Satrio Pratomo*Pusat Kajian dan Terapan Kesehatan dan Keselamatan Kerja Universitas Indonesia

* BP Tangguh Sr. SHE Manager

DifinisiDifinisi RISKRISK:: The chance of something

happening that will impact on objectives.

RisikoRisiko:: Peluang untuk terjadinya sesuatu yang akan mempunyai dampak yang berpengaruh terhadap pencapaian tujuan.

HazardsHazards:: is a source of potential harm or a situation with the potential to cause loss.

BahayaBahaya:: adalah suatu sumber potensi kerugian atau suatu situasi dengan potensi yang menyebabkan kerugian/ kehilangan.

DifinisiDifinisi

PengertianPengertian

Risk = Hazards X Exposure X Probability

Hirarki PengendalianHirarki Pengendalian

Risiko di tempat kerja dikurangi dng. Prioritas sbb : Pengendalian Rekayasa (Engineering

Control)

Pengendalian secara Administrasi & Praktek pengoperasian (SOP) .

Alat Pelindung Diri (APD/PPE).

Aplikasi kebijakan menejemen & prosedur u/ memaksimalkan kesempatan dan meminimalkan kerugian (LOSS)

Aplikasi kebijakan menejemen, prosedur & praktek (practices) u/ Identifikasi, Analisa, Evaluasi dan Menangani risiko.

Menejemen dlm. Suatu iklim ketidak pastian.

Safety Safety : is managing risk to avoid or minimize loss or injury.

Pro- AktifSistimatisBerdasarkan Fakta-2 dan Analisa

LogikaMemperhitungkan kenyataan

kenyataan politis yg. Lain.

Why …..

Untuk memperbaiki pengambilan keputusan pd. Setiap tingkat mgm. Keputusan berdasarkan analisa,

ketimbang perasaan, keberanian.Untuk mencegah kejadian yg. Tidak

diharapkan/ tdk.direncanakan.Menejemen perubahan yg. Efektif.Membuat kesempatan yg. Paling

baik.

Hazards Analysis ToolsHAZOPFMEAFault TreesEven TreesDecision Trees JSA (Job Safety Analysis).

Tentukan Konteks

Identifikasi Risiko

Analisa Risiko

Evaluasi & Rangking Risiko

Treat (menangani) Risiko

Ass

ess

Ris

ks

Monitor&

Review

1

2

3

4

5

Hierarchy of Risk Reduction

ELIMINATION is more powerful than………

PREVENTION is more powerful than………

CONTROL is more powerful than………

MITIGATION is more powerful than………

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Analyzing Risk

MEDIUM

HIGH

LOW

Probability

1 2 3 4 5

A

B

C

DCon

sequ

ence

E

Reduced Risk

Reducing Risk

Emergency Response and other Barriers

Eliminate

Prevention, Engineering

Control (PassiveActiveOps.)

Mitigate (PassiveActiveOperational)

RESIDUAL RISK (Managed to ALARP)

HIGH

LOW

Probability

1 2 3 4 5

A

B

C

DCon

sequ

ence

E

Probability

1 2 3 4 5

A

B

C

DCon

sequ

ence

E

MEDIUM

DocumentBU maintain hazard registers with

corresponding risk ranking

What’s the purpose? Hazard Identification

What can go wrong?Consequence Evaluation

How bad? Frequency Estimation

How often?Risk Criteria and Assessment

So what?

Risk Tools Pyramid

Process

Business

Social Impact Assessment

Health Risk Assessment

Environmental Impact Assessment

Detail ProcessJob Safety Analysis

Task Risk Assessment

What if?

HAZID

FMEA

HAZOP

QRA

Major Accident Hazard Assessment

1.Tentukan konteks kegiatan

2.Apa yg. Akan terjadi ? Bagaimana dpt. Terjadi ?

3.Tentukan Kemungkinannya,& Konsekuensinya dan sekaligus tentukan tingkat risikonya.

4. Bandingkan thd. Kriteria yg. Telah ditentukan

5.Evaluasi pilihan penangannya, persiapkan rencana penangannya, laksanakan rencananya.

