lib.ui.ac.idlib.ui.ac.id/file?file=digital/20312867-s 43168-pelanggaran... · iv universitas...

UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA

PELANGGARAN TERHADAP HAK ASASI MANUSIA ATAS

LINGKUNGAN HIDUP OLEH PERUSAHAAN

TRANSNASIONAL DALAM HUKUM INTERNASIONAL

SKRIPSI

MARGARETHA QUINA

0806342636

FAKULTAS HUKUM

PROGRAM STUDI ILMU HUKUM

DEPOK

JULI 2012

Pelanggaran terhadap..., Margaretha Quina, FH UI, 2012.


PELANGGARAN TERHADAP HAK ASASI MANUSIA ATAS

LINGKUNGAN HIDUP OLEH PERUSAHAAN TRANSNASIONAL

DALAM HUKUM INTERNASIONAL

SKRIPSI

Diajukan sebagai salah satu syarat untuk memperoleh gelar Sarjana Hukum

MARGARETHA QUINA

0806342636

FAKULTAS HUKUM

PROGRAM STUDI ILMU HUKUM

KEKHUSUSAN HUKUM TENTANG HUBUNGAN TRANSNASIONAL

DEPOK

JULI 2012


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iii



iv


KATA PENGANTAR

Puji dan Syukur Penulis panjatkan kepada Tuhan, cahaya yang selalu

membimbing, memberikan harapan atas damai dan bahagia, cinta yang selalu ada

dan sabda yang tak bisa terlupa; karena atas kesempatan lahir, berpikir, dan

bermimpi, serta berkat dan semangat yang dititipkannyalah Penulis dapat

menyelesaikan skripsi berjudul “Pelanggaran Terhadap Hak Asasi Manusia

Atas Lingkungan Hidup Oleh Perusahaan Transnasional Dalam Hukum

Internasional”. Penulisan skripsi ini dilakukan dalam rangka memenuhi salah

satu syarat menjadi Sarjana Hukum Program Kekhususan VI (Hukum Tentang

Hubungan Transnasional) pada Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia.

Penulis ingin menghaturkan rasa terima kasih sedalam-dalamnya pula

kepada orang-orang yang telah memberikan warna dalam penyusunan skripsi ini

maupun selama perjalanan Penulis dalam proses untuk menjadi seorang terpelajar:

1. Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia; pendiri, pengabdi, seluruh fasilitas

dan elemen-elemennya yang telah melingkupi Penulis selama empat tahun

ini. Sungguh suatu karunia berada di lingkungan yang mengajarkan berbagai

cara pandang, memperkenalkan berbagai jenis manusia yang memacu Penulis

menjadi seseorang yang lebih baik dan lebih berguna. Tetaplah menjadi

tempat cahaya-cahaya bangsa ditempa, dan semoga semakin banyak

membentuk manusia;

2. Teramat spesial pula untuk Bapak Adijaya, S.H., LL.M., Pembimbing I

dalam penyusunan skripsi ini, atas diskusi, saran, kritik, bimbingan, dan

pengertiannya. Tak kurang teruntuk Bang Hadi, Pembimbing II, atas

kesabaran, masukan-masukan, kelucuan, dan diskusi-diskusi menarik yang

didedikasikan dalam menghadapi murid bimbingan dan skripsinya yang rumit

dan abstrak ini;

3. Seluruh dosen FHUI dengan karakter dan kenangannya masing-masing,

terlebih Ibu Henny Marlina, Pembimbing Akademis paling rock n roll,

teman, motivator, ibu yang begitu perhatian. Tak lupa seluruh dosen Program


v


Kekhususan VI Hukum Transnasional, khususnya Ibu Tiurma Pitta dan Bang

Yu Un Opposunggu atas pelajarannya untuk menjadi yang terpelajar;

4. Untuk keluarga Penulis, harta paling berharga, tempat pulang penuh cinta;

yang telah membentuk, melindungi, menyayangi Penulis dengan tulus hingga

siap menghadapi dunia. Terutama untuk Papa, ayah teraneh, tertampan, the

coolest I could ever have, atas waktu, diskusi, penerimaan, pendampingannya

dalam setiap pencarian. Mama, ibu yang tak biasa, yang tertulus, tercantik,

berhati besar, yang selalu ada dan membiarkan Penulis menjadi apapun yang

diinginkannya bagi dunia. Santi, my half-soul sister, I hate you forever for

being just perfect companion for me;

5. Teman-teman PK VI, sumber inspirasi, energi tak terbatas, kreativitas-

kreativitas unik, yang selalu mengingatkan Penulis untuk berani bermimpi

dan menjadi diri sendiri. Terima kasih telah memberikan Penulis kesempatan

kenal dengan pribadi-pribadi yang begitu mengesankan dan belajar dari

kalian semua, dan merasakan satu tahun kelas intens dengan individu-

individu unik, melewati malam dan subuh penuh tawa dengan lelucon

berkualitas;

6. Keluarga besar BEM FHUI 2010, terutama untuk Ray Aryaputra Singgih,

Randi Ikhlas, dan Josye Barus; orang-orang hebat, mentor, kakak, pemimpin,

yang telah melindungi, membimbing, menantang, dan memberikan

kesempatan bagi Penulis untuk bermimpi, belajar, dan berkarya melalui

karya-karya kecil dan naif kita dalam BEM dan kesempatan lainnya;

7. Untuk dua puluh lentera kecil, jiwa-jiwa naif yang telah rela mengorbankan

setahun mencicipi Departemen Pengabdian Masyarakat BEM FHUI 2010.

Terima kasih atas tawa kekanakan yang selalu ada saat kita bersama, dan

terlebih terima kasih karena telah mengajarkan penulis arti bersyukur dalam

situasi terburuk, bersiap walaupun dalam rencana terbaik, berjuang sebagai

yang tak terlihat, dan tetap berbahagia. Tak lupa Dea Merissa dan Dita

Rahmasari yang memperkenalkan pada Pengabdian Masyarakat. Serta

terutama dan terspesial untuk Annisa Fadilla, pasangan yang tak pernah


vi


mengeluh, selalu ceria, ringan, dengan semua ide segar dan ketulusannya

untuk selalu saling melengkapi;

8. Keluarga Hendra Soenardi, lawfirm pertama yang meletakkan mimpi penulis

dalam realita. Bapak Eddy Hendra dan Soenardi Pardi, pribadi-pribadi unik,

pemimpin sesungguhnya yang mendorong orang lain untuk berani menjadi

yang terbaik dan tak berhenti sebagai ‘sekedar’. Tak lupa untuk Cakra

Perkasa, atas ambisi dan inspirasinya di hari-hari pertama Penulis sebagai

mahasiswa; serta Anita Abigail untuk motivasi dan pendampingannya ketika

mulai bermimpi;

9. Keluarga One Link Consulting, khususnya Ibu Sylvia Maladi; mentor, teman,

pembimbing, pengajar, motivator; atas kesempatan dan kesabarannya

menampung keingintahuan Penulis, atas pelajarannya untuk berkreasi

menemukan jalan di belantara, you’re the hottest boss, Ma’am!;

10. PT Freeport Indonesia, khususnya Legal Department. Terima kasih atas

kesempatannya mencari perspektif lain dalam tiga bulan yang menyenangkan,

pembelajaran untuk mengkritisi akuntabilitas dan merasakan menjadi bagian

kecil dari sebuah entitas raksasa;

11. Keluarga Palu’e Kuliah Kerja Nyata UI 2011; satu bulan yang mengubah

selamanya. Pulau kecil, orang-orang tak dikenal dengan jiwa yang begitu

besar, pribadi-pribadi hebat di mana penulis belajar arti kebahagiaan dalam

ketiadaan, kesederhanaan, cinta, mimpi, tanah air, dan bersyukur dalam setiap

keadaan. Terutama untuk Pater Budi Kleden dan Pater Otto Gusti, guru

terdekat, cahaya dunia. Juga empat orang spesial, Julia Ikasarana, Dwi Susilo

Komar, Anju Hasiholan, Risa Rizania, serta empat belas mahasiswa tangguh

lainnya, yang Penulis yakini ketangguhannya dalam mewujudkan mimpi-

mimpi luar biasa. Tak lupa guru yang mengajarkan hidup dan realita; Papa

Mboy Zakarias dan Mama Pali, terima kasih atas peluh tanpa keluh, diskusi

dan mimpi, tuak dan pesta, serta cinta yang sebening lautan Flores;

12. Keluarga besar AIESEC, empat keluarga angkat, orang-orang asing yang

berubah menjadi sahabat, juga bocah-bocah berjiwa muda yang haus


vii


pengetahuan dan pengalaman akan dunia; atas dua bulan dongeng nyata di

Istanbul, serta kehangatan, pelajaran untuk bertahan sendirian, manisnya

kepolosan, dan tantangan untuk menjadi yang tak terbatas dalam jiwa muda;

13. Keluarga Mahasiswa Katolik, kakak-kakak, teman-teman, adik-adik seiman

atas ruang spiritualnya. Terima kasih atas kesediaannya untuk menjadi sedikit

terang, sedikit kehangatan, and simply... a family. Juga keluarga Taekwondo

FHUI, Paragita UI, Bipop UI, Equestrian UI, untuk sempat memuaskan

dahaga tubuh yang kehausan bergerak dan otak kanan yang memohon sedikit

seni. Tak lupa LBH Masyarakat, Yapusa, serta Lapas Anak Tangerang yang

telah memberi ruang untuk berbagi, memberi makan jiwa, dan berbahagia;

14. Maria Yudithia, Budi Susilo, Fallissa Ananda; sahabat yang tak pernah

hilang, teman berjuang dan bermimpi, kisah remaja-remaja kota kecil untuk

bertahan di kota besar, masa SMA yang abadi. Tak lupa Muhammad Rizki,

Rima Monique, Priska Betya, Aisyah Mulya, untuk nikmatnya rasa ‘rumah’

dan ‘masa remaja’, sebuah motivasi berpulang;

15. Lingkungan hidup. Keluarga PALAXSA, Bekap dan Sores, Huda Robbani,

Lina dan Irma, John, Bona, Agan, Boyan, manusia-manusia alam yang

menjelajah hutan, gunung, sawah, lautan; yang telah begitu indah

menafsirkan hidup, rasa, cita. Semua yang pernah memberikan pengalaman

mahal bergumul dengan alam, senggama dengan sepi, keinginan untuk

menjaga, dan sebuah rasa bahagia tak berpikir tentang hari esok;

16. Putra Aditya, I Gusti Agung Putra Trisnajaya, Supriyanto Ginting, terima

kasih karena telah ada dan selalu ada, mengerti dan menerima, without any

reason. Maryam Az-Zahra, Meidiana Adhika, Elizabeth Lubis, Maria Jayanti;

sahabat-sahabat pertama, gadis-gadis terfavorit Penulis, pribadi berbeda yang

tak pernah takut untuk jadi berbeda;

17. Najmu Laila, Damianagatayuvens, Andri Rizki Putra, Fadhillah Rizky, atas

pembelajaran, mimpi-mimpi, dan ambisi-ambisi yang dirajut bersama.

Terima kasih atas visi dan setiap detail yang bisa Penulis ambil dari kalian,

inspirasi dari orang-orang terdekat;


viii


18. Andri Sanjaya, Ilman Hadi, Ratyan Noer Hartiko, Try Indriadi, Fikri

Hamdani; kakak-kakak paling kejam, lovely devils, bodyguards, yang selalu

setia menemani dan menjaga Penulis membunuh waktu di Lobby FHUI

dengan segala tawa, absurditas, barbaritas, kelucuan, keanehan kalian;

19. Keluarga Griya Pangestu; Ellen, Nda, Kak Trias, Kak Lia, Owpy, Gina, Ibu

Korah, Ibu Endang, wanita-wanita khas Gripang, pemberani-pemberani yang

mengajarkan untuk siap memanjat pagar tinggi sekalipun dengan high heels;

20. Kekasih, saudara sekaligus keluarga, Paroeh Waktoe. Terima kasih atas

kehangatan, perlindungan, dentingan nada, benderang panggung, mimpi dan

cita dalam musik dan lirik. Terima kasih telah menyediakan sebuah dunia lain

untuk sebentar lari dari dunia yang biasa dengan cinta yang luar biasa pula;

21. Untuk persinggahan-persinggahan spesial yang tak akan Penulis sebutkan,

terima kasih telah membuka hati untuk disinggahi, dan bersama mencari arti.

Depok, ___ Juli 2012

Penulis


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HALAMAN PERNYATAAN PERSETUJUAN PUBLIKASI

TUGAS AKHIR UNTUK KEPENTINGAN AKADEMIS

Sebagai sivitas akademik Universitas Indonesia, saya yang bertanda tangan di

bawah ini:

Nama : Margaretha Quina

NPM : 0806342636

Program Studi : Ilmu Hukum

Fakultas : Hukum

Jenis Karya : Skripsi

demi pengembangan ilmu pengetahuan, menyetujui untuk memberikan kepada

Universitas Indonesia Hak Bebas Royalti Nonekslusif (Non-exclusive Royalty-

Free Right) atas karya ilmiah saya yang berjudul:

Pelanggaran Terhadap Hak Asasi Manusia Atas Lingkungan Hidup Oleh

Perusahaan Transnasional Dalam Hukum Internasional

Dengan Hak Bebas Royalti Nonekslusif ini Universitas Indonesia berhak

menyimpan, mengalihmedia/format-kan, mengelola dalam bentuk pangkalan data

(database), merawat, dan memublikasikan tugas akhir saya selama tetap

mencantumkan nama saya sebagai penulis/pencipta dan sebagai pemilik Hak

Cipta.

Demikian pernyataan ini saya buat dengan sebenarnya.

Dibuat di : Depok

Pada tanggal : 5 Juli 2012

Yang menyatakan

(Margaretha Quina)


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ABSTRAK

Nama : Margaretha Quina

Program Studi : Ilmu Hukum

Judul : Pelanggaran Terhadap Hak Asasi Manusia Atas Lingkungan

Hidup Oleh Perusahaan Transnasional Dalam Hukum

Internasional

Skripsi ini membahas pokok permasalahan sebagai berikut: (1)

Bagaimanakah pengakuan hak atas lingkungan hidup sebagai bagian dari hak

asasi manusia dalam hukum internasional?; (2) Bagaimanakah tanggung jawab

yang dibebankan terhadap perusahaan transnasional terkait permasalahan

lingkungan hidup dalam hukum internasional?; dan (3) Bagaimana

pertanggungjawaban perusahaan transnasional terhadap pelanggaran hak atas

lingkungan hidup telah diterapkan terutama dalam perkara-perkara gugatan

masyarakat terhadap perusahaan transnasional?

Secara garis besar, analisis didasarkan pada studi literatur mengenai

perkembangan doktrin dan pengaturan hak atas lingkungan hidup, dengan

meninjau perjanjian internasional baik yang bersifat global maupun regional,

instrumen soft law, dan hukum kebiasaan internasional; serta tinjauan

pertanggungjawaban yang dibebankan oleh instrumen-instrumen hukum

internasional terhadap perusahaan transnasional dalam hal pemenuhan hak atas

lingkungan hidup. Selanjutnya dianalisis mengenai keberlakuan hak atas

lingkungan hidup sebagai hukum internasional terhadap perusahaan transnasional,

serta pertanggungjawaban yang dapat dibebankan terhadapnya.

Dalam analisis, dibahas mengenai tiga kasus pelanggaran hak atas

lingkungan hidup oleh perusahaan transnasional, yaitu Aguinda v. Texaco, Lubbe

v. Cape PLC, dan Beanal v. Freeport McMoran. Dalam analisis, dapat terlihat

bahwa dalam perkara-perkara tersebut: (1) Hukum internasional tidak diterapkan

secara langsung; (2) Terhentinya perkara dalam proses yurisdiksi; (3) Adanya

irisan ranah hukum publik dan privat dalam substansi dan formil perkara; (4)

Pelanggaran hak atas lingkungan hidup diterjemahkan dalam pelanggaran hak-hak

asasi secara umum; dan (5) Adanya irisan antara akuntabilitas dan liabilitas

perusahaan transnasional. Selain itu, terdapat kecenderungan bahwa pengaturan

tanggung jawab lingkungan hidup terhadap perusahaan transnasional ini akan

menjadi hukum internasional di masa depan.

Secara ringkas, simpulan yang didapat menjawab secara positif adanya

pengakuan hak atas lingkungan hidup sebagai bagian dari hak asasi manusia

dalam hukum internasional, namun pengaturan pertanggungjawabannya terhadap

perusahaan transnasional masih mendasarkan pada instrumen yang bersifat

sukarela tanpa menyinggung liabilitas, sehingga masyarakat yang dirugikan masih

kesulitan untuk mendapatkan ganti kerugian atas hak-hak asasinya yang dilanggar

karena perusakan lingkungan oleh perusahaan transnasional.

Kata Kunci:

Hak Asasi Manusia, Hak atas Lingkungan Hidup, Perusahaan Transnasional,

Bisnis dan Hak Asasi Manusia, Hukum Lingkungan Internasional


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ABSTRACT

Name : Margaretha Quina

Study Program : Law

Title : Violations of Human Rights to Environment by Transnational

Corporations in International Law

This undergraduate thesis tries to answer following questions: (1) How

does right to environment recognized as a part of human rights in international

law?; (2) How does liability imposed upon transnational corporation related to

environmental harms in international law; (3) How does transnational

corporations' liability has been enforced in claims by injured civilians towards

transnational corporations?

Generally, the analysis is based on literature study concerning

development of doctrine and regulation on right to environment, considering

global and regional treaties and soft law instruments, also customary international

law; and examination of liability imposed by international legal instruments on

transnational corporations in regards of fulfillment of right to environment.

Further, Writer analyses enforceability of right to environment as international

law towards transnational corporations, and liability imposed upon them.

In analysis, three cases on environmental violations by transnational

corporations have been examined, which are Aguinda v. Texaco, Lubbe v. Cape

PLC, and Beanal v. Freeport McMoran. It is concluded that in such cases: (1)

International law is not imposed directly; (2) Dismissal on jurisdictional process;

(3) The intersection of public and private legal area in the substance and process

of the cases; (4) Violation of right to environment is translated into violations of

general human rights; (5) The intersection of transnational corporations'

accountability and liability. Further, there is a tendency that regulation of

environmental liability to transnational corporations will be international law in

the future.

In brief, the conclusion answers in positive the recognition of right to

environment as a part of human rights in international law, yet still bases

transnational corporation accountability on the voluntary instruments silent on

liability provisions, causing the injured community troubled in demanding

compensation for their violated right to environment related to environmental

harms by transnational corporations.

Key words:

Human Rights, Right to Environment, Transnational Corporations, Business and

Human Rights, International Environmental Law


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DAFTAR ISI

HALAMAN JUDUL ............................................................................................... i

LEMBAR PERNYATAAN ORISINALITAS ...................................................... ii

LEMBAR PENGESAHAN .................................................................................. iii

KATA PENGANTAR .......................................................................................... iv

LEMBAR PERSETUJUAN PUBLIKASI KARYA ILMIAH ............................. ix

ABSTRAK .............................................................................................................. x

DAFTAR ISI ........................................................................................................ xii

DAFTAR BAGAN ............................................................................................... xv

DAFTAR TABEL ............................................................................................... xvi

DAFTAR LAMPIRAN ....................................................................................... xvii

1. PENDAHULUAN .................................................................................... 1-19

1.1. Latar Belakang ......................................................................................... 1

1.2. Pokok Permasalahan .............................................................................. 11

1.3. Tujuan Penelitian ................................................................................... 12

1.4. Manfaat Penelitian ................................................................................. 12

1.5. Metode Penelitian .................................................................................. 13

1.6. Kerangka Konsepsional ......................................................................... 15

1.7. Sistematika Penulisan ............................................................................ 17

2. PERKEMBANGAN DOKTRIN DAN PENGATURAN HAK ATAS

LINGKUNGAN HIDUP ........................................................................ 20-47

2.1 Pengertian Hak atas Lingkungan Hidup Berdasarkan Doktrin ............. 20

2.1.1. Kategorisasi Hak atas Lingkungan Hidup: Right to Environment, Right

of Environment, dan Environmental Rights .......................................... 21

2.1.2 Ruang Lingkup dan Cakupan Hak atas Lingkungan Hidup .................. 24

2.2. Perjanjian Internasional dan Instrumen Soft Law yang Mengatur

Mengenai Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup ................................................ 31

2.2.1. Perjanjian Internasional: Hak Asasi Manusia yang

Mensyaratkan Lingkungan Hidup yang Sehat ........................... 32

2.2.1.1. Instrumen Global .......................................................... 32

2.2.1.2. Instrumen Regional ....................................................... 35

2.2.2. Instrumen Soft Law: Pengakuan Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup ... 37

2.3. Pandangan Mengenai Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup dari Segi Hukum

Kebiasaan Internasional ......................................................................... 41

2.3.1. Pembentukan Hukum Kebiasaan Internasional ......................... 41

2.3.2. Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup: Suatu Hukum Kebiasaan

Internasional? ............................................................................. 44


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3. TINJAUAN PERLINDUNGAN HAK ATAS LINGKUNGAN HIDUP

DALAM KEGIATAN BISNIS PERUSAHAAN TRANSNASIONAL .... 48

3.1. Tinjauan Right to Environment dalam Kegiatan Bisnis Transnasional . 48

3.1.1. Kegiatan Bisnis Transnasional dalam Bidang Ekstraksi Sumber

Daya Alam dan Dampaknya terhadap Lingkungan ................... 48

3.1.2. Degradasi Lingkungan dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap

Kesejahteraan Masyarakat ......................................................... 50

3.2. Perusahaan Transnasional Sebagai Aktor Bisnis Transnasional ........... 54

3.2.1. Pengertian Perusahaan Transnasional ........................................ 54

3.2.2. Bentuk Hukum Perusahaan Transnasional ................................ 57

3.2.3. Kesatuan Ekonomi dan Terpisahnya Entitas Hukum Perusahaan

Transnasional ............................................................................. 61

3.3. Tanggung Jawab Hukum Perusahaan Transnasional dalam Pemenuhan

Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup ................................................................. 63

3.3.1. United Nations Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational

Corporations (1990) .................................................................. 64

3.3.2. United Nations Global Compact (2000) .................................... 65

3.3.3. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2000) .......... 66

3.3.4. WSSD Plan of Implementation (2002) ....................................... 67

3.3.5. Draft Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational

Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to

Human Rights (2003) ................................................................. 69

3.3.6. Perluasan Interpretasi atas Instrumen Hukum Internasional yang

Ditujukan bagi Negara ............................................................... 72

3.4. Tinjauan Keberlakuan Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup Sebagai Hukum

Internasional Terhadap Perusahaan Transnasional................................ 74

3.4.1. Perusahaan Transnasional Sebagai Subjek Hukum Internasional

Terbatas ...................................................................................... 75

3.4.2. Mekanisme Gugatan Transnasional Terhadap Perusahaan

Transnasional ............................................................................. 79

3.4.3. Tanggung Jawab Hukum Perusahaan Transnasional dalam Hal

Terjadinya Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia ............................. 84

4. PENERAPAN HAK ATAS LINGKUNGAN HIDUP DALAM

GUGATAN MASYARAKAT MELAWAN PERUSAHAAN

TRANSNASIONAL ...................................................................................... 89

4.1. Aguinda v. Texaco (Amerika Serikat, 1993) ......................................... 89

4.1.1. Posisi Kasus ............................................................................... 91

4.1.2. Jurisdiksi dan Pertanggungjawaban Perusahaan Transnasional 94

4.1.3. Hak atas Lingkungan Hidup dalam Dalil Gugatan dan Putusan

Hakim ........................................................................................ 99


xiv


4.2. Lubbe v. Cape PLC (Inggris, 1999-2003) ........................................... 102

4.2.1. Posisi Kasus ............................................................................. 103


Hakim ...................................................................................... 104

4.3. Beanal v. Freeport McMoran (Amerika Serikat, 1996) ...................... 107

4.3.1. Posisi Kasus ............................................................................. 107


Hakim ..................................................................................... 108

4.4. Analisis Terhadap Pengakuan Atas Tanggung Jawab Perusahaan

Transnasional Terhadap Pelanggaran Terhadap Hak Atas Lingkungan

Hidup dalam Perkara-Perkara di Atas. ................................................ 112

4.4.1. Penerapan Hukum Internasional dalam Ketiga Perkara di Atas

Bukanlah Penerapan Secara Langsung .................................... 115

4.4.2. Ketiga Perkara di Atas Terhenti pada Proses Yurisdiksi ......... 118

4.4.3. Permasalahan Pelanggaran HAM atas Lingkungan Hidup oleh

Perusahaan Transnasional Berada dalam Irisan Ranah Hukum

Publik dan Privat ...................................................................... 119

4.4.4. Terdapat Pelanggaran Hak atas Lingkungan Hidup Secara

Besar-besaran dalam Ketiga Perkara di Atas. .......................... 121

4.4.5. Tanggung Jawab Perusahaan Transnasional: Antara

Akuntabilitas dan Liabilitas ..................................................... 124

4.5. Lex Feranda: Perkembangan Hukum Internasional dalam Pengakuan

Perusahaan Transnasional sebagai Pengemban Hak Atas Lingkungan

Hidup Secara Langsung. ...................................................................... 125

5. PENUTUP ................................................................................................... 130

5.1 Kesimpulan .......................................................................................... 130

5.2 Saran .................................................................................................... 132

DAFTAR PUSTAKA ......................................................................................... 134

LAMPIRAN ....................................................................................................... xviii


xv


DAFTAR BAGAN

Bagan 3.1 Proses Ekstraksi Dalam Pertambangan Secara Umum ......................... 49


xvi


DAFTAR TABEL

Tabel 4.1 Ringkasan Analisis Perbandingan Perkara .......................................... 112


xvii


DAFTAR LAMPIRAN

Lampiran 1 Aguinda v. Texaco: Original Complaint, 1993

Lampiran 2 Aguinda v. Texaco: Decision of Federal Court (Eastern

District of Lousiana), 2001

Lampiran 3 Aguinda v. Texaco: Decision of the Court of Appeal, 2002

Lampiran 4 Lubbe v. Cape PLC: Decision of the Court of Appeal, 1998

Lampiran 5 Lubbe v. Cape PLC: Decision of the House of Lords, 2000

Lampiran 6 Beanal v. Freeport McMoran: Original Complaint, 1996

Lampiran 7 Beanal v. Freeport McMoran: Federal Court Decision,

1997

Lampiran 8 Beanal v. Freeport McMoran: Court of Appeal Decision,

1999

Lampiran 9 United Nations Draft Principles On Human Rights And

The Environment

Lampiran 10 United Nations Draft Norms On The Responsibilities Of

Transnational Corporations And Other Business

Enterprises With Regard To Human Rights

Lampiran 11 Wawancara dengan Rhino Subagyo (Senior Researcher

dari Indonesian Center for Environmental Law)


1


BAB 1

PENDAHULUAN

1.1. Latar Belakang Penelitian

Hukum bukanlah suatu skema yang final (finite scheme), namun terus

bergerak, berubah, mengikuti dinamika kehidupan manusia.1 Dalam konteks

hukum internasional, hal ini dapat terlihat dengan terus berkembanganya sistem

hukum internasional yang terdiri dari substansi, struktur, serta budaya hukum.2

Masyarakat internasional telah dan sedang mengalami berbagai perubahan yang

besar dan pokok, yang menyebabkan adanya perkembangan dalam hakikat

masyarakat internasional dewasa ini. Perubahan-perubahan tersebut antara lain

ialah perubahan peta bumi politik yang terjadi terutama setelah Perang Dunia II,

kemajuan teknologi, dan struktur masyarakat internasional.3 Perkembangan

terdahulu dalam hal struktur telah menunjukkan timbulnya perubahan dalam

struktur masyarakat internasional yang tadinya didasarkan pada bangsa, yang

kemudian beranjak pada hubungan antara negara yang berdaulat, hingga

diakuinya beberapa organisasi atau lembaga internasional yang mempunyai

1 Satjipto Rahardjo, Penegakan Hukum Progresif, (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010),

halaman judul. Dalam teori hukum progresif, Prof. Satjipto Raharjo menggambarkan hakikat

hukum yang tidak sekedar sebagai rumusan perundang-undangan, namun juga merupakan suatu

perilaku yang berkembang di masyarakat. Karena itu, hukum harus terus dibedah dan digali

melalui upaya-upaya progresif untuk dapat menemukan kebenaran dalam mencapai keadilan.

Teori ini sebenarnya muncul dalam konteks hukum nasional, namun dalam pemikirannya Prof.

Satjipto melandaskan pada dasar filosofis dari hukum, yaitu hakikat hukum untuk manusia.

2 Menurut Lawrence W. Friedman, sistem hukum terdiri atas struktur hukum (legal

structure), substansi hukum (legal substance), dan budaya hukum (legal culture). Ia menentukan

pengertian struktur adalah, “The structure of a system is its skeleton framework; it is the

permanent shape, the institutional body of the system, the tough rigid nones that keep the

process flowing within bounds..”; sedangkan substansi dirumuskan sebagai, “The substance is

composed of substantive rules and rules about how institutions should behave,”; dan budaya

hukum yaitu “The legal culture, system their beliefs, values, ideas and expectation. Legal culture

refers, then, to those ports of general culture customs, opinions ways of doing and thinking that

bend social forces toward from the law and in particular ways.”. Lawrence W. Friedman,

American Law: An Invaluable Guide To The Many Faces of the Law, And How It Affects Our

Daily Lives, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984), hlm. 1-8. dan pada “Legal Culture

and Social Development”, Stanford Law Review, (New York, 1987), hlm. 1002-1010 serta

dalam Law in America: a Short History, (New York: Modern Library Chronicles Book, 2002),

hlm. 4-7

3 Mochtar Kusumaatmadja dan Etty R. Agoes, Pengantar Hukum Internasional, (Bandung:

P.T. Alumni, 2003), hlm. 20-24.


2


eksistensi terlepas dari negara-negara.4 Sementara perubahan pada peta bumi

politik ditandai dengan proses emansipasi bangsa-bangsa dan munculnya begitu

banyak negara merdeka, yang pada perkembangan selanjutnya berkembang pula

dalam klasifikasi geopolitik lainnya seperti timur-barat, utara-selatan; maupun

klasifikasi negara berkembang dan negara maju.5

Salah satu perkembangan yang memiliki akibat yang sangat besar terhadap

masyarakat internasional dan hukum internasional yang mengaturnya ialah

kemajuan teknologi. Kemajuan teknologi dan munculnya berbagai alat

perhubungan menambah mudahnya hubungan yang melintasi batas negara.6

Revolusi Industri yang dimulai di Inggris pada abad ke-18 dan kemudian

menyebar ke Eropa, Amerika Utara, hingga seluruh dunia, merupakan momentum

sejarah yang begitu penting yang menandai perubahan besar di bidang agrikultur,

manufaktur, pertambangan, transportasi, dan bidang-bidang lainnya.7 Salah satu

dampak yang paling menonjol dari revolusi industri ialah munculnya entitas-

entitas bisnis besar yang didukung dengan produksi massal berskala besar, yang

muncul beriringan dengan ideologi pasar bebas (laissez-faire economics).8 Pada

masa inilah, tepatnya pada pertengahan abad ke-19, korporasi-korporasi raksasa

mulai bermunculan, dan mulai muncullah suatu entitas yang dikenal sebagai

Transnational Corporations (selanjutnya disebut Perusahaan Transnasional).9

4 Ibid., hlm. 22.

5 Sekarang tercatat 193 negara berdaulat yang terdaftar sebagai anggota PBB (Persekutuan

Bangsa-Bangsa), di mana sebelum pecahnya Perang Dunia II hanya 63 negara yang terdaftar

sebagai anggota LBB (Liga Bangsa-Bangsa), United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG),

“Chronology of League of Nations”, Sumber: http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/

%28httpAssets%29/3DA94AAFEB9E8E76C1256F340047BB52/$file/sdn_chronology.pdf, serta

United Nations Official Website, “Member States of United Nations”, Sumber:

http://www.un.org/en/members/

6 Mochtar Kusumaatmadja dan Etty R. Agoes, Pengantar Hukum Internasional, hlm. 23.

7 Berg, Maxine dan Pat Hudson "Rehabilitating the Industrial Revolution". The Economic

History Review (Vol. 45, No. 1, 1992), hlm. 24–50.

