as such as an end initself, as the secularists demanded-and that nationalism provid-ed merely the arena and the context of the action which belief inIslam prompted. While Islam and nationalism were not in contra-diction, indeed, were "like the left and the rightleg" , and while theGod-given attachment to kebangsaan was "inherent in man as theshadow is to the body",e'Permi resolved at its second congress in1931 that nationalism was a "way of action" rather than an intel-lectual pillar. In Luthfi's words, "kebangsaan .... is just a way toachieving Indonesian independence", ar.d its building a religiousand meritorious work; "with a Free Indonesia we can obtain glori-ous Islam".e3 Nationalism gave direction and purpose to the taskof human improvement-such as the struggle against feudalism,imperialism, and capitalism, as well as limiting prqvincialism andethno-centrism, and for democracy and the rights and li6eiationof humans. But it was, in the final analysis, a work carried out inthe name of God and in his service;ea "the Quran says, God doesnot change the condition of a people until they change their owncondition".es Independence was the means to the achievement ofthese goals-including the primacy of Islam and full commitmentto its teachings, both deemed impossible under colonial rule-butwould not itself necessarily bring them about or even guaranteetheir achievement.e6

Permi leaders, then, had attempted to bring together the increas-ingly fractious streams of Islam and kebangsaan by emphasisingthe positive character of both and ignoring the different visions eachhad for the future of Indonesia. That stance, of course, involved awholesale rejection of the kinds of pan-Islamic thinking still dear tomany PSII figures.eT When challenged by outraged Muslim politi-

Studia IsLamika, Vol. 16, No. 1,2009

Disunity , distance , disregard: The political t'nilure of lslamism in late colonial Indonesin

cians, they were forced, their bluff called, to acknowledge that theirpolitics was framed in fundamentally Islamic terms. A Persis leader,

iccentuating what Permi leaders had earlier attempted to cloud and

divert attention from, wrote that "the kebangsaan movement workswith Indonesian people in the name of 'Mother Indonesia' and forthe sake of the Indonesia marhaen [little people]. The Islamic move-

ment in this country works with the Indonesian Muslims in the

name of Allah and for the independence of Islam".e8 That concise

assessment showed in fact how divergent the Islamist and nation-

alist visions were: the one, to create a state freed from colonialismwhose inhabitants could fashion it as they chose; the other to create

the freedom to install an Islamic state which would be shaped, as

would the lives of its inhabitants, by Islamic ideals, laws, and be-

liefs. The Permi attempt at synthesis was crushed by its inability to

marry those two notions.Notwithstanding its intellectual defeat, Permi's great practical

success in mobilising nationalism in the cause of Islam and merg-

ing religious attachment with political activism made it the largest

and most popular political party in Sumatra, although it remainedrestricted to the regions of Minangkabau, Tapanuli and Bengkulu.ee

"Together with the PSII it strove, "with equal fierceness", to bringabout, as quickly as possible, a "ftee Indonesia".10o It was, indeed,

"the only political party of any significance outside Java", and

the only one with its headquarters in Sumatra, with a member-

ship estimated in mid-1933 at 10,000, of whom "some thousands"were women-twice PSII's membership in West Sumatra.1o1 That

very success, inevitabl!, made it an important target for Dutch re-

pression and intimidation. The arrests of Permi's major leaders inIggg/o2 and the repressive limits the government thereafter placed

on its political and educational activities, forced it to abandon its

political activities the followin g year in favour of meek educationaland social activities, the prestige and capacity of which also rapidlydeclined. That stance so weakened the party that it resolved in1936to disband, being finally wound up in October \937.103

The Jong Islamieten Bond

Permi was not the only site of intellectual contestation over the

relationship of nationalism to religion. The Jong Islamieten Bond

(JIB - Young Muslims' Association), created in 1925 from the Jong

]ava (Young Java) association by Syamsurijal under the sponsorship

Studia Islamika, VoI. 16, No. 1,2009

t-16 Robert E. Elson

of Salim, grew to a membership of 1000 by the end of 1925 and toaround 4,000 by the early 1930s,10a and became a significant sourceof elaborated thinking on that matter.los Its starting point, naturallyenough, was Islam itself, and its goal one of "studying and exactlyobserving the usages prescribed by Islam";106 it thought of Islam not"like an heirloom which hinders progress, no more as a place torun to because we are afraid of the threat of the hereafter".1O7 Since"Muslims are brothers",I1s 't was Islam that underlay feelings ofcommunity among the Indonesian people; thus "the national spirit.... means for the J.I.B.: the spirit of Islam//'10e the organisation's suc-cess was deemed by its founders to be "ahigh national interest".11oThat sense brought one JiB delegate to disparage nationalism for itsdivisive tendencies, comparing it to Islam which "knows no divi-sions based on nation and contains nothing which stirs up hatredbut by contrast encourages all peoples to mutual appreciation andunderstanding". In that sense, then, a notion of the national was a"luxury item/.111 Others, however, while affirming that Islam pro-vided the real basis for Indonesian unity-" a unity which is notbased on internal likeness is imperfecl"ttz-u1fl playing down ordenying the apparent conflictbetween Islam and nationalism-1'theJ.I.B. and Indonesian nationalism go hand in hand. This had beenthe case right from the beginning//113-moved to improve links withnationalist-inclined youth and even with Christian youth, a strategythat was not reciprocated.lla JIB, indeed, was a professedly nation-al, not regional or ethnic body, and it named its scouting body theNational Indonesian Scout Movement, reflecting something of theambivalence of its position.11s All the while, JIB maintained a strongsense of religious toleration ("Indonesia has many religions .... wemust not force our religion on others who believe differentlf ,butmust work together with them if possible")116 and a fixedly apoliti-cal position, something nicely manifested by the deployment of itsDutch-language name. But one indication of its desire for distancewas its refusal to join the fusion of youth groups established inI93L,Indonesia Muda (Young Indonesia) in order to preserve its identityas a dedicated Muslim group.117

Islam versus nationalism

The threat of secular nationalism to Islamism was not just that itopposed, in the name of emancipation, some fundamental Islamictenets, or even that it criticised the haji as a means to "enrich the

Studia Islamika, Vol. 16, No. 7, 2009


Arabs at the cost of [Indonesians'] own land"'118 The problem was

more fundamental, as one PNI leader noted: "the P.N.I' was notestablished to involve itself with religious matters/ not even to act

against the laws of Mohammed, but to work to make Indonesiafree".11'e Indeed, one young nationalist activist thought that "there

was no unity in Islam and that people involved in the movementmust set aside Islam".120 That kind of thinking made Muslim lead-

ers fearful, antagonistic and defensive; what might become of Islam

should the nationalists succeed in enthroning the nation? One PSII

member, indeed, expressed the fear that "as soon as 'Indonesia'falls into the hands of the P.N.I., the Islamic religion will be broughtdown".l2l

The Persis leader Hassan opposed the concept of the nation-state

and saw nationalism as a dangerously fissiparous tendency for the

global Muslim community, dividing people one from another ratherthanbringing them together as Muslimbrothers. Indeed, he thoughtthat "to set up a kebangsaan organization, to invite and persuade

people to join kebnngsaan, to assist akebangsaan Patty, is forbidden inIslam", indeed a form of apostasy. "IsIarn" , he argued, "orders us to

unite ourselves according to Islam and on the basis of Islam. Islam

obliges us to seek freedom, not on account of happiness or misery,but in order to realize fully the commandments of Islam in every

respect". 122 Indeed, "to belong to the nationalist party means leav-

ing Islam".123 Haji Rasul thought along similar lines, if not quite so

severely: "1. Islam is tolerant, kebangsaan is not' Thus they contradicteach other and therefore cannot be united. 2' Islam brings peace and

unity to the world, kebangsaan divides the world. 3. Islam embraces

mankind in general, and strengthens the brotherhood of man, even

the tie between Muslims and non-Muslims may not be severed".12a

The controversy reached its most sophisticated form, in waysthat served further to separate the two streams of thinking and to

deepen their differences, in the thinking of the Persis leader Natsir,expressed in a series of articles in Pembela Islam in 1931 and 1932.

Himself schooled inboth Islamic (informally) and Western styles,l2s

Natsir naturally saw Islam as providing the fundament for nation-ally-minded thinking in Indonesia: "It was the Islamic movementwhich first paved the way in this country for political actions aim-ing at independence, which first planted the seeds of Indonesianunity .... which first planted the seed of brotherhood with those ofthe same faith outside the boundaries of Indonesia ...' ."126 Islam,

then, the religion of the great majority of Indonesians, provided

Studia Islamika, Vol. 1.6, No. 1,2009

18 Robert E. Elson

the necessary basis and ground for the archipelago's solidarity andunity.127 For Muslims, independence would provide "the freedomof Islam in order that Islamic rules and regulations be realized forthe well-being and perfection of the Muslims as well as of all Allah'screatures".128 Religiously-neutral nationalists, by contrast, sought todownplay the importance of Islam and replace it with a basis whichwas "vague, and does not meet the requirements we desire".12e Islamprovided not just the foundation for unity but a moral and politicalguideline for the new state, "a code for the upholding of ethics ....

for the regulation of man's relations at home, in society, in the gov-ernance and the state .... the regulation of relations with people ofother faiths .... with people of other countries; which gives guidanceto the fulfilment of the physical and other spiritual needs of manin order to attain his highest aspirations".13O Natsir did not mincehis words in contrasting his vision for Indonesia with that of thenatiorralists. Kebangsaan, like regional or ethnically based solidarity,was essentially divisive, self-serving and selfish. Islam, by contrast,preached altruistic, not competitive, qualities of community: "Islamplants in the heart of the Javanese, the Sumatrans, the Chinese etc

[the consciousness of ] belonging to the noblest creatures of Allah.... Only with these teachings can the love of one's people which isindeed a nature of mankind .... be safeguarded from falling into thelow and intolerant fanaticism of kebangsaarz which teaches: 'in ourinterest, in the interest of our needs, we do not care [if we] harmothers'//.131 Responding to the nationalist plea to put religion to oneside, he remarked:

Our aim and purpose are not similar. You seek independence forIndonesia on accourt of the Indonesian nation, on account of MotherIndonesia. We struggle for independence because of Allah, for thewell-being of all the inhabitants of the Indonesian archipelago .... we goseparate ways!132

Islamist Isolation

The developing clarity and fixity of the Islamist position servedonly to isolate it politically. PSII remained the largest political partyin the country, claiming at the end of 7931a membership of around30,000.133 But the attempt to Islamise the idea of Indonesia circum-scribed a notion the greatest virtue of which was its broad inclusive-ness. Islamists thereby distanced themselves from the mainstream ofIndonesian political thinking and refused to engage constructively

Studia Islamikn, Vol. 75, No. 1, 2009

Disunity, distance, disregnrd: The political t'aiture of Islamism ln late colonial Indonesia 79

with the now deeply-anchored popularity of the idea of Indonesia

amongst the educated elite. The simple idea proclaimed by national-

ist leaders-"that only a free Indonesia canbring salvation//1'34-had

found a deep resonance especially with young Western-influenced

elites and even among people who had no deep grasp of the con-

cept or of its implications. They proclaimed that the Indonesia they

sought must be united, notwithstanding differences in ethnicity, re-

ligion and region. "A people who cannot be one are like loose sand,

"*ity blown ipart by the wind" , Sukarno asserted; "But if this sand

remains together, and is pressed together into cement, the cement

of the soul, then it can become concrete/ that is, the concrete of that

national will, from which finally national deeds proceed"'13s Even

when the non-cooperating group of parties was finally crushed by

the government-Sukarno, Hatta, and Syahrir arrested and impris-

orr"J, Sukarno repudiating non-cooPeration, the PNI Baru dead

and Partindo dissolving itself in !936136-tlnt idea of Indonesia still

shone brightly and"effectively amongst other parties'