KonteksDifinisikan Ruang lingkupDifinisikan, keterpaparan risiko

secara umumAnalisa EvaluasiAmbil Tindakan (take action)Monitor

HHAZARDAZARD A ANALYSISNALYSIS(General definition)(General definition)

The identification of undesired event, that The identification of undesired event, that leads to the materialisation of the hazardleads to the materialisation of the hazard

The analysis of the mechanisms by which The analysis of the mechanisms by which those undesired event could occur those undesired event could occur

The estimation of the extent, magnitude The estimation of the extent, magnitude and relative likehood of any harmful and relative likehood of any harmful effectseffects

RISK

THE PRODUCT OF THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH AN EVENT IS ANTICIPATED TO OCCUR AND THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE EVENT OUTCOME

RISK = FREQUENCY x CONSEQUENCE

Hazard: An inherent physical or chemical characteristic of a material, system, process or plant that has the potential for causing harm.

Chemicals provide additional hazards due to the toxic, flammable, explosive, and reactive hazards.

Risk: For episodic events, risk is a function of probability and consequence.

Risk Analysis: Quantitative estimate of risk

Risk Assessment: Results of risk analysis are used to make decisions.

INDUSTRIAL RELATED DEFINITIONS

Safety Base procedure that was designed for minimizing the frequency and consequences of hazardous event and could be adjusted with the target for the activity concerned.

Safety Goals

Prevent: Death/injury to workers Death/injury to the general public

Damage to the facility Damage to surrounding property Damage to the environment

Industrial Accident

Many potential dangerous chemical substances (risk) Death or personal injury High potential magnitude of the occured explosion Financial loss occured after disaster accident (loss, damage or destruction of

property other than the product itself) Health-care – continuous exposure to error (impact)

$110M

$950M

$440M

$1.35BN

$300M

$0

$200M

$400M

$600M

$800M

$1BN

$1.2BN

$1.4BN

'98 '99 '00 '01 '02*

* 02 Loss Exceeding $50M include: Gas, plant fire, Kuwait $150M Refinery fire, Japan $ 75M Power station flood, Washington State $ 70M

FLIXBOROUGH, UK (1974) CYCLOHEXANEFLIXBOROUGH, UK (1974) CYCLOHEXANE INDUSTRIAL DAMAGES INDUSTRIAL DAMAGES28 Deaths, 128 Injures, $ 450 Million Lost28 Deaths, 128 Injures, $ 450 Million Lost

Hazard Evaluation

What is a hazard?

Hazard Evaluation PSIM relates to hazards that can cause “major accidents” (different from BP 8 Golden Safety Rules)

“Process” hazards………LEAKS, FIRES, EXPLOSIONS

“Logistics” hazards……SHIPS, RIGS, VEHICLES AND HELICOPTER COLLISIONS. BIG LIFTS (dropped objects)

“Natural” hazards………EARTHQUAKES, HURRICANES, LIGHTNING, EXTREME LOW TEMPERATURES, FOREST FIRES

“Security” hazards.……TERRORISM, SABOTAGE

Process safety disasters: new regulations

Flixborough UK 197427 fatalities

Phillips Pasadena US1989. 23 fatalities

Piper Alpha UK, 1988,167 fatalities

Algerian disaster, January 2004

Ship and rig collision hazards

Earthquake in Japan, Nov 2003

Unsafe spacing of storage tanks

Hazards of lightning

Hurricane damage to BP platform

Hazard Evaluation: key concepts

“Major accident”

Hazard identification……..risk assessment

Inherently safer design

“As low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP)

Safety critical equipment (SCE)

Hazard barrier diagramHAZARD

CONSEQUENCE

BARRIERSBARRIERS

ESCALATION CONTROLSESCALATION CONTROLS

TOP EVENT

HAZARD

CONSEQUENCE

BARRIERSBARRIERS

ESCALATION CONTROLSESCALATION CONTROLS

TOP EVENT

Recognizing Hazards

What are we trying to avoid?

• Barriers put in place between initiating event and accident

• Barrier failure/weakness visualized as holes

• Accident occurs when all barriers fail...