8 Charles W. Carey, Jr., "An Essay From 19th Century U.S. Newspaper Database:

Corporations and Big Business", Gale Digital Collection, Sumber: http://www.gale.cengage.com

/pdf/whitepapers /gdc/Corporations_whtppr.pdf

9 Dalam berbagai literatur, terdapat perbedaan penyebutan dalam menyebut Perusahaan

Transnasional ini. Muchlinski sendiri menggunakan terminologi Multinational Enterprises, di

mana penggunaan enterprises ialah untuk menghindari pembatasan objek studi sebatas entitas


http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%20%28httpAssets%29/3DA94AAFEB9E8E76C1256F340047BB52/$file/sdn_chronology.pdf




http://www.gale.cengage.com/

3


Semenjak kemunculannya, perusahaan transnasional telah berkembang

pesat dan memainkan peranan yang cukup vital dalam dunia internasional,

terutama untuk pengaruhnya dalam bidang ekonomi. Tercatat secara teratur

bahwa perusahaan-perusahaan transnasional menyaingi negara sebagai unit-unit

organisasi ekonomi, dimana sebuah perbandingan antara penjualan korporasi

dengan gross domestic products (GDPs) negara-negara menunjukkan bahwa dari

100 entitas ekonomi terbesar di dunia, 51 diantaranya adalah korporasi dan 49

adalah negara.10

200 korporasi terbesar diperkirakan membentuk 27,5% dari

aktivitas ekonomi dunia11

, sehingga tidaklah mengejutkan bahwa korporasi

menyimbolkan baik sisi kreatif dan destruktif dari kapitalisme global.12

Tak dapat dipungkiri, kerusakan lingkungan dan pelanggaran hak asasi

manusia kerap ditemui di wilayah-wilayah Perusahaan Transnasional melakukan

operasinya, terutama terkait ekstraksi sumber daya alam. Perkara-perkara yang

diajukan oleh masyarakat lokal melawan perusahaan transnasional telah

mengemuka semenjak beberapa dekade yang lalu. Misalnya, pada tahun 1993,

sebuah gugatan class-action dari masyarakat Ekuador mengemuka pula di

Pengadilan Amerika Serikat di bawah Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA), yang

mendalilkan kerusakan lingkungan maupun personal yang disebabkan oleh

Texaco.13

Texaco (sekarang Chevron) melakukan pertambangan minyak di

wilayah utara hutan hujan Amazon, Ekuador, yang dikenal dengan nama Oriente.

bisnis yang telah didirikan dan grup korporasi yang berbasiskan relasi anak dan induk perusahaan

saja. Sementara Transnational Corporations merupakan istilah yang digunakan oleh ECOSOC

untuk tujuan program-program UN dalam hal MNE. Dalam buku ini, uraian Muchlinski

menguraikan pula terminologi yang berkembang, serta menyatakan bahwa tinjauan buku ini

merupakan tinjauan umum atas terminologi-terminologi tersebut, terlepas dari perdebatan yang

berlangsung. Untuk netralitas, maka Penulis menggunakan istilah Perusahaan Transnasional

sebagaima digunakan oleh ECOSOC. P.T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law,

(Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1995), hlm. 19-33.

10 Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise Of Corporate Global Power 9

(2000), Sumber: http://www.ips-dc.org/reports/top200.htm.

11 Ibid., hlm. 5.

12 Michael Anderson, “Transnational Corporations and Environmental..., hlm. 400.

13 Lihat: Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11,

1994), Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 745 (S.D.N.Y.

Jan. 31, 2000).


4


Polusi dan paparan toksin terjadi secara sistematis dari berbagai sumber, setiap

harinya selama hampir tiga dekade.14

Di wilayah hutan hujan yang secara kasar

luasnya tiga kali Manhattan ini, Texaco menambang 350 sumur minyak, dan

ketika meninggalkan negara tersebut pada 1992, yang tertinggal ialah sekitar

1.000 pit terbuka sisa bahan kimia penambangan. Dari pit terbuka inilah sungai

dan aliran air di mana sekitar 30.000 orang bergantung terhadap airnya sebagai

sumber air minum, untuk memasak, mandi, serta menangkap ikan, pada akhirnya

mengalami pencemaran berat. Di sungai Oriente, Texaco juga membuang lebih

dari 18 miliar galon racun dan formation water yang sangat salin, produk

sampingan dari pengeboran.15

Penduduk Oriente, tempat di mana Texaco

melaksanakan operasinya, dalam sebuah studi pada tahun 1993 dinyatakan

terpapar level kontaminan terkait minyak yang melebihi standar internasional.

Penyakit yang berhubungan dengan kulit juga banyak ditemukan, beserta

meningkatnya resiko penyakit-penyakit terkait reproduksi dan syaraf, begitu pula

dengan kanker.16

Texaco dalam perkara di atas, maupun perusahaan transnasional lainnya,

secara yuridis merupakan entitas yang terpisah dan berdiri secara mandiri, namun

secara ekonomi merupakan satu kesatuan.17

Hal ini memberikan keamanan bagi

induk perusahaan karena secara hukum induk perusahaan berada di luar yurisdiksi

negara tempat anak perusahaan beroperasi. Namun, pihak ketiga dari anak

perusahaan memiliki kerentanan dari sikap oportunis induk perusahaan yang

memanfaatkan celah hukum antara bentuk jamak secara yuridis dan kesatuan

14

Chevron Toxico, "A Rainforest Chernobyl", Sumber: http://chevrontoxico.com/about/

rainforest-chernobyl/

15 Ibid.

16 The Center For Economic And Social Rights, Rights Violations In The Ecuadorian

Amazon: The Human Consequences Of Oil Development, (Maret 1994), hlm. 23. Sumber:

http://www.cesr.org.

17 Sulistyowati menguraikan bahwa fakta pengendalian induk terhadap anak perusahaan

memungkinkan induk perusahaan mendominasi pengurusan anak perusahaan. Dominasi induk

terhadap anak perusahaan menyebabkan orientasi kepentingan ekonomi anak perusahaan

sepenuhnya ditujukan untuk mendukung kepentingan perusahaan grup. Sementara itu, dari sisi

hukum, status badan hukum induk dan anak perusahaan memberikan pengakuan yuridis sebagai

subjek hukum mandiri sehingga induk sebagai pemegang saham anak perusahaan tidak

bertanggung jawab atas perbuatan hukum yang dilakukan anak perusahaan. Sulistiowati, Aspek

Hukum dan Realitas ..., hlm. 8-13.


http://chevrontoxico.com/about/

5


ekonomi sehingga merugikan kepentingan pihak ketiga tersebut.18

Hal ini, dalam

konotasi yang negatif, memberikan kesempatan bagi induk perusahaan untuk

melakukan eksternalisasi kegiatan usaha yang beresiko tinggi ataupun melawan

hukum, dengan memberikan instruksi kepada anak perusahaan.19

Permasalahan seperti ini tercermin terutama dalam aktivitas perusahaan-

perusahaan transnasional yang melakukan bisnis di bidang yang berhubungan

dengan ekstraksi sumber daya alam, khususnya dalam bidang pertambangan,

seperti dijelaskan dalam kasus-kasus di atas.20

Dalam beberapa puluh tahun

terakhir, perusahaan transnasional telah semakin sering dipersalahkan karena

melakukan pencemaran atau aktivitas yang merusak lingkungan melalui anak

perusahaan mereka, terutama di negara-negara berkembang.21

Terdapat beberapa

faktor yang memberikan sumbangan terhadap pola ini, diantaranya: keputusan

diambil di negara dari perusahaan induk, namun dampak negatif dirasakan di luar

negara tersebut; rencana-rencana ramah lingkungan yang dibuat di atas kertas

tidak dilakukan dalam praktek; pemerintah dari negara penerima mungkin gagal

untuk mengawasi dampak lingkungan yang ditimbulkan oleh aktivitas bisnis

perusahaan-perusahaan transnasional. Selain faktor-faktor tersebut, harus diakui

pula bahwa perusahaan transnasional dalam beberapa hal membuat keputusan

eksplisit untuk memotong pengeluaran dan menambah pemasukan dengan

memilih aktivitas dan proses yang tidak sesuai dengan praktek lingkungan yang

baik. Dalam kasus lainnya, aktivitas yang mencemari dan beresiko telah

18

Phillip I. Blumberg, “The Corporate Entity In An Era of Multinational Corporations”,

Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, (Spring, 1990), hlm. 288. Blumberg menyebut bahwa isu ini

menjadi one of the major problems in the corporations law.

19 Sulistiowati, Aspek Hukum dan Realitas ..., hlm. 10.

20 Michael Anderson, “Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort

Law the Answer?”, Washburn Law Journal, Vol. 41, (7 Mei 2002), hlm. 399-425.

21 Michel Chussudovsky, The Globalization Of Poverty: Impacts Of IMF And World Bank

Reforms (1997); Mark Hertsgaard, Earth Odyssey (1999); Joshua Kar-Liner, The Corporate

Planet: Ecology And Politics In The Age Of Globalization (1997); David C. Korten, When

Corporations Rule The World (1995)


6


dipindahkan dari negara asal ke negara penerima yang kurang berkembang untuk

menghindari regulasi yang ketat di negara asalnya.22

Eksistensi perusahaan transnasional sebagai subjek hukum dalam hukum

internasional hingga kini masih menjadi pertanyaan yang belum terjawab.23

Regulasi mengenai pencemaran lingkungan dan pelanggaran HAM oleh

perusahaan transnasional telah secara nyata tidak efektif. Perjanjian-perjanjian

internasional di bidang hukum lingkungan internasional mengikat negara pihak,

namun tidak meletakkan kewajiban secara langsung terhadap perusahaan. Telah

ada beberapa eksplorasi ilmiah untuk membuat negara asal perusahaan

transnasional bertanggung jawab terhadap aktivitas perusahaan transnasional yang

berpusat di dalam yurisdiksinya24

, tetapi pendekatan ini telah gagal baik karena

oposisi politik maupun karena permasalahan yurisdiksi dan hukum perusahaan

sebagaimana dijelaskan di atas. Telah ada banyak pula soft initiatives untuk

mengatur perusahaan transnasional dengan membentuk pedoman dan kode etik,

termasuk pula International Labour Organization (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of

Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy25

,

22

Sebagai contoh, setelah Thor Chemicals Company yang berbasis di Inggris mendapatkan

kritik dari UK Health and Safety Executive terkait aktivitasnya menghadapkan para pekerja ke

merkuri, perusahaan tersebut mengekspor proses dan mesin-mesinnya ke Afrika Selatan untuk

melakukan produksi beresiko yang sama untuk menghindari regulasi Inggris. Lih: Sithole &

Others v. Thor Chem. Holdings Ltd., (1999) 96(9) L.S.G. 32. Lih: The Export Of Hazard (Jane H.

Ives ed., 1985).

23 Amerika Serikat, The Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, (St Paul,

1987), hlm. 126 menyatakan bahwa Perusahaan Transnasional, sebagai fitur yang terbentuk dalam

kehidupan internasional, „belum mencapai status yang independen dalam hukum internasional‟,

Lih: Malcom Shaw, International Law 5th Edition, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,

2003), hlm. 224-225.

24 Michael R. Anderson, (W.E. Butler Ed.), State Obligations in a Transnational Dispute:

The Bhopal Case, in Control Over Compliance With International Law (Norwell: Kluwer

Academic Publishers, 1991), hlm. 83; Lihat pula Francesco Francioni, (Francesco Francioni &

Tullio Scovazzi Eds) Exporting Environmental Hazard Through Multinational Enterprises: Can

the State of Origin Be Held Responsible?, (1991), hlm. 275.

25 Tripartile Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Special

Policy, Sumber: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/ standards/norm/ sources/mne.htm diakses pada

Kamis, 27 Oktober 2011


7


Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on

Multinational Enterprises26

, dan United Nations Global Compact.27

Di sisi lain, hukum lingkungan internasional mengenal beberapa prinsip

dasar dalam penegakan hukum lingkungan internasional, yang diterapkan dalam

formulasi praktis aturan hukum positif. Aplikasi dari prinsip-prinsip ini terhadap

situasi yang berbeda-beda berpengaruh terhadap keadilan substantif secara

kasuistis.28

Beberapa di antara prinsip ini telah mendapatkan dukungan secara luas

dan tercermin dalam tindakan negara secara ekstensif (extensive state practice)

dengan berulangnya penggunaan prinsip tersebut atau penunjukan terhadapnya

dalam konteks hukum internasional.29

Di antara prinsip yang dikenal luas tersebut adalah Prinsip Pencemar

Membayar (Polluters Pay Principle), Prinsip Kehati-hatian (Precautionary

Principle), prinsip pembangunan berkelanjutan (Sustainable Development

Principle), dan prinsip 21 Deklarasi Stockholm/Prinsip 2 Deklarasi Rio

(Sovereignty Over Natural Resources and the Responsibility Not To Cause

Damage To the Environment of Other States or To Areas Beyond National

Jurisdiction).30

Namun, sesuai dengan hakikatnya sebagai prinsip, dibutuhkan

instrumen internasional yang mengikat agar prinsip-prinsip tersebut dapat

diterapkan. Dengan begitu, keberadaan prinsip-prinsip tersebut secara praktis

dapat ditemukan dalam sumber-sumber hukum lingkungan internasional31

, yang

berdasarkan pasal 38 Piagam Mahkamah Internasional (International Court of

26

Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD), The OECD Guide-

lines for Multinational Enterprises. Lih: Stephen Tully, “The 2000 Review of the OECD

Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”, 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 394

(2001)

27 Michael Anderson, “Transnational Corporations and ...”, hlm. 405

28 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), hlm. 376

29 Phillipe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, ..., hlm. 232

30 Ibid., hlm. 235-245, dilanjutkan dengan hlm. 252-284.

31 Patricia Birnie dan Alan Boyle menyatakan bahwa sumber hukum lingkungan

internasional adalah sama dengan sumber-sumber hukum internasional secara umum. Patricia

Birnie dan Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2002), hlm. 12


8


Justice Statute atau ICJ) meliputi perjanjian internasional, prinsip-prinsip umum

dalam hukum internasional, hukum kebiasaan internasional, dan doktrin serta

keputusan-keputusan Badan Peradilan Internasional.32

Berbagai kasus yang

melibatkan perusahaan transnasional, di antaranya seperti telah dipaparkan di atas,

telah menunjukkan pelanggaran-pelanggaran serius terhadap prinsip-prinsip di

atas.

Hal lainnya yang terkait secara erat dalam konteks ini ialah dilanggarnya

Hak Asasi Manusia dalam hal mendapatkan lingkungan hidup yang sehat, yang

diakui dalam berbagai perjanjian internasional33

, instrumen soft law34

, serta

mendapatkan dukungan dari badan peradilan internasional. Tindakan-tindakan

bisnis yang tidak sehat ini dalam kenyataannya telah mengakibatkan kerugian

terhadap komunitas yang mendiami wilayah dimana perusahaan tersebut

melaksanakan operasi bisnisnya.35

Dampak buruk bagi kesehatan karena

pengamanan lingkungan yang tidak sesuai standar, air yang tercemar,

keseimbangan ekosistem yang terganggu yang berdampak pada pemenuhan

32

Pasal 38 International Court of Justice Statute menyatakan bahwa “(1) The Court, whose

function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall

apply:

a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly

recognized by the contesting states;

b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most

highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of

rules of law,” dan dalam ayat (2) menyatakan

(2) This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et

bono, if the parties agree thereto.

33 Di antaranya ialah dalam ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in

Independent Countries (1989), Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation and

Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (1998), American Conbention on Human Rights in the

Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1988), African Charter on Human and Peoples‟

Rights (1981), serta European Convention on Human Rights (1950).

34 Beberapa instrumen soft law yang mengkristalkan right to environment antara lain ialah

The Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment (1972), Declaration on the Right to

Development (1986), Legal Principles for Environment Protection and Sustainable Development

(1987), the Rio Declaration on Human Environment (1992), dan lain-lain.

35 Hari M. Osofsky, “Learning From Environmental Justice: A New Model For

International Environmental Rights”, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Vol 24, 1, (Januari

2005), hlm. 2.


9


makanan masyarakat lokal, merupakan contoh dari sekian banyak pelanggaran

HAM yang diakibatkan operasi bisnis perusahaan-perusahaan transnasional yang

tidak bertanggung jawab.36

Kelompok-kelompok pejuang HAM dan komunitas

lokal telah melakukan banyak hal untuk memperlihatkan perkara-perkara

pencemaran atau pengurangan sumber daya secara ilegal, dan seringkali

mendalilkan bahwa aktivitas-aktivitas tersebut terkait dengan keterlibatan

perusahaan-perusahaan transnasional dalam pelanggaran HAM.37

Kedua rezim hukum yang dijelaskan di atas pada awalnya dianggap sebagai

dua hal yang berbeda. Dalam perkembangan hukum lingkungan internasional

kontemporer pada akhir tahun 1960an, hubungan antara kedua rezim tersebut

mulai disadari secara luas. Pada 1972, negara-negara yang berpartisipasi dalam

konferensi multilateral besar pertama terkait lingkungan hidup, digelar di

Stockholm, menyatakan dalam Stockholm Declaration bahwa "perlindungan dan

perbaikan dari lingkungan hidup manusia merupakan isu besar yang

mempengaruhi kesejahteraan manusia".38

Semenjak Deklarasi Stockholm pada

1972 tersebut, mulai dikenal suatu rezim baru yang merupakan irisan dari hak

asasi manusia dan hukum lingkungan internasional yang mengemuka dan cukup

banyak diperdebatkan dalam hukum internasional.39

Rezim tersebut disebut rights

to environment, yang mengenal beberapa pendekatan dan cakupan, baik substantif

maupun prosedural.

Selama persiapan Konferensi Stockholm dan terlebih lagi setelahnya,

negara-negara mulai mengadopsi provisi konstitusional terkait lingkungan hidup,

sering kali menggunakan bahasa 'hak'. Pada 1980an, hubungan antara HAM dan

lingkungan hidup yang diakui dalam Stockholm Declaration dikristalkan dalam

36

Ibid.

37 Salah satu contoh ialah Human Rights Watch, “The Price Of Oil: Corporate

Responsibility And Human Rights Violations In Nigeria‟s Oil Producing Communities” (1999).

38 United Nations, Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration

of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N.Doc.A/CONF. 48/14 /Rev. 1,p. 3 (June 5

– 16, 1972 )

39 Kathleen Morris, “The Emergence of Customary International Law Recognizing

Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human Rights and Environmental Law”,

Gonzaga Journal of International Law, Sumber: http://www.gonzagajil.org/content/view/167/26/


10


perjanjian-perjanjian internasional yang mengikat. Di antaranya ialah African

Charter on Human Rights40

serta Additional Protocol to the American Human

Rights Convention on Economic and Social Rights41

yang berlaku secara regional.

Selain itu terdapat pula ribuan instrumen soft law terkait lingkungan hidup

internasional, puluhan konstitusi nasional dan perundang-undangan legislatif,

serta lusinan putusan badan peradilan internasional, regional, maupun nasional

yang memperkuat keberadaan hak asasi manusia atas lingkungan hidup ini.42

Meskipun berhubungan erat dan menjelma dalam berbagai instrumen

hukum, namun perwujudan relasi hukum lingkungan dan HAM dalam rights to

environment merupakan suatu hal yang rumit. Jika pencemaran lingkungan

diklasifikasikan murni dalam lingkup hukum lingkungan, negara memiliki

kedaulatan yang tidak dapat diganggu gugat kecuali dalam kasus-kasus lintas

batas negara atau yang berimplikasi global. Di sisi lain, jika pencemaran

lingkungan dipandang mempengaruhi HAM, maka perilaku internal sebuah

negara dapat menjadi perhatian internasional.43

Hingga kini hukum internasional

masih belum mengatur secara spesifik dan terintegrasi baik mengenai rights to

environment itu sendiri, maupun dalam hubungannya dengan tindakan perusahaan

transnasional, dalam suatu instrumen hukum yang bersifat global.44

Relasi yang rumit dalam rights to environment, dalam kaitannya dengan

kasus-kasus di atas menjadi semakin rumit dengan keterlibatan perusahaan-

40

The African Charter on Human Rights, diadopsi di Nairobi, Kenya, on June 27, 1981,

menyatakan, “All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favor-able to

their development.” Artikel 24 , African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, O.A.U. Doc.

CAB/LEG/ 67/ 3 Rev. 5, dicetak ulang dalam International Legal Materials Vol. 21, (1982), hlm.

58.

41 Article 11 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area

of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, menyatakan "(1) Everyone shall have the right to live in

a healthy e nvironment and to h ave access to basic public services. (2) The States Parties shall

promote the protection, preservation, and improvement of the environment." O.A.S.T.S. 69,

dicetak ulang dalam International Legal Materials Vol. 28, (1989), hlm. 156.

42 Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, “Is The Human Right To Environment Recognized Under

International Law? It Depends on the Source”, Colorado Journal of International Environmental

Law and Policy, Vol. 12, (Winter 2001), hlm. 23.

43 Ibid.

44 Hari M. Osofsky, “Learning From...”, hlm. 5.


11


perusahaan transnasional sebagai subjek yang melakukan pencemaran tersebut.

Kompleksitas perusahaan transnasional sebagaimana telah dijelaskan di atas,

membuat perusahaan transnasional cenderung kebal dari kontrol satu negara

tertentu dan kekurangan regulasi dalam hal hukum publik internasional.45

Suatu kenyataan yang penting untuk digarisbawahi dalam hal ini ialah

hubungan hukum antara perusahaan transnasional dan masyarakat yang

merasakan dampaknya merupakan hubungan hukum lintas negara. Namun

hubungan hukum ini berada di dalam suatu batas kabur antara ranah privat dan

publik. Di satu sisi, perlindungan terhadap lingkungan hidup serta hak-hak atas

lingkungan hidup yang layak, juga prinsip-prinsip yang merupakan norma yang

mengatur hubungan hukum tersebut diakui secara universal dan diatur dalam

instrumen-instrumen internasional. Negara terikat untuk melaksanakannya dalam

mengatur subjek hukum yang beroperasi di dalamnya. Namun di sisi lain, hingga

kini belum ada pengaturan yang memungkinkan litigasi perkara-perkara

pencemaran lingkungan lintas negara yang dilakukan oleh aktor bukan negara.

Berdasarkan uraian dalam latar belakang, maka menarik untuk dikaji

permasalahan mengenai perkembangan hukum lingkungan internasional dan hak

asasi manusia dalam kaitannya dengan gugatan-gugatan masyarakat melawan

transnational corporations (perusahaan transnasional) dengan mengangkat judul:

Pelanggaran Terhadap Hak Asasi Manusia Atas Lingkungan Hidup Oleh

Perusahaan Transnasional Dalam Hukum Internasional.

1.2. Pokok Permasalahan

Berdasarkan pemaparan latar belakang di atas, terdapat tiga pokok

permasalahan yang akan dibahas dalam skripsi ini, yaitu:

1. Bagaimanakah pengakuan hak asasi manusia terhadap lingkungan sebagai

bagian dari hak asasi manusia dalam hukum internasional?

45

Shyami Fernando Puvimanasinghe, Foreign Investment, Human Rights and the

Environment: A Perspective from South Asia on the Role of Public International Law for

Development (2007), hlm. 59-60.


12


2. Bagaimanakah tanggung jawab yang dibebankan terhadap perusahaan

transnasional terutama terkait dengan permasalahan lingkungan hidup

dalam hukum internasional?

3. Bagaimana pertanggungjawaban perusahaan transnasional terhadap

pelanggaran hak atas lingkungan hidup telah diterapkan dalam perkara-

perkara gugatan masyarakat terhadap perusahaan-perusahaan

transnasional?

1.3. Tujuan Penulisan

Berdasarkan pemaparan dalam latar belakang dan pokok permasalahan di

atas, pembahasan dalam skripsi ini bertujuan untuk:

1. Mengetahui sejauh mana pengakuan hak asasi manusia terhadap lingkungan

hidup dalam hukum internasional, ditinjau dari perjanjian internasional,

instrumen soft law, dan hukum kebiasaan internasional;

2. Mengetahui sejauh mana tanggung jawab yang dibebankan terhadap

perusahaan transnasional dalam bidang lingkungan hidup oleh hukum

internasional; dan

3. Mengkaji secara mendalam penerapan prinsip-prinsip hukum internasional

dalam bidang hak asasi manusia terhadap lingkungan hidup dalam gugatan-

gugatan lingkungan lintas negara antara masyarakat melawan perusahaan

transnasional;

3.1. Manfaat Penulisan

Penelitian ini diharapkan akan memberikan manfaat sebagai berikut:

1. Bagi komunitas lokal yang berhubungan dengan aktivitas bisnis perusahaan

transnasional, agar dapat memahami hubungan antara aktivitas bisnis yang

dilakukan oleh perusahaan transnasional dengan hukum lingkungan

internasional dan hak asasi manusia, serta memahami hak-hak yang

diberikan oleh hukum internasional terhadap komunitas lokal dalam hal

tersebut.


13


2. Bagi para pengusaha sebagai entitas dari perusahaan transnasional, agar

dapat melakukan aktivitas bisnisnya sesuai dengan hukum internasional

yang berlaku dalam hal lingkungan internasional dan hak asasi manusia.

3. Bagi pemerintah, agar dapat memahami hukum internasional yang berlaku

terkait lingkungan internasional dan hak asasi manusia, serta perkembangan

dan kewajiban yang dibebankan kepada negara dalam hubungannya dengan

subjek hukum yang berada di dalamnya.

4. Bagi kalangan akademis dan masyarakat pada umumnya penelitian ini dapat

menambah khazanah pengetahuan mengenai kaitan antara hak asasi

manusia, hukum lingkungan internasional, dan perusahaan transnasional

dengan perkembangan hukum lingkungan internasional.

3.2. Metode Penelitian

Penelitian ini berbentuk Yuridis-Normatif,46

sehingga metode penelitian

yang digunakan adalah penelitian kepustakaan. Penggunaan metode ini untuk

menjawab permasalahan-permasalahan dalam penelitian ini tidak terlepas dari

kebutuhan akan data yang dapat dipenuhi dengan pencarian bahan berupa buku

atau tulisan-tulisan lainnya.

Dari sudut ilmu yang dipergunakan, maka penelitian ini merupakan

penelitian mono disipliner. Penelitian mono disipliner adalah penelitian dengan

pemilihan metode penelitian berdasarkan satu disiplin ilmu.47

Pemilihan metode

dalam penelitian ini didasarkan pada disiplin ilmu hukum. Meskipun berkaitan

dengan hukum lingkungan, namun metode yang digunakan terbatas pada metode

penelitian hukum normatif. Menurut sifatnya, tipe penelitian yang digunakan

adalah penelitian deskriptif karena memberikan data yang seteliti mungkin

tentang manusia, keadaan, atau gejala-gejala lainnya dengan maksud terutama

untuk mempertegas hipotesa, memperkuat teori lama, atau untuk menyusun teori

46

Sri Mamudji et.al., Metode Penelitian dan Penulisan Huukm (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit

Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2005), hal. 9-10.

47 Ibid, hal. 5.


14


baru.48

Menurut bentuknya, penelitian ini adalah penelitian prespkriptif sedangkan

menurut tujuannya adalah penelitian untuk menemukan solusi atas permasalahan.

Jenis data yang digunakan adalah data sekunder yang didapatkan dengan

metode penelitian kepustakaan.49

Data sekunder ini terdiri dari bahan hukum

primer, sekunder, dan tersier.50

Bahan hukum primer yaitu bahan-bahan hukum

yang mengikat.51

Bahan hukum primer yang Penulis pergunakan adalah berbagai

peraturan perundang-undangan yang terkait dengan permasalahan yang tengah

dibahas. Adapun bahan hukum sekunder ialah bahan hukum yang memberikan

penjelasan mengenai bahan hukum primer yang dipergunakan, dan dalam hal ini

meliputi berbagai literatur seperti buku, artikel, media massa, makalah serta jurnal

ilmiah yang terkait dengan masalah yang tengah dibahas. Bahan hukum tersier

yaitu bahan yang Penulis peroleh dari ensiklopedia, kamus, dan berbagai bahan

yang dapat memberikan petunjuk dan penjelasan mengenai bahan hukum primer

dan bahan hukum sekunder.

Alat pengumpul data yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah studi

kepustakaan.52

Studi kepustakaan adalah segala usaha yang dilakukan peneliti

untuk menghimpun informasi yang relevan dengan topik atau masalah yang akan

atau sedang diteliti.

Metode analisis data yang dipergunakan di dalam penelitian ini adalah

dengan menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif. Pendekatan kualitatif digunakan

karena penelitian ini mencoba untuk membangun atau menghasilkan sebuah teori

dari bawah (induktif. Pada penelitian hukum normatif yang menelaah data

sekunder, biasanya penyajian data dilakukan sekaligus dengan analisanya.53

Peneliti mengumpulkan data/informasi, kemudian mengklasifikasi data

48

Soerjono Soekanto dan Sri Mamudji, Penelitian Hukum Normatif: Suatu Tinjauan

Singkat, (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2001), hlm. 10.

49 Soerjono Soekanto, Pengantar Penelitian Hukum, (Jakarta: UI Press, 1942), hlm. 51.

50 Ibid., hlm. 32.

51 Soerjono Soekanto dan Sri Mamudji, Penelitian Hukum ..., hlm. 52.

52 Sri Mamudji, et.al., Metode Penelitian dan..., hlm. 6.

53 Soerjono Soekanto, Pengantar Penelitian Hukum, ... hlm. 69.


15


berdasarkan kategori-kategori dalam upaya menemukan pola atas realitas/gejala

yang terjadi.54

Selanjutnya, penelitian yang dihasilkan di dalam penelitian ini

berbentuk deskriptif analisis.

3.3. Kerangka Konsepsional

Untuk menghindari terjadinya kerancuan dalam penggunaan terminologi,

maka dalam skripsi ini telah dilakukan pembatasan definisi dari kata, istilah, dan

konsep yang digunakan, sebagai berikut:

1. Hukum Lingkungan Internasional adalah keseluruhan kaedan dan asas yang

terkandung di dalam perjanjian-perjaanjian internasional maupun hukum

kebiasaan internasional, yang berobjek lingkungan hidup, yang oleh

masyarakat internasional, yaitu masyarakat negara-negara, termasuk subjek-

subjek hukum internasional bukan negara, diwujudkan dalam kehidupan

bermasyarakat melalui lembaga-lembaga dan proses kemasyarakatan

internasional.55

2. Hukum lingkungan adalah bidang hukum yang mengatur mengenai

pelestarian dan perlindungan lingkungan, termasuk pula ukuran-ukuran

prefentif seperti persyaratan dari pernyataan dampak lingkungan, serta

meliputi pula penyediaan pemulihan atas kecelakaan-kecelakaan yang

menyebabkan tercemarnya lingkungan.56

3. Lingkungan hidup adalah semua benda dan kondisi, termasuk di dalamnya

manusia dan tingkah perbuatannya, yang terdapat dalam ruang di mana

54

John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approach, (Sage

Publication. Inc.: 1994), hlm. 5.

55 Ida Bagus Wyasa Putra, Hukum Lingkungan Internasional: Perspektif Bisnis

Internasional, (Bandung: PT. Refika Aditama, 2003), hlm. 1. Phillipe Sands mendefinisikan

hukum lingkungan internasional terdiri dari ketentuan-ketentuan substantif, proseduran, dan

institusional dari hukum internasional yang memiliki tujuan utama perlindungan terhadap

lingkungan. Phillipe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2nd Edition,

(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003), hlm. 15.

56 Bryan A. Garner, Ed., Black‟s Law Dictionary Eighth Edition, (St. Paul, MN: Thomson

West, 2004), hlm. 575. Di atas merupakan terjemahan bebas, dari kalimat asli sebagai berikut

“Environmental Law is the field of law dealing with the maintenance and protection of the

environment, including preventive measures such as the requirements of environmental-impact

statements, as well as measures to assign liability and provide cleanup for incidents that harm the

environment.”


16


manusia berada dan mempengaruhi hidup serta kesejahteraan manusia dan

jasa hidup lainnya.57

4. Hak Asasi Manusia adalah kebebasan-kebebasan, imunitas-imunitas, dan

keuntungan-keuntungan, yang berdasarkan nilai-nilai modern seharusnya

dapat dinikmati oleh seluruh umat manusia sebagai bentuk dari hak dalam

masyarakat di mana mereka hidup.58

5. Perusahaan Transnasional atau Trans-National Corporations (selanjutnya

disebut Perusahaan Transnasional) adalah suatu perusahaan yang

mengontrol aset entitas lain dalam wilayah perekonomian selain dari

perekonomian negara asalnya, biasanya dengan memiliki jumlah tertentu

dari ekuitas modal saham. Modal saham sebesar 10% atau lebih dari saham

biasa atau kekuatan voting untuk suatu perusahaan yang tergabung, atau

yang setara untuk sebuah perusahaan tidak tergabung, biasanya dianggap

sebagai ambang batas untuk pengontrolan aset.59

6. Masyarakat adalah kumpulan manusia yang relatif mandiri, hidup bersama-

sama dalam waktu yang cukup lama, tinggal di suatu wilayah tertentu,

mempunyai kebudayaan sama serta melakukan sebagian besar kegiatan di

dalam kelompok / kumpulan manusia tersebut.60

7. Hukum Internasional adalah keseluruhan kaidah-kaidah dan asas-asas

hukum yang mengatur hubungan atau persoalan yang melintasi batas-batas

57

St. Munadjat Danusaputro, Hukum Lingkungan: Buku 1 Umum, (Binacipta: Bandung,

1980), hlm. 2

58 Bryan A. Garner, Ed., Black‟s Law Dictionary 8th Edition, hlm. 758. Di atas merupakan

terjemahan bebas dari “the freedoms, immunities, and benefits that, according to modern values,

all human beings should be able to claim as a matter of right in the society in which they live.”