Nationalist leaders were often cruelly dismissive of Islamism's

pretensions, but Sukarno made one of the few efforts to intellectu-

allse the Islam-nationalism problem. Exiled by the Dutch in Endeh,

he expressed in a series of letters to Ahmad Hassan his dismay at

what appeared to him as Islam's lack of dynamism, its reticence to-

wards piogt"tt, modernity and Western knowledge'137 Later, now

exiled elsewhere in Flores, Sukarno, sought to clarify further his

own, and the general nationalist attitude, to the political manifes-

tation of religion. He wrote approvingly of the example of secular

Turkey: "Islim has not been wiped out by Turkey, but Islam has

been given over to the people of Turkey themselves, and not to the

state -.. For us Islam is a matter for ourselves and not a matter for

the state,,.13s While he accepted the generalised notion of a lived, but

non-institutionalised, relationship between religion as such and the

coming Indonesian 5121g13e-3nd, indeed, hoped that "a11the people

will burn with the fire of Islamz140-his difficulties with the Islamist

political agenda began with Islam itself which he saw, at least inits extant manifestation, as backward and lacking in important ele-

ments.1a1 He argued that the union of state and religion in a soci-

ety that *u, ^oi

wholly Muslim would be fatal for democracy: "forcountries like this there are only two alternatives .... the unity of state

and religion, but without democracy, or democracy, but the state separated

from religiont'/.142 while he found much to praise in Islam's religious

and spiritual message, he found the Islamic claim to political domi-

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2A Robert E. Elson

nance/ especially if it were expressed through the authority of ula-ma,ra3 repellent. Equally, Sukarno scorned the weakness of a religionthat would seem to depend so utterly on state sponsorship.laa

In his response to Sukarno, Natsir offered nothing new. He em-phasised the particularly all-embracing, unsegmented quality ofIslam which saw no division into the divine and secular domains;earlier he had quoted approvingly Gibb's phrase that Islam was a"complete civilisation/.14s The state, indeed, had an obligation toensure that its subjects followed the prescriptions ordained by Godhimself;1a6 "the State, for us, is not an aim but a tool. The affairs ofstate are at root one part, one 'integrating part', which cannot beseparated from Islam" .la7 Indeed, "in Islamic statecraft there is abso-lutely no place for dualism".1a8Islam provided "the basis for regulat-ing society, the importance and the need for which does not changewhile people remain peopls" .tts Islam demanded no specific form ofgovernment, apart from prescribing the need for consultation; Islamwas democratic "insofar as Islam is anti-autocracy, anti-absolutism,anti-despotism//.150 Parliamentary democracy might be appropriate,even good, but it had no power to change the essential teaching ofIslam, notwithstanding the popular will. "If indeed a law or an in-tention of humankind conflicts with the laws and intention of Islam,the law and intention of God must stand, the law and intention ofhumankind must fall".151 State neutrality towards religion simplyd.emonstrated that leaders did not value Islamic princiiles.ls2In anIslamic state, though, non-Muslims need not be concerned: they en-joy "broad freedom of religion .... With the Laws of Islam in force,their Religion will not be disturbed, will not be damaged and willnot be diminished in any way".rsz

This interchange is instructive. For Sukarno, religion was essen-tially a matter of private observation, encouraged perhaps by thestate, but not ordained and controlled by it; such, indeed, threatenedto endanger the integrity and life of the state. For Natsir, the divinerevelation made it incumbent on the state to be informed by and toimplement Islamic law. He saw no salvation through nationalismas such. That no grounds for compromise could be found suggeststwo things: first, that in the context of colonial domination and withthe prospect of freedom apparently distant, the protagonists couldmaintain their positions without the incursion of pragmatic realityupon their thinking. Second, and more specifically, it underlines thefailure of Natsir to think imaginatively about how the practical re-alities of governance might give him cause to moderate his Islamist

Studin Islamifut, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2a09

Disunity, distance, dlsregard: The political t'ailure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia 27

strictures-if only to provide a sense of greater detail about how an

Islamist government and a regime of Islamic law might respond to

the specific conditions of Indonesian society. As things stood, how-ever, Islamism saw no need to move; its exclusivism would endure

until pragmatics would much later force at least a partial accom-

modation.

Emerging disunity

By the early 1930s, the PSII's sense of self-privileged mission and

self-importance and consequently its desire for distance from the

Dutch-managed political arena had hardened. S.M. Kartosuwiryosaw the hijrah policy as a means "to.hold [the partyJ apart and to

establish in Indonesia its own organisation which satisfies the re-

quirements of Islamic society".1sa Aruji Kartawinata, chairman ofthe party's Garut (West ]ava) branch, remarked that one goal ofthe PSII was to form the youth "in such a way that they are able

to create a society which satisfied the requirements of Islam".155

Abikusno Cokrosuyoso, Cokroaminoto's brother and later partyleader, responded to an attack by Hatta on his proposed agrarianprogram by retorting that "society must be organised not accordingto Marxist, but according to Islamic collectivismz.ls6 InMay 7934,

Cokroaminoto's "General Regulation for the Islamic Community"("Reglement umum bagi Ummat Islam") was endorsed by PSII's

20th congress in Banjarnegara.lsT PSII's exclusivism could only have

been strengthened by continuing expressions of anti-Islamic senti-

ment, such as that reported of a Kediri Catholic schoolteacher in 1934

who had encouraged his students to desecrate the Qur'an (resulting

in a protest meeting attended by 4,000 people and the teacher's dis-missal),1s8 a similar case in Surabaya in the same year,lse and 1937

press articles critical of the Prophet's stance on polygyny, deemed

a consequence of his alleged wantonness.l60 That such things couldhappen, remarked one Muslim, was testimony to "the decline ofIslam as a consequence of the indifference of Muslims who .... in-creasingly ignore Allah and His precepts".161

But PSII's complacent self-satisfaction with its political viewsand the range of its duties led to a sense of stagnation ("in gen-

eral the public remains cold";rez which invited internal contestation.

Suryopranoto's efforts to turn around the PSII position, expressed

in his plea for positive self-criticism of the party itself and its leader-

ship at the 1930 conference, had little impact, despite the meeting's


22 Robert E. Elson

conclusion that the party faced serious deficiencies in the range ofits branch activity, and problems in its loose financial management,the excessive and uncritical reverence it accorded its leadersl and itslack of success in competing with other organisations.l63 sukiman'sdisaffection with the PSII's exclusivism, his attachment to the na-tional aspect of emancipation-at the second psII conference hespoke of the struggle "for the interests of the Indonesian nationand the hopes for the freedom of our country and the Islamic reli-gion"16a-6nd the failure of his efforts to reform and modernise IrsIIpolicies, procedures and attitudes, finally led to his decision to charta new path. His persistence in seeking,like permi, collaborative in-teraction with the nationalists-evidenced by his invitation to Hatta(rejected by the party) to become joint edito; of the psII newspaperoetoesan Indonesia-inevitably led to sharp personal conflict withCokroaminoto. Both Suryopranoto and S.rki*u.t were expelledfrom the PSII in March r913;es an event, pandji rimoer.or,.rr,rd"d,with "serious consequences for the whole national movement//.166Djawa Barat asked, in a pointed reference to Cokroaminoto's dicta-torial grip on the party: "Is the p.s.I.I. the party of cokro or the partyof the people?",167 while party dissidents in Makassar, utnoyla ut"the manner the leaders_misuse the organisation for their own per-sonal interests", established their own party.168

Thereafter, sukiman and his supporters considered the possi-bility of establishing themselves as permi branches, but ultimatelydecided to form a new pafty, the Indonesian Isramic partv (partaiIslam Indonesia - Parii) in June 1933. The new party was firmly basedupon Islam-its leaders thought that "purifying society in generaland 'Indonesian' society in particular is possible onlv if GoJ,s willis observed'/16e-and upon non-coop"rutio.r, and sought alliance,and perhaps even unity, with nationalists in the causetf indepen-dence.170 It saw the need, as psII often did not, to follow an aggres-sively activist political program. sukiman saw in Islam and Muslimlaw the means to rescue humanity from division and turmoil: ,,Alllaws made by a group are especially for the interests of that groupand thus disadvantage others. But Islam is a law drafted by iod, isnot for the sake of personal interests and disadvantages no one, in-deed, it promotes the good". He also saw the contemp--orary practiceof Islam as skewed; "what is wrong with Muslimr

"nr."nity is that

they are only interested in the little things such as celebrations, whileno thought is given to the major goal of rslam// .171' Hopes for closercollaboration with Permi and even JIB-"thereby possibly to arrive



at the establishment of a large modern Islam parfy"-evaPoratedwith the government's repression of Permi. But Sukiman's new

party,notwithstanding its emphasis on political activity, gained no

popular traction, and disappeared within a year'172 However, his

ictions were a serious and damaging reproof to the PSII's sense of

self-satisfied withdrawal from serious political involvement'The departure of Sukiman and Suryopranoto did not heal the

PSII's problems of strategy and personality;r73 Soeara Oemoem

thoughi the party out-of-date, poorly led, and badly in need of new

leadership.lTa Shortly thereafter, Salim, an "outstanding leader" re-

nowned for "his intellect, his great oratorical skills, his many years

of experience in the political movement and .... the power of his

speciil personality" ,t'5 r.rrarrifested his own increasing doubts about

the pariy's exclusivist and self-regarding attitudes, and especially

about the hijrah policy. By the mid-1930s, he had adopted the view

that the PSII had to abandon its exclusionism and embrace collabo-

ration with other parties and even with the colonial government.lT6

His thinking may have been influenced by suggestions that he might

be proposed for a seat in the Volksraadl'77-!is opponents certainly

thought him a slave to his ambitionlT8-as well as his testy relation-

ship with Cokroaminolo,lTe but he must also have come to realise

that the hijrah policy was in many respects counterproductive and

even potentially fatal given the government's dangerously lepres-

sive mood, especially aftet 1933.180 As things stood, Salim argued,

the hijrah policy achieved nothing except to isolate the party from

playing an effective role in politics.181 As he later remarked, "we

hoped to get a podium or a platform in the volksraad in order to

propot" various changes which would improve the situation of the

people" .182 Through the hijrah policy, his supporters averred,," aPo-

iitical party is turned into a party for Qur'an reading and religious

ptopugu^da etc. etc."183 and, Salim remarked, "increasingly drifts

awiy from the political arena to a world of visions where there

is no place for any social action".18a Such distancing and quietude

meant, as well, that there was little sense of deeply-rooted activism.

A Dutch political survey remarked in 1936, lhat "a socio-religious

association such as the Muhammadiyah, which does constructive

work in the interests of the people, has greater drawing power withthe masses than a politico-religious organisation like the PSII, which

mainly contents itself with proclaiming hollow slogans and fruitless

mutual quarrelling".185

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Robert E. Elson

Salim's failure to convince his party of the need for change and en-gagement stiffened an already tense relationship with Abikusno,186head of the party's executive committee following Cokro's death,who maintained that "it is clear that the glory and nobility of theIslamic community is found through the Hijrah".187 Towards theend of 1936,Salim created an internal group, the "Barisan PenyadarPSII" (The Front of the Aware PSII) to campaign for his ideas, re-plete with numerous branch-level committees.l88 In consequence,"in numerous branches the members are divided into two camps,the one supporting the current administration and its hijrah prin-ciple, while the other rallies to the side of H.A. Salim-.18e The re-sult was catastrophic for Salim's hopes, with Abikusno relentlesslyfavouring the hijrah policy. Salim, and those around him, who in-cluded such notables as A.M. Sangaji and the young law studentMohammed Rum, were expelled from the PSII early in1937.|eu

Salim then moved to create the Barisan Penyadar as a sepa-rate, cooperative ("striving to realise its ideals in cooperation withthe Covernmenl")le1 partf , now renamed Pergerakan Penyadar(Movement of the Aware). It aimed to establish a parliamentaryform of democracy,\e2 and to establish itself as a champion of thepopular will,1e3 but the movement attracted little interest; "it ap-peared to be a club too much tied to Salim/.1e4 The open meetings atPenyadar's first congress attracted only around fifty people,les andonly a few local PSII branches, apparently disaffected by the uncom-promising hijrah policy especially championed by Kartosuwiryo.le6Moreover, PSII leaders, embittered by Salim's behaviour-"whileCokroaminoto was still alive, Salim did not have the courage to in-cite discord in the party"le7-gave the new party no respite, pre-venting, as we shall see, Penyadar's involvement in the more collab-orative politics of the late 1930s. Salim seemed to be, one newspaperaverred, "aleadet without followers",les and the party struggled toarticulate a clear sense of aims and purpose, not to mention a planof action. Its increasing marginalisation was reflected in Salim's fail-ure to be named to the Volksraad in1939.1ee

For their part, Sukiman and his colleagues, having toyed withovertures offered them to rejoin the PSII,200 determined to re-estab-Iish the old Parii under the name Partai Islam Indonesia (IndonesianIslamic Party - PII) in December 1938. It was loosely based aroundthe Islam Study Club, a group of Muslim intellectuals established inYogyakarta on the initiative of Muhammadiyah chair Mas Mansur,rejected the ideas of party discipline and non-cooperation,20l and