HAZARD

CONSEQUENCE

BARRIERSBARRIERS

ESCALATION CONTROLSESCALATION CONTROLS

TOP EVENT

Team exercise: barrier diagram

Turn to page 16 in your workbooks

Hazard barrier diagram

HAZARD

CONSEQUENCEBARRIERSBARRIERS ESCALATION CONTROLSESCALATION CONTROLS

TOP EVENT

Major accident

HARM TO

Death of two or more people

Long-term or widespread damage to the environment (up to 2 years)

Major costs or loss of revenue (> US$ 10 million)

Adverse headlines in international media: publicized prosecution

Major Hazard Risk MatrixNever heard

of in the world

Has occurred in the world but very unlikely

Incident has occurred in

BP

Incident has

occurred several

times in BP

Incident has

occurred several

times in the BU

Less than once in

10,000 years

Once every 1,000-

10,000 years

Once every 100-1,000

years

Once every 10-100 years

> Once every 10

years

Harm to People

Harm to Environmnt

BP Business

Impact

Reputation Damage 1 2 3 4 5

30+ fatalities

Long term damage to eco-system, poor potential for

recovery

>$1 billion

International media, BP forced to withdraw from region, public inquiry, loss of

A M H H H H

10-30 fatalities

Medium term damage to eco-

system, likelihood of

recovery within

$100 million - 1 billion

International media, regulator

intervention, major corporate

prosecution,

B M M H H H

1-10 fatalities

Change eco-system for up to

2 years with reasonable recovery

$ 10 million - 100 million

Headlines in international media, ongoing coverage in

national media, prosecution

C M M H H

Serious injury

Localised short-term change to eco-system,

good recovery potential

Potential for minor cost or

revenue impact to the BU

Headlines in national press and television,

possible prosecution by

regulator.

D M M H

First –aid / medical

treatment case, possible DAFWC

Change within scope of existing variability, can be

monitored

Negligible cost or revenue

impact

Mention in local press, queries by

regulatorE M M

CONSEQUENCE

PROBABILITY

Example of MAHA matrixNever heard

of in the world

Has occurred in the world

but very unlikely

Incident has occurred in BP

Incident has occurred

several times in BP

Incident has occurred

several times in the BU

Less than once in 10,000 years

Once every 1,000-10,000

years

Once every 100-1,000 years

Once every 10-100 years

> Once every 10 years

Harm to People

Harm to Environmnt

BP Business Impact

Reputation Damage 1 2 3 4 5

30+ fatalities

Long term damage to eco-system, poor

potential for recovery

>$1 billion

International media, BP forced to withdraw from region, public inquiry, loss of future access

A **** j,k,l d,e,f a

10-30 fatalities

Medium term damage to eco-

system, likelihood of recovery within 10

years

$100 million - 1 billion

International media, regulator intervention,

major corporate prosecution, punitive

fines

B ** * n,o,p,q,r,s,t g,h b,c

2-10 fatalities

Change eco-system for up to 2 years with reasonable

recovery potential

$ 10 million - 100 million

Headlines in international media, ongoing coverage in

national media, prosecution

C *** *** ** m i

Single fatality or serious injury

Localised short-term change to eco-system, good

recovery potential

Potential for minor cost or revenue

impact to the BU

Headlines in national press and television,

possible prosecution by regulator.

D **** ***** **** **

First –aid / medical treatment case,

possible DAFWC

Change within scope of existing

variability, can be monitored

Negligible cost or revenue impact

Mention in local press, queries by regulator E * ****** *** * ***

CONSEQUENCE

PROBABILITY

Cassia platform, Trinidad

Oil Gas

Banyan

Trinidad

Samaan AP

Teak A/EComplex

Poui AP

Immortelle

Flamboyant

Cassia

Amherstia

Atlantic LNG

30” NGC

Beachfield

Port-Of-Spain

GaleotaPoint

Samaan BD

Samaan CD

Teak D

18”

Teak BD

18”

16”

Mahogany

40” & 12”

Teak CD

Poui BD

Trinidad

GaleotaTerminal

36”

30” export gas riser beneath accommodation module. No subsea check or block valve. 60km pipeline to shore. Pressure 900psig. Condition of riser in splash zone unclear. Critical inspections and maintenance WOs overdue….HIGH RISK

ALARPR

I S

K

EFFORT

ALARP REGION

EX

PEN

DIT

UR

EProbability

1 2 3 4 5

A

B

C

DCon

sequ

ence

E LOW

HIGH

Reduced Risk

MEDIUM

Indonesia: major accident scenarios? Ship collision into manned platform

Fire from gas export riser between topside ESDV and sea surface, manned platform

Rupture of subsea oil pipeline

Lightning strike and fire of condensate tank

Pig launching / receiving leak / fire

Which is inherently safer?