59 Penulis menggunakan terminologi perusahaan transnasional (Transnational

Corporations) sesuai dengan definisi yang digunakan oleh United Nations Conference on Trade

and Developments, yang mendefinisikan Transnational Corporations sebagai “an enterprise that

controls assets of other entities in economies other than its home economy, usually by owning a

certain equity capital stake. An equity capital stake of 10% or more of the ordinary shares or

voting power for an incorporated enterprise, or the equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise,

is normally considered a threshold for the control of assets” M.N. Shaw mendefinisikan

Perusahaan transnasional sebagai “in essence constitute private business organisations

comprising several legal entities linked together by parent corporations and are distinguished by

size and multinational spread”, Malcom Shaw, International Law ... , hlm. 224.

60 Paul B. Horton dan Chester L. Hunt, Sosiologi Jilid. 1., (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2002), hlm.

45.


17


negara, antara negara dengan negara dan negara dengan subjek hukum lain

bukan negara atau subyek hukum bukan negara satu sama lain.61

3.4. Sistematika Penulisan

Penulisan skripsi ini terdiri atas 5 Bab yang akan menuntun pada penjelasan

yang berkelanjutan sampai pada kesimpulan penelitian ini.

Bab 1 – Pendahuluan

Bab 1 merupakan fondasi dari keseluruhan penulisan skripsi ini, yang

diperlukan untuk membangun konsep dan tujuan yang jelas dari skripsi ini. Bab

ini terdiri atas penjelasan latar belakang penulisan, pokok permasalahan, tujuan

penelitian, manfaat penelitian, medote penelitian yang mencakup tipologi

penelitian, pendekatan masalah, serta pemaparan bahan hukum yang digunakan,

kerangka konsepsional, serta sistematika penulisan dari skripsi ini.

Bab 2 – Perkembangan Doktrin dan Pengaturan Hak Atas Lingkungan

Hidup

Bab ini terdiri atas tiga sub-bab yang merupakan landasan teori untuk

mengantarkan ke analisa yang lebih dalam pada bab berikutnya. Dalam bab ini,

penulis memaparkan secara komprehensif mengenai hak atas lingkungan hidup

dalam hukum internasional yang dilihat dari eksistensinya berdasarkan berbagai

sumber hukum internasional. Dimulai dengan pengertian hak atas lingkungan

hidup berdasarkan doktrin pada sub-bab pertama, dan dilanjutkan dengan sub-bab

kedua yang membahas mengenai perjanjian internasional dan instrumen soft law

yang mengatur mengenai hak atas lingkungan hidup, Penulis mencoba

memberikan pemahaman mengenai perkembangan hak atas lingkungan hidup

sedari awal. Selanjutnya, pada sub-bab ketiga, Penulis memaparkan pandangan

mengenai hak atas lingkungan hidup dari segi hukum kebiasaan internasional.

61

Mochtar Kusumaatmadja dan Etty R. Agoes, Pengantar Hukum ..., hlm. 2.


18


Bab 3 – Tinjauan Perlindungan Hak atas Lingkungan Hidup dalam Kegiatan

Bisnis Perusahaan Transnasional

Bab ini terdiri atas empat sub-bab. Pada sub-bab pertama akan dipaparkan

mengenai tinjauan right to environment dalam kegiatan bisnis transnasional, yang

menganalisis dampak dari kegiatan bisnis transnasional di bidang ekstraksi

sumber daya alam terhadap lingkungan hidup, dan pengaruh kerusakan

lingkungan hidup tersebut terhadap hak asasi manusia masyarakat sekitar. Sub-

bab kedua memaparkan pemaparan konsepsi perusahaan trans-nasional, yang

dimulai dengan berbagai pendapat mengenai pengertian perusahaan trans-nasional

yang akan dilanjutkan dengan pemaparan mengenai bentuk hukum perusahaan

trans-nasional, serta dilanjutkan dengan pemaparan mengenai fenomena

perusahaan transnasional sebagai kesatuan ekonomi namun merupakan entitas

yang terpisah secara hukum. Sub-bab ketiga membahas mengenai

pertanggungjawaban hukum perusahaan trans-nasional dalam pemenuhan right to

environment berdasarkan hukum internasional, dengan menguraikan instrumen-

instrumen hukum internasional yang mengatur mengenai hal ini, serta melihat

pula perluasan interpretasi atas instrument hukum internasional yang sebenarnya

ditujukan bagi negara. Pada sub-bab terakhir, diuraikan mengenai tinjauan

keberlakuan hak atas lingkungan hidup sebagai hukum internasional terhadap

perusahaan transnasional, dengan melihat perusahaan transnasional sebagai subjek

hukum internasional terbatas, mekanisme gugatan transnasional terhadap

perusahaan transnasional, dan tanggung jawab hukum perusahaan transnasional

dalam hal terjadinya pelanggaran hak asasi manusia.

Bab 4 – Penerapan Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup dalam Gugatan

Masyarakat Melawan Perusahaan Transnasional

Terdiri dari lima sub-bab, bab keempat ini merupakan inti dari skripsi ini.

Secara umum, bab ini merupakan analisis mendalam atas tiga kasus di mana

masyarakat menuntut perusahaan transnasional karena alasan pelanggaran hak

asasi manusia terhadap lingkungan hidup. Kasus pertama, ialah Aguinda v.

Texaco, yang terjadi di Ekuador dan diadili di Amerika Serikat pada tahun 1993.

Kasus kedua, yaitu pada sub-bab kedua, memaparkan mengenai kasus Lubbe v.


19


Cape PLC yang terjadi di Afrika Selatan pada tahun 1999-2003 dan diadili di

Inggris. Selanjutnya, pada sub-bab ketiga, dipaparkan mengenai kasus Beanal v.

Freeport McMoran yang terjadi di Indonesia dan diadili di Amerika Serikat sejak

1996.

Pada masing-masing sub-bab, setelah dipaparkan terlebih dahulu mengenai

deskripsi dari kasus tersebut secara ringkas, dipaparkan pula mengenai putusan

hakim terkait dengan pengakuan right to environment dan pertanggungjawaban

perusahaan transnasional. Setelah itu, Penulis menganalisa mengenai putusan

hakim tersebut dengan menghubungkan dengan hak-hak spesifik tertentu dalam

perkara tersebut yang merupakan rights to environment yang berdasarkan

pengamatan penulis terdapat dalam perkara tersebut, dan dilanjutkan dengan

menganalisa telah digunakan atau tidak digunakannya hak-hak tersebut dalam

gugatan maupun putusan hakim terkait perkara tersebut dan bagaimana hak-hak

tersebut dikonstruksikan terkait dengan pelanggaran oleh perusahaan

transnasional.

Selanjutnya, pada sub-bab keempat, Penulis mencoba untuk

membandingkan dan menyimpulkan penerapan rights to environment terhadap

perusahaan transnasional pada ketiga perkara tersebut, dan melihat relevansinya

dengan hukum internasional sebagaimana telah dipaparkan pada Bab-bab

sebelumnya. Akhirnya, Penulis mencoba melihat pengaturan atas pertanggung-

jawaban perusahaan transnasional secara langsung atas pelanggaran hak atas

lingkungan hidup sebagai hukum yang akan berlaku di masa depan.

Bab 5 – Penutup

Berdasarkan hasil penelitian dari bab-bab sebelumnya, Penulis menyajikan

rangkuman dalam bentuk simpulan di bab penutup ini. Selain itu, Penulis juga

memberikan saran dan rekomendasi terkait hasil penelitian ini.


20


BAB 2

PERKEMBANGAN DOKTRIN DAN PENGATURAN HAK ATAS

LINGKUNGAN HIDUP

2.1. Pengertian Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup berdasarkan Doktrin

Sebelum melangkah lebih jauh, maka penting untuk memahami apa yang

dimaksud mengenai hak. Secara umum, ide atas 'hak' mengkonotasikan

kepentingan substansial yang diakui dan diikat oleh hukum. Sebuah hak diberikan

sebagai mekanisme untuk melindungi kepentingan substansial yang diakui secara

hukum. Namun hak dapat berarti kurang atau lebih. Hak secara hukum dapat

bersifat absolut (setidaknya secara teoritis) atau dapat dikurangi ketika

bertentangan dengan hak-hak lainnya. Suatu hak juga dapat ada dalam keadaan

pre-legal atau ekstra-legal sebagai klaim moral di luar hukum.62

Terminologi lingkungan hidup sendiri berasal dari kata kerja Perancis

“environner”, yang berarti melingkupi atau mengelilingi. Sehingga, dalam

konteks ekologis dan biologis, lingkungan dapat didefinisikan sebagai 'kompleks

dari faktor-faktor fisika, kimia, dan biotik yang mengelilingi dan bertindak

terhadap organisme atau ekosistem. Pengertian ini memberikan implikasi bahwa

lingkungan hidup tidak terlepas dari organisme atau orang-orang yang hidup di

dalamnya. Terminologi 'ekosfer' merupakan substitusi yang lebih tepat dan

substansial untuk terminologi 'lingkungan hidup'. Ekosfer terdiri dari empat

komponen yang sama pentingnya: atmosfer (udara), hidrosfer (air), litosfer

(tanah), dan biosfer (organisme).63

Perumusan hak atas lingkungan hidup mencakup ringkasan hak-hak yang

disusun dalam sebuah usaha untuk melindungi lingkungan hidup, sekaligus

melindungi hidup dan martabat manusia. Mengingat hakikatnya yang ringkas, hak

atas lingkungan hidup sering disalahartikan dan rentan terhadap kesalahan

kategori. Tiga kategori besar yang berkembang dari pendapat para ahli hukum

62

Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Philosophy, (New

Brunswick: Transaction, Inc., 1982), hlm. 148.

63 J. Stan Rowe, "What on Earth Is Environment?" The Trumpeter 6, no. 4 (1989). Diunduh

dari http://www.ecospherics.net/pages/RoWhatEarth.html.


21


dalam konteks hak atas lingkungan hidup ialah: Right to Environment, Right of

Environment, dan Environmental Rights.64

Doktrin yang berkembang membagi hak atas lingkungan hidup dalam

tiga kategori, dengan katogori pertama yang biasa disebut sebagai right to

environment, yang berkonteks substantif. Pelengkap dari rezim ini ialah

environmental rights, yang berkonteks prosedural. Suatu hak lainnya yang melihat

lingkungan sebagai subjek pengemban hak ini, biasa disebut dengan terminologi

right of environment. Pembahasan lebih lanjut mengenai ketiga hak ini akan

diuraikan dalam pembahasan berikut.

2.1.1. Kategorisasi Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup: Right To Environment,

Right of Environment, dan Environmental Rights

Right to Environment, merupakan komponen substantif dari hak atas

lingkungan hidup yang dibicarakan dalam karya tulis ini. Dalam mendefinisikan

hak ini, perlu diingat bahwa terminologi yang digunakan dalam merumuskan

konten dari hak ini berbeda-beda, kabur, kontroversial, dan terus berubah.

Sebagian besar cara dalam mendefinisikan hak ini ialah dengan memberikan kata

sifat, di antaranya ialah aman, memuaskan, sehat, layak, cukup, bersih, natural.65

Secara ringkas, sebagaimana telah dijelaskan dalam kerangka konsep, maka hak

substantif atas lingkungan hidup dalam karya tulis ini merupakan hak asasi

manusia untuk hidup dalam lingkungan hidup dengan kualitas minimal yang

memungkinkan terwujudnya kehidupan yang bermartabat dan sejahtera.66

Beberapa usaha telah dilakukan para ahli hukum untuk menyediakan isi

substantif dalam hak atas lingkungan hidup. Misalnya, hak atas lingkungan hidup

64

Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, “Is The Human Right To Environment Recognized Under

International Law? It Depends On The Source”, Colorado Journal of International Environmental

Law and Policy, (Winter 2011), hlm. 4.

65 Perumusan seperti ini dapat ditemukan dalam instrumen-instrumen hukum internasional

maupun legislasi nasional yang memberikan hak-hak masyarakat untuk menikmati lingkungan,

baik dengan menyebutkan kata benda lingkungan maupun kata benda lainnya. Alexandre Kiss dan

Dinah Shelton, Guide To International Environmental Law, (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff

Publishers, 2007), hlm. 238.

66 Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common

Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1989), hlm. 114


22


telah didefinisikan sebagai hak untuk menjaga, melindungi, dan memperbaiki

lingkungan hidup saat ini. Dinah Shelton menyatakan bahwa hak terhadap

lingkungan hidup dapat diinterpretasikan tidak sebagai hak atas lingkungan hidup

yang ideal yang mana sangatlah sulit didefiniskan secara abstrak, melainkan

sebagai hak untuk memiliki lingkungan hidup yang dinikmati sekarang

terlindungi, terjaga, dari pemburukan keadaan secara signifikan; dan dalam hal

tertentu mencakup pula perbaikan keadaan.67

Sedangkan, R.R. Churchill

merumuskan hak substantif terhadap lingkungan hidup sebagai dimasukkannya

standar substantif dari hak-hak ekonomi, sosial, dan budaya yang telah dikenal

untuk terwujudnya martabat manusia, seperti hak atas standar hidup yang layak

untuk kesehatan dan kesejahteraan, hak atas standar tertinggi yang dapat dicapai

atas kesehatan fisik dan mental, dan hak terhadap kondisi kerja yang aman dan

sehat.68

Selain itu, terdapat pula Right of Environment, yang melihat hak atas

lingkungan hidup sebagai hak yang dimiliki dan diberikan kepada lingkungan

hidup itu sendiri, terpisah dan dibedakan dari penggunaan manusia atas

lingkungan hidup.69

Sebagaimana nilai yang melekat dari manusia menjadi

predikat bagi hak asasi manusia, begitu pula telah diargumentasikan bahwa semua

benda hidup yang bukan manusia (dan bahkan komponen yang tidak hidup dalam

ekosistem) yang memiliki nilai instrinsik layak atas justifikasi tersebut terkait hak

terhadap komponen non-manusia dan lingkungan yang melingkupi.70

Aldo

Leopold mengargumentasikan pada tahun 1949, bahwa telah tiba waktunya untuk

menetapkan setidaknya hak-hak moral bagi lingkungan hidup, dengan menuliskan

sebagai berikut,

67

Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, International Environmental Law, 6th Edition, (New

York: Transnational Publishers, 2004), hlm. 25.

68 R.R. Churchill, “Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment”,

Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, (London: Clarendon Press, 1998), hlm.

43 dan 50.

69 Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, “Is The Human Right To Environment ..., hlm. 6.

70 Donald K. Anton dan Dinah L. Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights, ...,

hlm. 123-124.


23


“Perluasan dari hak moral bagi lingkungan hidup merupakan suatu

kemungkinan evolusioner dan sebuah kebutuhan ekologikal...

Hak moral dari tanah secara sederhana memperluas batasan-batasan dari

komunitas meliputi tanah, air, tanaman, dan binatang, atau secara

kolektif: Tanah.

... Sebuah hak moral atas tanah tentunya tidak dapat mencegah

pengubahan, pengolahan, dan penggunaan dari sumber daya-sumber daya

ini, namun etik tersebut menegaskan hak mereka terhadap keberadaan

yang berlanjut dan, setidaknya dalam titik-titik, keberadaan mereka

secara berlanjut dalam keadaan natural.

Singkat kata, sebuah hak moral atas tanah mengubah peranan Homo

sapiens dari penguasa dari komunitas berbasiskan tanah menjadi sekedar

anggota dan masyarakat dari tanah tersebut. Hal ini menyiratkan

penghormatan bagi sesamanya, dan juga penghormatan bagi komunitas

tersebut pula"71

Munculnya hak ini berpijak dari pendekatan ekosentrik atas permasalahan

lingkungan hidup, dimana pendukung hak ini menganggap bahwa pendekatan

yang antroposentrik secara inheren tidak murni, dan pendekatan terbaik untuk

melindungi lingkungan hidup ialah dengan memberikan hak secara langsung

terhadap lingkungan hidup, sebagaimana dirangkum oleh Lawerence H. Tribe,

“Dengan memperlakukan kebutuhan dan hasrat manusia perorangan

sebagai sudut pandang utama yang ditunjuk, klaim atas keberlangsungan

hidup dari area liar yang terancam atau spesies langka akan bertitik tolak

pada identifikasi dari kebutuhan dan keinginan manusia yang mungkin

saja bertolak belakang dengan perkembangan manusia. Sebagaimana

kapasitas manusia bertambah untuk memuaskan kebutuhan dan

keinginannya secara artifisial, klaim atas lingkungan tersebut jelas akan

berada dalam posisi yang rapuh.”72

Secara tekstual, right to environment dan right of environment merupakan dua

konsep yang bertentangan. Meskipun begitu, para ahli hukum telah menyarankan

71

Aldo Leopold dan Charles W. Schwartz, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and

There (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), hlm. 203-204.

72 Laurence H. Tribe, “Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for

Environmental Law”, Yale Law Journal Vol. 83, (1974), hlm. 1315, 1325-26


24


bahwa hak asasi manusia terhadap lingkungan dapat pula dikonstruksikan

mengakui hak intrinsik lingkungan hidup ini.73

Kategori ketiga ialah environmental rights, yang merupakan hak

prosedural yang diberikan kepada manusia demi tercapainya implementasi hak-

hak substantif terkait perlindungan lingkungan hidup. Environmental rights

meliputi: akses terhadap informasi mengenai lingkungan, partisipasi dalam proses

pembuatan keputusan dari kebijakan-kebijakan lingkungan, keberadaan ganti rugi

hukum untuk memulihkan kerusakan lingkungan, dan hak prosesual secara

umum.74

Walaupun environmental rights pada dasarnya merupakan komponen

penting dan terkait dalam implementasi dari right to environment (dalam

formulasi substantif dan sempitnya), komunitas hukum sejauh ini telah lebih

menunjukkan keinginan untuk mengakui keberadaan environmental rights dalam

tertib hukum internasional dibandingkan dengan hak substantifnya, mengingat

bahwa environmental rights pada hakikatnya didasarkan pada hak-hak sipil dan

politik yang telah ada.75

2.1.2. Ruang Lingkup dan Cakupan Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup

Untuk menjawab mengenai ruang lingkup dari hak atas lingkungan

hidup, Penulis akan merujuk pada Draft Declaration Of Principles On Human

Rights And The Environment76

(selanjutnya disebut “Rancangan Deklarasi”), yang

merupakan dokumen terlampir dalam laporan akhir yang dibuat oleh tim United

Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment yang diketuai

73

Kiss dan Shelton menyatakan bahwa nilai intrinsik dari biosfer tidaklah ditolak, tetapi

diintegrasikan dengan pengakuan bahwa manusia merupakan bagian dari jagad raya dan tidak

akan ada tanpa perlindungan terhadap biosfer dan ekosistem yang membentuknya. Alexandre Kiss

and Dinah Shelton, International Environmental Law, 6th Edition, ..., hlm. 11.

74 Phillipe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, ..., hlm. 229.

75 James Cameron & Ruth Mackenzie, Access to Environmental Justice and Procedural

Rights in International Institutions, dalam Human Rights Approaches to Environmental

Protection, (Alan Boyle & Michael Anderson Eds., 1996). hlm. 129

76 Fatma Zohra Ksentini, The Final Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights

and the Environment, UN Doc. No: E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9.


25


oleh Fatma Zohra Ksentini.77

Yang perlu diingat ialah bahwa Rancangan

Deklarasi ini bukanlah suatu dokumen internasional yang secara formil memiliki

kekuatan hukum, namun Penulis mengambil prinsip-prinsip di dalamnya yang

merupakan berbagai hak substantif atas lingkungan hidup yang telah terkodifikasi

dengan baik untuk memberikan gambaran yang menyeluruh mengenai right to

environment.

Rancangan Deklarasi ini dibuat pada 1994, beberapa bulan sebelum Ms.

Ksentini memberikan laporan akhirnya kepada Sub-Komisi, sekelompok ahli

hukum lingkungan internasional dan hak asasi manusia mengadakan pertemuan di

Jenewa selama tiga hari untuk membahas mengenai hak asasi manusia dan

lingkungan hidup. Rancangan Deklarasi ini merupakan hasil kerja dari para ahli

hukum tersebut, yang memberikan kerangka kerja untuk pendekatan yang

holistik, dengan berdasarkan pada hak asasi, untuk perlindungan lingkungan

hidup.78

77

Berawal pada tahun 1989 di mana beberapa NGO menyarankan kepada UN Sub-

Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities untuk melakukan studi

terhadap hubungan antara hak asasi manusia dan lingkungan hidup. Sub-Komisi ini

menyampaikan permohonan tersebut pada tahun 1990, yang kemudian disetujui UN Commission

on Human Rights (UNHCR) pada tahun 1991. Tahun itu juga, dilakukanlah penunjukan Sub-

Commission Special Rapporteur On Human Rights and the Environment, yang menunjuk Ms.

Fatma Zohra Ksentini, ahli hukum dan hak asasi manusia dari Nigeria yang sekaligus merupakan

anggota sub-komisi pada saat itu, untuk menyiapkan studi dalam hal hak asasi manusia dan

lingkungan hidup. Tim ini menyiapkan laporan awal pada 1991, laporan perkembangan pada 1992,

dan laporan akhir pada 1994. Neil A.F. Popovi, "In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights:

Commentary on the Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment",

Columbia Human Rights Law Review, (Spring 1996), hlm. 2.

78 Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, dalam Fatma Zohra Ksentini,

The Final Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, UN Doc.

No: E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9. Ahli-ahli yang terlibat termasuk Fatma Zohra Ksentini, U.N. Special

Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment; Philip Alston, Chair of the UN Committee on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Centre for International and Public Law; James

Cameron, Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, University of

London; Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, University of Brasilia; David J.A. Goldberg,

International Federation of Human Rights, University of Glasgow; Mario Ibarra, International

Indian Treaty Council; Alexandre C. Kiss, University of Strasbourg; Miloon Kothari, Center for

Housing Rights and Evictions; Dinah L. Shelton, University of Santa Clara School of Law;

Anthony Simpson, Australian Conservation Foundation; Thobeka Thamage, Tsoga Environmental

Re-source Centre; Meenakshi Raman, Consumers Association of Penang, Malaysia; and Lauri J.

Adams (chair), Adriana Fabra Aguilar (reporter), David C. McDonald, Yves Lador (reporter),

Karen Parker, and Neil A.F. Popovic (reporter). Perwakilan dari beberapa United Nations

Agencies, termasuk World Health Organization dan International Committee of the Red Cross,

berpartisipasi dalam kapasitas yang lebih terbatas sebagai observer.


26


Presentasi dari laporan akhir tim ini kepada Sub-Komisi pada tahun 1994

merupakan titik balik dalam pertimbangan United Nations terkait hak asasi

manusia dan lingkungan hidup. Laporan akhir Ms. Ksentini menunjuk berbagai

isu yang terkait dengan hak asasi manusia dan lingkungan hidup, termasuk pula

dasar-dasar hukum dari hak asasi manusia atas lingkungan hidup, pembangunan

berkelanjutan, partisipasi politik dan lingkungan hidup, masyarakat asli

(indigenous people), perlindungan lingkungan hidup dalam hal konflik bersenjata,

dampak dari degradasi lingkungan hidup terhadap kelompok-kelompok rentan,

dan efek dari permasalahan lingkungan hidup terhadap penikmatan berbagai hak-

hak asasi manusia.79

Secara umum, rancangan deklarasi ini terdiri atas 27 prinsip yang terbagi

atas 4 (empat) konsep umum mengenai hak atas lingkungan hidup, 10 (sepuluh)

hak substantif, 6 (enam) prinsip prosedural, 4 (empat) pasal yang secara khusus

membahas mengenai kewajiban negara maupun individu dan subjek hukum

lainnya terkait hak ini, 3 (tiga) prinsip yang merupakan pertimbangan khusus.80

Dalam kaitannya dengan skripsi ini, tidak semua hak akan dibahas, melainkan

difokuskan pada hak substantif saja.

Konsep umum yang berlaku atas hak atas lingkungan hidup ini berdiri di

atas empat prinsip dasar. Yang pertama, bahwa hak asasi manusia, lingkungan

hidup yang baik secara ekologis, dan pembangunan berkelanjutan serta

perdamaian merupakan hal-hal yang saling berkaitan dan tidak terpisahkan.81

Kedua, semua orang memiliki hak atas lingkungan hidup yang aman, sehat, dan

baik secara ekologis. Hak ini dan hak asasi manusia lainnya, termasuk hak-hak

sipil, ekonomi, politik, dan sosial, merupakan hak yang universal, saling terkait,

dan tidak terpisahkan.82

Ketiga, non-discrimination, setiap orang harus bebas dari

79

Fatma Zohra Ksentini, The Final Report of the UN Special Rapporteur...

80 Ibid.

81 Prinsip 1 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment,

menyatakan “Human rights, an ecologically sound environment, sustainable develompent and

peace are interdependent and indivisible.”

82 Prinsip 2 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and Environment,

menyatakan “All persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment.

This right and other human rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights,

are universal, inter-dependent and indivisible.”


27


bentuk diskriminasi apapun terkait perbuatan dan keputusan yang memiliki

pengaruh terhadap lingkungan hidup.83

Dan keempat, yaitu prinsip intra-

generational equity dan inter-generational equity, yaitu setiap orang memiliki hak

atas lingkungan hidup yang layak untuk memenuhi secara seimbang kebutuhan

dari generasi masa kini dan tidak mengurangi hak dari generasi mendatang untuk

memenuhi secara seimbang kebutuhannya.84

Selanjutnya, dalam Prinsip 5 sampai dengan Prinsip 14, ialah hak

substantif atas lingkungan hidup. Dalam skripsi ini, demi tidak melebarnya

pembahasan, maka hanya akan dibahas mengenai hak substantif. Sebagaimana

disebutkan dalam penjelasan dari Rancangan Deklarasi ini, hak-hak yang akan

dipaparkan berikut bukanlah hak-hak yang baru. Namun bagaimanapun,

pengakuan formal dan sistematis bahwa hak-hak tersebut relevan untuk

permasalahan lingkungan hidup diyakini akan dapat menghasilkan sebuah derajat

inovasi dalam perlindungan lingkungan hidup.85

Prinsip-prinsip yang merupakan

hak substantif atas lingkungan hidup ialah:

1. Prinsip 5: “Setiap orang memiliki hak atas kebebasan dari polusi, kerusakan

lingkungan, dan aktivitas yang berdampak buruk pada lingkungan,

mengancam kehidupan, kesehatan, mata pencaharian, kesejahteraan, atau

pembangunan berkelanjutan di dalam , melalui, atau di luar batas teritorial

nasional.”86

2. Prinsip 6: “Setiap orang memiliki hak untuk perlindungan dan kelestarian

udara, tanah, air, lautan es, tumbuhan dan binatang, dan proses dan wilayah

83

Prinsip 3 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and Environment menyatakan

“All persons shall be free from any form of discrimination in regard to actions and decisions that

affect the environment”

84 Prinsip 4 dari Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and Environment,

menyatakan “All persons have the right to an environment adequate to meet equitably the needs of

present enerations and that does not impair the rights of future generations to meet equitably

their needs.”

85 Neil A. F. Popovic, “In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights: Commentary on the

Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment”, Columbia Human Rights

Law Review, (Spring 1996), hlm. 514.

86 Rumusan asli dari Prinsip 5 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and

Environment ialah “All persons have the right to freedom from pollution, environmental

degradation and activities that adversely affect the environment, threaten life, health, livelihood,

well-being or sustainable de-velopment within, across or outside national boundaries.”


28


esensial yang penting untuk mempertahankan keberagaman hayati dan

ekosistem-ekosistem.”87

3. Prinsip 7: “Setiap orang memiliki hak atas standar kesehatan tertinggi yang

dapat dicapai yang bebas dari kerusakan lingkungan.”88

4. Prinsip 8: “Setiap orang memiliki hak atas makanan yang aman dan sehat

dan air yang layak bagi kesejahteraan mereka.”89

5. Prinsip 9: “Setiap orang memiliki hak atas lingkungan kerja yang aman dan

sehat”90

6. Prinsip 10: “Setiap orang memiliki hak atas tempat tinggal yang layak,

pemilikan tanah dan kondisi kehidupan dalam lingkungan hidup yang aman,

sehat, dan baik secara ekologis.”91

7. Prinsip 11: “(1) Setiap orang memiliki hak untuk tidak dipindahkan secara

paksa dari tempat tinggal atau tanah mereka untuk tujuan, atau sebagai

konsekuensi dari, keputusan atau tindakan yang mempengaruhi lingkungan

hidup, kecuali dalam keadaan darurat atau tujuan yang memaksa yang

menguntungkan masyarakat secara keseluruhan dan tidak dapat dicapai

dengan cara lain; dan (2) Setiap orang memiliki hak untuk berpartisipasi

secara efektif dalam keputusan dan untuk melakukan perundingan terkait

pemindahan paksa mereka dan memiliki hak, jika dipindahkan secara paksa,

87

Rumusan asli dari Prinsip 6 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and

Environment ialah “All persons have the right to protection and preservation of the air, soil,

water, sea-ice, flora and fauna, and the essential processes and areas necessary to maintain

biological diversity and ecosystems”


Environment ialah "All persons have the right to the highest attainable standard of health free

from environmental harm"


Environment ialah "All persons have the right to safe and healthy food and water adequate to their

well-being."


Environment ialah "All persons have the right to a safe and healthy working environment."


Environment ialah "All persons have the right to adequate housing, land tenure and living

conditions in a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment"


29


untuk mendapatkan restitusi atau kompensasi yang memadai dan segera,

dan/atau akomodasi atau tanah yang layak dan cukup.”92

8. Prinsip 12: “Setiap orang memiliki hak atas bantuan yang tepat waktu dalam

kejadian bencana alam maupun bencana teknis, atau yang disebabkan oleh

manusia”93

9. Prinsip 13: “(1) Setiap orang memiliki hak atas manfaat yang adil dari

konservasi dan penggunaan berkelanjutan dari alam dan sumber daya alam

untuk kebudayaan, ekologi, pendidikan, kesehatan, mata pencaharian,

rekreasional, spiritual, atau tujuan lainnya. Ini termasuk pula akses yang

baik secara ekologis terhadap alam; dan (2) Setiap orang memiliki hak atas

kelestarian situs-situs unik, sejalan dengan hak-hak fundamental dari orang-

orang atau kelompok-kelompok yang hidup dalam area tersebut.”94

10. Prinsip 14: “Orang-orang pribumi memiliki hak untuk mengontrol tanah,

wilayah, dan sumber daya alam mereka, dan untuk menjaga cara hidup

tradisional mereka. Ini termasuk pula hak atas rasa aman dalam penikmatan

cara penghidupan mereka.95

92

Rumusan asli dari Prinsip 11 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and

Environment ialah "(1) All persons have the right not to be evicted from their homes or land for

the purpose of, or as a consequence of, decisions or actions affecting the environment, except in

emergencies or due to a compelling purpose benefitting society as a whole and not attainable by

other means; and (2) All persons have the right to participate effectively in decisions and to

negotiate concerning their eviction and the right, if evicted, to timely and adequate restitution,

compensation and/or appro-priate and sufficient accommodation or land"


Environment ialah "All persons have the right to timely assistance in the event of natural or

technological or other human-caused catastrophes."


Environment ialah "Everyone has the right to benefit equitably from the conservation and

sustainable use of nature and natural resources for cultural, ecological, educational, health,

livelihood, recreational, spiritual or other purposes. This includes ecologically sound access to

nature; and (2) Everyone has the right to preservation of unique sites, consistent with the

fundamental rights of persons or groups living in the area"


Environment ialah "(1) Indigenous peoples have the right to control their lands, territories and

natural resources and to maintain their traditional way of life. This includes the right to security

in the enjoyment of their means of subsistence; (2) Indigenous peoples have the right to protection

against any action or course of conduct that may result in the destruction or degradation of their

territories, including land, air, water, sea-ice, wildlife or other resources."


30


Prinsip-prinsip yang disebutkan di atas merupakan kumpulan prinsip-prinsip yang

menyusun substansi dari right to environment dalam konteks substantif, yang

pada prakteknya tersebar dalam berbagai dokumen internasional maupun nasional

dalam berbagai perumusan, sebagaimana akan dijelaskan dalam sub-bab

berikutnya.

Prinsip lainnya yang penting dalam kaitannya dengan permasalahan

dalam skripsi ini ialah Prinsip 22 mengenai kewajiban yang dibebankan kepada

negara untuk mengatur dalam regulasi domestiknya untuk memastikan bahwa

perusahaan transnasional melaksakan kewajiban mereka dalam memenuhi right to

environment ini.

“Setiap negara harus menghormati dan memastikan bahwa hak terhadap

lingkungan yang aman, sehat, dan baik ekologisnya. Maka itu, negara-

negara harus mengadopsi standar administratif, legislatif, dan lainnya

yang penting untuk secara efektif mengimplementasikan hak-hak dalam

Deklarasi ini.

Standar-standar ini harus bertujuan untuk perlindungan kerusakan

lingkungan hidup, dalam provisi mengenai remedi yang layak, dan

penggunaan yang berkelanjutan dari sumber daya alam, dan meliputi, di

antaranya,

... (7) standar yang bertujuan memastikan bahwa perusahaan

transnasional, di manapun beroperasi, melaksanakan kewajiban

perlindungan lingkungan hidup, pembangunan berkelanjutan, dan

menghormati hak asasi manusia, ...”