Disunity, distance, disregard: The political t'ailure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia 25

foreswore purely social action in favour of politics-"each Muslim,according to the teaching of our religion, is obliged to move intothe political terrain .... our whole way of life and everything we dois a function of politics. Politics is a means to power".202 It made itsgoals clear in its statutes: "to make the Indonesian people ready toaccept the absolute position of Islam and its followers, a goal theytry to achieve by the closer invocation of the brotherly connectionbetween Muslims and their associations and by bringing to the peo-ple the realisation of their right to regulate their lives according tothe prescriptions of Islam-.203 PII's deliberate focus on politics as a

means of enhancing Islamic interests was a reflection of its antipa-thy towards Muslim political quiescence; it lamented that while thenationalists busily involved themselves in politics, "one hears andnotes virtually nothing from the Muslim community, at least not inproportion to its numbers".204 PII was equally adamantly opposedto the exclusiveness of bodies like PSII. The new party was to be "atorch, which enlightens the Muslim world, calling upon and urgingthe whole Muslim community in Indonesia to get involved in thepolitical terrairr", even if it endured some early tensions concerning

" the relative weight to be given to Islam as against nationalism.20s

Its chair was Wiwoho Purbohadqoyo,'ou member of the Volksraad(sometimes thought of, indeed, as that chamber's only Muslim rep-resentative, to the chagrin of Muslims who called for an increase

in their representation),2]7 and its leadership included Sukimanhimself and the Cairo-educated Abdulkahar Muzakkir. The partywas particularly fortunate in attracting the support of Mansur, whohad pushed Muhammadiyah more strongly into an activist stance

by proclaiming at the 1938 Muhammadiyah congress his organisa-tion's willingness to pursue collaboration with political parties,208

and who became himself a PII member and leader. Partly as a con-sequence of these strategic appointments and contacts, the partyquickly began to develop, even in the Outer Islands; by mid-1939 ithad around sixty branches and by early 79401'15.20e PII's disciplinedintellectual approach to politics produced a clear political agenda by\940, which saw Indonesia as a unitary state with democratic par-liamentary institutions-"indeed the religion of Islam obliges us tosupport with all our strength the demands of the Indonesian peoplefor a proper parliament/l2L0-at both central and regional level, itscitizens with rights of free expression and thought, a state-centredeconomic system which aimed at the protection and advancementof indigenous entrepreneurs/ Islam left free to manage its own af-

Studia Islamika, Vol. '16, No. 1.,2409

26 Robert E. Elson

fairs, an ending to state subsidies to all religions, and opposition tothe notion of a native mi1itia.211

PSII: an end to Exclusivism

The PSII maintained its virulent opposition towards cooperationfollowing Salim's departure. For Abikusno, "much association with'kafirs', as well as taking a seat in the representative councils to-gether with 'kafirs', is not good and contravenes the orders of God.If the P.S.I.I. were in the future to embrace the cooperative principlethis would be .... a sin against God'/.21'2 Such rhetoric was under-pinned by reference to the difficulties the Prophet himself faced inhis original hijrah.213 But the political utility of the party's exclusiv-ism was now increasingly under question. While the PSII remainedthe biggest political party in the Indies, with an estimated member-ship of between 40,000 and 50,000 members in the mid-1930s, it wasplagued by chronic division and long-term institutional difficultiesof a financial and disciplinary kind.21a More immediately importantwas its deepening awareness of the political ineffectiveness its non-cooperation policy had brought it. One newspaper remarked thatthe party had "left the field of political action .... and become 'non-dangerous"',"5 while the dissident Sabirin argued that non-coop-eration "is worthwhile only if the political party concerned is pow-erful enough to achieve its goal by 'extra-parliamentary' means.However, non-cooperation is pointless and even damaging anddangerous for the movement if a politicalparty thereby wholly cutsout avenues for further action, as is currently the case. Further,bymaintaining a non-cooperation standpoint, the P.S.I.I. isolates itselfmore and more from other parties and from society".216

Accordingl/, the PSII, while it remained entrenched in its non-cooperation policy with the government, began to reorient its at-titude to other parties and groups, something partly occasioned byincreasing Muslim resentment at persistent government interfer-ence in the religious arena, such as a proposed new marriage ordi-rrarrce,2l7 a 1937 regulation which moved the treatment of mattersof inheritance from the religious to the regular court system,218 //llne

insults which have been done in recent times to Muslims",21e andperhaps as well the continuing misery caused by the Depressionand gathering international tensions.22o

One aspect of that more ecumenical mood was the lifting of theexpulsion placed on Sukiman and his supporters in July 1937.221 In

Studia lslamlka, Vol.16, No. 1, 2009


that same month, the PSII congress, at which there was talk of a"Muslim brotherhood",222 embraced the notion of developing an

Islamic Congress along the lines of the Al-Islam congress last heldfive years before. It was eventually held in Surabaya in February1938-the tenth such Congress, by PSII reckoning-with twenty-five Islamic organisations attending, although/ as in times past, thetraditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (which claimed 67,000 mem-bers by 1935),22s having sent a delegation, withdrew from the conlgress because of doctrinal disagreements and the manner in whichPSII dominated proceedings.22a The congress was intended to bringtogether all Muslim associations to work together and to mediatedisputes within the Islamic community, to develop closer relationswith Muslim communities overseas, to work for the welfare ofIslam and the Muslim community, and to establish an IndonesianMuslim Congress. It made determinations to opPose Dutch plans tochange marriage law and the making of insults against the Prophetand Islam generally, and on various points of Islamic ritual, on im-proving hajj travel, and even on supporting the Muslim communityof Palestine.22s A further Al-Islam congress was held in Solo in May1939, and another in Solo in July 1941, which made important deci-

sions regarding the form of the state, the problem of an Indonesianmilitia, and on blood transfusions.226 The congress now countedamongst its numbers 14 ordinary members, T extraordinary ones,

and another 7 candidate organisations; all the major Muslim organi-sations, including PSII, PII, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, andNU were involved.227 It was treated to a rousing speech from WahidHasyim on the need for Muslim unity: "a watch is one, because each

wheel likes and wishes to be united; whether it is a big wheel or asmall one, whether it turns to the left or to the right, whether it has

springs or not, all of them like and want to be united .... One for alland all for one. Is the Indonesian Islamic community prepared to be

like that?"228

A further concrete result of the PSII's partial abandonment of itsexclusivism was its participation in the MIAI (A1-Madjlisul-Islamil-A'laa Indonesia - Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia), estab-

lished in Septemb er 1937 in Surabaya as a consultative federationof Muslim organisations on the initiative of Muhammadiyah's MasMansur, NU's Ahmad Dahlan Kebondalem and Abdul Wahab, as

well as PSII's Wondoamiseno. That combination was itself a sign ofa more highly cooperative attitude amongst Muslim organisations,notwithstanding PSII's pointed refusal to countenance the admis-

Studia lslamika, Vol. 16, No. 1,2009

28 Robert E. Elson

sion of Salim's Penyadar.22e PSII soon formed the MIAI's core/ andthe able Wondoamiseno spearheaded its administration. The MIAI'sgoals were framed in terms of strengthening the bonds betweenMuslim organisations, defending Islam from attack, and promotingties between Muslims both inside and outside the country.230 Whilethe MIAI, numbering seven organisations after its foundation (butnot NU, which joined the body only in late 1940),231 formally lim-ited its considerations to religious matters, "the boundary betweenIslam and politics was difficult to draw" .232

In October \937,P9IJ announced that although "the P.S.I.L has fora considerable time in its activities held itself aside from the nation-al movements", it had come to the conclusion that "such separationappears to be less useful for the 'Indonesian' people's movement ingeneral". Accordingly, it had determined to reconnect "in order towork together with the national movements" .233 By the end of 1937,an initiativo by Abikusno with Sutomo's Parindra had resulted inthe idea of an Indonesian National Congress, "a place for consulta-tion by the whole people".23a That collaboration was " a symptom ofthe inclination for cooperation between a religious political groupand a pure nationalist one".235 Sutomo himself remarked on "thegood understanding and cooperation which now exists betweenParindra and other parties, for example, the Indonesian People'sMovement (Gerindo) and the Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party".236It was itself a consequence of the dire political situation in whichthe general Indonesian movement had found itself in its quest foran independent Indonesia.237 It was formalised in April-1938 asBadan Perantaraan Partai-partai Politik Indonesia (Liasion Boardof Indonesian Political Parties - Bapeppi), and included as well thestaunchly secularist Gerindo and the ethnically-based West Java as-sociation Pasundan; each of the four parties "represent[ing] a spe-cific group or stream".238 Bapeppi sought "the development of co-operation between the Indonesian PoliticalParties";23e as Abikusnoremarked, "the nation must be educated in the idea of working to-gether".2a0 But Bapeppi, while it was open to non-indigenous organ-isations (unlike the old PPPKI), was rent by jealousies and fears; itenjoyed little success and lasted less than a year.2al Moreover, therewere still voices within the PSII which championed exclusivism;one PSII party leader in Palembang remarked that "the political,economic and social hijrah means that this party will have nothingto do with anything which is not in accord with the regulations ofIslam given in the Qt)t'ar." .242

Studia Islamikn, Vol. 16, No. 1,2009


Another and more successful effort at mutual engagement sawthe appearance of a federation of parties, Gapi (Gabungan PolitikIndonesia - Indonesian Political Federation) in May 1939, with itsstated aim to create a responsible parliamentary form of governmentfor the Indies.2a3 Its emergence signalled even more strongly thatthe old issue of cooperation or non-cooperation had sagged in rel-evance, especially given the increasingly threatening internationalsituation and the emerging, slight, possibility that the Dutch mightbe amenable to cooperating in incremental reform, notably the for-mation of a responsible parliament for the Indies.2af Gapi includedthe four major parties-notwithstanding Salim's reservations thatsuch an alliance would restrain the political freedom of Muslim par-ties2as-as well as PII, Persatuan Minahasa (Minahasa Union), andPersatuan Politiek Katholiek Indonesia, but non-indigenous organi-sations were not permitted to join. Gapi was not intended to pursueideological unification, but rather "unity of action in matters whichare thought important from the point of view of the community andwhich the community needs'{.246 Its aim, as expressed in its statutes,was "to implement the ideals of the Indonesian people".2a7

The PSII was an especially strong supporter of the notion of a

parliament.2as In Abikusno's view, "Islam teaches that the world wascreated for [humankind's] wellbeing, and because 'Indonesians'did not yet possess this wellbeing, it could be achieved througha parliamerrt".24e At the "Congress of the Indonesian People"(Kongres Rakyat Indonesia) established by Gapi,250 Wondoamisenoexpressed his hope "for thE speedy establishment of an Indonesianparliament".2sl At the same time Sukiman claimed democracy as

a Muslim concept; "the government desired by Islam is a govern-ment which accords with deliberation, which does not depend onthe wish of a single group, much less a single individual",252 aviewwhich accorded with Salim's earlier explanation that "the democra-cy of Islam is not the Western kind of one-half plus one but that theywho come to do the work for it have the right and therefore the re-sponsibility and bear power".2s3 The Congress, establishing itself as

a permanent body under the aegis of Gapi, declared its goal as "thewelfare and prosperity of the Indonesian people" and its methodof decision as majority vote democracy.2sa The parliamentary idea,naturally, did not enjoy the support of the Dutch goverrunent, evermore convinced of Indonesian political and social immaturity.zssAs Syahrir had already observed, "the Dutch and the Indonesians... have only learned to distrust each other//.2s6 Further, it saw the

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30 Robert E. Elson

emergence of another Islamist contrarian, Kartosuwiryo, whosecontradiction of the PSII's newly engaged approach to politics, andespecially its participation with non-Muslim parties in the push foran Indonesian parliament, and perhaps as well his idiosyncraticmystical leanings,led to his estrangement from the party and thenhis expulsion, together with his close associates, in January 1939. 7

Pandjilslam asserted that "a ner / time has dawned, the time of co-operation between the Islamic movement and the Covernment".2s8Indeed, the MIAI was becoming an ever more influential playerin politics as it cast itself as the representative body of definitiveMuslim sentiment in relation td the government and the channelfor the government's communications regarding Islamic affairs.2se

By September 1940, the MIAI comprised seventeen member organi-sations; even the Indonesian-Malayan student association in Cairowas a probationary member.260 Late in1939, Wondoamiseno issueda demand for an "Indonesian parliament on the basis of Islam",z'ta notion adopted by the MIAI in JuIy 1.947.26'zThe 1940 PSII con-gress in Palembang was of a similar mind, asserting the notion thatan appropriate parliament was one which "produces the greatestbenefits and advantages for the Indonesian Muslim communityand which meets the desires of society".263 Further, the support ofMuhammadiyah and NU for a Muslim parliament represented "anenormous step away from political neutrality".26a Early in L941 theMIAI sought from Gapi recognition of its centrality and authority inthings Islamic, and even an acknowledgement that Indonesia was"a Muslim Iand".265

MIAI's April 1941 support for Gapi's memorandum to theDutch-instituted Visman Commission on political reform, however,was qualified, since "the popular representation proposed by Gapiis in various respects not sensitive to the principles of Islam relat-ing to statecraft .... the largest part of the society, in this case theMuslim community, would not be represented in appropriate waysin this parliament".266 Al the very least, Muslim support involvedthe notion that within such a parliament Muslims would be domi-nant, with a Muslim as head of state, and at least two-thirds of theministry comprising Muslims, with a dedicated Ministry for Islamicaffairs, and the addition of a crescent to the flug.'u'MIAI's demandscaused an uproar in nationalist ranks, given their potential to dam-age Gapi's case-Wondoamiseno was absent through illness at theMIAI meeting which had made that determination-but the cleav-age was papered over by subsequent declarations on both sides

Stud ia lslam iko, Vol . 16, No. 1 , 2009


that there was no difference in meaning, while MIAI declared thatit was not intervening in politics. Within Muslim ranks, Abikusnoand Wondoamiseno, deeply concerned at the injury inflicted onGapi's unity, emphasised the slightness of the difference with Capi.