In your teams find 5 differences between these cans and decide which design is the safer.

Which is inherently safer?

Stainless steel wet gas line

Carbon steel dry gas line

Inherent safety design (ISD) concepts

• Eliminate or reduce quantities of hazardous materials

• Minimize potential leak/ignition sources

• Use corrosion resistant materials• Separate people from hazardous

materials• Preference for simple over complex

Inherent safety offshore: exercise

Manning Platform orientation

Location of crane Location of risers

Approach routing of pipelines Welded-in versus flanged valves

Platform layout: separation / segregation Minimisation of hydrocarbon inventory

Pressure rating of process piping and equipment Location of riser ESD valves and design of actuators

Tangguh Platform Inherent Safety Goals

Minimise inventory Minimise potential leak paths Minimum corrosion by use of suitable materials Minimise erosion & intervention by minimizing sand production Minimise spec. breaks and relief systems Maximise natural ventilation Keep the design and operating activities simple Use best available technology Minimise helicopter flights Minimise processing Maximise reliability Eliminate fabric maintenance Minimise inspection, maintenance and intervention Minimum number of wells Casing and well internals to last for lifetime w/o services and well

entry Eliminate hazardous well activities Max design such platform incidents do not endanger drilling rigs Minimise Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) Minimise manning requirement

Platform inherent safety features

No hydrocarbon processing to reduce leaks and inventories

Open layout and grated decks to increase gas

dispersion

No helicopters philosophy to minimise hazards

No platform power generation to avoid

hazardous storage and operations

Pig launcher optimization to

avoid line blockage

NUI with no overnight accommodation to avoid

personnel exposure

CRA piping to eliminate corrosion

Topsides rated for WHSP to simplify and avoid overpressure

Deluge challenge to simplify and avoid congestion and maintenance

$2.0 Billion in losses

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT CASE

On the night of the July 6th 1988, aseries of explosion ripped the Pipper Alpha Platform appart, kiliing 167 people and only 61 people survived

Daily incidental Statistics

OSHA FAR FR

Chemical Industry 0.49 4Steel Industry 1.54 8Coal Mining 2.22 40Agriculture 4.53 10

Staying at Home 3Traveling by Car 57 17 x 10

-5

Rock Climbing 4000 4 x 10 -5

20 Cigarettes / day 500 x 10-5

Struck by Meteorite 6 x 10 -11

Struck by Lightning 1 x 10-7

Fire 150 x 10 -7

Run over by Car 600 x 10-7

*

* 50% by chemical exposure

FAR Fatal Accident Rate fatalities per 1000 employees and entire life = 108 h exposure

FR Fatality Rate per person per year (exposure poorly defined)

OSHA Occupational Safety & Health Administrationincidence rate per 100 worker years = 200,000 h exposure

Chemical Plant Accidents

Fire High Low Intermediate

Explosio Intermediate Intermediate High

Toxic Release Low High Low

RiskHazard

Fatalities

HazardEconomic

Loss

None

Property Damage

Injury

Disabled1

100

500

10.000

Accident Pyramid

None

Defeating Accidents

Step Desired Effect

Initiation Diminish Grounding, bondingInerting

Explosion proof electricalGuardrails and guardsMaintenance proceduresHot-work permits

Human factors designProcess design

Awareness properties chemicals

Propagation Diminish Emergency material transferReduce inventories of flammablesEquipment spacing and layout

Nonflammable construction materialsEmergency shut-off valves

Termination Increase FirefightingRelief systemsSprinklers

Emergency shut-off valves

PROCEDURESTEPDESIREDEFFECT