Prinsip bahwa negara harus membuat pengaturan hukum untuk melindungi hak

terhadap lingkungan telah diakui dalam berbagai provisi konstitusi nasional.

Beberapa mengenalnya sebagai kewajiban yang ditambahkan pada hak untuk

menikmati lingkungan hidup yang sehat.96

Beberapa lagi mengambil pendekatan

yang lebih antroposentrik97

, dan yang lainnya berbicara dalam terminologi untuk

melindungi lingkungan itu sendiri.98

96

Di antaranya ialah konstitusi Brazil (Bagian VI, art. 225: “Negara harus mewajibkan,

secara hukum, analisis mengenai dampak terhadap lingkungan hidup”), Ekuador (Art. 19 (2):

“Negara akan meletakkan pembatasan terhadap hak atau kemerdekaan tertentu, dalam rangka

melindungi lingkungan”), Mongolia, dan Swedia.

97 Di antaranya ialah konstitusi Angola, Kuba, Ethiopia, Jerman, Guyana, Honduras, Sri

Lanka, Spanyol, dan cukup banyak negara lainnya. Misalnya dalam konstitusi Meksiko disebutkan


31


2.2. Perjanjian Internasional dan Instrumen Soft Law yang Mengatur

Mengenai Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup

Perjanjian internasional merupakan salah satu sumber hukum

internasional sebagaimana disebutkan dalam Pasal 38 ICJ Statute, yang menunjuk

pada 'perjanjian internasional', baik secara umum maupun khusus, membangun

aturan hukum yang diakui oleh negara pihak.99

Perjanjian internasional dibedakan

menjadi 'law-making treaties', yang dimaksudkan untuk memiliki relevansi

universal atau umum; dan 'treaty-contracts', yang berlaku hanya antara dua, atau

sejumlah kecil negara. Pembedaan tersebut dimaksudkan untuk merefleksikan

keberlakuan umum atau lokal dari suatu perjanjian tertentu dan luasnya kewajiban

yang dikenakan. Pembedaan ini tidak dapat dikatakan telah mapan, dan terdapat

banyak wilayah abu-abu dan tidak pasti.100

Seperti layaknya kontrak, perjanjian

internasional menghasilkan serangkaian preposisi yang mengikat bagi para pihak.

Bagi para pihak yang tidak menjadi negara pihak atau meratifikasi perjanjian

tersebut, maka tidaklah diikat oleh hak dan kewajiban yang ada. Namun, apabila

perjanjian internasional tersebut telah mengkristal menjadi prinsip umum hukum

atau hukum kebiasaan internasional, maka suatu negara dapat terikat walaupun

bukan negara pihak dari perjanjian tersebut.101

Dalam membahas masalah ini, terdapat beberapa perjanjian internasional

yang relevan untuk ditunjuk dalam kaitannya dengan right to environment, yaitu

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous

and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Convention on Access to

bahwa Art. 27: “Negara memiliki hak untuk merulasi mengenai sumber daya alam demi

kepentingan masyarakat”

98 Konstitusi Albania, Bulgaria, China, Kolombia, Afganistan, dan sebagainya. Brazil,

selain meletakkan provisi pelengkap dengan pendekatan hak atas lingkungan hidup, memberikan

pula perlindungan hukum yang langsung melihat lingkungan sebagai subjek dalam Art. 23:

“Negara berkewajiban untuk melindungi lingkungan dan melawan polusi.”

99 Malcolm Shaw, International Law..., hlm. 88

100 Tunkin, Theory of International Law, hlm. 93-95, dalam Ibid.

101 Ibid., hlm. 90


32


Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental

Matters. Selain itu, terdapat pula beberapa instrumen regional, misalnya African

Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, Charter on Environmental Rights and

Obligations, serta Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human

Rghts in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Pemaparan lebih

detail mengenai perjanjian-perjanjian di atas akan dipaparkan sebagai berikut.

2.2.1. Perjanjian Internasional: Hak Asasi Manusia yang Mensyaratkan

Lingkungan Hidup yang Sehat

2.2.1.1. Instrumen Global

Hingga kini, hak atas lingkungan hidup belum ditransformasikan ke

dalam aturan hukum internasional yang mengikat dengan keberlakuan

universal.102

Pada 1986, Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World

Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) menyatakan bahwa hak

atas lingkungan hidup yang sehat belum dapat dipertimbangkan sebagai "hak yang

telah mantap dalam hukum internasional sekarang ini (well-established right

under present international law)".103

WCED menyarankan untuk mengisi

kekosongan ini dengan mengikutsertakan seperangkat prinsip hukum universal

dalam bidang perlindungan lingkungan dan pembangunan berkelanjutan, yang

mana disusun dengan pandangan bagi diikutsertakannya hak-hak ini dalam

instrumen global yang mengikat secara hukum, sebuah provisi yang dinamakan

"hak asasi manusia fundamental" dan disusun dalam kata-kata sebagai berikut:

"Setiap manusia memiliki hak fundamental atas lingkungan hidup yang layak bagi

kesehatan dan kesejahteraan mereka".104

Bagaimanapun, wacana ini hingga

sekarang belum diwujudkan dalam dokumen internasional yang bersifat global

dan mengikat secara hukum.

102

Maguelonne Déjeant-Pons dan Marc Pallemaerts, Human Rights And The

Environment..., hlm. 13

103 Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environment and

Development, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and

Recommendations, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), hlm. 40.

104 Ibid., hlm. 41.


33


Namun, selama instrumen ini belum terwujud, para ahli melakukan

pendekatan dengan menggunakan hak asasi manusia yang telah ada sebagai hak-

hak yang diturunkan (derogative rights) yang merupakan komponen yang integral

dengan adanya lingkungan hidup yang sehat. Meskipun secara spesifik tidak ada

perjanjian internasional dengan keberlakuan universal yang mengakomodasi right

to environment ini, namun pendekatan dengan reinterpretasi dan memperluas hak

asasi manusia yang telah mapan untuk menggabungkan perlindungan lingkungan.

Alasan dibelakang strategi ini ialah ukuran yang layak bagi perlindungan

lingkungan dapat diperoleh dengan reformulasi dari hak asasi manusia yang telah

ada, dan dengan demikian mengambil keuntungan dari mekanisme monitoring

dan penegakan internasional dan regional yang telah ada.105

Beberapa perluasan

dapat ditarik dari instrumen-instrumen hukum internasional berikut:

1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (selanjutnya disebut

“ICCPR”)106

Salah satu instrumen hukum internasional yang memuat hak-hak yang

menjadi dasar perluasan hak asasi manusia ke dalam konteks lingkungan ini

ialah ICCPR pada tahun 1966 yang mengakui hak untuk hidup sebagai salah

satu hak sipil dan politik.107

Hak untuk hidup ini berhubungan erat dengan

hak atas lingkungan hidup, di mana buruknya keadaan lingkungan dalam

keadaan tertentu dapat menyebabkan hilangnya nyawa seseorang.

2. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

(selanjutnya disebut “Kovenan Ekosob”) 108

105

Richard Desgangne, “Integrating Environmental Values Into the European Convention

on Human Rights”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, (1995), hlm. 263.

106 United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, diadopsi oleh

United Nations General Assembly di New York, 16 December 1966 dan mulai berlaku pada 23

Maret 1976. Hingga saat ini, negara penandatangan konvenan ini telah mencapai 74 negara, dan

negara pihaknya mencapai 167 negara.

107 Artikel 6 par (1) dari ICCPR, disebutkan bahwa “Every human being has the inherent

right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”

108 United Nations, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,

diadopsi oleh United Nations General Assembly di New York pada 16 Desember 1966 dan mulai

berlaku sejak 3 Januari 1976. Kovenan ini mensyaratkan negara pihaknya untuk bekerja baik

secara sendiri-sendiri maupun bekerja sama demi tercapainya pemenuhan hak-hak ekonomi,

sosial, dan budaya bagi individu, termasuk hak-hak buruh dan hak atas kesehatan, hak atas

pendidikan, dan hak atas standar kehidupan yang layak. Pada bulan November 2011, terdapat 160


34


Selain ICCPR, Kovenan Ekosob merupakan istrumen internasional lain

yang juga mengakui hak individu untuk mendapatkan "perbaikan terus

menerus dari kondisi hidup"109

serta hak untuk "menikmati standar tertinggi

yang dapat dicapai terkait kesehatan fisik dan mental"110

dan mensyaratkan

negara untuk melindungi hak atas kesehatan dengan ukuran-ukuran positif,

termasuk antara lain, "perbaikan semua aspek higienitas lingkungan hidup

dan industri".111

Hak atas kesehatan ini secara jelas mengajak negara-negara

peserta untuk mengambil langkah untuk “perbaikan segala aspek higienitas

lingkungan hidup dan industrial, dan pencegahan, pengobatan, dan

pengendalian penyakit-penyakit epidemik, endemik, musiman, maupun

penyakit-penyakit lainnya.112

3. ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent

Countries113

Selain kedua konvensi yang telah begitu luas keanggotaannya sebagaimana

disebutkan di atas, ada pula ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and

Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries tahun 1989. Konvensi ini meliputi

berbagai penunjukan pada tanah, sumber daya alam, dan lingkungan hidup

di mana orang-orang pribumi tinggal. Negara-negara diwajibkan untuk

negara yang menjadi pihak dari konvensi ini. Sumber: United Nations Treaty Collection Official

Website, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chap-

ter=4&lang=en, diakses pada Rabu, 30 November 2011

109 Artikel 11 Kovenan Ekosob, menyatakan "Negara Pihak pada Kovenan ini mengakui

hak setiap orang atas standar kehidupan yang layak baginya dan keluarganya, termasuk pangan,

sandang dan perumahan, dan atas perbaikan kondisi hidup terus menerus. Negara Pihak akan

mengambil langkah-langkah yang memadai untuk menjamin perwujudan hak ini dengan mengakui

arti penting kerjasama internasional yang berdasarkan kesepakatan sukarela.”

110 Artikel 12 paragraf (1) Kovenan Ekosob menyatakan “Negara Pihak dalam Kovenan ini

mengakui hak setiap orang untuk menikmati standar tertinggi yang dapat dicapai atas kesehatan

fisik dan mental.”

111 Artikel 12 paragraf (2) huruf (b) Kovenan Ekosob menyatakan “Langkah-langkah yang

akan diambil oleh Negara Pihak pada Kovenan ini guna mencapai perwujudan hak ini sepenuhnya,

harus meliputi hal-hal yang diperlukan untuk mengupayakan: (b) Perbaikan semua aspek

kesehatan lingkungan dan industri.”

112 Ibid.

113 International Labor Organization, Convention Converning Indigenous and Tribal

Peoples in Independent Countries, diadopsi pada 27 Juni 1989 di Jenewa. Sejauh ini, 22 negara

telah meratifikasi konvensi ini.


http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chap-ter=4&lang=en

http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chap-ter=4&lang=en

35


memastikan keberadaan pelayanan kesehatan yang layak atau menyediakan

sumber daya bagi orang-orang pribumi “sehingga mereka dapat menikmati

standar tertinggi yang dapat dicapai dari kesehatan fisik dan mental”114

4. Aarhaus Convention115

Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to

Justice in Environmental Matters, atau dikenal sebagai Aarhus Convention

pada tahun 1998, yang diratifikasi 35 negara dan European Community,

merupakan suatu instrumen internasional yang penting pula dalam

pengakuan atas right to environment. Terutama mengenai ketentuan-

ketentuan prosedural, konvensi ini menguatkan teks sebelumnya yang

diakui dalam Stockholm Declaration.

2.2.1.2. Instrumen Regional

Selain instrumen hukum internasional yang bersifat global dan mengikat

di atas, terdapat pula beberapa instrumen regional seperti African Charter on

Human and Peoples‟ Rights116

yang merupakan perjanjian internasional dalam

bidang hak asasi manusia yang pertama kali mengakui hak dari “semua orang”

terhadap “lingkungan hidup yang memuaskan dan mendukung pembangunan

mereka”117

Selain itu, instrumen ini juga mengakui hak atas kesehatan.118

Di

Eropa, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) telah

menyatakan bahwa lingkungan hidup yang “baik” harus diakui sebagai salah satu

114

Artikel 25 par (1) dari ILO Convention Converning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in

Independent Countries (1989).

115 United Nations, Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-

Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, dibuat di Aarhaus, Denmark, pada 25

Juni 1998 dan mulai berlaku pada 30 Oktober 2001. Konvensi ini telah ditandatangani 40 negara

dan memiliki negara pihak sejumlah 45 negara.

116 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, diadopsi

pada 27 June 1981 dan mulai berlaku pada 21 Oktober 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21

I.L.M. 58 (1982). Piagam ini dikenal pula sebagai "Banjul Charter" dan sejauh ini telah

ditandatangani 42 negara Afrika, serta memiliki negara peserta sebanyak 53 negara.

117 African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, dibuka untuk ratifikasi pada 27 Juni

1981, art. 24.

118 Artikel 16 dari Charter ini menjamin “the right to enjoy the best attainable state of

physical and mental health to every individual”. African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights,

artikel 16.


36


hak asasi manusia yang fundamental.119

United Nations Economic Commission

for Europe (UNECE) juga telah menyusun Charter on Environmental Rights and

Obligations, yang menguatkan prinsip fundamental bahwa setiap orang memiliki

hak atas lingkungan hidup yang layak bagi kesehatan dan kesejahteraan secara

umum.120

Hak-hak yang diformulasikan dalam piagam ini utamanya ialah hak

prosedural terkait akses terhadap informasi, proses yang layak, dan partisipasi

dalam pembuatan keputusan. Selain itu, di Amerika Serikat dikenal pula

Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rghts in the Area of

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, atau dikenal sebagai Protocol of San

Salvador yang pada Artikel 11, berjudul “Hak atas Lingkungan Hidup”,

menyatakan bahwa: (1) Setiap orang harus memiliki hak untuk hidup dalam

lingkungan hidup yang sehat dan memiliki akses pada pelayanan publik yang

mendasar; serta (2) Negara-negara peserta harus mempromosikan perlindungan,

penjagaan, serta perbaikan lingkungan hidup,”121

Banyak yang mengasumsikan bahwa European Convention on Human

Rights yang dibuat pada 1950 memiliki ketentuan terkait dengan lingkungan

hidup. Namun, konvensi ini tidak memiliki provisi eksplisit mengenai hak atas

lingkungan hidup yang baik. Namun, permasalahan ini diatasi dengan baik di

European Union dengan mendasarkannya pada preseden kasus-kasus terdahulu

dengan memperbolehkan kompensasi untuk kerugian terhadap lingkungan hidup

dalam konteks hak-hak lainnya yang telah mapan dalam hukum internasional,

seperti hak untuk hidup, privasi, dan kehidupan berkeluarga serta kebebasan

berekspresi.122

119

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Responsibility and Liability

of States in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, dicetak ulang dalam Environmental Policy and

Law, Vol. 13, (1984), hlm. 122.

120 Draft UNECE Charter on Environmental Rights and Obligations, diadopsi pada 29-31

Oktober 1990.

121 Additional Protocl to the American Convention on Human Rghts in the Area of

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, diadopsi pada 14 November 1988, Art. 11.

122 Right to Environment: Regional Treaties dan Legal Provisions, Sumber:

http://www.righttoenvironment.org/default.asp?pid=82


37


2.2.2. Instrumen Soft Law: Pengakuan Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup

Soft law memiliki arti yang luas, namun tiga hal yang paling terkait

dengan konteks ini adalah (1) Ia tidak mengikat; (2) Ia terdiri dari norma-norma

atau prinsip-prinsip umum, bukan aturan; (3) Ia adalah hukum yang tidak dapat

langsung diimplementasikan melalui resolusi yang mengikat.123

Pengaturan

mengenai lingkungan hidup dalam dunia internasional memiliki suatu

karakteristik unik, yaitu dengan lebih banyaknya dilakukan pengaturan sukarela

dengan instrumen-instrumen tidak mengikat atau soft law. Beberapa dokumen soft

law yang bersifat global dan memuat hak atas lingkungan hidup dalam provisinya

ialah:

1. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment

(selanjutnya disebut “Deklarasi Stockholm”)124

Hubungan antara perlindungan lingkungan dan hak asasi manusia pertama

kali dikenal secara eksplisit pada Deklarasi Stockholm di tahun 1972.

Dalam Prinsip 1 pada deklarasi ini dinyatakan:

"Manusia memiliki hak fundamental atas kebebasan, persamaan,

dan kondisi yang layak untuk hidup, dalam sebuah lingkungan

hidup dengan kualitas yang memungkinkan kehidupan dengan

martabat dan kesejahteraan, dan manusia memiliki kewajiban

serius untuk melindungi dan memperbaiki lingkungan untuk

generasi kini maupun mendatang"125

Hubungan antara lingkungan hidup dan hak asasi manusia juga ditekankan

dalam pembukaan Deklarasi Stockholm, yang menyatakan bahwa

perlindungan lingkungan hidup ialah "penting [...] bagi dapat dinikmatinya

hak-hak asasi manusia yang mendasar - bahkan juga hak untuk hidup itu

sendiri".126

Perlu dicatat pula bahwa provisi-provisi tersebut juga tidak

123

A.E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law,

International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (1999), hlm. 901-903.

124 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, diadopsi di

Stockholm, 16 Juni 1972 oleh United Nations

125 Prinsip 1 Deklarasi Stockholm

126 Paragraf pertama dari Preambule Deklarasi Stockholm selengkapnya menyatakan “Man

is both creature and moulder of his environment, which gives him physical sustenance and affords

him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, social and spiritual growth. In the long and tortuous


38


secara langsung mengakui hak terhadap lingkungan hidup yang sehat pula.

Pengakuan ini lebih merupakan pengakuan secara tidak langsung akan hak

ini, dengan membangun sebuah hubungan antara hak-hak asasi manusia

yang telah diakui dengan baik, misalnya hak untuk kebebasan dan hak untuk

hidup, dan hak atas kualitas lingkungan hidup.127

Kualitas lingkungan hidup

disebutkan sebagai suatu keadaan yang harus terpenuhi untuk tercapainya

"kondisi hidup yang layak". Dengan demikian, Deklarasi Stockholm

sebenarnya dibangun di atas kalimat sebelumnya yang terdapat dalam

Konvensi Ekosob, sebagaimana telah dijelaskan pada sub-bab sebelumnya,

yang memberikan hak atas kesehatan serta perbaikan terus menerus dari

kondisi hidup dengan perumusan “penikmatan atas standar tertinggi yang

dapat dicapai”.128

2. Declaration on the Right to Development129

Deklarasi yang dibuat pada tahun 1986 ini merupakan dokumen penting

selanjutnya yang menyinggung mengenai hubungan antara hak asasi

manusia dan lingkungan hidup. Artikel 8 ayat (1) dari Deklarasi ini

menyebutkan bahwa

“negara-negara harus mengambil segala ukuran yang dibutuhkan,

pada level nasional, untuk mewujudnyatakan hak terhadap

pembangunan dan harus memastikan, di antaranya, persamaan

kesempatan bagi semua orang terkait akses terhadap sumber daya

evolution of the human race on this planet a stage has been reached when, through the rapid

acceleration of science and technology, man has acquired the power to transform his environment

in countless ways and on an unprecedented scale. Both aspects of man's environment, the natural

and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights the

right to life itself”

127 Maguelonne Déjeant-Pons dan Marc Pallemaerts, Human Rights And The Environment:

Compedium Of Instruments And Other International Texts On Individual And Collective Rights

Relating To The Environment In The International And European Framework (Strasbourg:

Council of Europe Publishing, 2002), hlm. 11-12.

128 Artikel 11, 12 paragraf (1) dan (2) huruf b Kovenan Ekosob

129 Pada dasarnya, dokumen ini menitikberatkan pada hak terhadap pembangunan, dengan

menyatakan pada Artikel 1 par (10) bahwa “hak terhadap pembangunan merupakan hak yang

universal dan tidak dapat dicabut dan merupakan bagian integral dari hak asasi manusia yang

fundamental”. Declaration on the Right to Development diadopsi oleh Resolusi UN General

Assembly 41/128 pada tanggal 4 December 1986.


39


dasar, pendidikan, pelayanan kesehatan, makanan, perumahan,

pekerjaan, dan distribusi pendapatan yang adil.”130

Dalam menginterpretasi artikel ini, UN General Assembly mengklarifikasi

dan menguatkan Resolusi 54/175 bahwa "hak atas makanan dan air bersih

merupakan hak asasi manusia yang fundamental dan dorongan

perwujudannya merupakan keharusan moral baik bagi Pemerintah nasional

maupun komunitas internasional". UN General Assembly menguatkan

hubungan antara hak asasi manusia dan perlindungan lingkungan hidup

dalam Resolusi 45/94, menyatakan bahwa setiap individu berhak untuk

hidup dalam lingkungan hidup yang layak untuk kesehatan dan

kesejahteraan mereka.131

Perumusan tekstual ini kemudian kerap dipakai

dalam berbagai instrumen internasional selanjutnya yang membahas

mengenai hak asasi manusia dan lingkungan hidup.132

3. Bruntland Report

Pada 1987, Bruntland Commission mengeluarkan sebuah laporan yang

berbentuk Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable

Development. Laporan ini mencari solusi terhadap permasalahan paralel dari

degradasi lingkungan hidup secara global dan kurangnya pembangunan

ekonomi dan sosial secara global dengan menanyakan tantangan-tantangan

ini untuk dipecahkan dalam cara yang terintegrasi dari generasi masa kini

maupun masa depan. Dalam laporannya, pembangunan berkelanjutan

didefinisikan sebagai "pembangunan yang memenuhi kebutuhan masa kini

tanpa mengurangi kemampuan generasi masa depan untuk mewujudkan

130

Artikel 8 dari Declaration on the Right to Development, yang eks asli dari artikel

tersebut berbunyi “[s]tates should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the

realisation of the right to development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of opportunity for all

in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the

fair distribution of income”

131 UN General Assembly Resolution No: A/RES/45/95, Regarding Need To Ensure A

Healthy Environment For The Well-Being Of Individuals, Plenary C.3, Agenda Item No.93,

Meeting Record No. A/45/PV.68, dated 14 December 1990, adopted without vote.

132 Maguelonne Déjeant-Pons dan Marc Pallemaerts, Human Rights And The

Environment..., hlm. 13.


40


kebutuhannya".133

Artikel 1 dari prinsip legal ini, diadopsi oleh Expert

Group of the Brundtland Commission, secara jelas menghubungkan ketiga

bidang dengan menyatakan bahwa "Semua manusia memiliki hak

fundamental terhadap lingkungan hidup yang layak untuk kesehatan dan

kesejahteraan mereka".

4. Rio Declaration on Sustainable Development (selanjutnya disebut

"Deklarasi Rio")

Perkembangan penting selanjutnya dalam bidang hukum lingkungan

internasional adalah Deklarasi Rio pada 1992. Dalam Deklarasi Rio ini

sendiri, tidak terdapat provisi yang secara eksplisit menunjuk hak asasi

manusia. Deklarasi ini bagaimanapun memuat beberapa provisi yang

relevan dengan permasalahan ini. Prinsip 1 menyatakan "Manusia

merupakan pusat perhatian untuk pembangunan berkelanjutan. Mereka

berhak atas kehidupan yang sehat dan produktif yang selaras dengan

alam".134

Tujuan utama dari provisi ini ialah untuk mengartikulasikan

sebuah alasan antroposentrik untuk perlindungan lingkungan hidup dan

pembangunan berkelanjutan, dibandingan untuk menegaskan hak individu

atas lingkungan. Namun penting untuk dicatat, bahwa ketika deklarasi ini

sebenarnya gagal untuk secara eksplisit menegaskan hak terhadap

lingkungan hidup yang sehat, Deklarasi Rio secara eksplisit mengakui hak

terhadap pembangunan, walaupun tidak secara eksplisit sebagai hak asasi

manusia.135

Selanjutnya, dalam Prinsip 3 Deklarasi Rio menyatakan bahwa "hak

terhadap pembangunan harus dipenuhi dengan menyeimbangkan kebutuhan

pembangunan dan lingkungan hidup dari generasi masa kini dan akan

133

Development And International Economic Co-Operation: Environment, Report of the

World Commission on Environment and Development, diadopsi oleh UN General Assembly

dengan Resolusi No: A/42/427, pada tanggal 4 August 1987

134 Prinsip 1 Deklarasi Rio, teks aslinya berbunyi “Human beings are at the centre of

concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in

harmony with nature.”

135 Maguelonne Déjeant-Pons dan Marc Pallemaerts, Human Rights And The

Environment..., hlm. 13.


41


datang”. Prinsip ini ambigu, dapat ditafsirkan menyiratkan pemenuhan hak

atas pembangunan sendiri cukup untuk terpenuhinya kebutuhan lingkungan

hidup; atau bahwa hal tersebut ketergantungan keseimbangannya tidak

hanya dalam aspek pembangunan, tetapi juga aspek lingkungan hidup

manusia.136

Selain itu provisi penting lainnya ialah Prinsip 10, karena

mengakui kebutuhan akses publik terhadap informasi lingkungan hidup,

partisipasi publik dalam pembuatan keputusan lingkungan hidup dan akses

terhadap keadilan, yang dapat dianggap sebagai hak prosedual yang

merupakan turunan dari hak-hak substansi tersebut.

5. Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (selanjutnya

disebut “Deklarasi Johannesburg”)137

Pada tahun 2002 dalam Earth Summit, Deklarasi Johannesburg memperkuat

pula hak ini, dengan secara spesifik berkomitmen untuk “menganggap

tanggung jawab kolektif untuk memajukan dan memperkuat pilar yang

saling terkait dan saling memperkuat antara pembangunan berkelanjutan

(pembangungan ekonomi, pembangunan sosial, dan perlindungan

lingkungan) pada level lokal, nasional, regional, dan global.”138

2.3. Pandangan Mengenai Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup dari Segi

Hukum Kebiasaan Internasional

2.3.1. Pembentukan Hukum Kebiasaan Internasional

ICJ Statute mendeskripsikan kebiasaan (custom) sebagai “evidence of

general practice accepted as law”.139

Teori tradisional mengenai hukum

kebiasaan internasional dibangun oleh International Court of Justice (ICJ) dalam

North Sea Continental Shelf Case.140

Pada prinsipnya, kebiasaan dalam hukum

136

Ibid., hlm. 14.

137 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development diadopsi pada World Summit on

Sustainable Development (WSSD), terkadang disebut juga sebagai Earth Summit 2002, di mana

negara-negara juga menyetujui Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable

Development.

138 Paragraf 5 dari Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development.

139 Internationa Court of Justice Statute Artice 38 ayat (1) (b)

140 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1969, hlm. 3, paragraf 77.


42


internasional terdiri dari dua elemen, yaitu: (1) Elemen objektif, yaitu praktek

negara (state practice) yang dimengerti sebagai perbuatan materiil yang dilakukan

oleh negara, dan (2) Elemen subjektif yaitu opinio juris sive necessitatis, yaitu

kepercayaan bahwa praktek tersebut dipertimbangkan sebagai suatu kewajiban

dengan adanya aturan hukum yang mengharuskannya.141

Elemen pertama, yaitu mengenai state practice, merupakan praktek

aktual yang dilakukan oleh suatu negara. Terdapat beberapa poin dalam

mempertimbangkan sifat dari praktek tertentu dari negara, termasuk (1) jangka

waktu dilakukannya; (2) konsistensi; (3) pengulangan, dan (4) generalitas.142

Dalam hukum internasional, tidak ada kriteria waktu yang rigid dalam

pembentukan hukum kebiasaan, dan hal ini akan tergantung pada keadaan dari

kasus dan sifat dari penggunaannya. Dalam beberapa bidang, aturan tersebut

berkembang dengan cepat. Dalam bidang lainnya, proses pembentukan ini jauh

lebih lambat. Durasi, oleh karena itu, bukanlah merupakan komponen yang paling

penting dari state practice.143

Sedangkan mengenai konsistensi dan pengulangan,

sebagaimana diputuskan ICJ dalam kasus Asylum pada tahun 1950, suatu hukum

kebiasaan haruslah 'sesuai dengan cara yang konstan dan uniform yang

dipraktekkan oleh negara terkait hal yang dipertanyakan‟.144

Dengan kata lain,

perlu ada suatu kebiasaan yang merupakan suatu pola tindak yang berlangsung

lama, yang merupakan serangkaian tindakan serupa mengenai hal dan keadaan

yang serupa pula.145

Generalitas sendiri berarti bahwa kebiasaan atau pola tindak

yang disebutkan sebelumnya haruslah bersifat umum dan bertalian dengan hukum

internasional.146

141

Malcolm Shaw, International Law 5th Edition, hlm. 70.

142 Ibid., hlm. 72

143 Lih: D'Amato, Concept of Custom, hlm. 56-8 and Akehurst, 'Custom as a Source', hlm.

15-16.

144 ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 276-7; 17 ILR, p. 284.

145 Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Pengantar Hukum Internasional, hlm. 144.

146 Ibid.


43


Elemen kedua, yaitu mengenai opinio juris, mewajibkan adanya suatu

„perasaan hukum‟ atau kepercayaan dari negara-negara bahwa apa yang dilakukan

mereka ialah didasarkan hal tersebut dikategorikan sebagai suatu „kewajiban

hukum‟.147

Dilihat secara praktis, suatu kebiasaan internasional dapat dikatakan

diterima sebagai hukum apabila negara-negara itu tidak menyatakan keberatan

terhadapnya. Keberatan ini dapat dinyatakan dengan berbagai cara misalnya

dengan jalan dipomatik (protes) atau dengan jalan hukum dengan mengajukan

keberatan di hadapan suatu mahkamah.148

Bagaimanapun, menurut beberapa ahli dan ICJ dalam kasus Nicaragua,

kewajiban kebiasaan internasional dapat juga dibuktikan melalui instrumen

normatif: (1) Dalam konteks perjanjian internasional, kewajiban kebiasaan

internasional bagi non-peserta (dan bagi peserta perjanjian tersebut) ialah dengan

penerimaan lebih jauh dari kewajiban tersebut melalui state practice; dan (2)

Dalam konteks instrumen yang tidak mengikat (misalnya Deklarasi atau Resolusi

Majelis Umum UN yang diadopsi dengan konsensus) dapat dibuktikan bahwa

kewajiban tersebut merupakan kebiasaan internasional bagi semua negara di mana

hal ini dilakukan dalam derajat tertentu dengan state practice.149

Sebagaimana dinyatakan Theodor Meron, dalam teori coutume sage

maupun dalam „normativitas relatif‟ dalam hukum internasional, dapat

diargumentasikan bahwa terdapat pengakuan implisit dari kewajiban internasional

dengan mengaplikasikan teori klasik „penerimaan‟ (acquiescence).150

Pengakuan

implisit ini harus disimpulkan dari state practice dalam beberapa cara: yang dapat

mencakup, di antaranya: (1) tindakan unilateral negara-negara (secara umum

tindakan yang diambil dan pernyataan yang dibuat oleh perwakilan negara kepada

organisasi internasional); (2) partisipasi dalam rezim perjanjian internasiona

147

Andrew Capham dan Mariano Garcia Rubio, „The Obligation of States with Regard to

Non-State Actors in the Context of the Right to Health‟, Health and Human Rights Working Paper

Series No. 3, (2002), hlm. 20.

148 Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Pengantar Hukum Internasional, hlm. 145.

149 Andrew Capham dan Mariano Garcia Rubio, „The Obligation of States..., hlm.20.

150 Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1989), hlm. 89.


44


tertentu; (3) legislasi nasional; dan (4) yurisprudensi domestik. State practice

tidak hanya membuat aturan tersebut, tetapi juga menentukan isinya. Dengan

demikian, state practice mewakili kriteria determinan untuk menentukan apakah

suatu hak tertentu telah masuk dalam kategori hukum kebiasaan.151

2.3.2. Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup: Hukum Kebiasaan Internasional?

Jawaban mengenai apakah hak atas lingkungan hidup telah menjadi

hukum kebiasaan internasional tergantung dari analisis dari state practice dalam

bidang ini. Apakah negara mempertimbangkan hak atas lingkungan hidup sebagai

hukum kebiasaan internasional? Untuk menjawab pertanyaan tersebut, harus

dipertimbangkan pula tindakan material yang dilakukan oleh negara. Dari hal

tersebut, dapat disimpulkan ada tidaknya opinio juris dalam komunitas

internasional.

Dalam menjawab pertanyaan ini, terdapat empat kriteria penting yang

dipertimbangkan, yaitu:152

(a) penerimaan secara luas terhadap instrumen tidak

mengikat terkait hak atas lingkungan hidup; (b) partisipasi secara luas dalam

perjanjian multilateral yang membentuk hak atas lingkungan hidup; (c)

penunjukan terhadap hak tersebut dalam legislasi nasional, terutama dalam level

konstitusional; (d) implementasi hak tersebut dalam badan peradilan nasional.

Dalam menganalisis, baik perumusan right to environment secara umum maupun

bagian substantif tertentu sebagaimana diuraikan dalam sub-bab sebelumnya

dihitung sebagai penunjukan terhadap right to environment.