Abikusno, indeed, remarking that he did not agree with the MIAIproposals, thought that "people must first strive to obtain a parlia-ment and leave until later the discussion of how the parliament willwork. If we talk now about details there will be no agreement, since

each association had its own point of view/l .268 In the end, followingrobust discussion, t]ne 1941' MIAI conference confirmed its earliersupport for a fu1l parliament based on Islamic principles, and left

the MIAI council to draft a document on how such a parliamentmight operate.26e

By contrast, the PII, maintaining a cooperationist stance as cir-

cumstances dictated, "struggling by means of the ideologies of Islam

and nationalisrr.",2To and in ever deepening competition with PSII

(whose membership was estimated by the government at aroundonly L2,000 members by the end of 1940),271took a more emphaticand unqualified position on Muslim political suPremacy.2T2That ap-

proach may in part have been a component of PII's gathering at-'

tempts to usurp PSII dominance within the MIAI'273 Other members

groups within MIAI were concerned that MIAI had overstepped itsformal apolitical stance.2Ta That issue was addressed at aJlune 194L

MIAI meeting, where Wondoamiseno remarked that MIAI had notchanged its position, "which remains based on Islamism". In Islam,

he explained, there were provisions relating to every realm, relatingboth to the present world and to the world hereafter: "Islam gives

rules relating to politics, education, marriage, inheritance, ttade,war, and so on. It is therefore inaccurate to assert that Islam pro-vides rules only for serving God .... People should not be puzzledthat a Muslim organisation from time to time moves into the politi-cal sphere".27s

In the end, though, PSII's efforts to maintain good relationswith Gapi came to nothing. Gapi's attempt in the Majelis Rakyat

Indonesia (Indonesian People's Council - MRI), a kind of proto-Indonesian parliament formed in Septembet 194L to develop a

democratic front with the Dutch in the event of war in the Pacific,

was too much for PSII to bear, and resulted in fierce attacks on those

nationalist leaders, Sartono and Sukarjo, who, in the eyes of PSII

leaders, had exceeded their authority in asserting.their loyalty to the

colonial government.2T6 Gapi's refusal to reconsider its position re-

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32 Robert E. Elson

sulted in the PSll-perhaps more indifferent than Westernised sec-ular intellectuals to the challenge of fascism and disappointed at thesmall fruits of its collaboration-leaving Gapi and, indeed, the MRI,in December 1941,. The MIAI and PII supported PSII's position, butdid not take their leave. The break was only sharpened when thegoverrunent invited the MRI for talks, at which Islamist politicianswere not represented.2TT These feelings of disenchantment, coupledwith the anticipation of a Japanese victory, pushed the PSII back toits old non-cooperative position with regard to the Dutch.278

Nonetheless, the most striking aspect of Islamist political actiontowards the end of the 1930s was its vigorous embrace of main-stream politics as a means of advancing its interests. The Dutchthemselves were at least superficially conscious of this turn, not-ing that "religious consciousness has constantly strongly expandedin recent years" and "the continuing strrJggle against statements inword and in writing which are deemed insulting to Islam".27e TheDutch thought that the Muslim community had gained in self-con-fidence, that Muslims had become "more aggressive", and more"intolerant through an increasing sense of identity in both religiousand political spheres".28o But how far had Islamism come both indefining its core values and in pressing them politically?

The meaning and limits of Islamism

Dutch scepticism about the religious core of Islamist politics ("re-ligious slogans .... are nothing other than means to move towardsthe goal: bringing down Dutch authority")281 seriously underesti-mated the significance of a distinctive, carefully cultivated Islamicidentity and discourse and a growing Islamist conviction. Since thePSII had first specifically adopted Islamism in the early and mid-1920s, some slow progress had been made in clarifying just whatthe concept meant and what its implications might be. All Islamistsagreed that Islam should function as a centrally determining aspectof the state apparatus. For the Sumatran PSII leader Datuk SingoMangkuto, "the Islamic religion is the religion of Allah. For this rea-son, no single temporal power can dominate it// .282 The blunt funda-mentalist kaum muda figure Haji Rasul-"a passionate, puritanicalteacher"z83-saw his ideal society as one in which human law waswholly based upon and was consonant with the law of God, andwhich drew its legitimacy from that fact, even though he recognisedthe political reality of Dutch dominance and sought as best he could

Sludia Islamika, Vol. 16, No. 1,2009

Disunity, distance, disregard: The political t'ailure of Islamism in late colonlal Indonesia 33

to inject an Islamic sensibility into political discourse.2sa Less nu-

anced was the view of the Persis figure Sabirin, who thought that

Muslims were "forbidden to honor 'homeland' and flag .... forbid-den to follow a nationalist cause The PSII's Sangaji saw the

task in terms of the establishment " of a society regulated by the willof God" .286 Penyadar stated in its principles that "matters concern-

ing society and the state, as well as the place and the lives of each

individual therein, should be regulated in accordance with the prin-ciples and main features in the laws and prescriptions of the Islamicreligion and avoiding all things which contravene them".287 That

was because "the [Mustim] religious system is the best system forthe general wellbeing".2s8 For Cokroaminoto, "the teachings of the

Qur'an sufficiently cover everything relating to man's needs and re-

quirements, in other words, they are sufficient to provide the basis

for our actions."28e Further, "the Qur'an and hadith are sufficient to

be used as the basis or comPass for all laws which we need to make,

so that we can lead the kingdom (state) to the goal: to make every

person as happy as possible in himself, and to make each person to

the fullest extent possible useful to the community as a whole and

for all of humankind by means of developing physical skills and

spiritual good works-.2eO Already in \931,, noted Wondoamiseno,

the PSII congress had refined and clarified its program "so as to

create a P.S.I.I. ideal or ideology in shaping an Islamic State in ac-

cord with the teachings of the Prophet and according to the orders

of God contained in the Qur'an".2e1 According to the PII's Wali Al-Fatah, "there are sufficient regulations in Islam which provide forall the needs of society, the highest as well as the lowesf" '2e2

To achieve the desired goal Islamist political parties sought to

deepen Islam's hold on Indonesian society. For Cokroaminoto,PSII's aim was "to put Islam into effect as widely and as fully ns pos-

sible, so that we can obtain a genuine World of Islam".2e3 For Hassan,

it was the duty of Muslims to "emphasise Islam-ness in a countrygoverned by foreigners in order to obtain the broadest freedom, so

to be able to implement Islamic laws".2oa

How that might be achieved was a matter of considerable and

sometimes angry dispute. Some Muslims like Mas Mansur empha-

sised the need for personal devotion and attachment to Islamic fun-damentals as the means for emancipation, self-improvement and

self-strengthening.2es His organisation, Muhammadiyah, did not see

a necessary connection between Muslim political dominance and

the establishment of an Islamic state; rather, it sought the develop-


34 Robert E. Elson

ment of an Islamic society, a society in which Muslim precepts andvalues were dominant and would as a matter of course eventuallyguide state policy and the making of laws. Thereby an Islamic statewould inevitably develop.2e6 Fachruddin al-Kahiri was similarly fo-cussed on religious seriousness as the means to freedom: "so long asthe Muslims of Indonesia consider Indonesian freedom as more im-portant than the freedom of all Muslims, consider politics as moreimportant than worship .... exchange obedience to the religiousscholar for obedience to the [national] leader .... consider emotionsmore important than examination of substance .... and consider theenemies endangering Indonesian freedom more important than theenemies who endanger Islam .... so long will Indonesian freedomremain only a phrase on the lips".'o' But for others like Sukiman,the explicit practice of politics was deeply important in their mis-sion; it was not enough to pray and to perform good works, onehad.actively to participate in politics and to seek the political endswhich the full message and implementation of Islam demanded.To Sukiman, Muslims bore responsibility to take an active part inthe work of striving "for the progress of Indonesia and its people" ,and he lamented their characteristic political passivity and politi-cal ignorance which, he claimed, had led to their weakened condi-tion.2e8 Similarly, in order to realise his aim of establishing a "UnitedIslamic Community", Cokroaminoto spoke of the necessity first ofcreating "a Croup (Party) which is not continually discordant anddivided".2ee The PSII program emphasised the obligation of politi-cal activity, with its "goal of obtaining the freedom of Muslims"and the creation of "a favourable and secure Muslim kingdom inIndonesia".3oo

The gradual and sometimes reluctant embrace by Islamist organi-sations of the idea of Indonesia had become, for the most part, a thingof the past. By the late 1,920s, it had become evident to most Islamiststhat the fate of Islam was now inextricably tied to Indonesia's des-tiny; the key to achieving their goals was Indonesian independence,which would truly free all the people from slavery of every kind-as long as that freedom was based upon Islam.301 Pembela Islam ar-gued that "national freedom is what the Islam-movement needsmore than anything else/.302 Kartosuwiryo thought in1932, that "aslong as the Netherlands government existed, people cannot followthe prescriptions of Islam/.303 In that sense, the 1930s had broughta significant clarification from an earlier position which had givenpride of place to a notional Islamic community rather than a spe-

Sludla Islanikn, Vol. 16, No. l, 2A09


cific national identity. One Muslim, PerPlexed that "in the midst ofthis holy war [against colonialism] a group of 'ulamd 'have risen uPforbidding patriotism and making war on patriots in the name ofthe Islamic religion and its doctrines",3oa even sought the opinion ofthe revered Rashid Rida. He responded that "the type of patriotismthat should adorn a Muslim youth is that he be a good example ofthe people of the homeland, no matter what their religious affilia-tion, cooperating with them in every legitimate action for indepen-dence", while reminding him that "he is a member of a body greaterthan his people, and his personal homeland is part of the homelandof his religious community. He must be intent on making the prog-ress of the part a means for the progress of the whole'.3os The oldtension between ummat and nation was ebbing, if not completelyerased. Both NU and Muhammadiyah judged that participation inwar to defend the Dutch-ruled Indies could not be countenancedas holy war in defence of Islam.306 In similar vein, the MIAI ruledthat Muslim Indonesians should not provide blood transfusions forsoldiers wounded in such awar.3o7

Islamists remained generally uncertain and confused about how

, independence, once obtained, might be organised. Cokroaminoto,according to Wondoamiseno, had been convinced that "our State

and nation will be unable to achieve a just and prosPerous life, asecure and peaceful society while social justice according to Islamicteachings are not yet in force or implemented to become law in ourstate, even if we are independent.//308 But most Islamist organisationsrecognised the need for freedom of religious practice. Penyadar ar-gued that since faith was a gift from God, it was not something thatcould be forced. Accordingly, "in society and the regulations of thestate, every person's freedom of religion must be acknowledged, as

long as thereby no intrusion is made on the freedom of others or the

general good customs or the order and the Peace of the country".3oe

That freedom, however, carried with it an obligation for Muslims toform organisations "to expand knowledge and science and for theregulation of social life, such as this is desired by Islam for all thepeople in the whole world/.310 More broadly, PSII proclaimed an

essential equality in humankind "in society and in law" ,ztt which in-cluded an acknowledgement of the equal value of believers, wheth-er male or female,312 and equality of rights in marriage.313 That view,however, did not prevent PSII from threatening that, upon indepen-dence, the Dutch, together with Chinese and Arabs, would be expa-triated.3la PII's attitude to non-Muslims was negotiable, as ZainaI

Studia Islamikn, VoI. 16, No. 1,2009

36 Robert E. Elson

Abidin Ahmad explained: "Provided they and their organisationsdo no damage to the interests of Islam and the Islamic community,our attitude towards them is naturally good. Where that is possible,we work together with them. But if they harm those interests, thenthey become our unconditional enemies and they will encounterpositive and serious opposition'/.315 But Ahmad Hassan was unsym-pathetic to non-Muslim Indonesians who wanted a neutral basis forthe state: "Is it proper that because of 10% of the population, wewipe out the interests of 90oh of the population?".316

There was uncertainty as well about the political machinery andpolicies of an independent Indonesian Islamic state. While Natsirremained agnostic about the particular political form that Islamismmight inhabit, there was broad general attachment to the notion ofdemocracy as an integral aspect of Islam.317 Cokroaminoto thoughtthat "the free country (Indonesia) which PSII is attempting to bringabout must be democratic, as is stated in the Qur'an".318 Indeed,Cokroaminoto saw the referendum as a tool for parliament to keepthe will of the people at the forefront, "to strengthen the influence ofthe People on the parliament, so that parliament continually devel-ops in response to the will of the People".31e The Perserikatan Ulama(Ulamas' Association) based its call for a parliament on Qur'anicteaching.32o MIAI, as we have seen, supported the Gapi move for aresponsible parliament.32l Connecting democracy with anti-colonial-ism, Abikusno remarkedinl94I, that "the striving of democracy to-wards an international community of free peoples can .... be achievedonly by the abolition of colonial relationships" .zzz Penyadar claimed"Islam and democracy" as its basis,323 and Salim spoke of the needfor local grassroots parliaments.32a But a lack of clarity and precisionabout how a democratic system and popular sovereignty might ac-commodate the normative demands of Islam endured.325 There wasuncertainty about the role an Indonesian government might play inpromoting Islam, just as there were differences about how Islamicfundamentals might be deployed in such a state. Muhammadiyah,for example, saw Islam as providing a broad guide to the making of

. law, and "rejected formal jurisprudential law codes as proposed bythe traditionalist Muslims//.326 There was more clarity on the futurenature of the economy. Islamism generally opposed the capitalistsystem. According to Cokroaminoto, "the wickedness of capitalismwhich acts violently and powerfully in our Land has clearly been thecause of our nation losing its freedom, falling into the humiliation of'national slavery' and the humiliation of 'the slavery of poverty"' .327

Stttdia Islamikn, VoL 16, No. 1,2009


Salvation was a function of the creation of a government-sponsoredeconomy, "fully suPervised by the People, the whole based uponthe foundation of Islam".328

Conclusion

Through the decade or so immediately before the outbreak ofWorld War II, Indonesian Islamism endured a tumultuous period,characterised by fierce internal competition over strategy and fol-lowings, as well as the manifestation and exacerbation of deep sus-

picion and discord between Islamism's view of the political futureand that of the secularist champions of the idea of Indonesia. "There

could never be a political stream as powerful and vehement as a

politico-Islamic movement",' remarked one Indonesian in 1939.32e

True in theory, perhaps, but in the circumstances of Indonesia in the

late colonial period, Islamism was characterised more by weakness

than strength. It struggled to accommodate the attraction of the idea

of Indonesia with its pan-Islamic imaginings, but found itself com-

pelled to attempt the task in order to retain its relevance. It foughtunrelentingly against what it often saw as nationalists' blasphe-

mous privileging of the Indonesian nation over Islam. It was racked

by division, notably when the PSII's hijrah policy and a more gen-

eral reluctance to cooperate with other political groups caused the

departure of strong and able leaders like Sukiman and Salim.There had been some advance, despite Islamism's division and

the fact that it remained on the back foot in relation to the effortsof the secular nationalists (themselves sorely weakened by Dutchrepression), In the last part of the 1930s, most Islamists had aban-

doned the pretentions to exclusivity which had so deeply woundedtheir capacity to make a political mark, and began a Process of col-

laboration with other political forces which aimed to accelerate the

process of achieving Indonesia's freedom.Overall, however, Islamism remained marginalised within the

general and dominant discourse of nation. That outcome was a resultof the fact that Islamism could find no meaningful compromise withthe proponents of the simple idea of Indonesia. It could agree thatIndonesia must be free from colonial domination, but Islamism'ssense of what that might mean remained a central source of dis-

putation with the nationalists. Islamism sought a free Indonesia inwhich Islam would be the political and legal compass; that central

fact found no sympathy with and often fierce opposition from those

Studia Islamika, Vol. 16, No. 1,2049

38 Robert E. Elson

who sought to shape a new Indonesia according to their own non-Islamic agendas.

It could have been different. The Islamist message was heavilytinged with religious idealism. Cokroaminoto remarked that ..webelieve with all our being in the establishment of a Kingdom ofIslam in Indonesia, where oui community can live in happiiess andglory".330 As Taufik Abdullah has suggested, that idealism distract-ed Islamists from the difficult task of negotiating a more pragmaticdomain for Islam in a new Indonesia.331 Islamists foundit i,,'ror-sible to temper their moral and political demands to what mighthave been more generally acceptable and achievable in a societyrenowned for its internal social and religious differences. A majorproblem throughout was the fact that Islamism's major political ve-hicle, the PSII, spent much of the decade in internal ,un"or. becauseit adopted a politics of distance from both government and otherpolitical actors that left it estranged from the demands of politi_cal combat and thus politically impoverished. An earlier und -o.uenthusiastic engagement with the idea of Indonesia and its propo-nents might have forced Islamism not to seek solace ln stutrtrirndefensiveness but to strive for a form of pragmatic compromisewith the secular nationalists. That, of course, would have requiredthoughtful, courageous and more detailed and expansive analysisof the political implications of Islamism, and how-they might bet-ter be accommodated in an imagined nation inhabited by dlfferentpeoples of different systems of belief.

Thgt did not happen. when the Japanese arrived in Java early in1942, rslamism was internally more unified and purposeful than ithad been a decade before. But it was no more capable of managingits differences with its political competitors than it had ever beeryand no further advanced in the search for a practical solution tothe problem of how Islam might best be manifested in the politicalinstitutions of an independent Indonesia in ways that did not in-vite contestation from other Indonesians. Accordingl/, the Islamistunderstanding of Indonesia remained peripheral to-the ,, ,,,orrrral,,

practice of late colonial-era politics, and consequently disregardedas a serious contribution to politics. An opportunity, neveito ap-pear again in quite this form, had been lost.


,

Disunity, distance, disregard: The political failure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia

Endnotes

* The research in this article was funded by a grant from the Australian Re-

search Council. I am gratefui to John Butcher for his helpful comments onan earlier draft.

1. Swara Publiek,2g september 1930, oaerzicht oan de Inlandsche en Maleisch-

Chineesche pers IIP OI 41 / 1930, p. 80.2. Acting Advisor for Native Affairs [ANAI (E. Gob6e) to Governor-General

tGGl, 2 luly 1927, Archive Ministerie van Kolonihn [AMK], Mailrapport[MR] 830*/1927, National Archive, The Hague [NA]. See also Harry A.Poeze, "Inleiding", in Harry A. Poeze (ed.), Politiek-politionele or)erzichten

aan Nederlandsch-Indih (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, Dordrecht:Foris, 1983, 1988; Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 1994) lPPOl, vol' 2, pp' xxvii,xxxii "Politiek Politioneel Overzicht" pPOl March 1929,PPOJuly 1929,

PPO December 1929, PPO January 1930, PPO luly L930, in Poeze (ed'),

PPO, voI.2, pp.72, L64,275,292, 408; "Verslag van de Conferentie met de

Hoofden van Inlandsch Bestuur in de"Provincie Oost-Java .". gehouden

op dinsdag, 5 mei 1931, in het Kunstkringgebouw te Soerabaja", AMK,WBZqS" /lgg1, NA; Chartes O. van der Plas, Nationalism in the Netherlands

Indies (n.p.: Netherlands-Netherlands Indies Council/Institute of PacificRelations, Dal,p.7.

3. Gob6e to GG,2i:UJy 1927; Tauflk Abdullah, Schools and politics: the knum

muda moaement in West Sumatra (1927-1933) (Ithaca: Cornell ModemIndonesia Project, Cornell University, 197I), p' 122.

See R.E. EIson, The idea of Indonesia: a history (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2008), pp. 13-47.W arna W arta [n.d.], IPO 25 / 1928, p. 587.Soeloeh Rajat Indonesia, !5February 1928,IPO 8/1928, p.348.Darmo Kondo,2-7 JuIy 1928,lPO 23 /1928, p.8I.Sabirin, Fadjar Asia,8 November 1928,IPO 46/1928,p.214.j.Th. Petrus Blumberger, De nationalistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie

(Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1987 11931'l), p. 326. See also "Nota deralgemene secretarie inzake de Partij Sarekat Islam" [Septembet 1927],

in R.C. Kwantes (ed.), De ontwikkeling aan de nationalistische beweging in

N e derlandsch-Indih, v ol. 3 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhof, 197 8), pp' 590-

A

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

91,605.10. Anon., "Islam kena boycot" , Pembela Islam 1' (1929), p. 5.

11. Ibid., p. 10. See also Comit6 dan Redactie Pembela Islam, "Pendirian 'Pem-

bela Iilam"', Pembela Islam 1'0 (1930), pp. 15-16, and Sukiman, "Tentangan

terhadap agama Islam" [1930], in Amir Hamzah Wiryosukatto (ed.), Wa'

wasan pblitik seorang Muslim patriot Dr Soekiman Wiriosandjojo (1998-1974):

kumpulan karangan (Malang: Yayasan Pusat Pengkajian, Latihan dan Peng-

12.

13.

14.

15.

embangan Masyarakat, 1984?), pp. 15-22.

Fadjar Asia,3 January 1929,IPO 2/1929,p.47.P embela Islam 3 (1929), IP O 51 / 1929, p. 351.PPO Novemb er 1929, in Poeze (ed.), P P O, v ol. 2, pp. 250-51; John Ingleson,Road to exile: the Indonesian nationalist mooement 1927-1934 (Singapore:

Heinemann, 1979), p. 68.Hadji Agoes Salim, "De Perhimpoenan Indonesia en de Indonesisch-nationalistische beweging", De Socialist, 19 October 1929 ltyped pamphlet,KITLV, Leidenl, p. 2.


17.

18.

19.20.

4A Robert E. Elson

16. Fadjar Asia,17 July 1919, quoted in Al Chaidar, Pemikiran politikproklamatorNegara Islam Indonesia S.M. Kartosoewirjo: fakta dan data sejarah Darul Islam(jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999), p.38.Pembela Islam 1.2 (1930), IPO 38/1930,p.441.Petrus Blumb er ger, D e nati onalist is che b ew e gin g, p. 325.Ingleson, Road to exile, p.32.Fadjar Asia,9 April 1928, IPO 15 /1928, p.72; Abdullah, Schools and politics,p. 142; PP O January-Febru ary 1933, in Poeze (ed.), P P O, v oL 3, p. 262.See, e.g., S., "Kebangsaan", Pembela Islam 12 (1930), pp. 1-3.See, e.g., F., "Sedikit pemandangan boeat T.M.O.", Pembela Islam 1.2 (1930),pp. 34-36; P embela Islam 19 (1931), IP O 14 / 1931, p. 2."Congres P.S.I., M.O.I., en S.I.A.P. van 16 tot 23 januari 1929 te Batavia",AMK, MR 334* /1929,NA.AI N oer, November-December 1928, IP O 4 / 1929, p. 97 .

"Congres P.S.I., M.O.I., en S.I.A.P.".IPO 18/1932,p.267.Het Licht, March 1930,lPO 13/1930,p.462."Kort verslag van de openbare vergadering van den 'Jong IslamietenBond' afd. Batavia op zondag 23 October 1,932 in de 'Gedoeng NasionalIndonesia' (Gang Kenari)", AMK, MR 1189*/1932, NA.PPO August 1929, in Poeze (ed.), PPO,voL 2,pp.184-85.Ibid., p. 185. For a similar view expressed by the head of the PSI scoutassociation, see Fadjar Asia, 30 August 1928, IPO 36/L928,p.475.PPO October 1929, in Poeze (ed.), P P O, v ol. 2, pp. 231,-32."Congres P.S.L, M.O.I., en S.I.A.P.".PPO March t931, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, voI.3, p. 47.PPO August 1929, p.186."Verslag van het XVIde Congres van de P.S.I.I., gehouden van den 24stentot den 27sten januari 1930 in de Adhidharmoschool, Bintaranlor, ]ogja-kafta", AMK, MR 230*/1930, NA.Comit6 dan Redactie Pembela Islam, "Pendirian'Pembel a Islam"', P embelaIslaml0 (1930), p. 15.