Mengenai kriteria pertama yaitu penerimaan secara luas terhadap

instrumen tidak mengikat terkait hak atas lingkungan hidup, maka jawabannya

telah diuraikan secara detail dalam sub-bab sebelumnya mengenai instrumen soft

law dalam bidang ini. Dalam konteks ini, dokumen yang paling relevan ialah

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, yang diadopsi oleh UNGA pada 1948

tanpa voting negatif. Artikel 25 dari DUHAM, sebagaimana telah dijelaskan,

151

Andrew Capham dan Mariano Garcia Rubio, „The Obligation of States..., hlm.21.

152 Penulis mengambil kriteria yang digunakan Clapham dan Rubio dalam menganalisis hak

atas kesehatan sebagai hukum kebiasaan internasional, dengan mempertimbangkan bahwa analisis

yang dilakukan terhadap suatu hak asasi manusia dalam bidang tertentu sebagai hukum kebiasaan

internasional melibatkan kriteria yang sama. Andrew Clapham dan Mariano Garcia Rubio, “The

Obligations of States ...”, hlm. 22


45


merupakan suatu cerminan atas hak atas lingkungan hidup yang sehat, walaupun

tidak menunjuk secara langsung pada right to environment, namun dalam

pemenuhannya mensyaratkan lingkungan hidup dengan kualitas yang cukup untuk

mempertahankan kesehatan dan kesejahteraan manusia. Dan walaupun teks

tersebut seringkali dinyatakan terlalu luas dan kabur, namun pentingnya Deklarasi

1948 ini sebagai dokumen hak asasi manusia yang dikenal dan diakui tidak dapat

dikecilkan. Dokumen ini masih merupakan instrumen penting untuk menghadapi

negara yang belum menandatangani atau meratifikasi perjanjian internasional

dalam bidang hak asasi manusia.153

Lebih jauh lagi, gambaran hak tersebut secara umum telah

dikodifikasikan dalam berbagai instrumen soft law penting lainnya, misalnya yang

paling luas implikasinya ialah Stockholm Declaration dan Rio Declaration.

Mayoritas negara telah mengakui paling tidak tiga kali inti dari ketiga dokumen di

atas bahwa „setiap individu berhak untuk hidup dalam lingkungan yang layak bagi

kesehatan dan kesejahteraannya‟.154

Perjanjian multilateral yang membentuk hak atas lingkungan hidup

hingga saat ini masih belum terwakili dalam suatu dokumen dengan keberlakuan

universal yang mengkodifikasikan hak ini secara sistematis. Namun, beberapa

konvensi regional telah menunjukkan adanya state practice dalam pengakuan hak

tersebut. Aspek prosedural dari hak ini telah dikodifikasikan dalam Konvensi

Espoo dan Konvensi Aarhaus, sementara hak substantifnya telah dikristalkan

dalam dua konvensi regional yang mengikat, yaitu African Charter dan Additional

Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,

Social, and Cultural Rights (selanjutnya disebut Protocol of San Salvador).155

Lebih jauh lagi, African Charter menyediakan mekanisme untuk penegakan hak

tersebut oleh African Comission on Human and People‟s Right.156

Sementara,

153

Brigit C.A. Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law,

(Oxford: Internsentia, 1999), hlm. 40.

154 Lynda Collins, "Are We There Yet: The Right to Environment in International and

European Law", JSDLP - RDPDD, Vol. 3: Issue 2, hlm. 119-154.

155 Ibid.

156 African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, 26 Juni 1981, art. 24, International

Legal Materials Vol. 21, (1982), hlm. 59-63.


46


Protocol San Salvador menyediakan mekanisme yang sama pula melalui Inter-

American Commission and Court of Human Rights.157

Sementara itu, kriteria ketiga mengenai penunjukan hak atas lingkungan

hidup dalam level nasional, baik dalam level konstitusional maupun perundang-

undangan lain, telah dilakukan oleh sebagian besar negara di seluruh dunia. Lebih

dari 60 negara, termasuk pula beberapa pemerintahan sub-nasional (negara bagian

di Amerika Serikat) telah mengadopsi provisi mengenai hak atas lingkungan

hidup dalam konstitusinya.158

Di antaranya ialah Argentina, Moldova, Nigeria,

Filipina, Turki, Spanyol, dan sebagainya.159

Hal ini menunjukkan pengakuan atas

right to environment tidak hanya terjadi dalam area geografis maupun politis

tertentu, hak ini telah diakui oleh negara-negara tanpa memandang timur-barat,

utara-selatan, negara maju-berkembang, maupun faktor-faktor politik, ekonomi,

maupun sosial lainnya.

Selain itu, badan peradilan nasional pun telah mengakui hak ini dalam

berbagai putusannya. Terkait hak atas lingkungan hidup secara keseluruhan, tidak

diragukan lagi terdapat ribuan putusan peradilan nasional yang secara tegas

memberikan pengakuan dengan menunjuk pada hukum nasionalnya, meskipun

tidak semuanya secara eksplisit menunjuk hak atas lingkungan hidup. Selain itu,

badan supra-nasional seperti European Court on Human Rights juga telah

mengakui hak ini misalnya dalam Oerlemans v. Netherlands,160

Zander v.

Sweden,161

Lopez Ostra v. Spain,162

dan Guerra v. Italy,163

serta puluhan kasus

lainnya yang mengakui hak atas lingkungan hidup dalam berbagai bentuk. Kasus

terkenal lainnya dalam yurisdiksi nasional ialah kasus Bhopal yang terkenal, yang

157

Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 17 November 1988, art. 11 (1), O.A.S.T.S. No. 69,

International Legal Materials Vol. 28, (1989), hlm. 161.

158 Neil A. Popovi, “In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights...”, hlm. 8.

159 Ibid., hlm. 54.

160 12565/86 [1991] ECHR 52 (27 November 1991)

161 1993, IIHRL 103 (25 November 1993)

162 16798/90 [1994] ECHR 46 (9 Desember 1994)

163 14967/89 [1998] ECHR 7 (19 Februari 1998)


47


diputuskan Pengadilan Tinggi di India di mana Union Carbide menyelesaikan

permasalahan dengan penggantian kerugian terhadap para korban sejumlah

ratusan juta dollar US, dan dengan demikian mengakui pertanggungjawaban

terhadap bencana yang disebabkannya.164

Pengakuan yang sama dapat dilihat pula

dalam kasus-kasus besar lingkungan hidup di pengadilan-pengadilan di Australia,

Kanada, maupun Inggris yang secara khusus melibatkan korporasi dan

pelanggaran terhadap hak atas lingkungan hidup.165

Dari uraian di atas, maka dapat dilihat bahwa telah terdapat baik state

practice yang cukup maupun opinio juris di antara negara-negara mengenai hak

atas lingkungan hidup sebagai hukum kebiasaan internasional.

164

Malcolm J. Rogge, “Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global

Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conbenens in In Re: Union Carbide, Alfaro,

Sequiha, and Aguinda”, Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 36, (2001), hlm. 299-302.

165 Dr. Isabella D. Bunn, “Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability: Translantic

Perspectives from the NGO Community”, American University International Law Review, Vol.

19, (2004), hlm. 1265-1292.


48


BAB 3

PERLINDUNGAN HAK ATAS LINGKUNGAN HIDUP DALAM

KEGIATAN BISNIS PERUSAHAAN TRANSNASIONAL

3.1. Tinjauan Right To Environment dalam Kegiatan Bisnis

Transnasional

3.1.1. Kegiatan Bisnis Transnasional dalam Bidang Ekstraksi Sumber

Daya Alam dan Dampaknya terhadap Lingkungan

Terbukanya batas-batas negara bagi korporasi asing telah

mengintensifkan tekanan untuk memajukan garis terdepan eksploitasi. Dalam hal

pertambangan, pada periode 1985 - 1995 telah terjadi investasi senilai US$ 3.5

miliar di negara berkembang, sedangkan 1995 - 1998 bernilai US$ 8 miliar.

Kecenderungan yang sama yang sama ditemukan pula bagi sumber daya alam

lain,166

mengingat permintaan pasar yang paling banyak ialah dalam bidang

sumber daya energi, terutama minyak dan gas, yang diikuti tembaga, emas, timah,

perak, kobalt, dan logam lainnya, serta bahan mentah biotik seperti kayu dan ikan.

Nilai investasi yang begitu besar ini bukanlah tanpa konsekuensi.

Terutama dalam bidang ekstraksi sumber daya alam, adalah suatu konsekuensi

logis bahwa terdapat perubahan-perubahan bentang alam yang terjadi karena

operasi para perusahaan transnasional ini. Proyek pertambangan memindahkan

dalam jumlah yang sangat besar bebatuan yang tertanam di tanah dan mengubah

struktur geologi secara masif. Zat beracun seringkali digunakan untuk

memisahkan zat-zat metal dari zat ikutannya; yang zat yang dihasilkan dari akhir

operasi dapat mengancam hingga meracuni tanah sekitar, saluran air, dan flora-

fauna liar.167

Limbah memerlukan tempat pembuangan dan pengolahan, yang tak

jarang mengubah bentang alam yang tadinya sungai atau hutan menjadi alat

transportasi atau pembuangan limbah. Hal ini menyebabkan duty of care atau asas

kehati-hatian yang didasarkan pada praktik terbaik (best practice) dengan standar-

standar teknis yang detail sangatlah penting untuk dipatuhi secara ketat dalam

166

International Forum on Globalization, Interim Report: Intrinsic Consequences of

Economic Globalization on the Environment, San Fransisco: IFG, 2002.

167Ibid., hlm. 13.


49


bidang-bidang ekstraksi sumber daya alam ini. Seperti dapat dilihat, kompleks

yang harus diperhatikan dalam suatu proyek ekstraksi sumber daya alam, dengan

mencontohkan siklus dalam hal pertambangan mineral, dapat diilustrasikan dalam

gambar di bawah ini.

Bagan 3.1. Proses ekstraksi dalam pertambangan secara umum168

Proses ekstraksi dapat mempengaruhi keanekaragaman ekosistem yang

tinggi dari gurun, hutan tropis, laut dalam, dan sebagainya. Menjadi masalah,

ketika perubahan bentang alam ini tidak lagi sesuai dengan daya dukung

lingkungan hidup dan menyebabkan kerusakan pada lingkungan operasinya

tersebut. Dalam hal ekstraksi dilakukan terhadap material biotik, maka

permasalahan ekologis dan sosial berasal dari hilangnya sumber daya alam.

168

The Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development Project (MMSD), Breaking New

Ground: The Report of the Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development Project, (Londoh:

Earthscan Publication Ltd., 2002), hlm. 67.


50


Namun dalam hal material abiotik, maka proses aktual dari ekstraksi dan

transportasi tersebutlah yang menimbulkan permasalahan.169

3.1.2. Degradasi Lingkungan dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Kesejahteraan

Masyarakat

Para ahli hukum yang menghadapi pencemaran lingkungan terhadap

manusia di level internasional harus menghadapi sifat bersegi-banyak yang

melekat pada pencemaran tersebut. Walaupun berbagai dampak negatif

melibatkan berbagai area hukum, dampak-dampak tersebut tidak terfokus dalam

satupun dari area ini. Tidak perduli bagaimana permasalahan-permasalahan

tersebut ditandai (sebagai pelanggaran hukum lingkungan internasional, hukum

hak asasi manusia, atau hukum anti-diskriminasi) deskripsi dan pemenuhan unsur

dari hal-hal tersebut tidaklah lengkap.170

Aktivitas perusahaan transnasional memiliki potensi menyebabkan

pencemaran lingkungan secara ekstensif, yang dapat mempengaruhi berbagai hak-

hak, termasuk hak atas kesehatan, hak-hak minoritas, dan hak untuk menentukan

nasib sendiri (self-determination).171

Hubungan antara kerusakan lingkungan dan

penikmatan seseorang atas hak asasi manusianya dapat dikatakan tampak jelas.

Ketika udara terpolusi gas beracun, orang yang menghirup gas tersebut akan

mengalami keracunan, hingga mungkin pula terbunuh. Ketika air terkontaminasi,

orang yang meminum air tersebut dimungkinkan terkena penyakit sebagai akibat

terminum zat yang membahayakan kesehatan, dan ibu hamil yang meminumnya

mungkin pula menurunkan penyakit atau kecacatan kepada bayinya. Singkat kata,

169

Wolfgang Sachs, Environment And Human Rights, (Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institute for

Climate, Environment, Energy, 2003), hlm. 12

170Hari M. Osofsky, "Learning from Envronmental Justice: A New Model for International

Environmental Rights", Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 24, (2005), hlm. 71, 78-87.

171Hak-hak minoritas diakui dalam Artikel 27 ICCPR, dan hak untuk menentukan nasib

sendiri diakui dalam Artikel 1 dari ICCPR pula. Aktivitas TNC dapat menyebabkan pencemaran

lingkungan secara ekstensif, yang dapat mempengaruhi berbagai hak-hak, termasuk hak atas

kesehatan, hak-hak minoritas, dan hak untuk menentukan nasib sendiri (self-determination). F.

Johns, „The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and

Legal Theory‟, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 19, (1994), hlm. 904, 907–908.


51


ketika lingkungan hidup mengalami pencemaran, orang yang bergantung pada

lingkungan yang tercemar tersebut ikut tercemar pula.172

Terdapat dua pendekatan yang biasa dilakukan dalam melihat

permasalahan lingkungan hidup ialah pendekatan antroposentrik dan ekosentrik.

Pendekatan antroposentrik secara ringkas melihat bahwa seluruh jagad raya

berputar di sekitar kepentingan manusia dan segala aktivitas manusia bersentral

pada manusia. Sedangkan pendekatan ekosentris merupakan kumpulan pandangan

yang secara teoretis melihat sistem nilai-nilai dengan berpusat pada alam.173

Dalam level yang lebih teoretis, hak asasi manusia ada untuk mendorong

dan melindungi kesejahteraan manusia, untuk memberikan kesempatan

perkembangan sepenuhnya dari setiap orang dan maksimalnya tujuan dan

kepentingan manusia, baik secara individu maupun kolektif dalam masyarakatnya.

Hal ini tidak dapat terjadi tanpa perlindungan negara terhadap lingkungan hidup

yang aman, misalnya dalam hal udara, air, dan tanah. Polusi tidak hanya

menghancurkan lingkungan, tetapi sekarang ini juga dianggap melanggar hak

asasi manusia pula.174

Sebuah celah yang belum tercakup oleh hukum lingkungan internasional

meliputi perlindungan terhadap hidup dan martabat manusia dari ancaman-

ancaman yang berhubungan dengan kerusakan lingkungan, terutama ketika

ancaman tersebut terjadi sebagai suatu konsekuensi dari tindakan, atau tiadanya

tindakan, yang dilakukan oleh individu dari sebuah Negara. Ini merupakan area

hukum hak asasi manusia internasional yang bersinggungan dengan permasalahan

lingkungan hidup, baik nasional maupun internasional. Area ini juga merupakan

bidang di mana begitu banyak debat ilmiah telah terjadi, dan di mana kesepakatan

mengenai pendekatan yang tepat untuk dilakukan masih kurang.175

172

Jennifer Cassel, “Enforcing Environmental Human Rights: Selected Strategies of US

NGOs”, Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights, (Fall, 2007), hlm. 1.

173Linda Hajjar Leib, Human Rights and the Environment: Philosophical, Theoretical, and

Legal Perspectives, (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), hlm 12.

174Alexandre Kiss dan Dinah Shelton, Guide To International Environmental Law,

(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), hlm. 241.

175Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, “Is The Human Right To Environment Recognized Under

International Law? It Depends On The Source”, Colorado Journal of International Environmental

Law and Policy, (Winter 2011), hlm. 4.


52


Dalam melihat hak atas lingkungan hidup, terdapat tiga pendekatan yang

digunakan oleh para teoris. Pendekatan pertama, para teoris mempercayai bahwa

isu-isu lingkungan pada hakikatnya berada dalam kategori hak asasi manusia,

karena tujuan dari perlindungan terhadap lingkungan hidup ialah untuk

meningkatkan kualitas kehidupan manusia.176

Oposisi dari pendekatan ini ialah

pendapat yang menyatakan bahwa manusia hanyalah merupakan suatu elemen

dari ekosistem global yang kompleks, yang harus dilindungi demi kepentingannya

sendiri. Pendekatan kedua ini meletakkan hak asasi manusia di bawah tujuan

utama perlindungan alam secara keseluruhan. Pendekatan ketiga, yang tampaknya

paling mencerminkan keadaan hukum dan kebijakan sekarang, memandang hak

asasi manusia dan perlindungan lingkungan sebagai masing-masing mewakili

nilai-nilai sosial yang berbeda namun saling beririsan atau bertumpang tindih.

Kedua bidang ini memiliki inti tujuan dan kepentingan yang sama, walaupun

jelas-jelas tidak semua pelanggaran hak asasi manusia dapat dihubungkan dengan

kerusakan lingkungan. Pandangan ini menyadari konflik potensial antara

perlindungan lingkungan dan hak asasi manusia lain, tetapi juga kontribusi tiap

bidang dapat membantu pencapaian tujuan bersama.177

Dalam karya tulis ini, Penulis condong pada pandangan ketiga yaitu

melihat hak asasi manusia dan perlindungan lingkungan sebagai dua bidang yang

terpisah namun beririsan dalam suatu tujuan tertentu yang sama. Christopher

Weeramantry, wakil presiden terdahulu dari International Court of Justice,

menyatakan bahwa hubungan antara perlindungan lingkungan hidup dan hak asasi

manusia telah terbukti dengan sendirinya. Dalam pendapat terpisah (separate

opinion) dalam Kasus terkait Proyek Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, ia menyatakan:

"Perlindungan lingkungan hidup ... merupakan suatu bagian vital dari

doktrin hak asasi manusia kontemporer, mengingat hal tersebut

merupakan sine qua non bagi berbagai hak asasi manusia semisal hak

terhadap kesehatan dan hak untuk hidup itu sendiri. Sangat perlu untuk

dipaparkan di sini, bahwa pencemaran terhadap lingkungan hidup dapat

176

Dinah Shelton, “Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right To Environment”,

Stanford Journal of International Law, (Fall 1991), hlm. 1.

177Ibid.


53


mempengaruhi dan menghambat segala hak asasi manusia yang tertuang

dalam Deklarasi Universal dan instrumen hak asasi manusia lainnya”178

Sebagaimana disebutkan pula oleh Fatma Zorah Ksentini, bahwa hubungan antara

hak asasi manusia dan perlindungan lingkungan hidup bersifat resiprokal, di mana

pencemaran lingkungan hidup mempengaruhi pemenuhan hak asasi manusia, dan

hak asasi manusia mempengaruhi kondisi lingkungan. Perlindungan pada bidang

yang satu mensyaratkan pula perlindungan pada bidang lainnya.179

Meskipun begitu, penting untuk dicermati bahwa kedua bidang ini

memiliki karakteristik yang berbeda dalam implementasinya. Kebanyakan

instrumen hukum lingkungan internasional tidak diimplementasikan dengan rezim

pertanggungjawaban hukum atau tanggung jawab negara, tetapi lebih melalui

berbagai insentif atau mekanisme trade-off. Secara kontras, instrumen hak asasi

manusia bersandar pada prosedur pelaporan negara, komplain antar-negara, dan

petisi atau komplain individual, yang mana kesemuanya secara langsung ataupun

tidak mengizinkan kritik atau serangan kepada negara yang tidak patuh.180

Perusahaan transnasional mungkin pula menyalahgunakan kekuatannya dan

campur tangan proses politik dalam sebuah negara, melemahkan hak-hak

demokratis.181

Bagaimanapun, sebagian besar negara berkembang memiliki insitusi

yang lemah untuk menunjunjung hukum (rule of law), dan sistem yudisial yang

buruk yang mengakibatkan bertambahnya jumlah korban dalam pencarian

kompensasi dan pemulihan. Kurangnya perlindungan baik secara nasional

maupun global, mengakibatkan komunitas miskin dan marginal di negara

berkembang tertinggalkan begitu saja, baik untuk menderita atau untuk melawan -

178

Donald K. Anton dan Dinah L. Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), hlm. 119

179Fatma Zorah Ksentini, Laporan Akhir dari United Nations Conference on the Human

Environment, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess, 21st plenary meeting. at 2-7, U.N. Doc.

A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14. at 2-65, and Corr. 1 (1972), 11 I.L.M.

1416 (1972) (hereinafter Stockholm Declaration)

180Alexandre Kiss dan Dinah Shelton, International Environmental Law, 6th Edition, (New

York: Transnational Publishers, 2004), hlm. 348-360.

181Hak-hak demokratik, dalam betuk dari hak untuk berpartisipasi secara setara dalam

hubungan publik, diakui dalam Artikel 25 ICCPR.


54


atau untuk keduanya.182

Perusahaan transnasional mampu melakukan pelanggaran

hak asasi manusia, seperti dimungkinkan pula bagi semua entitas. Efek dari

pelanggaran perusahaan transnasional bagaimanapun meningkat dengan kekuatan

inheren dari perusahaan transnasional-perusahaan transnasional yang ada.183

3.2. Perusahaan Transnasional Sebagai Aktor Bisnis Transnasional

3.2.1. Pengertian Perusahaan Transnasional

Sebelum beranjak lebih jauh dalam melihat permasalahan yang akan

dibahas dalam skripsi ini, maka diperlukan penjelasan detail terlebih dahulu apa

yang dimaksud dengan terminologi Perusahaan Transnasional, karena definisi dari

terminologi ini tidaklah terbukti dengan sendirinya (self evident) dan bukan pula

merupakan pengetahuan umum. Ketiadaan konsensus mengenai hakikatnya secara

umum dimulai dari tingkatan yang paling bawah: Apakah karakteristik pendefinisi

dari entitas yang kompleks, beragam, dan abstrak ini?

Terdapat beragam terminologi yang digunakan para ahli hukum dalam

mendefinisikan Perusahaan Transnasional, di antaranya ialah Multinational

Enterprises, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Enterprises, Group

Company, dan sebagainya. Hingga kini, masih didebatkan di antara para ahli

terminologi mana yang paling sesuai untuk mendefinisikan secara tepat entitas

ini.184

Penggunaan pertama dari terminologi 'multinasional' dalam hubungan

dengan korporasi dilakukan oleh David E. Lilienthal, yang mendefinisikan

Multinational Corporations sebagai 'korporasi, ... yang memiliki asal (home) di

sebuah negara tetapi beroperasi dan hidup di bawah hukum dan kebiasaan dari

182

Lyuba Zarsky, Human Rights and the Environment: Conflicts and Norms in a

Globalizing World, (London: Nautilus Institute, 2002), hlm. 19.

183Sarah Joseph, Human Rights Law in Perspective: Corporations and Transnational Human

Rights Litigation, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), hlm. 4.

184Stephen D. Cohen, Multinational Coporations and Foreign Direct Investment: Avoiding

Simplicity, Embracing Complexity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), hlm. 38-39.


55


negara lain pula'.185

Definisi ini melihat MNC sebagai suatu badan uni-nasional

dengan operasi asing.

Pada perkembangan selanjutnya, United Nations membedakan antara

'Multinational Corporations' dengan 'Transnational Corporations'. Dalam

laporannya, UN Group of Eminent Persons mengadopsi definisi sederhana

Multinational Corporations dari para ekonom sebagai

'badan yang memiliki atau mengontrol produksi atau fasilitas servis di

luar negara di mana mereka berbasis. Badan tersebut tidak selalu

didirikan atau privat, dapat juga berupa koperasi atau badan usaha milik

negara'.186

Selanjutnya ECOSOC mengadopsi terminologi 'Transnational Corporations'

dalam rangka program UN terkait Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). Dengan

demikian, apa yang disebut multinasional oleh para ekonom akan dikenal sebagai

transnasional dalam ranah UN. Dengan ini UN melakukan pembedaan antara

badan yang dimiliki oleh entitas atau orang dari suatu negara tetapi beroperasi

melampaui batas negara (transnasional) dengan badan yang dimiliki dan dikontrol

oleh entitas atau orang dari lebih dari satu negara (multinasional).187

Peter Muchlinski sendiri, dengan menggunakan terminologi

Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), memaparkan karakteristik umum dari

perusahaan transnasional sebagai berikut,

“Walaupun dalam berbagai hal MNEs [perusahaan transnasional]

mewakili berbagai tipe dari perusahaan uni-nasional, MNEs [perusahaan

transnasional] berbeda dalam kapasistasinya untuk meletakkan fasilitas

produktif melintasi batas negara, untuk mengeksploitasi faktor lokal yang

memasoknya, untuk melakukan perdagangan lintas batas dalam

pemasukan faktor di antara afiliasi, untuk mengeksploitasi know-how

mereka dalam pasar asing tanpa kehilangan kontrol darinya, dan untuk

mengorganisir struktur managerialnya secara global dengan mengacu

185

David E. Lilienthal memberikan sebuah paper kepada Carnegie Institute of Technology

yang berjudul 'Management and Corporations 1985', dan kemudian dipublikasikan dengan judul

'The Multinational Corporation' (MNC). Dikutip dari Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises

and the Law, ..., hlm. 12.

186UN Doc Report of the Group of Eminent Persons, hlm. 25. E/5500/Add 1 (Part I) 24 Mei

1974. Laporan ini dicetak ulang dalam 13 International Legal Materials 800 (1974)

187(C.D. Wallace, Legal Control of the Multinational Enterprise (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,

1983), hlm. 10-13.


56


pada pembauran yang paling tepat dari garis-garis divisi dan otoritas.

Faktor-faktor ini memungkinkan MNEs [perusahaan transnasional] untuk

mempengaruhi alokasi internasional dari sumber daya-sumber daya

produktif, dan dengan demikian membedakan permsalahan-permasalahan

dalam perkembangan dari kebijakan ekonomi di negara di mana mereka

beroperasi. Sebagai konsekuensi, MNEs [perusahaan transnasional] dapat

dan harus diperlakukan sebagai tipe yang berbeda dari badan usaha

dalam kaitannya dengan regulasi ekonomi.”188

Sementara itu, M.N. Shaw dengan menggunakan terminologi Transnational

Corporations, mendefinisikan perusahaan transnasional sebagai “in essence

constitute private business organisations comprising several legal entities linked

together by parent corporations and are distinguished by size and multinational

spread”189

Suatu studi tentang tanggung jawab perusahaan transnasional dalam hal

perbuatan melawan hukum (tort) oleh Queen Mary Univeristy, Muzaffer Eroglu

berpendapat bahwa struktur perusahaan transnasional190

terkait hubungan antara

induk perusahaan dan anak perusahaan tidak identik dengan grup universitas, atau

organisasi pelayanan sosial atau institusi politik dan ekonomi internasional.191

Struktur organisasional baru menekankan dua karakter penting dari perusahaan

transnasional yang sangat penting untuk eksaminasi dari diskusi mengenai

tanggung jawab perusahaan transnasional. Yang pertama ialah penekanan pada

struktur horizontal dengan fitur kepemilikan kompleks dan kekaburan geografis

dan fungsional dari anak perusahaan pada level global. Karakteristik penting

kedua ialah pergantian kontrol hierarkis dengan pengambilan keputusan

horizontal yang lebih datar dengan berbasiskan kontrol kultural, yang

mempengaruhi prosedur pengambilan keputusan pada level anak perusahaan.192

188

Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, ..., hlm. 15.

189Malcom Shaw, International Law ... , hlm. 224

190Terminologi yang digunakan oleh Muzaffer Eroglu ialah Multinational Enterprises

(MNEs). Untuk kemudahan penyebutan dalam skripsi ini, terminologi MNEs selanjutnya akan

tetap disebut “TNCs”. Muzaffer Eroglu, Multinational Enterprises and Tort Liabilites: An

Interdisciplinary and Comparative Examination, (London: Edward Elgar, 2008)

191Christopher A. Bartlett dan Sumantra Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders: the

Transnational Solution (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1989)

192Muzaffer Eroglu, Multinational Enterprises and Tort Liabilities., ...,hlm.90.


57


3.2.2. Bentuk Hukum Perusahaan Transnasional

Untuk mengetahui bagaimana suatu perusahaan transnasional dapat

bertanggungjawab atas perbuatan yang dilakukan oleh anak perusahaannya di

wilayah negara yang berbeda, maka penting untuk mengetahui, setidaknya secara

ringkas, mengenai berbagai bentuk hukum dari perusahaan transnasional ini.

Menurut Peter Muchlinski, secara umum terdapat enam kelompok bentuk

hukum dari perusahaan transnasional. Keenam bentuk tersebut ialah bentuk

kontraktual (contractual forms), grup korporasi berbasiskan ekuitas (equity based

corporate groups), perusahaan patungan (joint ventures), kerjasama informal

antar perusahaan transnasional (informal alliances between MNEs), perusahaan

grup milik publik (publicly owned MNEs), dan bentuk supranasional dari bisnis

internasional.193

Bentuk pertama ialah bentuk kontraktual, yang bercirikan tiadanya

pendirian anak perusahaan yang dimiliki dan dikendalikan di negara penerima,

yang mana operasi bisnis dilakukan dengan kontrak yang mengikat secara hukum

antara korporasi di negara asal korporasi dan korporasi dari negara penerima.

Bentuk seperti ini dapat diwujudkan dalam berbagai cara, beragam dari penjualan

eksport sekali selesai yang sederhana hingga konsorsium internasional194

yang

permanen. Hubungan kontraktual dapat dibedakan menjadi yang bertujuan pada

distribusi (distribution agreement) dan yang bertujuan pada produksi (production

agreement).195

Selanjutnya, perusahaan transnasional dapat berbentuk grup korporasi

berbasiskan ekuitas. Bentuk ini merupakan bentuk yang paling umum di mana

grup perusahaan yang dikontrol secara ketat dihubungkan dengan saham yang

dimiliki oleh induk perusahaan dan semi-induk perusahaan (intermediate holding

company). Dalam prakteknya, terdapat berbagai bentuk yang berbeda dari

193

Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, ..., hlm. 62-80.

194Konsorsium internasional dapat didefinisikan sebagai sebuah organisasi yang dibuat

ketika dua atau lebih perusahaan bekerjasama sehingga berntundak sebagaimana entitas tunggal

untuk tujuan yang spesifik dan terbatas. C.M. Schmitthoff, Export Trade, 9th Edition, (New

Hampshire: Stevens, 1990), hlm. 343.

195Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, ..., hlm. 63.


58


berbagai negara dan region. Beberapa tipe dari bentuk berbasis ekuitas ini ialah

the Anglo-American „Pyramid‟ Group, European Trans-National Mergers, the

Japanese „Keiretsu‟, dan perubahan dalam organisasi bisnis yang berefek pada

struktur berbasis ekuitas.196

Peter Muchlinski, setelah menguraikan berbagai jenis bentuk dari

perusahaan transnasional berbasis ekuitas ini, menyimpulkan bahwa terdapat dua

pendekatan dalam melihat bentuk hukum dan kontrol dari aktivitas MNE tersebut,

yaitu pendekatan struktural dan pendekatan operasional.197

Pendekatan yang pertama, diperkuat oleh Professor Hadden, ialah

pendekatan struktural. Entitas korporasi harus dibentuk kembali dengan cara yang

lebih secara dekat berhubungan dengan organisasi bisnisnya, dan memastikan

keberadaan unit yang relevan untuk akuntansi, fiskal, dan berbagai maksud

regulasi lainnya. Dalam pandangan Professor Hadden, penjagaan dari

karakteristik-karakteristik yang paling berguna dalam bentuk hukum korporasi,

pembuatan perwakilan legal yang dapat diidentifikasi dari aktivitas bisnis terkait,

dan adaptasinya terhadap realitas modern.198

Pendekatan kedua, yang dikuatkan oleh Tricker, ialah pendekatan

operasional. Ia menyarankan untuk meninggalkan versi kini dari bentuk hukum

perusahaan sepenuhnya, tetapi menaikkan kewajiban yang diberikan langsung

terhadap divisi atau anak perusahaan dalam grup. Secara parsial, Tricker

menyarankan pengenalan keterbukaan informasi divisional melalui konsep sebuah

„aktivitas bisnis yang akuntabel‟, di mana manajer akan bertanggung jawab untuk

memaparkan informasi berdasarkan garis-garis aktual dari pengambilan keputusan

dalam perusahaan, dibandingkan bersandar pada pembatasan kewajiban legal

untuk keterbukaan, yang mana dapat diberikan pada entitas yang telah berdiri

saja.199

196

Ibid., hlm. 65-72.

197Ibid., hlm. 81-82.

198T. Hadden, The Control of Corporate Groups, (IALS, 1983), hlm. 44-45.

199Tricker, Corporate Governance, (London: Gower, 1984), hlm. 156-159.