PPO January 1929, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 2, p. 13.Ironically, PSI hadadopted its hijrah policy in response to the failure of the government toappoint Cokroaminoto to a Volksraad (People's Council) seat.

38. PPO December 1929,p.275.39. PPO September 1929,-inPoeze (ed.), PPO,vol.2,p.211.40. PPO january 1930, pp. 295-96.41. H.O.S.Tjokroaminoto,TafsirprogramazasdanprogramtendhimPartaiSjarikat

Islam Indonesia [1931,], in Amelz, H.O.S. Tjokroaminto hidup dan perjuanganja,vol. 2 (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952), pp.24. See also p. 31.

42. Sukiman in "Verslag van het XVIde Congres van de P.S.I.I."..43. PPO Janu ary 1929, PPO March L929, PP O August 1,929, pp. 2, 65, 17 8.44. Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the struggle for Indonesian independence (Ithaca:

Comell University P ress, 1969), p. 82.45. Bintang Timoer, 7 I anuary 1931, IP O 2 / 1931, p. 57 .

46. Pembela Islam 4 (1930), IPO 5 /1,930, p. 135. "Mr" was the title carried byWestern-educated lawyers.

47. Al. Sukarno's trial in 1930, the prosecution introduced a series of letterswritten by Cipto Mangunkusumo to Sukarno in 1928, warning him that thePSI would attempt to take over the PPPKI with catastrophic consequencesfor the movement as a whole (Attomey-General to GG, 17 September 1932,

Sturlia Islamika, Vol. 16, No. 1, 20a9

21,.

22.

23.

an

25.26.27.28.

29.30.

JI.

JZ.33.34.35.

Jb.

37

49.50.51.52.53.

54.

55.56.

Disunity, distance, disregard: The political t'ailure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia 4l'

in Kwantes (ed.), De ontwikkeling, vol. 3 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhof,/Bouma's Boekhuis, 19BI), pp. 659-60).

48. PPO Janu ary 1,929, PPO Decemb er 1929, PPO january 1.930, pp. 13, 265, 286-87;Nan Sing,26 September 1'930,lPO 4L/1930,pp.77-82. See also Sangaji'scomments in "Verslag van een openbare vergadering der Partij SarekatIslam Indonesia gehouden te Batavia op den 28sten december 1930", AMK,MR 327*/1931, NA.PPO January 1930, p.288.PPO July 193I, inPoeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 3, p. 86.Sedio Tomo,26-27 Februaty 1931,lPO 1'0 /1931, p.417.Pertjatoeran,12 March 1931, IPO 13 / 193L, p. 531.PPO July 1930, p. 405; Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO' vol. 2, p.xxx. See "Ma'loemat Comit6 Oemmat Islam Soerabaja, kepada segenaPOemmat Islam di Indonesia", Pembela Islam 12 (1930), pp. 38-40.PPO August-September 1930, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 2, p. 420-22;Abdullah, Schools nnd politics, p.156Lasjkar, September 1930, IPO 51. / 1930, p. 490.Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol.2, pp. xxii-xxiii; PPO January1930, PPO August-September 1930, PPO October 1930, in Poeze (ed.),PPO, voI.2, pp.288-89, 422-23,439. See also 't Bestuur M.P.I., "Ma'loematMadjelis Permoesjawaratan Islam (M.P.I.) Soerabaja", Pembela Islam 1'4

(1930), pp.4-6.57. PPO March L931,p.45.58. "Bestuurs- en Regentenconferenties 1930. Overzicht van den inwendigen

politieken toestand sedert januari 1929, afgesloten in januai 1930" , AMK,MR 155*/1930, NA; Sukarno,inWarnaWarta, IPO 25/1929.

59. PPO Aprll1931., in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 3, pp. 55-56.

60. PPO March 1931., p.41..6L. Sin Tit P o, 30 December 1930, IPO 2 / 1931, p. 70.

62. S oeloeh Raj at Indonesilt, 7 J anuary 1931', IP O 3 / 1931', p. 115.63. PPO October 1930, p. 440; see also Poeze, "InIetding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO,

vol. 2, p. xxxi; H. Aboebakar, Sedjarah hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan

karangan tersiar (lakarta: Panitya Buku Peringatan AIm. K.H.A. WahidHasjim, 1957), p.221.

64. NU did not attend the Al-Islam congress since it was alienated by PSIIattacks on government and religious officials, particularly in the wake ofthe naming of a Christian to the position of Regent (PPO April 1931', p.61).

65. PPO May-june 1931, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, voI. 3, p.72; "De Islam in actie" ,

IPO 32/1931, pp. 280-83; Aboebakar, Sedjnrah, pp. 310-11; Ismatu Ropi,"Depicting the other faith: a bibliographical survey of Indonesian Muslimpolemics on Christianity" , Studia Islamikn 6,1 (1999), p. 88-90.

66. PPO May-June 193L, p. 73. See also Pembela Islam (October) 1931', IPO47 /1931,pp.299-300.PPO May-Junel93l, p. 73. That latter sense was reflected in criticism of theactions of Italian troops against Tripoli Muslims (pp. 72,107).PPO April-May 1932, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 3, p. 188.

Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 3, p. xxxix.Aboebakar, S edj ar ah, p. 311.Abdullah, Schools and politics, pp. 110,136.ln November 1928 there were 39 Thawalib schools educating around17,000 students ("Gegevens betreffende de godsdienstige stroomingen

Studia Islamikt, Vol. 16, No. 1,2009

67.

68.69.70.71.72.

73.74.

75.

42 Robert E. Elson

in het gewest Sumatra's Westkust" [by Ch. O. van der Plas], AMK, MR567* /1929,NA).Acting ANA (E. Gob6e) to GG, 11July 1930, AMK,698*/1930, NA.PPO July 1930, p.409. See also Abdullah, Schools and politics, p.130.Aboebakar, Sedjarah, p. 220. See also Deliar Noer, The modernist Muslimmoztement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,1973), p.155."Rapport over het onderwijs aan godsdienstscholen, in verband met deontdekkingen tijdens de huiszoekingen in september 1933", AMK, MRI5I8* /1933, V 19 April 1934lV9, NA.Abdullah, Schools andpolitics, sp. 163."Nota over de godsdienstig-politieke beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust"[3Iune 1929], AMK, MR 1518*/1933,V 19 April 1934lV9, NA.Fauzan SaIeh, Modern trends in Islamic theological discourse in 20th centuryIndonesia: a critical study (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 137; Syafiq Mughni,"Warisan A. Hassan dalam arus pemikiran Islam di Indonesia", in H.Endang Saifuddin Anshari and Amien Rais (eds), PakNatsir 80 tahun: bukukedua: penghargaan dan penghormatan generusi mudn (Jakarta: Media Da'wah,1988), pp. 1.69,172; Tamar D1aja, Riwayat hidup A. Hassan (Jakarta: Mutiara,1980), pp. 19-29; G.F. Pljper, Studilln oaer de geschiedenis aan de Islam inIndonesia 1900-1950 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1,977), pp. 120-22.A. Jainuri, Muhammadiyah: gerakan reformasi Islam di lawa pada awal abadkedua puluh (Surabaya: PT Bina Ilmu, 1981), pp. 81-83; Noer, Tfte modelnistMuslim moaement, p. 85; Howard M. Federspiel, Islam and ideology in theemerging Indonesian state: the Persatuan Islam (PERSIS),1.923 to 1957 (Leiden:Brill,2001), p.viii.Abdullah, Schools and politics, pp. 1,47-49.Ibid., p. I30, 131,, 154, 1,57

Quoted in ibid., p. 158.PPO August-September 1930, p. 428.Quoted in Abdullah, Schools and politics, p.1,31.Abdullah, S cho ol s an d p olitic s, pp. 146-47, 158.Quoted in ibid., p. 155.Noer, The modernist Muslim moaement, p.38.They wbre, perhaps, concerned as well that the emphasis on nationmight fuel the sense of Minangkabau group longing which included anattachment to adat (Abdullah, Schools and politics, pp. 1,57 , 160) .

Abdullah, Schools and politics, pp.134-35,158; Noer, The modernist Muslimmortement, p.264.

91. Quoted in Abduliah, Schools andpolitics,p.L59.92. Semangat I, c. L932, quoted in Noer, The modernist Muslim moaement, p.

263.93. Mukhtar Ltftfi, " A. Hassan dan Permi", in Djaja, Riwayat hidup A. Hassnn,

o.61.94. Abdullah, Schools and politics, pp. 160-61.95. Semangat I, c. 1932, quoted in Noer, The modernist Muslim moaement, p.

263.96. Noer, The modernist Muslim morsement, p. 155; AbdulIah, Schools andpolitics,

p.167.97. Abdullah, Schools and politics, p.172.98. Quoted in Abdullah, Schools and politics, pp.161,-62

76.

77.78.

79.

80.

81.82.83.84.85.86.87.88.89.

90

Studia Islamika, Vol. 16. No. 7, 2A09

Disunity, distance, disregard: The political t'ailure of lslnmism in late colonial Indonesia

99. Abdullah, Schools and pllitics, p. 1'63; Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.),

PPO, vol. 4, p. xIi.100. GG to MvK, 29 August 1933, AMK, V 19 October 1933 / O24, N A.101. Poeze, "Inleiding",-in Poeze (ed.), PPO,vol.3, pp. xli-xlii. See also Noer,

The modernist Muslim mortement, p.3I.102. See, inter alia, AMK, MR 1451" /1933 and MR 861*/1934, NA.103. GG to MvK, 29 August 1933; IPO 20/1936, pp' 3L8-19; IPO 2l/1936, pp.

326-28; Abdullah, Schools and politics, p. 224; Noer, The modernist Muslimmonement, pp. 50-52; 172;Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p.xli.

L04. "Verslag van het Congres van den jong-Islamieten Bond, gehouden te

Jogjakarta, op 25 en 26 december 1925", A}I4K,}'/.F.76" /1926, NA; Poeze,"Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 3, p. xlvi.

105. Kasman Singodimejo remarked that the jIB was not interested in questionsof cooperation and non-cooperation, and members were free to join anypolitical organisation they chose (PPO June-July 1933, in Poeze (ed.), PPO,

vol. 3, p. 302).106. Surowiyono at the December JIB congress, PPO December 1929, p.276.

See also Sidi Mawardi, Bibit perseteruan: nationalis Islam aersus nationalis

sekuler: pengalaman Jong lslamieten Bond 1925-1942 (Jakarta: Yayasan StudiPerkotan, 2000), pp. 6-7.

107. Mohamad Roem, "Haji Agus Salim", in Hazil Tanzil (ed.), Seratus tahun

Haji Agus Salim tJakafta: Sinar Harapan:1996 [1984]), p. 188.

108. Syam, quoted in "Verslag van het Congres van den Jong-IslamietenBond".

109. Surowiyono at the December JIB congress, paraphrased in PPO December1929, p.276. See also "jong Islamieten Bond" [January 1925, by R. Kern],AMK 198*/1925, NA; Roem, "Haji Agus Salim", p. 187.

110. Quoted in ANA to GG, 13 February 1925, All4K, MR 198*/1925, NA.1 1 1. Sutiyono at the Decemb er 1929 IIB congress, paraphrased in PPO December

1929,pp.276-77.112. Kasman Singodimejo at the December 1930 ]OB congress, paraphrased in

PPO January 1931,n Poeze (ed.), PPO,vol.3,p.12.113. Kasman Singodimejo, paraphrased in "Kort verslag van de openbare ver-

gadering van den 'jong Islamieten Bond' afd. Batavia". See also Mawardi,Bibit, pp.108-114.

11.4. Poeze, "InIeidrng" , in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 2, p. xxxiii.115. Roem, "Haji Agus Salim", p. 1'87; Noer, The modernist Muslim moaement,

pp.265.116. Sam, quoted in "Verslag van het Congres van den jong-Islamieten

Bond".117. Taufik Abdullah et al., Sejarah ummat Islam Indonesin (Jakarta: Majelis

Ulama Indonesia, 1991'), p. 249; Ridwan Saidi, "The organizations ofyoung Moslem intellectuals past and present", Mizan 2, ! (1985), p.36.

LL8. PNI commissioner Raharjo in September 1930, PPO September 1929, p.208.

119. rbid.120. Alam Siregar, IPO 36/1932,p.170.121. PPO May 1929, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, voI. 2, p. 119.122. Quoted in Noer, The modernist Muslim moaement, pp. 259-60. See also

Federspiel, Islam and ideology, p. rx.

Studia Islamika, VoL 16, No. 1,2009

44 Robert E. Elson

123. Quoted in Pijper, Studilln, p. 125. For a more elaborate discussion of thematter, see A. Hassan, Islam dan kebangsaan (Bangil: Lajnah PenerbitanPesantren Persis Bangil , 1984 [1941]), p. 37-39.

124. Suara Muslimin 2-3 (1932), quoted in Noer, The modernist Muslim moaement ,p.264.

125. Aboebakar, Sedjarah, p. 217; YuzriI Ihza, "Combining activism andintellectualism: the biography of Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993)", StudiaIslamika 2,1 (1995), p.117.

126. Natsir, Pembela Islam 36 (I93L), quoted in Noer, The modernist Muslimmoaement, p.260.

127. Natsir, Pembela Islam 43 (1932), quoted in Noer, The modernist Muslimmooement, p.262.

128. Natsir, Pembela Islam 36 (1931), quoted in Noer, The modernist Muslimmoaement, pp.260-61.

129. Natsir, Pembela Islam 41, (L932), quoted in Noer, The modernist Muslimmoaement, p.26\.

130. Natsir, Pembela Islam 43 (1932), quoted inmouement, p.252.

131. Natsir, Pembela Islam 35 (193\), quoted in

Noer, Tlze modernist Muslim

Noer, The modernist Muslimmoaement, pp.26a-65.

132. Natsir, Pembcla Islam 43 (1932), quoted in Noer, The modernist Muslimmoztement, p.263.

1.33. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 3, p. xli.134. Iskaq, in PPO August 1932, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol.3, pp.205-06.135. "Rede uitgesproken door Ir. Sukarno op het eerst Indonesia Raja congres"

[January 1932], Allt4K, MR 100x/1932, NA.136. Dahm, Sukarno, pp. 166, 173.I37. See, for example, his letter of 22 Aprll 1936, n Sukarno, Dibawah bendera

reoolusi,vol.l (3'd pr. jakarta: Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bandera Revolusi,D6Q,pp.333-35.

138. Sukarno, "Me-'muda'-kan pengertian Islam" 11940], in Sukarno, Dibawahbendera reuolusi , vol. 1 , pp. 377-78.

139. Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the state in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003),pp.26-27.

140. "Saja kurang dinamis" [1940], in Sukamo, Dibazuahbendera reaolusi,vol. I,p.453.

141. Dahm, Sukarno, p. 183.142. "Saja kurang dinamis", p.452. [emphasis in original]143. "Me-'mudah'-kan pengertian Islam" [1940], in Sukarno, Dibawah bendera

reoolusi, vol. 1, pp. 398.1,44. "Saja kurang dinamis", p.454.145. M Natsir, "Islam dan kebudajaan" 11936l, in Capita selecta [akarta: Bulan

Bintang, 19SQ,p.2l.146. Natsir, "Arti agama dalam negara", in M. Natsir oersus Sukarno: persatuan

agama dengan negara (Padang: Yayasan Pendidikan Islam Padang,1968),pp.7-8,L4-15.

1.47. Ibid., p.15.148. Natsir, "Dualisme dalam Caesaro-Papisme", in M. Natsir aersus Sukarno,

o.36.149. Natsir, "Mungkirrlah Quran mengatur negara?", it M. Natsir aersus Su-

karno,pp.2l-22.150. Natsir, "Islam 'demokrasi'?" , in M. Natsir oersus Sukarno, p.27.


Disunity, distance, disregard: The politicd failure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesis 45

151. Natsir, "Dualisme", p. 36. Hassan was of a similar view (Pemerintahan tjaraIslam (Malane: Toko Timoer, 1936),p.13).

152. Natsir, "Menasih Islam bersinggasana dalam kalbu", in M. Natsir aersusSukarno, p.43.

153. Natsir, "Berhakim kepada sedjarah", in M. Natsir oersus Sukarno, p.77.154. PPO March 1933, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol.3, p.268.t55. lDlcl.156. PPO April 1933, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 3, p. 281. See also IPO 15/1.933,

pp.232-34.L57. Amelz, Tjokroaminto, vol.2, p.75.158. PPO August-September 1934, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 3, p. 398; "Nota

over Islamietische reacties in Nederlandsch-Indih gedurende de laatstejaren", AMK, MR 82I* /1938,V30-9-1.938-1.5, NA; IPO 33/1934,p.51.8;IPO36/934,p.550.

159. "Nota over Islamietische reacties".160. Ibid.; Adil,1.1. November 1937,lPO47/1937,pp.771.-71.;IPO52/1937,pp.

845-50; Noer, Tfo e mo dernist Muslim moa ement, p. 245.Adil, 5 September 1934, IPO 36 / 1934, p. 551."Verslag van de 2e al-Islam congres in de maand apfil 1932 te Malanggehouden" [2May 1932,by E. Gob6e], AMK, MR 472" /1932,NA.PPO January 1.930, pp. 291.-92; PPO March 1.931., p. 46.Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, Peranan ummat Islam Indonesia (n.p.: n.p. ,195?),

761.L62.

L63.164.

p. o.165. PPOJanuary-February1933,pp.258-59; Poeze, "Inleiding",inPoeze (ed.),

PPO, vol.3, pp. xxxix-xl, xlviii-xlix; "Nota van den Regent van Malang",AMK, MR 954* /1936, NA; lPO 10/1933, p.145-46; IPO 11/1933, pp. 161-63; IPO 13/1933, p. 204, IPO 18/1933, pp. 280-87; Noer, The modelnistMuslim moaement / pp. 312-13.

1.66. IPO 12/ 1933, p. 1.83.

167. Ibid., p.184.168. At-W;fd, September-October 1933, IPO 41 / 1933, p. 644.169. PPO December 1933, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, voI. 3, p. 348.I70. Sikap,28 August 1933, IPO 35 /1933, p. 545; Oetoesan Indonesia ln.d.), IPO

23/1935, pp. 359-60.171. Sukiman, in "Korte inhoud. Vertaling" [report on Parii meeting 9-10

December 19331, AMK, MR 247*/1934, NA172. Poeze, "InIeiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 3, p. xl; Abdullah, Schools

andpolitics,p.lS4; Noer, The mod.ernist Muslimmoaement, pp. 157-58; PPO

June-July 1933, pp. 30L-02.173. PPO April 1933, p. 281.17 4. S oear a O emoem, 31 May 1935, IP O 23 / 1935, pp. 356-59.175. ANA (G.F. Pijper) to GG, 2 November 1938, AMK, MR 1056*/1938,V 23

November 1938/K38, NA.176. Pemandangan 13 luly 1936, IPO 29 /1936, pp. 449-52; Noer, The modelnist

Muslim moaement, p. 14i5.177 . P emandangan, 30-31 October 1934, IP O 43 / 1934, p. 677 -7 8; P emandangan 30

November 1934, IPO 48 / 1934, pp. 7 64-65.178. Mata Hari, 27 May 1937, IPO 23 / 1937, p. 373.179. PPO January 1930,pp.294-95.180. PPO April-May 1935, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. 17; Mata Hari, 1

May 1937, IPO 20 /1937, pp. 318-20; Hadji A. Salim, Pergerakan politiek diIndonesia: Penjadar - Volksraad -Konsentrasi (Bangkalan: Locaal Comit6

Studia lslamika. Vol. 16. No. 1.2009

46 Robert E. Elson

Pergerakan Penjadar Bangkalan, 1939), p. 32; Swadi, Haji Agus Salim dan

konflik politik dalam Sarekat Islam (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1997),pp.62-63;Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 3, p. xl.

18L. Sinar P asoendan, 18 August 1936, IP O 34 / 1936, pp. 533-34.182. Salim, Pergerakan politiek, p. 11.183. PSII press communique,2 December 1936, IPO 49 /1936, p.772.184. Pemandangan,4 December 1,936, IPO 50 /1936, p.791.185. PPO ]une-luly 1936, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p.112.1,86. Poeze,"Inleiding", inPoeze (ed.),PPO, vol.4, p. xxxvi.187. Abikusno, quoted in Suradi, Haji Agus Salim, p.66. See also Sedio Tomo, \6

JuIy 1936, IPO 30 /1936, p. 468.188. Noer, The modernist Muslim moaement, p. 146; PPO December 1936-March

1937, inPoeze (ed.), PPO, voI. 4, p. 150.189. PPO October-Novernber 1936, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p.142.190. PSII press communique, 13 February 1937 , IPO 8 / f937 , p. 117 .

191. ANA to GG,2 November 1938.L92.Ibid.193. Salim's paraphrased speech in "Kort verslag van het Eerste Congres van

de 'Pergerakan Penjadar', gehouden te Batavia-Centrum (Karetweg 44),

van 21 tot 25 September 1938", AMK, MR 1,056* /1938, V 23 November1938/K38, NA.

194. Poeze, "Inleidlng", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. xxxvi-xxxviii. See aisoPPO January-March 1938, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p.198; ANA to CG,2 November 1938.

195. PPO May-October 1938, in Poeze (ed.), PPO,vol.4,p.226.196. Pemandangan,2T January 1937, IPO 6/1937, pp.91-92. See also S.M.

Kartosoewirj o, S ikap hidj rah PSI/ (Buitenzorg: Buitenzorgsche Drukkerij,1936), especially pp.65-69; Al-Chaidar, Pemikiranpolitikproklamator NegaraIslam Indonesia S.M. Kartosoewirjo: fakta dan data sejarah Darul Islam (Jakarta:Darul Falah, 1999), pp. 46-47.

197 . P emandangan, 31- March 1937, IP O 1,3-1,4 / t937, p. 206.198. Adil,9 December 1937,IPO 51. /1937, p.831..199 . P oeze, " Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), P P O, v ol. 4, p. xxxvi-xxxvii.200. P emandangan, 25 May 19 37, IP O 22 / 1,937, p. 35 7; Darul Aq sha, Ki aiH aj i Mas

Mansur (1896-1946): perjuangan dan pemikiran (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2002), p.67-68.

201. Adil, 14 ]anuary 1939, IPO 3 / 1939, p. 37.202. "Bekendmaking II van de 'Partai Islam Indonesia"' 11,6 January 1939),

AMK. MR 309* / 1939, V19-7 -1939 -14, N A.203. PPO October-December 1938, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p.244.204. "Bekendmaking II van de 'Partai Islam Indonesia"'.205. Ibid.; Mata Hari, 14 January 1939, Soeara Oemoem, 17 January 1939, IPO

4/L93s, pp.65-67.206. ANA (Pijper) to GG, 14 December 1938, AMK, MR 1186*/1938, V 10-1-

1939-Y, NA.207. Noer, The modernist Muslim moaement, p. 212. On Muslim representation in

the Volksraad, see Darmo Kondo,28 November 1938, IPO 49 /1.938, p.797;Pedoman Masjaraknt,3l May 1,939, IPO 23 /1939, pp. 407-09.

208. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, voI. 4, p. xi. See also ANA to GG,14 December 1938; Aqsha, KiaiHaji Mas Mansur,p.68-69.

209. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. xxxviii; Noer, The

modernist Muslim moaement,p.l58; PPO January 1939, inPoeze (ed.), PPO,


Disunity, distance, disregard: The political t'ailure of Islamlsm in late colonial Indonesia 47

vol. 4, p.257; Siang Po,7 June 1939, IPO 23/1939, p. 406; Sedya Tama' !1Aprrl 1940, IP O 1.5 / L9a0, p. 25L.

210. Sukiman, "Indonesia berparlement" 119391, in Wiryosukarto (ed.),

Wawasan,p.49.211. Noer, The modernist Muslim moaement,p.160.212. Paraphrased in PPO August-September 1936,in Poeze (ed.), PPO,vol.4,

o. 130.2L3. Mata Hari, 27 May 1937, IPO 23 / 1937, p. 372.

214. ANA to GG, 28 August 1935, AMK, MR 963* / 1935, N A; P oeze, " Inleiding",in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. xxxvi. By 1939, the Dutch estimated themembership at25,000, and its local branches mostly "in a state of inertia"(ANA to GG, 9 February 1940, in S.L. van der Wal (ed.), De Volksraad en

de staatkundige ontwikkeling ,tan Nederlandsch-Indil1, vol. 2 (Groningen: J.B'Wolters, 1,965), p. 515).

2I5. Sin T it P o, 3 Aprll 1937, IP O 1'5 / 1937, p. 224.

216. P emandangan, 31. December 1936, IP O 2 / 1937, pp' 17 -1'8.

21 7. See the various comments in IPO 29 / 1937, pp. 448-51, 47 1-7 5 ; IP O 30 / t937'pp. 498-500; IPO 34/1937, pp.562-65; IPO 47 /1937, pp' 770-7L.