59


Bentuk ketiga ialah dengan perusahaan patungan. Terminologi joint

ventures tidak memiliki arti hukum secara spesifik. Terminologi ini dapat

menunjuk pada perjanjian atau kesepakatan antara dua perusahaan independen.200

Secara khusus, perusahaan patungan melingkupi kerja sama antara dua atau lebih

perusahaan induk yang terhubung, melalui venture, untuk secara umum

melakukan aktivitas komersil, finansial, atau teknis. Bentuk hukum dari joint

venture dapat berupa kontrak, partnership, atau perseroan terbatas. Pilihan bentuk

ini berbeda-beda derajat kebebasannya di tiap negara.201

Selanjutnya, perusahaan transnasional dapat berbentuk aliansi informal di

antara perusahaan-perusahaan transnasional. Sejauh ini, bentuk hukum dari cara

keempat ini ialah dengan membentuk hubungan kontraktual, penggabungan

transnasional, dan joint ventures. Alasan dari dipilihnya bentuk hukum yang

beragam ini bergantung pada, di antaranya, derajat integrasi yang dibutuhkan

untuk realisasi tujuan aliansi, dan pada beban regulasi terkait masing-masing

bentuk. Namun, selain bentuk-bentuk hukum di atas, beberapa aliansi yang telah

terbentuk, dalam kenyataannya, bisa jadi kurang jelas struktur hukumnya. Tricker

memberikan contoh berikut berdasarkan kenyataan praktek,

Tiga grup PLC, masing-masing tercatat di pasar modal yang berbeda di

seluruh dunia, memiliki kepemilikan silang (cross-holdings) masing-

masing sahamnya antara 27% s.d. 30%. Ini cukup untuk menyediakan

kepemimpinan yang saling terkait (interlocking directorship), namun

perusahaan-perusahaan ini bukanlah anak perusahaan atau asosiasi yang

memungkinkan satu perusahaan menjadi anggota dari perusahaan

subsider lainnya.202

Tricker menyimpulkan bahwa dalam situasi tersebut direktur secara umum dan

kepala-kepala eksekutif untuk berbagai perusahaan anak dalam tiga grup tersebut

dapat melakukan pengaruh bersama terhadap bidang-bidang yang menjadi

200

Brodley, “Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy”, Harvard Law Review Vol. 95, (1982),

hlm. 1525-1527. Brodley memasukkan pula dalam pengertian tersebut pembentukan perusahaan

baru yang secara khusus mampu dalam hal kapasitas produktif yang baru, teknologi baru, produk

baru atau masuknya entitas tersebut ke pasar yang baru.

201E. Herzfeld, Joint Ventures, 3rd Edition, (New York: Jordans, 1996), hlm. 35-36.

202Tricker, Corporate Governance, ..., hlm. 148-149.


60


perhatian bersama, semisal tender, penawaran, penetapan harga, produk-produk,

riset dan strategi finansial.203

Bentuk kelima ialah perusahaan transnasional yang dimiliki oleh publik

(publicly owned MNEs). Perusahaan transnasional milik publik dapat terbentuk

melalui satu dari dua cara berikut: pertama, suatu perusahaan milik negara

mengambil strategi ekspansi internasional; kedua, nasionalisasi atas MNE yang

telah ada di negara tersebut.204

Pertanyaan hukum yang terkait struktur hukum

dari MNE yang dimiliki oleh publik ini ialah hubungan antara negara dengan

perusahaan, dan secara khusus, derajat kontrol yang dapat dilakukan negara

terhadap perusahaan.205

Pada umumnya, perusahaan akan didirikan sebagai entitas

yang terpisah dari negara, dengan negara sebagai pemegang saham mayoritas atau

eksklusif. Di beberapa negara, kepemilikan negara dilakukan melalui sebuah anak

perusahaan milik negara, dibandingkan dengan kepemilikan saham secara

langsung. Posisi negara sebagai pemegang saham utama membuat perusahaan

tergantung dari pemberian dari negara, memberikan negara kontrol yang kuat.206

Terakhir, perusahaan multinasional dapat berwujud supranasional dari

bisnis internasional. Kategori ini melibatkan entitas yang dibentuk di bawah

hukum yang ditetapkan oleh organisasi regional negara-negara, yang bertujuan

perluasan kerjasama antara perusahaan-perusahaan dari lebih dari satu negara

pihak. Dua contoh bentuk seperti ini dapat dilihat dari bentuk yang ditetapkan

203

Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, ..., hlm. 73-74.

204J.P. Anastassopoulos, G. Blanc dan P. Dussauge, State-Owned Multinationals (New

York: Wiley/IRM, 1987), hlm. 12-13.

205Kameel Khan, „Some Legal Considerations On the Role and Structure of State Oil

Companies: A Comparative View‟, International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 34,

(1985), hlm. 584.

206J.P. Anastassopoulos, G. Blanc dan P. Dussauge, State-Owned Multinationals, ..., hlm.

69-72.


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oleh European Community207

dan The Andean Multinational Enterprise adopted

by the Andean Common Market (ANCOM).208

Dengan mempertimbangkan bentuk-bentuk di atas sebagai legalitas

operasional suatu perusahaan transnasional, terdapat suatu kenyataan lagi yang

berkaitan dengan keberadaan perusahaan transnasional. Dalam sub-bab

selanjutnya, Penulis akan membahas mengenai status hukum perusahaan

transnasional sebagaimana diuraikan di atas dalam hubungannya dengan kesatuan

ekonomi perusahaan transnasional.

3.2.3. Kesatuan Ekonomi dan Terpisahnya Entitas Hukum Perusahaan

Transnasional

Perusahaan transnasional memberdakan diri mereka dalam tujuannya,

yang mana memaksimalkan profit untuk pemegang saham mereka. Sehingga,

perusahaan transnasional harus melakukan perubahan untuk menyesuaikan diri

terhadap dinamika dunia baru yang terpengaruh globalisasi. Secara umum,

struktur baru organisasi perusahaan transnasional biasanya mendeksripsikan dunia

ekonomi baru yang berkembang: pergeseran dari produksi massa ke produksi

yang fleksibel; dari integrasi vertikal, organisasi berskala besar ke unifikasi rantai

nilai dan unit ekonomi yang terorganisir secara horizontal. Dalam dunia bisnis,

struktur dari organisasi ini tidak terlihat dari kedudukan organisasi tertentu, dan

tidak memiliki status hukum. Lebih penting lagi, organisasi horizontal sebagai

suatu sistem terlepas dari batas-batas hukum perusahaan transnasional.209

Dalam bentuk-bentuk perusahaan transnasional, salah satu konstruksi

yang paling umum ialah dengan basis ekuitas, yang berarti kendali dilakukan

dengan penyertaan saham, baik sebagian maupun sepenuhnya terhadap anak

perusahaan. Dalam korporasi berbasis ekuitas ini, salah satu karakteristiknya ialah

207

Dalam bentuk kerjasama ini, berdasarkan GIE Perancis, disebutkan European Economic

Interest Grouping (EEIG), yang diperkenalkan dalam Council Regulation No. 2137/85 pada 25

Juli 1985. Regulasi ini telah diimplementasikan ke dalam hukum negara United Kingdom melalui

Statutory Instrument: SI 1989 No. 638, SI 1989 No. 216 (Irlandia).

208Negara-negara ANCOM mengadopsi Andean Foreign Investment Code dalam Decision

24 of the Commission of the Cartagena Accord pada tanggal 21 Desember 1970, yang kemudian

direvisi dan digantikan dengan Decision 291 pada 21 Maret 1991.

209Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law., ..., hlm. 89.


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pertanggungjawaban terbatas (limited liability) bagi pemilik saham. Kerugian dan

tanggung jawab hukum pemilik hanyalah terbatas pada modal yang

diinvestasikannya pada korporasi, yang mana, pemegang saham tidak dapat

dihitung untuk menanggung defisit korporasi, atau tanggung jawabnya.210

Penerapan prinsip limited liability pada pemegang saham pengendali atau

induk perusahaan dapat menimbulkan permasalahan dengan berlakunya „limited

liability dalam limited liability‟ induk perusahaan terhadap perbuatan melawan

hukum yang dilakukan oleh anak perusahaan yang berada pada lapisan kedua atau

lebih. Menurut Sulistowati, terdapat lapisan derajat limited liability perusahaan:

1. Induk perusahaan memiliki limited liability atas perbuatan melawan hukum

yang dilakukan oleh anak perusahaan;

2. Induk perusahaan memiliki „limited liability dalam limited liability‟ atas

perbuatan melawan hukum yang dilakukan oleh anak dari anak perusahaan

(anak perusahaan pada lapis kedua);

3. Induk perusahaan memiliki „limited liability dalam limited liability dalam

limited liability‟ dari perbuatan hukum yang dilakukan oleh anak

perusahaan lapis ketiga;211

Dengan konstruksi demikian, kompleksitas tanggung jawab dari perusahaan grup

yang memiliki jaringan yang demikian rumit; atau bentuk yang tidak sederhana

sebagaimana dijelaskan di sub-bab sebelumnya, dapat menyebabkan lapisan yang

rumit dan tebal atas tumpukan limited liability hingga ke perusahaan induk yang

paling atas.

Hal ini dapat mendorong adanya sikap oportunis dari pemegang saham

pengendali atau induk perusahaan untuk melakukan eksternalisasi resiko pada

anak perusahaan yang berada pada lapisan terbawah. Sebaliknya, secara yuridis

perusahaan kelompok sebagai persona in standi untuk melakukan perbuatan

melawan hukum sehingga tanggung jawab induk perusahaan hanya terbatas pada

kedudukannya sebagai pemegang saham anak perusahaan.212

210

Eugene Brigham and Michael C. Ehrhardt, Financial Management: Theory and Practice,

11th ed. (Mason, OH: Thomson/South-Western, 2005 ), chapter. 1

211 Sulistiowati, Aspek Hukum dan Realitas Bisnis ..., hlm. 165-166.

212Ibid., hlm. 166-167.


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Sebagian besar pelaku litigasi dalam kasus hak asasi manusia

transnasional kini terkait korporasi yang berusaha untuk mengatribusikan

kesalahan terhadap induk perusahaan di sebuah negara berkembang. Terdapat

beberapa alasan mengapa induk perusahaan lebih ditargetkan dibandingkan

dengan anak perusahaan. Pertama, Pengadilan di negara rumah lebih mungkin

memiliki yurisdiksi personal terhadap induk perusahaan. Kedua, induk perusahaan

memiliki kekayaan aset yang lebih banyak dibandingkan anak perusahaan, dan

dengan demikian lebih mampu memenuhi putusan ganti rugi yang diberikan.213

Kasus besar yang terjadi belum satupun yang diputus sampai dengan

substansinya, di mana sebagian kecil dari kasus-kasus di yurisdiksi tertentu telah

secara serius menghadapi isu krusial mengenai perluasan pertanggungjawaban

korporasi induk terhadap pelanggaran hak asasi manusia yang dilakukan oleh

anak perusahaannya. Isu ini karenanya akan dibahas pada level yang umum,

dibandingkan dengan basis yurisdiksi-oleh-yurisdiksi.214

3.3. Tanggung Jawab Hukum Perusahaan Transnasional dalam

Pemenuhan Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup

Hukum hak asasi manusia internasional telah mengalami perkembangan

terkait pemberlakuan kewajiban hak asasi manusia dalam lapisan non-

pemerintahan. Kewajiban hak asasi manusia dikenal memiliki karakter tripatrit:

Negara diwajibkan untuk menghormati, melindungi, dan memenuhi penikmatan

hak-hak asasi manusia oleh orang-orang dalam yurisdiksinya.215

Agar pemenuhan

kewajiban tersebut dapat terpenuhi secara layak, Negara harus mengontrol entitas

privat dalam yurisdiksinya. Kewajiban ini termaktub secara jelas dalam beberapa

perjanjian internasional.216

Pemberlakuan 'horizontal' dari hak asasi manusia

213

Sarah Joseph, „Corporations and Transnational...”, hlm. 129.

214Ibid., hlm. 129.

215'Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights‟, Human

Rights Quarterly, Vol. 20, (1998), hlm. 691

216Misalnya, Human Rights Committee telah mengkonfirmasi bahwa kewajiban untuk

'menghormati' dan 'memenuhi' hak-hak Kovenan dalam artikel 2 (1) ICCPR mensyaratkan negara

peserta untuk melindungi orang-orang dari penyalahgunaan hak-hak mereka oleh orang lain; Lih.

S. Joseph, J. Schultz, dan M. Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

Cases, Commentary and Materials 2nd Ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 36–37.


64


internasional, misalnya kewajiban negara untuk memberikan efek terhadap hak

asasi manusia bagi pihak-pihak privat, yang juga telah dikuatkan dengan

yurisprudensi hukum hak asasi manusia internasional. Dalam cara ini, badan-

badan non-pemerintahan seperti perusahaan transnasional dibidik secara tidak

langsung berdasarkan hukum internasional. Tanggung jawab langsung, termasuk

kewajiban untuk menegakkan kewajiban-kewajiban tidak langsung tersebut,

bagaimanapun berlanjut dalam tataran pemerintahan nasional. Akuntabilitas yang

sesungguhnya hanya dapat ada jika penjaga-penjaga tidak resmi (yaitu kampanye

NGO dan aktivis-aktivis akar rumput) didampingi oleh adanya mekanisme formal

dan legal untuk menyatakan perusahaan transnasional bertanggung jawab atas

pelanggaran hak asasi manusia.217

Selain itu, terdapat pula hukum internasional berupa 'soft law', yang tidak

mengikat dan bertindak sebagai petunjuk bagi tindakan Perusahaan transnasional

secara layak.218

Setidaknya, terdapat 4 (empat) instrumen yang mengatur tindakan

perusahaan transnasional terkait dengan hak atas lingkungan hidup, yaitu United

Nations Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations (1990), 2000

United Nations Global Compact, 2000 OECD Guidelines for Multinational

Enterprises, WSSD Plan of Implementation 2002, serta Draft Norms on the

Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and other Business Entities 2003.

3.3.1. United Nations Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations

(1990)

United Nations Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations

(selanjutnya disebut „UN Draft‟) merupakan salah satu rancangan aturan

internasional yang mengatur secara komprehensif mengenai akuntabilitas

perusahaan transnasional. Namun demikian, rancangan tersebut tidak pernah

diadopsi oleh Majelis Umum PBB, karena adanya perbedaan pendapat yang

signifikan antara negara-negara maju dan negara-negara berkembang. Perbedaan

pendapat yang utama ialah terkait tiga hal berikut. Pertama, negara-negara

217

Michael Anderson, „Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort

Law the Answer?‟ Washburn Law Journal, Vol. 41, (2002), hlm. 399, 403.

218D Kinley, „Human Rights as Legally Binding or Merely Relevant‟ dalam S Bottomley

and D Kinley (eds), Commercial Law and Human Rights (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), hlm. 33-36.


65


berkembang lebih menginginkan regulasi kegiatan perusahaan transnasional

secara detail dan bersifat memaksa, sedangkan negara-negara maju menginginkan

bahasa yang lebih umum dan sifatnya sukarela.219

Kedua, negara-negara

berkembang menginginkan titik berat acuan pada hukum nasional negara tuan

rumah (host state), sedangkan negara-negara maju menganggap hukum nasional

negara-negara berkembang terlalu rumit atau tidak memadai, dan menginginkan

acuan pada hukum internasional.220

Ketiga, negara-negara berkembang khawatir

akan pembatasan yang ditetapkan oleh Rancangan tersebut terhadap hak negara

untuk melakukan ekspropriasi terhadap perusahaan transnasional di negaranya.221

3.3.2. United Nations Global Compact (2000)

Instrumen selanjutnya ialah 2000 United Nations Global Compact yang

merupakan inisiatif UN yang mengajak pelaku sektor bisnis untuk

mempromosikan sembilan prinsip yang diturunkan dari Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of the

ILO, dan Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Tiga dari sembilan

prinsip tersebut mengatur tentang lingkungan, yakni himbauan kepada sektor

bisnis untuk (1) mendukung precautionary approach dalam menghadapi

tantangan lingkungan222

; (2) mengemban inisiatif mempromosikan tanggung

jawab yang lebih besar terhadap lingkungan223

; dan (3) mendukung

pengembangan teknologi ramah lingkungan.

219

Paul Lansing dan Alex Rosaria, “An Analysis of the United Nations Proposed Code of

Conduct of Transnational Corporations”, World Competition Law and Economy Rev., Vol.14,

(1991), hlm. 35, 40.

220Barbara A. Frey, “The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations

in the Protection of International Human Rights,” Minnesota Journal on Global Trade, Vol. 6,

(1997), hlm. 153, 167.

221Sean D. Murphy, “Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level,”

Columbia Journal on Transnational Law, Vol. 43, (2005), hlm. 389.

222Prinsip 7 UN Global Compact

223Prinsip 8 UN Global Compact


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3.3.3. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2000)

Instrumen hukum ketiga, yaitu 2000 OECD Guidelines for Multinational

Enterprises (selanjutnya disebut “OECD Guidelines”), dibentuk pada tahun 1976

sebagai instrumen pertama yang disepakati secara internasional untuk menjadi

kerangka kerja sama di bidang foreign direct investment dan perusahaan

transnasional, yang kemudian diperbaharui pada tahun 2000.224

OECD Guidelines

merupakan seperangkat rekomendasi yang diberikan oleh pemerintah kepada

perusahaan transnasional, berisi prinsip-prinsip dan standar mengenai aktivitas

perusahaan yang bertanggung jawab di bidang hak asasi, keterbukaan, anti

korupsi, hubungan perburuhan, perlindungan konsumen, serta lingkungan.

Guidelines ini dibuat oleh OECD untuk mendukung kontribusi positif yang bisa

diberikan oleh perusahaan transnasional terhadap perkembangan ekonomi, sosial,

dan lingkungan.225

Penerapan tanggung jawab perlindungan lingkungan hidup terdapat

dalam Bab V OECD Guidelines, yang menyatakan bahwa

“Perusahaan harus, dalam kerangka hukum, regulasi, dan praktek

administratif dalam negara di mana mereka beroperasi, dan sesuai

pertimbangan perjanjian internasional, prinsip, tujuan, dan standar yang

relevan; secara tepat mengambil nilai-nilai yang wajar terhadap

kebutuhan untuk melindungi lingkungan hidup, kesehatan masyarakat,

dan keamanan, serta secara umum untuk melaksanakan aktivitas mereka

dalam cara yang berkontribusi bagi tujuan yang lebih luas yaitu

pembangunan berkelanjutan”226

Dalam Guidelines ini, disebutkan pula langkah-langkah minimum yang

harus dilakukan oleh perusahaan transnasional, di antaranya:227

1. Membuat sistem manajemen lingkungan yang sesuai bagi perusahaan;

2. Menyediakan informasi yang aktual mengenai dampak dari kegiatan-

kegaitan perusahaan bagi kesehatan dan keamanan;

224

Phillipe Sands, Principles of International Environmental ..., hlm. 117.

225Claude Fussler, Aaron Cramer, dan Sebastian van der Vegt, Raising the Bar, Creating

Value With the United Nations Global Compact, (London: Greengield Publishing, 2004), hlm. 41.

226Bab V OECD Guidelines

227Bab V Paragraf 1-8 OECD Guidelines


67


3. Menganalisa dampak lingkungan, kesehatan, dan keamanan yang mungkin

dapat terjadi karena kegiatan pengolahan barang atau jasa yang dilakukan

perusahaan (melakukan Analisa Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan atau

AMDAL);

4. Tidak menggunakan kurangnya bukti ilmiah sebagai alasan untuk menunda

langkah-langkah pencegahan kerusakan lingkungan (hal ini merupakan

perwujudan precautionary approach);

5. Memiliki rencana terpadu untuk mencegah, mengurangi, dan mengontrol

kerusakan lingkungan atau kesehatan yang ditimbulkan operasi perusahaan;

6. Terus menerus berupaya meningkatkan operasi yang ramah lingkungan.

OECD Guidelines ini dapat diadopsi oleh negara-negara anggota OECD. Negara-

negara yang mengadopsinya wajib berupaya mendorong agar OECD Guidelines

ini diikuti oleh perusahaan transnasional yang beroperasi di wilayahnya.228

Negara

peserta diharuskan membuat kantor penghubung (yang disebut sebagai „National

Contact Point‟) yang bertugas mendorong implementasi Guidelines dan

memastikan Guidelines tersebut tersosialisasikan dan dipahami oleh sektor bisnis

di wilayahnya.229

Bagi perusahaannya sendiri, OECD Guidelines ini bersifat

sukarela, artinya tidak mengikat, namun dapat diadopsi oleh perusahaan dengan

memasukannya dalam pedoman perilaku (codes of conduct) yang berlaku bagi

perusahaan tersebut secara internal.230

3.3.4. WSSD Plan of Implementation (2002)

Selanjutnya, terdapat pula WSSD Plan of Implementation yang dibuat

pada tahun 2002 pada World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) di

Johannesburg. Konferensi ini diadakan sebagai tidak lanjut Konferensi Rio, untuk

membicarakan perkembangan dan implementasi Agenda 21. Konferensi ini

menghasilkan dua instrumen: sebuah Deklarasi Politik dan sebuah Recana

Implementasi (selanjutnya disebut “WSSD Plan of Implementation”). Instrumen

228

Paragraf 1 pada Pembukaan OECD Guidelines

229Bab 1 Paragraf 10, OECD Guidelines

230Ilias Bantekas, “Corporate Social Responsibility in Interntional Law”, Berkeley

University International Law Journal, Vol. 22, (2004) hlm. 309.


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ini bukanlah pedoman perilaku, namun merupakan deklarasi negara-negara yang

menunjukkan konsensus bahwa prinsip pembangunan berkelanjutan tidak hanya

merupakan tanggung jawab negara. Yang paling menarik dari Konferensi

Johannesburg adalah fokusnya pada perilaku aktor non-negara.231

Salah satu

terobosan WSSD Plan of Implementation adalah dengan mewajibkan negara-

negara meningkatkan akuntabilitas (accountability) dan tanggung-jawab sosial

perusahaan-perusahaan terhadap lingkungan, termasuk melakukan langkah-

langkah untuk mendorong agar industri:

“Memperbaiki performa sosial dan lingkungan hidup melalui inisiatif

sukarela, termasuk sistem manajemen lingkungan hidup, codes of

conduct, sertifikasi, dan pelaporan kepada masyarakat dalam

permasalahan sosial dan lingkungan hidup, termasuk pula inisiatif seperti

standar International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) dan

pelaporan Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines on Sustainability”

Selain itu, Universal Declaration of Human Rights juga tidak secara

eksplisit menunjuk negara sebagai pengemban kewajiban dalam artikel-artikelnya,

dan dalam paragraf pembukanya menyebutkan kewajiban organ-organ masyarakat

pula.232

Bahasa yang digunakan ini seringkali digunakan untuk menunjuk

kewajiban internasional dari perusahaan-perusahaan.

Dari uraian di atas, terlihat bahwa telah ada upaya-upaya untuk

menerapkan right to environment terhadap perusahaan transnasional melalui

berbagai instrumen. Hanya saja, penerapan tersebut selalu bersifat sukarela bagi

perusahaan, dan masih merupakan beban negara peserta untuk mempromosikan

nilai-nilai perlindungan lingkungan hidup yang terdapat dalam instrumen-

instrumen tersebut. Tentunya, fakta bahwa tidak ada kekuatan mengikat dari

instrumen-instrumen ini tidak menyebabkan dokumen-dokumen ini tidak

berharga. Standar yang ada di dalamnya dapat menjadi titik referensi yang

231

Terdapat 10.000 orang delegasi yang mewakili negara, 8000 delegasi yang mewakili

NGO, masyarakat sipil, serta sektor perusahaan. UN/DESA, “Key Outcomes of the Summit”,

September 2002. Sumber:

http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/summit_docs/2009_keyoutcomes_commitme

nts.doc

232Sebagaimana dapat ditemukan dalam paragraf 42 dan penjelasan umum 14, di mana

dapat ditemukan terminologi „anggota masyarakat‟ (members of society), Andrew Chaplam dan

Mariano Garcia, “The Obligation of States...”, hlm. 23.


69


berguna bagi pemerintahan nasional yang berharap mengenakan kewajiban

domestik yang mengikat bagi perusahaan transnasional, dan bagi NGO yang

mencari amunisi untuk kampanye melawan perusahaan transnasional tertentu, dan

bagi korporasi yang mengadopsi dan mengimplementasikan codes of conduct

secara internal.233

3.3.5. Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and

Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (“Draft

Norms”)

Draft Norms234

merupakan salah satu dokumen soft law terkait tanggung

jawab perusahaan transnasional atas hak asasi manusia yang cukup komprehensif

mencerminkan, mencantumkan, dan menunjuk pada norma-norma hukum

internasional yang telah ada serta merinci pula beberapa metode dasar untuk

implementasi. Dokumen ini disetujui oleh United Nations Sub-Commission on the

Promotion and Protection of Human Rights pada 13 Agustus 2003 melalui

Resolusi No: 2003/16; namun belum mendapatkan tindak lanjut dari United

Nations Human Rights Commission.

Prinsip pertama, yang berjudul “General Obligations”, menyatakan

bahwa perusahaan transnasional memiliki kewajiban di dalam lingkup aktivitas

dan pengaruhnya untuk mengurangi kewajiban pemerintah untuk mendorong,

mengamankan pemenuhan, menghormati, memastikan penghormatan atas, atau

melindungi hak asasi manusia, termasuk pula hak dan kepentingan dari

masyarakat adat dan kelompok rentan lainnya. Dalam prinsip ini, ditegaskan pula

bahwa Draft Norms dalam hal apapun tidak bermaksud untuk mengurangi peran

Negara sebagai pengemban utama tanggung jawab atas hak asasi manusia

tersebut, termasuk pula untuk memastikan bahwa perusahaan transnasional

menghormati hak asasi manusia.235

233

Sarah Joseph, Human Rights Law and Perspective..., hlm. 10.

234 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business

Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (26 Agustus

2003)

235 Prinsip 1 dari Draft Norms, dalam teks aslinya menyatakan sebagai berikut “States have

the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and


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Terdapat dua prinsip dalam Draft Norms yang berhubungan dengan hak

asasi manusia dan lingkungan hidup, yaitu Prinsip 12 (Bagian E: Respect for

National Sovereignty and Human Rights) dan Prinsip 14 (Bagian G: Obligation

with Regard to Environmental Protection). Adapun perumusan kedua prinsip

tersebut adalah sebagai berikut:

1. Prinsip 12: Perusahaan transnasional dan badan usaha lainnya harus

menghormati hak-hak sipil, budaya, ekonomi, politik, dan sosial, dan

berkontribusi terhadap pemenuhannya, antara lain terhadap hak atas

perkembangan; makanan dan air minum yang layak; standar tertinggi yang

dapat dicapai atas kesehatan fisik dan mental; tempat tinggal yang layak;

pendidikan; kebebasan atas pemikiran, hati nurani, dan agama; serta

kebebasan berpendapat dan berekspresi; dan tidak melakukan perbuatan

yang menghambat pemenuhan hak-hak tersebut.

2. Prinsip 14: Perusahaan transnasional dan badan usaha lainnya harus

melakukan aktivitasnya sesuai dengan hukum, peraturan, praktik

administratif, dan kebijakan nasional yang terkait dengan perlindungan

lingkungan hidup dari Negara di mana mereka beroperasi, serta terkait pula

dengan perjanjian, prinsip, tujuan, tanggung jawab, dan standar

internasional yang relevan kaitannya dengan lingkungan hidup serta hak

asasi manusia, kesehatan dan keamanan publik; dan wajib untuk secara

umum melakukan aktivitasnya dengan cara yang berkontribusi terhadap

tujuan yang lebih luas dari pembangunan berkelanjutan.

Dalam penjelasan umum (general comment) Prinsip 12, dokumen ini menunjuk

pula terhadap hak-hak yang telah dicantumkan dalam instrumen-instrumen hukum

internasional yang bersifat global dan mengikat, seperti ICCPR, ICESR, termasuk

pula penjelasan umumnya, serta standar-standar kesehatan yang dibuat oleh

WHO.

protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including ensuring that

transnational corporations and other business enterprises respect human rights. Within their

respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and other business

enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and

protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including the rights and

interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.”


71


Adapun penjelasan umum atas prinsip 14 menegaskan diakuinya hak atas

lingkungan hidup yang bersih dan sehat, dengan membebankan kewajiban

terhadap perusahaan transnasional untuk menghormati hak tersebut dalam konteks

hubungan antara lingkungan hidup dan hak asasi manusia; perhatian untuk

keadilan antar generasi; standar-standar lingkungan hidup yang diakui secara

internasional; dan tujuan yang lebih luas terkait pembangunan berkelanjutan.236

Perusahaan transnasional harus bertanggungjawab pula atas akibat terhadap

lingkungan maupun kesehatan manusia yang terjadi karena aktivitasnya, termasuk

pula produk atau jasa yang terlibat dalam perdagangan.237

Dalam proses

pembuatan dan pengambilan keputusan pun, secara periodik, perusahaan

transnasional dibebankan kewajiban untuk meninjau akibat dari aktivitasnya

terhadap lingkungan hidup dan kesehatan manusia.238

Assessment tersebut harus

meliputi kelompok tertentu, serta wajib didistribusikan secara berkala dan dapat

diakses oleh United Nations Environmental Programme, ILO, dan badan

internasional terkait lainnya, pemerintah nasional tempat anak maupun induk

perusahaan, serta kelompok lainnya yang terpengaruh, serta masyarakat umum.239

Selain itu, dua prinsip yang dikenal dalam hukum lingkungan

internasional, yaitu Prinsip Pencegahan (Prevention Principle) dan Prinsip

Kehati-hatian (Precautionary Principle) ditegaskan pula dalam penjelasan Prinsip

14 Draft Norms, di mana perusahaan transnasional diwajibkan untuk

menghormati kedua prinsip ini dan tidak menggunakan kurangnya kepastian

ilmiah sebagai alasan untuk menunda dilakukannya ukuran-ukuran pencegahan

236

Penjelasan umum poin (a) dari Prinsip 14 Draft Norms, terjemahan bebas oleh Penulis.

237 Penjelasan umum poin (b) dari Prinsip 14 Draft Norms, terjemahan bebas oleh Penulis.

238 Penjelasan umum poin (c) dari Prinsip 14 Draft Norms, dalam perumusan aslinya

“Consistent with paragraph 16 (i), in decision-making processes and on a periodic basis

(preferably annually or biannually), transnational corporations and other business enterprises

shall assess the impact of their activities on the environment and human health including impacts

from siting decisions, natural resource extraction activities, the production and sale of products or

services, and the generation, storage, transport and disposal of hazardous and toxic substances.

Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall ensure that the burden of negative

environmental consequences shall not fall on vulnerable racial, ethnic and socio-economic

groups.”

239 Penjelasan umum poin (d) dari Prinsip 14 Draft Norms, merincikan kelompok yang

harus ditinjau adalah “…children, older persons, indigenous peoples and communities

(particularly in regard to their land and natural resources), and/or women…”


72


yang efektif untuk mencegah adanya akibat-akibat yang tidak dapat dihindarkan

terhadap kesehatan dan lingkungan hidup.240

Kewajiban lain yang sangat penting ialah pembeban kewajiban terhadap

perusahaan transnasional untuk mengambil tindakan-tindakan yang layak dalam

aktivitasnya untuk meminimalisir resiko kecelakaan dan kerugian terhadap

lingkungan hidup dengan menggunakan praktik manajemen dan teknologi terbaik.

Antara lain, harus digunakan praktik manajemen terbaik dan teknologi yang layak

dan memungkinkan entitas komponen mereka untuk mencapai tujuan-tujuan

lingkungan hidup ini dengan berbagi teknologi, pengetahuan, dan pendampingan,

serta melalui system manajemen lingkungan hidup, pelaporan keberlanjutan, dan

pelaporan mengenai pelepasan bahan beracun dan berbahaya baik aktual maupun

yang diantisipasi. Selain itu, mereka wajib mendidik dan melatih pekerja untuk

memastikan pemenuhan tujuan-tujuan ini.241

3.3.6. Perluasan Interpretasi atas Instrumen Hukum Internasional yang

Ditujukan Bagi Negara

Perjanjian-perjanjian internasional yang bersifat global dan mengikat

sebagaimana disebutkan sebelumnya, misalnya ICCPR dan ICESR, sekalipun

ditujukan terutama untuk negara, mengharuskan pula korporasi untuk

menghormati hak-hak yang dijamin dengan menunjuk kepada mereka secara

langsung.242

Dalam ICCPR dan ICESR termaktub pula hak atas lingkungan hidup

yang merupakan hak derivatif dari hak-hak dasar dalam hal ini. Terdapat

kelompok ahli yang berpendapat bahwa dengan perumusan yang menunjuk

individual, memberikan perusahaan transnasional kewajiban terhadap hak-hak

dalam suatu instrumen internasional, sekalipun elemen pertanggungjawaban

240

Penjelasan umum poin (e) dari Prinsip 14 Draft Norms, dalam teks aslinya dirumuskan

sebagai berikut “Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall respect the

prevention principle, for example by preventing and/or mitigating deleterious impacts identified in

any assessment. They shall also respect the precautionary principle when dealing, for example,

with preliminary risk assessments that may indicate unacceptable effects on health or the

environment. Further, they shall not use the lack of full scientific certainty as a reason to delay the

introduction of cost-effective measures intended to prevent such effects.”

241 Penjelasan umum poin (g) dari Prinsip 14 Draft Norms

242 Beth Stephens, "The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human

Rights", Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, (2002), hlm. 45, 71-78.


73


utama tetaplah dibebankan pada Negara.243

Misalnya Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, yang menyatakan bahwa "setiap individu dan setiap organ

masyarakat" harus mendorong dan mengamankan hak-hak dan kebebasan-

kebebasan yang termaktub dalam Deklarasi ini”. Hal ini ditafsirkan bahwa

perusahaan transnasional, sebagai organ masyarakat, harus memastikan

pemenuhan hak-hak tersebut. ICCPR dan ICESR menunjuk pula dalam

pembukaannya kewajiban dari individu privat dengan rumusan "Mengingat bahwa

individu, memiliki kewajiban terhadap individu lainnya dan masyarakat di mana

ia berada, tunduk pada kewajiban untuk memperjuangkan peningkatan dan

ketaatan hak-hak yang diakui dalam Kovenan ini".