218. PPOApril-Octoberlg3T,inPoeze(ed.),PPO,vol.4,PP.1'61,1'63;Noer,Tluemoderiist Muslim moaement, p. 152; Muhamad Hisyam, "Islam and Dutchcolonial administration: the case of pangulu in lava" , Studia Islamika 7 , 1

(2000), pp.112-14.219. Wondoamiseno, paraphrased in PPO March-April 1938, in Poeze (ed'),

PPO, vol.4, p.212-13.220. Pemandangan,2T luly 1938,1PO 31'/1938, pp. 514-15.

221. P oeze, " Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), P P O, v ol. 4, p. xxxviii.222. Ps[press communique, lPO 31/1937, pp.505,506.223. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. xl.224. Berita Nahdlatoel Oelama,l April 1938, IPO 19/1939, pp. 300-02; PPO

March-April 1938,pp.212-1'3; Poeze, "Inleiding", inPoeze (ed.), PPO, vol.4, p. xxxix.

225. Aboebakar, Sedjarah, pp. 3I2, 315.226. ANA (Pijper) .to GG, 28 August 1939, and "Verslag van het Tweede

'Congres AI-Islam Indonesia' gehouden te Soerakarta, van 2 tot 7 Mei1939" [10 June1939], both in ]lt4.R966" /1'029,V 26-10-1939-E45, NA.

227. Aboebakar, Sedjarah,pp.3LS-1.6; PPO April-july 194I, in Poeze (ed.), PPO'vol.4,p.434.

228. Quoted in Aboebakar, Sedjarah, p. 318-19.

229. Noer, The modernist Muslim moaetnent, p.242;Poeze, "InIeiding" , in Poeze(ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. xxix, xxxix; Harun Nasution, "The Islamic state inIndonesia: the rise of the ideologY, the movement for its creation andthe theory of the Masjumi", MA thesis, McGill University, 1965' p' 44;

Aboebakar, Sedjarah, p. 311; Harry j. Benda, The crescent and the rising sun:

Indonesian Islam under the lapanese occupation 1942-1945 (The Hague: W.van F{oeve, 1958), p.226n.

230. PPO August-September 1939, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. 328-29;

Aboebakar, Sedjarah, p. 309.231. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. xl; PPO November-

December 19 40, in Poeze (ed.), P P O, v ol. 4, p. 389..

232. Poeze, "InIeiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. xxxix.233. PPO November 1937 -lanuary 1938, in Poeze (ed'), PP O, v ol. 4' p. 178.

234.Ibid.


48 Robert E. Elson

235. PPO April-October 1937, p.163.236. PPO November I937-January 1,938, p.171.237. Ibid. pp.171-72.238. PPO |anuary-March 1938, p. 1,87. See also Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso et al.

(eds), Parlement Indonesia $akarta: Drukkerij Pemandangan, 1939), pp.9-10.

239. T j aj a Timoer, 5 May 1938, IP O 20 / 1938, p. 319.240. Pemandangnn,2T July 1938, IPO 31/1938, p.51.3. See also Soeara P.SJ.I.,

March 1939, IP O 15 / 1939, pp. 27 5-7 6.241. Poeze, "Inieiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO,vol.4,p. xxix-xxx.242. P ertj a S elatan, 2 lune 1938, IP O 24 / 1938, p. 393.243. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, voL 4, p. xxx; Susan Abeyasekere,

"Partai Indonesia Raya, 1936-42: a study in cooperative nationalism",lournal of Southeast Asian Studies 3,2 (1972),p.270;PPO April-May 1939,inPoeze (ed.), P P O, voI. 4, p. 286; PPO August-September 1,939, p. 323; IPO40/1939,pp.712-16.

244. Gapi manifesto, 20 September 1939, in Van der Wal (ed.), De Volksraad, p.403.

245. PPO luly 1939, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p.308. Salim's Penyadar wasexcluded from Gapi, as it had been from MIAI, something he attributedto his scepticism to the idea unity at all costs and his opposition to partyelitism (Salim, Pergerakan politiek, pp. 41,43-44,48-49;Poeze, "Inleiding",in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. xxx). The leaders of PSII and PII, however,simply refused to allow Penyadar's inclusion in Gapi (Tjaja Timoer, 22May 1939, IPO 21/1939, pp.369-71. See also IPO 24/1939, pp. 415-17.

246. T oedj oean Rakj at, ]une 1 939, IP O 24 / 1939, p. 418.247 . P ew art a D eli, 30 lune 1939, IP O 27 / 1939, p. 47 2.248. ANA to GG, 9 February 1940, in Van der Wal (ed.), De Volksraad, p.513.249. PPO August-September 1939, p. 326.250. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. xxxii. See Abikusno et al.

(eds), Kongres Ra'jat Indonesia ke-L (Batavia: Gaboengan Politiek Indonesia,19aQ; Tjaja Timoer,23 December 1939,IPO 52/1939, p. 894.

251. Tj aj a Timoer, 27 December 1939, IP O 52 / 1939, p. 897 .

252. Sukiman, "Indonesia berparlement", in Abikusno et al. (eds), KongresRa'jat Indonesia, p. 67.

253. "Herdenkings vergadering van de Partij Sarekat Islam op 26 lanuari 1928teJogjakarta (inverband methaar 15 jarigbestaan)", AMK, MR332" /1928,NA.

254. S oear a O emoem, 27 December 1939, IP O 52 / 1939, p. 899.255. Abeyasekere, "Partai Indonesia Raya" , p.271.256. Soetan Sjahrir, Out of exile, trans. Charles Wolf Jr. (repr. New York:

Greenwood Prcss, 19 69 [19491), pp. 96-97 [1936].257. J.11. StatiusMullertoGG, llApril 1940,inKwantes (ed.),Deontwikkeling,vol.

4 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhof ,/ Bouma's Boekhuis, 1982), pp. 7 41 - 43 ; C.van Dijk, Rebellion under the banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia (TheHague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 35.

258. P andj i Islam, 20 February 1939, IP O 9 / 1939, p. 161.259. PPO November-December 1940, p. 390.260. PPO September 19 40, in Poeze 1ed.), P P O, v ol. 4, pp. 37 1,, 37 4.261,. Suara PSII 5,4-5 (1941), quoted in Noer, The modernist Muslim mouemail+ r

270. See also Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. xxxii.262. Noer, The modernist Muslim mot)ement, pp.271.

Sludia Islamikn, Vol.1b, No. 1,2009

Disunih1, distance, disregard: The political t'ailure of lslamism in late colonial Indonesia

263. Quoted in ibid., p. 268.264. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. liii.265. PPO December 1940-lanuary 1941,p.397.266. PPO March 1941,in Poeze (ed.), PPO,vol..4,p.402'267. Nasution, "The Islamic.state", p. 45; Noer, The modernist Muslim moaement,

pp.269; PPO April-July 1941', p. 428.268. PPO April-July 1941,p.432.269. rbid.270. Tamar Dja1a, Dr. Soekiman Wirjosandjojo: ketoea oemoem "Masioemi" (Boeki

Tinggi: Dewan Penerangan Masjoemi S. Barat, n.d.), p. 9.

271. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. liii;272. Ibid., p. xlix; PPO Juty \940, in Poeze (ed.), PPO,vol. 4, p.340; PPO April-

JuIy 1941, pp. 418, 429, 430-31.273. PPO September 1940, p.372.274. PPO April-July 1941.,p.428.275. Ibid.,p.431.276. Aqsha, KiaiHaji Mas Mansur,p.68.277. Poeze, "Inleiding", in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p. xlixJ.278. Y an D1jk, Rebellion, p. 40.279. ANA (G.F. Pijper) to GG, 18 October 1939, AMK, l;4RI239* /1929,V 20-12-

1939-19, NA.280. "Nota over Islamietische reacties".281. GG to MvK,29 August 1933, AMK, V 19 October 1933/O24,N4.282. Quoted in Abdullah, Schools and politics, p.115.283. Ph.S. van Ronkel, Rapport betreffende de godsdienstige aerschijnselen ter

S um atr a's W estkust (Batavia: Landsdrukke fij, 1916), p. 1'8.

284. Abdullah, Schools and politics, p. 73 and n.285. Quoted in Federspiel, Islam and ideology, p. 35.286. "Yerslag van de openbare vergadering der P.S.I.I. (Partij Sarekat Islam

Indonesia) gehouden te Malang op zondagmorgen 4 augustus 1935, bligelegenheid van het 21ste (spoed) congres", AMK, MR 963*/1935, NA.

287. "statuten van de 'Pergerakan Penjadar", AMK, MR 1056+ /1938, V 23 No-vember 1938/K38, NA.

288. "Kort verslag van het Eerste Congres".289. Tjokroaminoto, T afsir, p. 1.8.

290. Ibid.. p. 30.291,. Letter from Wondoamiseno, quoted in Amelz, Tiokroaminto, vol. 2, p. 9.

292. Soeara Oemoem,20 June 1939,lPO 26/1939, pp. 458-59.293. Tjokroaminoto,Tafsir, pp. 15-16. See also p. 19.

294. Hassan, Islam dan kebangsaan, p.37.295. Saleh, Modern trends, pp. 120-21..

296. Howard M. Federspiel, "The Muhammadijah: a study of an orthodox

297.298.299.300.301.302.303.

Islamic movement in Indonesia" , Indonesia 10 (1970), pp. 64,76-77.Pembela Islam 59 (1933), quoted in Federspiel ,Islam and ideology, p.102.Sedya Tama, 1.2 Apr1l1940, IPO 16 / 1940, p. 270-71'.

Tjokroamino to, T afsir, p. 20.PPO May-June 1940, in Poeze (ed.), PPO, vol. 4, p.340.Tjokroaminoto, Tafsir, p. 44.Pembela Islam 24 (1931), IPO 1.8 /1931, p. 175.

Paraphrased in "Nota" [on Kartosuwiryo, 10 March 1949], A.};4.K, ArchiveProcureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlandsch-Indih1945-1950, no. 399. NA.

Studia Islamika, Vol. 16, No. 1,2009

5A Robert E. Elson

304. Rashid Rida, "Patriotism, nationalism, and group spirit in Islam" 119331,in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (eds),Islam in transition: Muslimperspectiaes (2"d ed. New York: Oxford University Press,2007), p. 41.

305. Ibid., p. 43.306. PPO April-|uly 1941, p. 432; Aboebakar, Sedjarah, p.1,11,.307. PPO April-July 1941, p. 433.308.W. Wondoamiseno, "Republik Indonesia belum sesuai dengan jang

diidam-idamkan H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto", in Amelz, Tjokroaminto, vol. 1,pp.22-23.

309. "Statuten van de 'Pergerakan Penjadar".310. "Kort verslag van het Eerste Congres".311. Tjokroaminoto, Tafsir, p. 40.3L2.1brd.,p.41.313.1bid.,p.42.314. PPO April-May 1939, p. 292.315. Pewarta Deli, 20 February 1940,IPO 9 / 1940, p. 149.316. Hassan, Islam dan kebangsaan, p. 40.3|7.Yuzril Ihza, "Combining activism and intellectualism: the biography

of Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993)", Studia Islamika 2, 1 (1995), p. 137; P.Loebis, "Het werk van de nationale beweging voor een vrijer Indonesia",in Anon., 30 jaar Perhimpunan Indonesia, 1908-1938. lubileumnummer oanhaar aereenigingsorgaan 'Indonesia'(Leiden: Perhimpunan Indonesia, 1938),o.171.

318. ljokroam tnoto, T afsir, p. 27 .

319.[bid., T afsir, p. 31.320. PPO December 19 40-J anuary 19 4I, in Poeze (ed.), P P O, v ol. 4, p. 399.32L. P em an dan gan, 7 D ecemb er 19 39, IP O 49 / 1939, pp. 861 -62.322.PPO March 1941., p. 41.0.

323. S oear a Oemoem, 29 March 19 40, IP O 14 / !9 40, p. 238.324.Pemandangan,8 Aprll1940,IPO 1,5 /1940, pp 249-50.32l.Effendy, Islam and the state, p. 27.326. Federspiel, "The Muhammadijah" , p.76.327 . Tjokroatninoto, T afsir, p. 31.328. Ibid., T afsir, p. 37 .

329 . N icork- E xpr e s, 9 Iune 19 39, IP O 24 / 1939, p. 41,5.

330. Tjokroaminolo, Tafsir, p.25.331. See Abdullah, Schools and politics, p.173.

Robert E. Elson, PhD, FAHA, Professor of Southeast Asian History School of History,Philosophy, Religion, and Classics The Unioersity of Queensland Brisbane Queensland,Australia

Studia Islamika, VoL 16, No. 1.2009

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