Namun bagaimanapun, instrumen-instrumen ini tidak dapat untuk

memastikan kepatuhan korporasi dengan standar-standar tersebut oleh karena

beberapa alasan.244

Pertama, kewajiban dikenakan terhadap negara peserta dan

bukan secara langsung terhadap perusahaan transnasional, dan dengan demikian

tidak terdapat mekanisme kontrol dan penegakan hukum yang efektif disediakan

untuk ditujukan terhadap perusahaan transnasional.245

Kedua, implementasi dari

kewajiban-kewajiban tersebut bergantung pada kemampuan dari negara-negara

untuk melakukan kontrol terhadap perusahaan transnasional, yang mana tidak

selalu midah, mengingat kekuatan perusahaan transnasional yang semakin

besar.246

Ketiga, instrumen-instrumen ini tidak meliputi seperangkat standar yang

dibutuhkan untuk diaplikasikan terhadap tindakan perusahaan transnasional,

sehingga tidak cukup untuk mengatur tindakan korporasi dalam segala aspek yang

dibutuhkan.247

243

Ibid., 72, 77-78; Lih. Surya Deva, "Human Rights Violations by Multinational

Corporations and International Law: Where from Here?", Connecticut Journal of International

Law, Vol. 19, (2003), hlm. 1, 13.

244 Surya Deva, “Human Rights Violations…”, hlm. 13-14.

245 Beth Stephens, “The Amorality of Profit…”, hlm. 167-175.

246 Surya Deva, “Human Rights Violations…”, hlm. 13-14.

247 Lea Hanakova, “Accountability of Transnational Corporations…”, hlm. 32-33.


74


3.4. Tinjauan Keberlakuan Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup Sebagai

Hukum Internasional Terhadap Perusahaan Transnasional

Bagaimana suatu perusahaan transnasional dapat dinyatakan akuntabel

untuk pelanggaran hak asasi manusia? Pada dasarnya, sumber yang paling jelas

dari akuntabilitas ialah regulasi oleh negara di mana pelanggaran terjadi. Sebagian

besar kritik terbaru mengenai praktik hak asasi manusia korporasi telah

memfokuskan tata kelakuannya dalam negara berkembang,248

di mana proses

akselerasi dari globalisasi ekonomi telah menghasilkan peningkatan signifikan

dalam aktivitas multinasional dan investasi asing secara langsung.249

Bagaimanapun, seringkali perusahaan transnasional lebih kuat secara ekonomi

dibandingkan dengan negara berkembang di tempat mereka beroperasi, di mana

banyak negara-negara berkembang yang mempercayai bahwa mereka perlu untuk

menarik investasi perusahaan transnasional untuk mendorong pertumbuhan

ekonominya.

Pemerintahan yang rapuh dan/atau koruptif dapat kekurangan niatan

politis untuk mendirikan atau menegakkan hukum pertanggungjawaban hak asasi

manusia yang berhubungan dengan korporasi, dengan ketakutan bahwa regulasi

dan akuntabilitas yang lebih ketat, misalnya dalam hal lingkungan atau buruh,

dapat memacu perusahaan transnasional untuk menarik investasinya.250

Lebih

jauh lagi, negara berkembang mungkin memiliki sistem hukum yang belum

berkembang secara baik dan dengan demikian dapat kekurangan kemampuan

hukum maupun teknis untuk secara layak mengatur operasi perusahaan

transnasional.251

Misalnya, negara-negara berkembang dapat kekurangan

248

S. Joseph, „Taming the Leviathans: Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights',

Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 46, (1999), hlm. 199-201. Beberapa paragraf berikut

juga sebagian besar berasal dari sumber ini.

249Zia-Zarifi, „Suing Multinational Corporations in the US for Violating International Law‟,

University of California at Los Angeles Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 4,

(1999), hlm. 81, 86–87

250S. Joseph, „An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of Multinational

Enterprises‟ dalam M. Kamminga and S. Zia-Zarifi (eds), Liability of Multinational Corporations

under International Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000), hlm. 251, 255–256.

251Lihat, a.l. J. Cassels, „Outlaws: Multinational Corporations and Catastrophic Law‟,

Cumberland Law Review, Vol. 31, (2000) hlm. 317, mendeskripsikan tidak cukupnya standar

keamanan India dalam meregulasi operasi seperti Union Carbide di Bhopal pada tahun 1980an


75


perangkat legal, misal sumber-sumber untuk melakukan penemuan kompleks

dokumen-dokumen, untuk mengungkap corporate veil yang melindungi sebuah

perusahaan induk kaya aset di balik anak perusahaan yang miskin aset.252

Bahkan

jika tabir pertanggung jawaban terbatas korporasi ditembus untuk mengungkap

induk perusahaannya, putusan yang diberikan mungkin saja tidak dapat

dilaksanakan dalam yurisdiksi di mana aset dari induk perusahaan terletak.253

Di

lain sisi, mungkin pula tidak mungkin secara praktis bagi banyak penggugat untuk

mencari ganti rugi dalam negara-negara berkembang, karena bantuan hukum

jarang tersedia.

Akibat konsekuen dari hal tersebut dapat menyebabkan perusahaan

transnasional beroperasi di negara tuan rumah yang sedang berkembang dengan

kebebasan efektif.254

Bahaya dari kebebasan perusahaan transnasional dalam

negara tuan rumah cukup tinggi dengan mempertimbangkan contoh-contoh

komersialisasi militer, di mana perusahaan transnasional dituduh bekerja sama

dengan pemerintah tuan rumah dalam pelanggaran hak asasi manusia dan bahkan

pelanggaran kemanusiaan. Dalam situasi tersebut, seringkali mencari kompensasi

hukum di negara tempat pelanggaran terjadi adalah sia-sia dan bahkan berbahaya.

3.4.1. Perusahaan Transnasional Sebagai Subjek Hukum Internasional

Terbatas

Pada awalnya, kewajiban hukum hak asasi manusia internasional

dianggap hanya terbatas pada negara. Hal ini didasarkan pada doktrin hukum

tradisional terkait personalitas hukum (legal personality). Lauterpacht pada

pertengahan abad ke-20 menyatakan bahwa “doktrin ortodoks positivis telah

awal. Cassels menyatakan bahwa standar-standar India 'berdasarkan sebuah paradigma industri

buruh-intensif teknologi-rendah'. Lih. juga H. Ward, „Securing Transnational Corporate

Accountability through National Courts: Implications and Policy Options‟, Hastings International

and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 24, (2001), hlm. 451, 463–64.

252S. Joseph, „Taming the Leviathans...‟, hlm. 177.

253Misalnya, putusan melawan Shell, Dow Chemicals, dan Standard Fruit oleh pengadilan

di Nikaragua dinyatakan tidak dapat dilaksanakan oleh pengadilan California. 'Nicaragua:

Pesticide Claim Dismissed', New York Times (New York, 25 Oktober 2003)

254GGA Tzeutschler, „Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational

Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad‟, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 30,

(1999), hlm. 359, 361–62, 382.


76


secara eksplisit setuju bahwa hanya negaralah Subjek hukum internasional”.255

Individu dan non-state actor lainnya dipandang sebagai objek, bukan subjek, dari

sistem hukum internasional. Kewajiban dalam hukum internasional, misalnya

untuk “menghormati, memastikan, dan mengambil langkah” seperti yang

ditemukan dalam berbagai instrumen internasional, terletak pada negara-negara

untuk pemenuhannya.256

Seiring dengan perkembangan masyarakat hukum internasional, subjek

yang diakui dalam hukum internasional mengalami perkembangan hingga tidak

hanya terbatas pada negara. Dalam Reparation for Injuries Case, ICJ

mendefiniskan bahwa subjek hukum internasional adalah “entitas yang mampu

mengemban hak dan kewajiban internasional dan memiliki kapasitas untuk

mempertahankan haknya dengan melakukan klaim internasional.”257

Pandangan

yang kini mendominasi di antara ahli hukum internasional, tidak semua entitas

yang berpartisipasi dalam hubungan internasional kontemporer dapat diakui

sebagai subjek hukum internasional, sekalipun mereka mungkin memiliki derajat

pengaruh tertentu dalam komunitas internasional.258

Mochtar Kusumaatmadja

memaparkan bahwa setidaknya terdapat enam entitas yang telah diakui sebagai

subjek hukum internasional, yang meliputi negara, Takhta Suci Vatikan, Palang

Merah Internasional, organisasi internasional, individu (secara terbatas), dan

pemberontak (belligerent).259

255

Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Subjects of the Law of Nations”, Law Quarterly Review, Vol.

63, hlm. 438, 439. Lih. pula Oppenheim, 1 International Law, hlm. 341 (1905). Oppenheim juga

menyatakan bahwa “Karena hukum antar bangsa (law of nations) hanyalah antara negara saja dan

secara terbatas, Negara sajalah secara eksklusif yang merupakan subjek hukum antar bangsa”.

256Donald K. Anton dan Dinah L. Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights,

..., hlm. 863.

257Reparation for Injuries Case, ICJ Reports (1949), hlm. 179, sebagaimana dikutip Ian

Brownlie dalam Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),

hlm. 57. Beliau menyatakan bahwa definisi ini berputar, karena indicia menunjuk kepada

bergantungnya eksistensi dari legal person. Dengan kata lain, personalitas didefinisikan dengan

referensi kepada eksistensi beberapa kriteria, yang mana pada akhirnya bergantung kepada

eksistensi personalitas itu sendiri.

258Karsten Nowrot, "New Approaches to the International Legal Personality of

Multinational Corporations Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibilities",

1993. Sumber: www.esil-sedi.eu/english/pdf/Nowrot.PDF

259Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Pengantar Hukum Internasional, ..., hlm. 53


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Revolusi dalam hukum internasional – yang dimandatkan oleh konsepsi

hak asasi manusia, perlindungan lingkungan, serta beberapa perkembangan

lainnya260

– telah membuat terobosan fundamental dalam konteks ini. Terdapat

argumen bahwa perkembangan nilai-nilai hak asasi manusia telah menuntun,

secara sebagian, kepada status baru bagi individu untuk diakui paling tidak secara

terbatas, sebagai subjek hukum internasional. Dan merupakan akibat yang wajar

dari pengakuan hak dan kewajiban inividu ini, bahwa gagasan tersebut diperluas

pula bagi badan hukum.261

Individual, baik natural maupun badan hukum, dapat

dianggap subjek dari hukum internasional dalam kerangka beberapa perjanjian

internasional. Bagaimanapun, penting juga untuk digarisbawahi bahwa terdapat

berbagai aturan mengenai hukum internasional yang ada demi manfaat untuk

orang-perorangan maupun perusahaan, namun hal itu tidak berarti bahwa aturan

tersebut memberikan hak bagi mereka.262

Dijelaskan pula oleh Dixon dan McCorquodale, bahwa terdapat berbagai

jenis subjek hukum internasional, di mana „personalitas internasional‟ bukanlah

suatu konsep yang absolut. Personalitas ini merupakan suatu hal relatif dalam arti

bahwa jenis subjek hukum internasional yang berbeda dapat memilki jenis atau

lapisan personalitas yang berbeda. Secara umum, personalitas internasional

memerlukan kemampuan untuk membawa klaim ke badan peradilan internasional

dalam yurisdiksi internasional; untuk menikmati hak dan tunduk pada kewajiban

internasional; untuk berpartisipasi dalam pembuatan hukum internasional; untuk

menikmati imunitas yang melekat pada subjek hukum internasional dalam sistem

hukum nasional; untuk berpartisipasi dalam organisasi internasional dan untuk

membuat perjanjian internasional.263

Selain itu, dikatakan pula oleh Cassese

260

Misalnya, dalam hukum humaniter secara keseluruhan, yang menyediakan berbagai

perlindungan hukum bagi manusia, terutama kelompok rentan dalam konteks perang; serta

menjatuhkan pertanggungjawaban kriminal terhadap pelaku kejahatan perang.

261Seidel-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law, (London: Sweet and Maxwell,

1999), hlm. 9.

262P. Malanczuk, Akehurst‟s Modern Introduction to International Law, (London:

Routledge, 1997), hlm. 100.

263M. Dixon dan R. McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law, (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2003), hlm. 132.


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bahwa dalam hukum internasional kontemporer, individual memiliki status

hukum. Mereka memiliki beberapa kewajiban, yang berasal dari hukum kebiasaan

internasional. Selain itu, hak prosedural melekat pada manfaat bagi individu, tidak

semata-mata sejajar dengan negara, namun hanya terhadap kelompok negara-

negara yang telah menandatangani perjanjian internasional; atau organisasi

internasional yang telah mengadopsi resolusi, mengenai hak tersebut. Secara jelas,

status hukum internasional bagi individu merupakan suatu hal yang unik,

memiliki posisi miring dalam komunitas internasional. Sejauh terkait kewajiban

mereka, mereka dikaitkan dengan semua anggota lain dari komunitas

internasional; dan secara bertolak belakang, mereka tidak memiliki hak dalam

hubungan dengan semua anggota kelompok. Secara sederhana, semua negara

memiliki keinginan untuk meminta individu menghormati beberapa nilai-nilai

fundamental, ketika mereka lebih tidak siap untuk mengasosiasikan mereka

kepada perundingan internasional, apalagi memberikan mereka kekuatan untuk

menuntut negara dalam badan internasional.264

Math Noorman, dalam evaluasinya terhadap dinamika non-state actors

dalam hukum internasional, mengargumentasikan tiga hal: (1) Perusahaan

transnasional (dengan menggunakan terminologi MNEs) memiliki kemunculan

yang cukup dalam aktivitas hukum internasional untuk dapat diukur personalitas

internasionalnya; (2) Partisipasi perusahaan transnasional dalam konsultasi

mengenai aturan-aturan internasional baru mungkin dapat memberikan mereka

ukuran akan personalitas internasional; (3) Negara-negara dapat menetukan untuk

memberikan hak atau kewajiban terhadap perusahaan transnasional di bawah

perjanjian internasional dan negara dapat secara sendiri bertanggungjawab untuk

pelanggaran korporasi terhadap hukum internasional dengan alasan efek

horizontal atau doktrin Drittwirkung.265

Pada 2003, Sub-Komisi Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of

Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to

Human Rights mencoba membuat suatu pendekatan normatif atas-bawah terhadap

264

A. Cassese, International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), hlm. 150.

265Math Noortmann, Cedric Ryngaert, Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law

(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2010), hlm. 11-13.


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perluasan kewajiban HAM terhadap aktor bisnis. Secara spesifik, Draft Norms

menyatakan bahwa: "Perusahaan transnasional dan bentuk bisnis lainnya harus

menyediakan reparasi yang cepat, efektif, dan memadai (prompt, effective, and

adequate) kepada orang-orang, entitas, dan komunitas yang telah dirugikan

karena kegagalan untuk mematuhi Norma ini, dengan cara antara lain: reparasi,

restitusi, kompensasi, dan rehabilitasi terhadap kerusakan apapun atau barang

yang telah diambil. Draft Norms memperkenalkan beberapa klarifikasi dimana

reparasi diatas dapat diberikan. Dalam paragraf 18 dari Draft Norms ditentukan

bahwa 'Dalam hubungan dengan menentukan kerugian, terkait sanksi kriminal,

dan dalam segala hal lain, norma-norma ini harus diaplikasikan oleh pengadilan

nasional dan/atau badan peradilan internasional, sesuai dengan hukum nasional

dan internasional‟.266

Jika melihat perkembangan hukum internasional hingga saat ini, dari

berbagai dokumen yang telah ada serta berbagai argumen akademis terhadap hak

dan kewajiban langsung dari perusahaan transnasional, serta melihat

perkembangan hingga adanya Draft Norms di atas, maka telah ada suatu

kewajiban non-voluntary yang dikenakan secara langsung terhadap perusahaan

transnasional dalam instrumen yang bersifat global. Hal ini semakin menegaskan,

di samping berbagai instrumen sukarela yang bersifat global yang memberikan

hak dan kewajiban terhadap korporasi, serta pendekatan kontekstual dari berbagai

instrumen internasional yang mengenakan kewajiban tidak secara langsung pada

individual, bahwa perusahaan transnasional merupakan subjek hukum

internasional terbatas.

3.4.2. Mekanisme Gugatan Transnasional Terhadap Perusahaan

Transnasional

Secara garis besar, litigasi hak asasi manusia melawan korporasi dapat

dilihat terhadap dua pertanggungjawaban, yaitu terkait pertanggungjawaban

pidana (criminal liabilities) dan pertanggungjawaban perdata (civil liabilities). Di

sebagian besar negara-negara, hukum pidana secara umum hanya berlaku

terhadap tindakan yang dilakukan atau setidaknya sebagaian dilakukan dalam

266

Ibid., hlm. 20-21.


80


teritorial dan yurisdiksi dari negara yang memberlakukan hukum pidana

tersebut.267

Maka itu, sebuah tindakan perusahaan transnasional di luar suatu

negara mungkin saja dapat diproses di negara asalnya apaila tindakan yang

didalilkan dipersiapkan, dan dengan cara tertentu secara sebagian dieksekusi, di

markas besar dari perusahaan tersebut.268

Tanggung jawab kriminal atas suatu

tindakan didasarkan pada 4 hal, yaitu asas teritorialitas, asas personalitas aktif,

asas personalitas pasif, dan asas universalitas. Bagaimanapun, dalam karya tulis

ini, pertanggungjawaban pidana tidak akan dibahas lebih lanjut.

Tanggung jawab perdata, walaupun tampaknya gugatan perdata tidaklah

signifikan terhadap pelanggaran hak asasi manusia dibandingkan proses kriminal

sebagai alat dari akuntabilitas hak asasi manusia,269

dalam hal hak atas lingkungan

hidup merupakan suatu hal yang sangat penting. Bagaimanapun, gugatan perdata

memiliki potensi menghasilkan ganti rugi dalam jumlah yang sangat besar, dan

secara langsung merusak garis utama finansial perusahaan transnasional, sebuah

'bahasa yang dapat dimengerti dan diikuti oleh perusahaan transnasional'.270

Selain bertujuan untuk mendapatkan ganti rugi, gugatan perdata dapat pula

mendorong penyelesaian di luar pengadilan yang menghasilkan suatu ukuran

ganti rugi tertentu bagi penggugat yang menderita kerugian. Mereka dapat pula

membawa kepada investigasi mendalam dan mengangkat fakta-fakta yang

besar,271

yang mungkin memiliki konsekuensi kritis bagi reputasi korporasi,

bahkan dalam hal tiadanya temuan tanggung jawab hukum, sebagai

'ketidakberuntungan yang memalukan' di antara retorika korporasi dan tindakan

267

C. Forcese, „Deterring „Militarized Commerce‟: The Prospect of Liability for

„Privatized‟ Human Rights Abuses‟, Ottawa Law Review, Vol. 31, (2000), hlm. 171, 173.

268Ibid., hlm. 190.

269B Stephens, „Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of

Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations‟, Yale Journal of International

Law, Vol. 27, (2002), hlm. 1, 26–27, dan 31–32.

270S. Zia-Zarifi, „Suing Multinational Corporations in the US for Violating International

Law‟, University of California at Los Angeles Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs,

Vol. 4, (1999), hlm. 81, 86–7

271B. Stephens, „Translating Filartiga...‟, hlm. 14.


81


mereka pada dasarnya dapat diungkapkan.272

Hal ini dapat pula menghasilkan

dampak buruk mengenai harga saham dari korporasi. Litigasi dapat pula

menaikkan kemungkinan terjadinya kampanye-kampenye NGO, memberikan

sang pengkampanye publisitas yang dibutuhkan dan berbagai keuntungan lain.

Lebih jauh lagi, gugatan perdata dapat diajukan oleh para korban sendiri, ketika

hukum pidana pada dasarnya harus dilakukan oleh aparat pemerintahan, misalnya

Jaksa Penuntut Umum atau Jaksa Agung,273

yang tidak selalu memiliki keakanan

politik untuk mengambil tindakan melawan induk korporasi demi keadilan atas

penderitaan para korban di luar wilayah negara tersebut. Pada akhirnya, dari sudut

pandang pragmatis, gugatan perdata memberikan penawaran untuk membuat

korporasi bertanggung jawab secara hukum atas tindakan pelanggaran hak asasi

manusia yang dilakukannya, sehingga mencegah tindakan penyalahgunaan hak

asasi manusia dan memberikan ganti rugi atau paling tidak justifikasi bagi para

korbannya274

dalam hal tiadanya proses pidana.

Sejauh ini, litigasi hak asasi manusia melawan korporasi telah

bermunculan, hampir secara eksklusif, di negara-negara common law.275

Pengadilan di negara common law mungkin dapat memberlakukan yurisdiksi

perdata terhadap orang asing dan perusahaan asing terkait tindakan ekstra-

teritorial mereka; yang mana tidak umum ditemukan di negara-negara civil law.276

272

H Ward, „Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability through National Courts:

Implications and Policy Options‟, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 24,

(2001), hlm. 451, 463–64

273J Terry, „Taking Filartiga on the Road: Why Courts outside the United States should

accept Jurisdiction over Actions involving Torture Committed Abroad‟ dalam C Scott (ed),

Torture as Tort (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), hlm.116–117.

274Tzeutschler mencatat bagaimana para penggugat seringkali termotivasi oleh adanya

hasrat atas justifikasi dan perubahan dalam kebijakan TNC dibandingkan dengan ganti rugi

moneter. GGA Tzeutschler, „Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational

Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad‟, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 30,

(1999), hlm. 377–78.

275Kasus gugatan transnasional yang terjadi di negara dengan sistem civil law terjadi di

yurisdiksi dari Lousiana dan Quebec. Baik Lousiana maupun Quebec sebenarnya merupakan

negara bagian dari Amerika Serikat, yang merupakan negara yang secara umum beroperasi di

bawah sistem common law. Lih: Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights...,

hlm. 15.

276B. Stephens, „Translating Filartiga...‟, hlm. 24.


82


Faktanya, mayoritas dari kasus-kasus besar telah terjadi di satu yurisdiksi, yaitu

Amerika Serikat, terkait dengan adanya beberapa causes of action yang tersedia di

negara tersebut, serta pula sifat sistem hukum Amerika Serikat yang ramah

terhadap penggugat. Terdapat pula beberapa kasus di United Kingdom, Australia,

dan Kanada.277

Setidaknya terdapat tiga mekanisme yurisdiksi umum di mana

akuntabilitas Perusahaan transnasional dapat dikejar. Untuk menyederhanakan,

selanjutnya tiga mekanisme ini akan disebut sebagai yurisdiksi lokal, yurisdiksi

negara asal, dan yurisdiksi internasional.278

Sebagaimana disebutkan sebelumnya, konsekuensi dari perbuatan

melawan hukum yang dilakukan oleh perusahaan transnasional terjadi di suatu

negara tertentu. Dalam hal tersebut, kewajiban utama untuk mengejar ganti rugi

terletak di negara di mana perbuatan melawan hukum tersebut terjadi.279

Hal ini

merupakan aplikasi dari prinsip umum hak asasi manusia dan konvensi-konvensi

lain yang menyatakan bahawa negara-negara peserta harus "menghormati dan

memastikan pemenuhan" hak-hak tertentu tersebut.280

Dalam situasi-situasi di

mana sebuah negara tidak dapat atau tidak ingin mengatur aktivitas tersebut,

bagaimanapun, atau di mana negara sendiri melakukan perbuatan melanggar

hukum tersebut dengan derajat kompleksitas tertentu sebagai bagian dari

perusahaan transnasional, maka akan lebih pantas untuk mencari ganti rugi di

yurisdiksi yang lain. Yang paling jelas adalah untuk berpaling pada yurisdiksi di

mana korporasi memiliki markas utamanya -dan yang penting pula, harta

kekayaannya.281

277

Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational..., hlm. 28.

278Simon Chesterman, 'Oil and Water: Regulating the Behavior of Multinational

Corporations Through Law', Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 36, (2004), hlm. 314.

279Chris Jochnick, „Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the

Promotion of Human Rights‟, HUM. RTS. Quarterly, Vol. 21, (1999), hlm. 56, 58.

280Misalnya International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, diadopsi pada 19

Desember 1966, art. 2, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 yang berbunyi “Each State Party to the

present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individualswithin its territory and

subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in thepresent Covenant . . . .”

281Simon Chesterman, „Oil and Water...‟, hlm. 315


83


Jika dapat dinyatakan bahwa suatu korporasi atau badan turunannya telah

melanggar hukum dari negara asalnya, misalnya dengan melakukan tindakan yang

dilarang dalam yurisdiksi di manapun mereka berada, membawa klaim hukum di

negara asal tersebut melawan korporasi dapat menjadi pilihan yang menarik.282

Namun, terdapat satu penghalang yang cukup sering diputuskan sebelum

pengadilan mengadili masalah substantif, yaitu forum non conveniens.Forum non

conveniens adalah suatu prinsip dalam hukum antar tata hukum (conflict of laws)

di mana sebuah forum (dengan kata lain, pengadilan) yang secara teknis pantas

untuk memberlakukan yurisdiksinya terkait hal tertentu dapat melepaskan

yurisdiksinya dengan alasan bahwa terdapat forum lain yang dapat menangani

kasus tersebut secara lebih nyaman (convenient).283

Salah satu yurisdiksi negara asal di mana begitu banyak terjadi gugatan

transnasional terhadap Perusahaan transnasional adalah dalam yurisdiksi Amerika

Serikat melalui Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA). ATCA merupakan sebuah undang-

undang yang berasal dari tahun 1789, yang mengijinkan orang asing unuk

menuntut di pengadilan AS untuk pelanggaran atas hak-hak mereka berdasarkan

hukum internasional. ATCA telah diinterpretasikan mengijinkan orang asing

untuk menuntut orang-orang (atau badan hukum) yang telah melakukan

pelanggaran berat dari hak asasi manusia mereka. Sejak 1997, beberapa kasus-

kasus ATCA telah dilakukan melawan perusahaan transnasional untuk dalil

pelanggaran hak asasi manusia berat dalam operasinya di luar Amerika Serikat.284

Yurisdiksi ketiga di mana ganti rugi dapat dikejar adalah dengan

mekanisme hukum internasional. Sebagaimana diuraikan sebelumnya, beberapa

kejahatan internasional dapat dilakukan oleh individu: misalnya pembajakan

(termasuk pembajakan pesawat terbang), perbudakan (termasuk pemaksaan

buruh), genosida, kejahatan perang, dan kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan.285

282

Michael Anderson, „Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage...‟, hlm.

399, 407-410.

283Aturan Forum Non Conveniens terdapat di dalam praktik federal bagi sebagaian besar

dari pemindahan provisi 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (2001)

284Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational..., hlm. 29.

285Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, ..., hlm. 565-568.


84


Kejahatan lainnya dapat dilakukan hanya oleh negara. Telah diterima setidaknya

sejak peradilan kejahatan perang pasca Perang Dunia II bahwa individual dapat

dinyatakan bertanggung jawab atas tindakan yang diambil melalui korporasi.286

Kemungkinan yang lebih kontroversial lagi ialah bahwa korporasi sendiri dapat

dinyatakan bersalah.287

Namun, dalam karya tulis ini, mekanisme ketiga ini tidak

akan dibahas mengingat pembatasan masalah yang terkait dengan semata-mata

gugatan perdata.

Berdasarkan pemaparan hingga sejauh ini, pada Bab selanjutnya Penulis

akan melihat penerapan pertanggungjawaban perusahaan transnasional terhadap

pelanggaran hak asasi manusia atas lingkungan hidup, sehingga dapat terlihat

apakah hak asasi manusia atas lingkungan hidup telah diterapkan dalam perkara-

perkara gugatan masyarakat atas pelanggaran hak atas lingkungan hidup yang

dilakukan perusahaan transnasional, dan bagaimana penerapannya dalam masing-

masing kasus.

3.4.3. Tanggung Jawab Hukum Perusahaan Transnasional dalam Hal

Terjadinya Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia

Berbicara mengenai tanggung jawab hukum, maka dalam konteks hukum

internasional terdapat tiga terminologi yang kerap digunakan dalam menunjuk

tanggung jawab subjek hukum internasional, yaitu accountability, responsibility,

dan liability. Namun terminologi responsibility tidak begitu umum digunakan

dalam menunjuk tanggung jawab hukum dari perusahaan transnasional, dan lebih

umum digunakan untuk menunjuk Corporate Social Responsibility, yang

merupakan tindakan sukarela dari perusahaan yang dilakukan untuk

mengimplementasikan standar-standar tertentu pada perburuhan, lingkungan

hidup, dan hak asasi manusia lainnya.288

Dengan kata lain, sebuah perusahaan

286

Steve Sharp, „Ok Tedi Case Has Global Lessons‟, Sydney Morn. Her., (15 Juni 1996),

hlm. 37

287Ibid.

288 David Monsma & John Buckley, “Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The Material

Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure”, University of Balitmore Environmental Law

Journal, Vol. 11, (2004), hlm. 151, 175-76; serta Dr. Isabella D. Bunn, “Global Advocacy for

Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic Perspectives from the NGO Community”, American

University International Law Review, Vol. 19, (2004), hlm. 1265, 1270-72.


85


transnasional secara sosial bertanggung jawab sekalipun tindakan etiknya

sukarena dan tidak disyaratkan oleh norma hukum atau peraturan lainnya. Codes

of conduct merupakan contoh dari pemberlakuan Corporate Social Responsibility

ini. Hal ini berbeda dari liability dan accountability yang sifatnya memaksa.

Liability muncul dari adanya kerugian yang ditimbulkan dari perbuatan

yang melawan hukum, yang meliputi pertanggungjawaban secara finansial

maupun secara legal. Dari sudut pandang hukum internasional yang mengatur

mengenai perusahaan transnasional, dapat dikatakan bahwa “hukum internasional

hingga saat ini sebenarnya tidak mengatur pertanggung jawaban hukum (liability)

dari perusahaan transnasional terkait pelanggaran hak asasi manusia”, khususnya

hak atas lingkungan hidup; dan “tidak pula menyediakan mekanisme untuk

menegakkan kewajiban hukum tersebut”.289

Namun, dalam bidang tertentu,

negara-negara telah merumuskan pengaturan melalui perjanjian internasional

mengenai tanggung jawab hukum secara perdata (civil liability) yang menunjuk

pada hukum domestik dalam penegakan hukumnya.

Dalam hal perusahaan transnasional sebagai pencemar, negara-negara

telah membuat ketentuan operasional melalui yang menempatkan

pertanggungjawaban secara langsung terhadap pencemar290

, yang berlaku pula

dalam hal pencemar merupakan perusahaan transnasional. Beberapa konvensi

internasional memberikan "pertanggungjawaban perdata" (civil liability) secara

langsung terhadap korporasi.291

Namun hal ini, sekali lagi, menimbulkan

kebingungan mengenai adanya pertanggungjawaban internasional jika melihat

cara implementasinya. Dalam dokumen-dokumen tersebut, hukum internasional

tidak dengan sendirinya memberikan pertanggungjawaban terhadap korporasi -

289

“Developments in the Law-Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human

Rights Law”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 114 (2001), hlm. 2025-2026

290 Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, Accountability For Human Rights Atrocities In

International Law, 3rd

Ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), hlm. 11-12.

291 Meskipun tidak bersifat global, di antaranya International Convention on Civil Liability

for Oil Pollution Damage, dibuat pada 29 November 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, dan

Protokol-nya pada 1984; serta Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting

from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources yang dibuat pada 17

Desember 1976, 16 I.L.M. 1450, memberikan pertanggungjawaban langsung terhadap korporasi

berdasarkan prinsip pencemar membayar.


86


walaupun dirumuskan demikian- karena mekanisme penegakkan hukumnya ialah

melalui gugatan perdata di salah satu atau lebih negara. Namun bagaimanapun,

penggunaan pengadilan domestik untuk mengimplementasikan pertanggung-

jawaban ini tidak mengubah kenyataan bahwa perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut

memang memberikan pertanggungjawaban terhadap pencemar, yaitu dalam

bidang perdata internasional. Selain itu, sekalipun dokumen-dokumen ini

bukanlah dokumen yang secara spesifik berbicara mengenai hak atas lingkungan

hidup ataupun pemenuhan hak asasi manusia oleh perusahaan transnasional,

namun diakomodasinya prinsip pencemar membayar pada dasarnya merupakan

pemenuhan atas hak atas lingkungan hidup. Sayang sekali sejauh mana dan

bagaimana pertanggungjawaban hukum dapat diatribusikan kepada induk

perusahaan tidak diatur dalam instrumen-instrumen tersebut, melainkan harus

tundak pada hukum domestik dari negara yang terlibat.

Masih mengenai liability, cara lainnya yang kerap digunakan terhadap

perusahaan transnasional adalah melalui litigasi transnasional antara Negara tuan

rumah dengan Negara asal perusahaan (home-host state transnational litigation).

Dalam bidang pelanggaran hak asasi manusia dan lingkungan hidup, cara ini

merupakan cara yang paling sering ditempuh oleh mereka yang dirugikan untuk

mendapatkan penggantian kerugian dan pemulihan. Bagaimanapun, terdapat

berbagai hambatan untuk dapat menyatakan induk perusahaan bertanggung jawab

hukum dalam transnational litigation. Secara singkat, hambatan yang ditimbulkan

oleh permasalahan personalitas hukum dalam perusahaan grup dapat diatasi

dengan tiga cara: pertama, dapat dicari penegasan pertanggungjawaban derivatif

dari induk perusahaan untuk tindakan dari anak perusahaannya, di mana

corporate veil dapat diangkat karena telah disalahgunakan; kedua, pendekatan

'perusahaan terintegrasi' dapat digunakan, yang merupakan pendekatan menengah

yang didasarkan pada pengertian bahwa perusahaan transnasional diorganisasikan

sebagai sebuah grup yang terintegrasi, yang mengijinkan anggapan bahwa

tindakan yang dilakukan oleh anak perusahaan akan dihubungkan dengan

induknya; ketiga, tanggung jawab langsung dari induk perusahaan dapat

ditegaskan untuk tindakannya sendiri atau atas tidak dilakukannya tindakan


87


tertentu (omisi), termasuk tidak dilakukannya kehati-hatian (due dilligence) dalam

pengontrolan anak perusahaan.292

Sementara itu, accountability merujuk pada instrumen-instrumen yang

mengatur tindakan perusahaan transnasional berdasarkan peraturan, nasional

maupun internasional, yang mengikat terhadap tindakan korporasi dalam bidang

hak asasi manusia, lingkungan hidup, dan lain-lain.293

Dengan kata lain,

accountability berarti bahwa perusahaan transnasional diharuskan untuk

mematuhi norma-norma hukum tertentu, sukarela ataupun tidak.

Salah satu instrumen internasional yang dapat menjadi rujukan

akuntabilitas perusahaan transnasional antara lain ialah Norms on the

Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises

with Regard to Human Rights. Dokumen yang diadopsi oleh United Nations ini

bukanlah merupakan inisiatif sukarela tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan. Provisi

implementasi menunjukkan bahwa dokumen ini berarti lebih dari sekedar

penegasan aspirasi dari tindakan perusahaan yang diinginkan.294

Lebih jauh lagi,

Resolusi 2003/16 menghimbau pembentukan mekanisme bagi NGO dan lain-lain

untuk menyampaikan informasi mengenai kegiatan usaha yang tidak mencapai

standar minimum dari norma ini. Sifat non-voluntary dari Draft Norms dengan

demikian melampaui pedoman sukarela sebagaimana UN Global Compact, ILO

Tripartite Declaration, dan OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

Sekalipun sifatnya non-voluntary, namun dokumen ini bukan pula merupakan

perjanjian internasional.

Sebuah kewajiban implementasi yang cukup penting ialah kewajiban

untuk menyediakan “prompt, effective, and adequate reparation” terhadap entitas

292

Sulistiowati, Aspek Hukum dan Realitas Bisnis ..., hlm. 285-290

293 Monsma dan Buckley, “Non-Financial Corporate…”, hlm. 175-176; Lih. Lea Hanakova,

"Accountability of Transnational Corporations Under International Standards", Georgia Law LLM

Theses and Essays, (Januari 2005), hlm. 6.

294 Donald K. Anton dan Dinah Shelton, Environmental Protection and…, hlm. 906-907.

Prinsip 15 dari Draft Norms mewajibkan perusahaan-perusahaan untuk mengadopsi,

menyebarluaskan, dan mengimplementasikan peraturan operasi internal sesuai dengan Draft

Norms. Pengaturan lebih lanjut, termasuk pula kewajiban pelaporan dan pengawasan periodik oleh

United Nations, serta kewajiban evaluasi secara periodik atas aktivitasnya terkait hak asasi

manusia.


88


yang telah terkena dampak buruk karena kegagalan korporasi untuk mematuhi

norma ini, melalui antara lain reparasi, restitusi, kompensasi, dan rehabilitasi

terhadap kerugian apapun yang ditimbukan atau hak milik yang diambil. Dalam

hubungannya dengan penentuan kerugian, serta sanksi pidana, dan dalam hal

lainnya, Norma ini harus diberlakukan oleh pengadilan nasional dan/atau badan

peradilan internasional, sesuai dengan hukum nasional dan internasional.295

295

Prinsip 18 Draft Norms, terjemahan bebas oleh Penulis.


89


BAB 4

PENERAPAN HAK ATAS LINGKUNGAN HIDUP DALAM GUGATAN

MASYARAKAT MELAWAN PERUSAHAAN TRANSNASIONAL

Pelanggaran hak atas lingkungan hidup oleh perusahaan transnasional

telah begitu sering terjadi dalam berbagai skala kerusakan lingkungan hidup dan

kerugian yang ditimbulkan terhadap penduduk lokal, sebagian besar terjadi di

negara berkembang. Pada umumnya, kerusakan yang terjadi tampak dengan jelas

dan dapat dicegah, namun diabaikan oleh pihak yang menyebabkannya. Dari

sekian banyak kasus, Penulis menyajikan tiga perkara, yaitu Aguinda v. Texaco,

Lubbe v. Cape PLC, dan Beanal v. Freeport McMoran. Ketiga perkara ini

merupakan perkara-perkara dengan skala besar, baik dari segi kerusakan dan

kerugian yang ditimbulkan maupun jumlah korban, sehingga cukup mendapat

perhatian dalam dunia internasional dan memicu cukup banyak analisis dalam

perkembangan hukum internasional dalam hal substansi hak asasi manusia atas

lingkungan hidup yang baik dan sehat maupun dalam hal pertanggungjawaban

perusahaan transnasional.

Secara substansi hak, akan dianalisis hak atas lingkungan hidup yang

dilanggar perusahaan transnasional dan penggunaannya dalam dalil perkara

maupun penerapannya dalam putusan hakim. Selain itu, analisis kedua adalah

mengenai penerapan pertanggungjawaban terhadap perusahaan transnasional,

mengingat ketiga perkara ini mengalami hambatan yurisdiksi yang serupa, serta

mewakili kesulitan yang dihadapi dalam litigasi transnasional terhadap

perusahaan transnasional.

4.1. Aguinda v. Texaco

Perkara ini merupakan kasus pencemaran lingkungan hidup dan

pelanggaran hak asasi manusia oleh sebuah perusahaan transnasional berbasis

Amerika, yaitu Texaco296

, yang dilakukan di wilayah Oriente di hutan hujan tropis

296

Pada tahun 1964, pemerintah Ekuador mengundang Texaco dan Gulf Oil Corporation

(selanjutnya disebut Gulf Oil) untuk mengeksplorasi minyak di wilayah Amazon , yaitu Oriente.

Texaco dan Gulf Oil membentuk sebuah konsorsium dengan saham yang sama (50%), dengan

jangka waktu perjanjian 28 tahun, dan mulai mengebor minyak di hutan hujan Amazon. Tahun

1972, jalur-jalur pipa TransEcuadorian telah selesai dibangun dan sejumlah besar minyak Texaco,


90


Amazon dalam teritorial Ekuador. Pencemaran besar-besaran terjadi semasa

operasi Texaco di Ekuador, didalilkan karena tidak diadopsinya ukuran-ukuran

praktik terbaik yang layak untuk mengekstraksi minyak bumi sebanyak-

banyaknya dengan ongkos minimal. Minyak bumi sempat menjadi garis utama

dari ekonomi Ekuador pada 1970-1980an, bahkan menjadi sumber utama

pendapatan pemerintah.297

Konsekuensinya, Texaco memiliki posisi tawar yang

sangat kuat terhadap pemerintah Ekuador.

Perkembangan besar dari industri minyak bumi juga bukan tanpa ongkos

lingkungan dan kemanusiaan, yang telah menjadi dasar dari gugatan ini. Perkiraan

tumpahan minyak 16,8 juta galon minyak mentah yang tertuang ke dalam sungai

Amazon.298

Terlebih lagi, hampir 30 miliar galon dari racun sampingan dari

ekstraksi minyak bumi dilepaskan ke lingkungan hidup.299

Ditambah lagi, pada

1987, sebuah gempa bumi dahsyat menghantam Ekuador dan secara serius

merusak jalur-jalur pipa TransEcuadorian, yang pada saat itu dikontrol

sepenuhnya oleh Petroecuador.300

Pada 1990, Texaco telah sepenuhnya

meninggalkan operasi minyak di Ekuador.

Kasus ini menjadi menarik karena terdapat perdebatan yang sangat

panjang dalam penentuan forum yang berwenang dalam mengadili perkara ini.

diesktraksikan dari Oriente. Tahun 1974, Petroecuador, perusahaan minyak milik negara,

mengakuisisi 25% saham dalam konsorsium tersebut. Pada 1976, Gulf Oil melepaskan

peranannya, dan Petroecuador mengambil alih sahamnya, memberikan negara saham sebesar

62,5% dalam konsorsium tersebut. Texaco And Ecuador: History Of Operations (terakhir diubah

pada 22 September, 1999). Sumber: http://www.texaco.com/shared/position/docs/history.html

297 Lisa Lambert, "At the Crossroads of Environmental and Human Rights Standards:

Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.", Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, Vol. 10, 1., (Fall, 2000), hlm.

109-132.

298 Judith Kimerling, "Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities: Environmental Protection

Law in Ecuador‟s Amazon Oil Fields", Journal of Law and Trade In Americas, Vol. 2., (1995),

hlm. 293, 315. Sebagai perbandingan, tumpahan Exxon-Valdez ialah 10,8 juta galon minyak

mentah di teluk Alaska.

299 The Center For Economic And Social Rights, Rights Violations In The Ecuadorian

Amazon: The Human Consequences Of Oil Development 23 (Mar. 1994).

Sumber:http://www.cesr.org.

300 Texaco, Texaco And Ecuador: Chronological Overview (diubah terakhir pada 1

Februari 1999), sumber: http://www.texaco.com/shared/position/docs/chron_overview.html. Pada

tahun 1986, Petroecuador mengambil alih 100% kepemilikan jalur pipa, sedangkan Texaco

mempertahankan 37,5% sahamnya dalam konsorsium.


91


Hal ini terkait pula dengan rumitnya sejarah politik Ekuador, yang pada awalnya

merupakan rezim junta militer perpanjangan AS301

dan kemudian ditumbangkan

oleh pemberontakan sehingga mempengaruhi stabilitas pemerintahan dan

berimbas pada layaknya badan peradilan. Perpindahan pengelolaan operasi

pertambangan di daerah Oriente ini juga menambah kompleksnya permasalahan

awal untuk menentukan pihak yang bertanggung jawab.

4.1.1. Posisi Kasus

Gugatan pertama masyarakat asli di Amazon melawan Texaco, yang kini

dikenal sebagai Chevron, dilakukan pada tahun 1993. Penghancuran lingkungan

yang didalilkan telah mempengaruhi kehidupan kira-kira dua puluh lima ribu

orang.302

Para korban dari pencemaran lingkungan tersebut mencari jalan lain

dalam gugatan perdata konsolidasi (consolidated lawsuit), Jota, et. al. dan

Aguinda, et. al. v. Texaco, yang diajukan berdasarkan Alien Tort Statute, 28

U.S.C § 1350.303

Gugatan ini dilakukan atas tindakan perusahaan tersebut ketika secara

eksklusif mengoperasikan ladang minyak di Amazon, Ekuador, pada tahun 1964

sampai dengan 1990. Dalam gugatan ini, didalilkan bahwa Texaco, dalam

operasinya di tahun tersebut, telah dengan sengaja membuang bergalon-galon sisa

racun ke hutan hujan untuk memotong biaya dan meninggalkan lebih dari 900 pit-

pit besar limbah tanpa garis pengaman yang membawa zat-zat racun ke dalam

tanah dan air tanah. Didalilkan delapan belas miliar galon minyak mentah dan

racun „produced water‟ telah secara sengaja ditumpahkan oleh Texaco ke dalam

pit-pit yang tak dibatasi, dan sering kali secara sengaja didesain untuk mengalir ke

dalam arus yang disekitarnya dan sungai-sungai yang digunakan untuk mandi,

mencuci, dan minum.304

Secara bersamaan, Texaco melepaskan pula „jumlah yang

301

John D. Martz, 'Ecuador: The Fragility of Dependent Democracy', in Latin American

Politics And Development, hlm. 378, 389 (Howard J. Wiarda & Harvey F. Kline eds., 3d ed.

1990).

302 Earth Rights International, Amicus Briefs in Chevron/Ecuador Litigation. Sumber:

http://www.earthrights.org/publication/amicus-briefs-chevron-ecuador-litigation

303 Ibid.

304 Lago Ario Legal Team, Amazon Def. Coal., Rainforest Catasthrope: Chevron‟s Fraud

and Deceit in Ecuador 4 (2006), sumber http://www.texacotoxico.org/docs/PDF%20Files/


http://www.texacotoxico.org/docs/PDF%20Files/%20rainforest_catastrophe.pdf

92


ekuivalen dengan 332 juta galon‟ minyak mentah ke dalam hutan Amazon

Ekuador.305

Selain itu, pipa-pipa yang pecah mengeluarkan jutaan galon

petroleum ke dalam hutan hujan, dan horizontal flares melepaskan berton-ton

hidrokarbon ke atmosfer.306

Gugatan tersebut juga mendalilkan bahwa kontaminasi yang terjadi

meracuni area seukuran Rhode Island, menghasilkan epidemi kanker, kecacatan

genetis, dan keguguran spontan pada kandungan;307

serta membinasakan orang-

orang pribumi, di mana sebuah komunitas pribumi, suku Tetetes, menghilang

sepenuhnya dan lainnya, seperti suku Cofanes, mengalami tekanan hingga hampir

hilang sepenuhnya.308

Limbah yang dihasilkan tersebut mencemari air yang

digunakan oleh masyarakat untuk mandi, menangkap ikan, minum dan memasak,

dan menyebarkan limbah tersebut ke jalan-jalan lokal. Selain itu, penggugat juga

mendalilkan bahwa tindakan Texaco telah memiliki dampak menghancurkan

dalam kemampuan mereka untuk menjaga budaya tradisional mereka.309

Beberapa

studi memperkirakan bahwa lebih dari 83% dari penduduk hutan hujan tersebut

mengalami penyakit terkait kontaminasi yang terjadi.310

Kerugian yang terjadi

rainforest_catastrophe.pdf, yang menyatakan bahwa Chevron telah mengakui mengeluarkan

sekitar [delapan belas setengah] miliar galon racun „water of formation‟ di Ekuador. Sekitar 2%

dari water of formation ialah minyak mentah murni; Lihat juga Judith Kimerling, „Indigenous

Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, Chevron Texaco, and Aguinda v.

Texaco‟, New York University Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 38, (2006), hlm. 452,

menjelaskan bahwa produced water ialah „noxious brew of crude oil, formation water, and

chemicals that have been injected down a well or used in the separation process ... Because of

this, most produced water in U.S. oil fields is re-injected underground‟

305 Lago Ario Legal Team, Rainforest Catasthrope..., hlm. 4, 8-11, dan 16.

306 Ibid., hlm. 4-11

307 Ibid., hlm. 4, 13-15 (dengan mengutip berbagai studi epidemiologi); Lihat juga Amazon

Watch, Chevron‟s “Rainforest Chernobyl” in Ecuador, (2005), sumber:

http://www.adventureecology.com/ecuador/chevron.pdf

308 Steven Donziger, Laura Garr, dan Aaron Marr Page, "Rainforest Chernobyl Revisited:

The Clash of Human Rights and BIT Investor Claims: Chevron's Abusive Litigation in Ecuador's

Amazon", sumber: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r24170.pdf

309 Earth Rights International, Amicus Briefs...

310 Aaron Page, Amazon Defense Coalition, Genocide in the Rainforest: Legal Analysis, the

Environment and Cultural Destruction of Chevron in Ecuador as Acts of Genocide and Crimes

Against Humanity Prohibited Under International Criminal Law (2006), Sumber:

http://www.texacotoxico.org/eng/node/58.


93


diperkirakan berkisar antara 6 miliar USD hingga 27 USD, dan pemulihan

diperkirakan dapat mencapai berpuluh-puluh tahun.311

Sebuah studi pada tahun 1993 menemukan bahwa penduduk Oriente

terpapar pada kontaminan terkait minyak yang levelnya melebihi standar

internasional.312

Studi ini juga mengungkapkan bahwa mereka menderita penyakit

kulit dalam tingkatan yang tinggi. Studi ini menunjukkan pula bahwa temuan

tersebut menunjuk pada meningkatnya resiko penyakit yang lebih serius semisal

permasalahan reproduksi dan neurologis, begitu pula kanker. Sebuah studi lain

yang tidak dipublikasikan dalam tingkatan awal menyatakan bahwa tingkatan

kanker di Oriente adalah 2,3 kali lebih tinggi dibandingkan penduduk dari ibukota

Ekuador, Quito.313

Didalilkan pula bahwa kebijakan-kebijakan perusahaan terkait tindakan

perusahaan di Ekuador diambil di Amerika Serikat oleh para pejabat tinggi

Texaco, dan atas hal tersebut meminta pembersihan yang komprehensif atas

kerugian yang ditimbulkan. Sejak November 1993 hingga tahun 2000 di

pengadilan Distrik Selatan New York (Southern District of New York), para

penggugat class action, Aguinda et.al., telah menghabiskan tujuh tahun litigasi

pra-sidang dan belum melewati perintah yang mengizinkan untuk penemuan

terbatas.314

Tahun-tahun telah dihabiskan menangkis mosi untuk menghentikan

(motion of dismiss) dari Texaco dengan tiga premis dasar: forum non-conveniens,

komitas internasional (international comity), dan kegagalan untuk bergabung

311

Richard Stalin Cabrera Vega, Technical Summary Report 6, (2008), sumber:

http://www.texacotoxico.org/docs/Cabrera%20Summary%20Report%20English%20final[1].pdf;

“Chevron US$ 27 Billion Liability in Ecuador‟s Amazon Confirmed by Team of Independent

Scientist, Amazon Def. Coal., (1 Desember 2008)

312 Ibid., hlm. 20.

313 Eyal Press, “Texaco on Trial”, The Nation, 31 Mei, 1999, ¶ 6 sumber:

http://www.thenation.com/issue/990531/0531press.shtml. Interview terhadap Dr. Miguel San

Sebastian, yang menganalisa pola kesehatan di area Oriente yang terkena dampak produksi

minyak. Hasil awal juga menunjuk pada para lelaki Oriente yang menderita kanker larynx 30x

lebih tinggi, dan kanker perut lima kali lebih tinggi, dibandingkan para laki-laki dengan umur yang

sebanding di Quito, Ekuador.

314 1994 WL 142006. Merupakan memorandum pertama yang tidak dilaporkan dan

diijinkan untuk penemuan terbatas, par. 1.


http://www.texacotoxico.org/docs/Cabrera%20Summary%20Report%20English%20final%5b1%5d.pdf

94


dengan pihak yang tidak terdispensasikan (failure to join the indespensable

party).315

4.1.2. Yurisdiksi dan Pertanggungjawaban Perusahaan Transnasional

Gugatan ini diajukan berdasarkan Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C § 1350.316

Provisi tersebut berbunyi sebagai berikut,

“Pengadilan Distrik harus memiliki yurisdiksi asli terhadap tindakan

perdata apapun oleh orang asing hanya untuk perbuatan melawan

hukum, dilakukan dengan melanggar hukum bangsa-bangsa atau

perjanjian internasional dari Amerika Serikat”

Sebagaimana dijelaskan pada bab sebelumnya, ATCA menganugerahkan

“yurisdiksi asli” bagi pengadilan-pengadilan federal Amerika Serikat. Dapat

diterima secara umum bahwa pemberian akses secara nyata oleh ATCA bagi

pengadilan-pengadilan tersebut berfungsi sebagai pelepasan syarat jumlah

moneter minimum ganti rugi untuk perbedaan yurisdiksi.317

Lebih jauh lagi,

yurisdiksi diberikan atas dasar hukum internasional, dan dengan demikian

permasalahan-permasalahan seputar persyaratan federal tidak perlu dibahas.318

Penggugat dalam klaim ATCA haruslah seorang asing, dengan kata lain bukan

warga negara Amerika Serikat. Pengadilan menerima pula bahwa Tergugat tidak

harus merupakan penduduk Amerika Serikat. Tergugat, bagaimanapun, harus

tunduk dalam pelayanan sistem Pengadilan Amerika Serikat. Untuk

mempertahankan yurisdiksi setelah pelayanan proses, Tergugat asing harus

memiliki hubungan yang cukup dengan negara forum.319

Tidak ada seperangkat

315

Lisa Lambert, “At the Crossroads of Environmental...”, hlm. 114.

316 Ibid. Teks aslinya berbunyi “The District Court shall have original jurisdiction of any

civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of

the United States”

317 Lihat: Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524

(1996); see also Jama v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353,

363 (D.N.J. 1998)

318 Lihat: Ibid., serta Lihat juga Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp, 405 U.S. 538, 546-547

(1972), reh‟g denied 406 U.S. 911 (1972)

319 Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Artikel 12 huruf (b) angka (2). Artikel ini menunjuk

pada apakah Pengadilan dapat menerapkan yurisdiksi personal terhadap Penggugat. Lihat (secara

umum): World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)


95


aturan rigid yang ada untuk menentukan apakah Pengadilan dapat memberlakukan

yurisdiksi terhadap Penggugat asing; Pengadilan memberlakukan diskresi dalam

dasar kasus per kasus. Bagaimanapun, beberapa garis-garis haluan umum meliputi

apakah Penggugat melakukan bisnis di negara forum, telah dinyatakan menyetujui

yurisdiksi, atau telah mengunjungi negara forum tersebut.320

Pada 1994, hakim pertama, Vincent L. Broderick, menolak motion to

dismiss Texaco dan mengijinkan limited discovery untuk diproses.321

Hakim

Broderick beralasan bahwa temuan-temuan (discovery) merupakan hal yang

penting untuk menentukan validitas dari klaim penggugat bahwa markas besar

Texaco memiliki otoritas akhir terkait segala pembuatan keputusan dalam proyek

Ekuador.322

Lebih jauh lagi, memorandum hakim menegaskan bahwa ketiadaan

perjanjian mengikat oleh Texaco untuk menerima yurisdiksi di Ekuador, berakibat

tidak akan ada pula determinasi terkait penolakan yang akan dibuat.323

Bagaimanapun, determinasi final mensyaratkan adanya informasi lengkap tentang

hubungan antara kejadian di Amerika Serikat dan di Ekuador.324

Menarik dari putusan Hakim Broderick, bahwa beliau mencatat

kegagalan Penggugat untuk mendalilkan perjanjian internasional tertentu bagi

klaim ATCA mereka, dan kemudian merujuk kepada Universal Declaration of

320

Roger S. Haydock et. al., Fundamentals of Pretrial Litigation, (3rd Edition, 1994), hlm.

153.

321 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 WL 142006, pada *1 (Southern

District of New York, 11 Paril 1994), menyatakan “limiting discovery to (a) events relating to the

harm alleged by plaintiffs occuring in the United States ... and (b) events occuring outside the

United States to the extent the information can be furnished or secured voluntarily or thorugh

directives to parties in the United States to secure the information.

322 1994 WL 142006., par. 4

323 Ibid., par. 2.

324 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), pada *2, menyatakan bahwa

„Disputes over class membership, determination of individualized or common damages, and the

need for large amount of testimony with interpreters, perhaps often in local dialects, would make

effective adjudication in New York problematic at best‟.


96


Human Rights325

dan Rio Declaration on Environment and Development sebagai

yang paling relevan.326

Bertahun-tahun setelahnya, perkara ini menjalani periode temuan

substansial (substantial discovery). Penggugat memperoleh berbagai respon atas

“tidak kurang dari [delapan puluh satu] permohonan dokumen dan 143

pemeriksaan” dan membuat banyak pernyataan.327

Lalu, pada Maret 1995, Hakim

Broderick meninggal. Hakim Rakoff mengasumsikan adanya yurisdiksi pada

permasalahan tersebut dan mengambil sikap yang jauh lebih keras terhadap klaim

penggugat. Ia membenarkan motion to dismiss tergugat yang diperbaharui atas

dasar forum non-convenience, komitas internasional (international comity), dan

kegagalan untuk membawa serta pihak yang tidak terpisahkan (failure to join an

indispensible parties (PetroEcuador dan Republik Ekuador).328

Bagaimanapun,

Pengadilan menganalisis sebuah dasar independen bagi penolakan (dismissal),

yaitu kegagalan untuk menggabungkan Ekuador dan Petroekuador sebagai pihak

yang tidak terpisahkan.329

Para pihak ini penting adanya untuk memberikan

bantuan penuh bagi Penggugat, namun sekaligus tunduk kepada Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act (selanjutnya disebut “FSIA”) dan tidak dapat dituntut

di forum Amerika Serikat.330

Karena imunitasnya, Pengadilan memutuskan

penolakan dari tindakan secara keseluruhan adalah pantas.

Setelah penolakan (dismissal) tersebut, Ekuador dan Petroecuador

mengajukan mosi untuk turut serta (motions to intervene) dalam tindakan hukum

325

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Resolution 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810

at 71, Artikel 3 (1948)

326 Lihat: Aguinda, 1994 WL 142006, pada *6-7

327 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538 (Southern District of New York,

2001), affirmed, 303 F.3d, 470 (2d Cir. 2002)

328 Pada saat itu, baik PetroEcuador maupun Republik Ekuador tidak telah melepaskan

kekebalan kedaulatan (sovereign immunity) yang dimilikinya (walaupun Republik Ekuador

kemudian memasukkan petisi untuk turut serta untuk dan atas nama penggugat Aguinda). Lihat:

Jota v. Texaco, 157 F. 3d 153, 157-158, (1998). Hakim Rakoff berpendapat bahwa, sebagai

hasilnya, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) membatalkan yurisdiksinya terhadap kedua

pihak.

329 Lihat: Aguinda v. Tecaco, Inc. 945 F. Supp. 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

330 Lihat: Aguinda, 945 F. Supp. *628


97


tersebut, menyatakan mendukung litigasi Penggugat di Amerika Serikat.331

Namun, mosi ini ditolak oleh Pengadilan, dengan mempertimbangkan bahwa

perubahan sikap ini dikarenakan perubahan kepemimpinan politik serta kurangnya

ketegasan pelepasan imunitas. Ekuador sebelumnya telah berulang kali

menyatakan bahwa Pengadilan harus menolak tindakan hukum ini dengan alasan

doktrin komitas (comity).332

Lebih jauh, Pengadilan menganggap bahwa Ekuador

tidak memiliki kepentingan hukum yang menjamin intervensi karena Ekuador

telah membuat sebuah kesepakatan formal dengan Texaco, melepaskan korporasi

tersebut dari tanggung jawab hukum di masa yang akan datang.333

Menginjak tahun kelima litigasi, penolakan dikosongkan dan diserahkan

dalam tahap banding (appeal).334

Pengadilan menyatakan bahwa penemuan yang

berpihak pada doktrin forum non conveniens adalah keliru karena Texaco tidak

disyaratkan untuk mengajukan kepada yurisdiksi dari pengadilan Ekuador. Isu

lain, yaitu mengenai penggabungan, tidak dinyatakan disyaratkan dan tidak pula

diakui dalam penolakan, “sederhana karena para pihak tidak dapat

digabungkan.”335

Pengadilan memutuskan bahwa Ekuador bukanlah pihak yang

tidak terpisahkan untuk segala klaim kelegaan (claim of relief); sehingga, litigasi

dapat diteruskan tanpa bergabungnya Ekuador. Bagaimanapun, kesempatan bagi

Ekuador untuk mengubah mosi intervensinya dengan pelepasan imunitasnya telah

dicoret dari daftar.

331

Lihat: Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. 175 F.R.D. 50, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)

332 Ibid.

333 Terdapat perjanjian dan rilis antara Ekuador dan Texaco, yang diunduh dari

http:///www.texaco.com/shared/position/docs/legal.html, diakses pada Selasa, 7 Februari 2012

334 Lihat: Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2nd Circuit, 1998), vacating, Aguinda v.

Texaco, Inc. 945 F. Supp 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Pada tahun 1994, sebuah kasus yang seiring, Jota

v. Texaco, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 9266 (JSR), diajukan. Penggugat dalam Jota merupakan sebuah kelas

masyarakat pribumi Peru yang bertempat tinggal di hutan hujan, mendalilkan pencemaran

lingkungan dan kesehatan sebagai hasil dari racun yang mengalir ke Peru melalui saluran air

Amazon. Penggugat Jota dan Aguinda kemudian mengajukan banding kepada Second Circuit

secara bersama-sama, mengingat klaim keduanya ditolak dengan dasar yang sama.

335 Ibid.


http://www.texaco.com/shared/position/docs/legal.html

98


Penggugat Aguinda mempertahankan kemenangan dalam tahap banding.

Kini, dalam pengadilan selanjutnya, Texaco menyetujui yurisdiksi di Ekuador,336

dan memperbaharui motion to dismiss terkait forum dan komitas.337

Pengadilan

menyatakan bahwa Ekuador mungkin merupakan forum yang pantas, tetapi

mengecualikan putusan terkait permasalahan penolakan. Sebaliknya, Pengadilan

mengeluarkan perintah bagi semua pihak untuk memberikan penerangan ringkas

mengenai apakah Ekuador dapat menyediakan forum yang cukup, dengan

setidaknya sebuah “sedikit keadilan mendasar bagi para pihak yang berperkara”,

mengingat kudeta yang baru terjadi pada tahun 2000.338

Pada tahun 2001, Pengadilan Amerika Serikat mengabulkan motion to

dismiss Texaco yang diperbaharui terhadap gugatan ini dengan dasar forum non

conveniens. Pengadilan memberikan analisis detail mengenai apakah Ekuador

merupakan forum alternatif yang memadai, salah satu persyaratan untuk

suksesnya sebuah motion to dismiss berdasarkan forum non conveniens.

Pengadilan melihat adanya bahaya korupsi dalam sistem peradilan Ekuador,

namun menemukan bahwa “pengadilan Ekuador bisa menjalankan yurisdiksinya,

dengan mempertimbangkan para pihak dan klaim yang disajikan dalam

pengadilan ini sedikitnya memenuhi independensi dan imparsialitas yang

diperlukan untuk sebuah forum alternatif yang memadai”

Pada 2002, The Second Circuit menguatkan penolakan District Court

dengan dasar forum non conveniens, menyatakan bahwa Ekuador merupakan

forum yang cocok bagi kedua Penggugat dari Peru maupun Ekuador. Menanggapi

argumen dari Penggugat Aguinda yang dinyatakan berkali-kali bahwa Pengadilan

Ekuador memiliki tendensi korupsi dan keberpihakan, Second Circuit

menyimpulkan bahwa penemuan oleh District Court bukanlah merupakan

penyalahgunaan diskresi. Hakim Rakoff sekali lagi menolak kasus tersebut,

336

Terkait dengan perkara Jota v. Texaco, Texaco juga menyetujui yurisdiksi di Peru. Lih:

Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 2000 U.S. District, Lexis Nexis 745, pada *4 (S.D.N.Y. 31 Januari 2000)

337 Ibid.

338 Pada 21 Januari 2000, kekuatan militer melengserkan Presiden Jamil Mahuad. Hakim

Rakoff, yang mengadili perkara ini, mencari tahu mengenai lembaga yudisial Ekuador terkait

dengan hal ini melalui State Department‟s Country Report. Lih antara lain: Ecuador Coup Shifts

Control to No. 2 Man, New York Times, 23 Januari 2000, hlm. 1.


99


menyatakan bahwa kasus tersebut “segalanya terkait dengan Ekuador dan tidak

ada kaitannya dengan Amerika Serikat”.339

Kali ini, Second Circuit menegaskan

perintahnya, tetapi memberikan Penggugat waktu tambahan untuk mengumpulkan

tanda tangan dari penduduk Amazon yang terkena dampak, karena, kontras

dengan sistem Amerika Serikat, tidak ada mekanisme “opt-out” di Ekuador untuk

gugatan class action.340

Ketika perkara Aguinda masih menunggu di New York, Texaco

melakukan negosiasi dengan pemerintah Ekuador untuk membentuk sebuah

perjanjian yang akan melepaskannya dari pertanggungjawaban hukum.


Hakim

Penggugat mendalilkan bahwa Texaco telah gagal untuk menerapkan

“standar yang layak dalam ekstraksi minyak, atau memenuhi ... standar

internasional yang diterima terkait keamanan dan perlindungan lingkungan ...

semata-mata demi keuntungan ekonominya”.341

Secara signifikan, Penggugat

menunjuk Konvensi Keanekaragaman Hayati (Biodiversity Convention atau

CBD)342

, Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species

(CITES)343

, Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage344

, Deklarasi

Rio dan Deklarasi Stockholm345

, UN Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational

339

Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d pada *537 dan 550.

340 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. 303 F. 3d pada bagian *470, 478-479 (2nd Circuit, 2002)

341 Brief for Plaintiff, Aguinda v. Texavo, Inc., 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), No. 93-

7527), 27.

342 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 Juni 1992)

343 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

(Washington, 3 Maret 1973)

344 Brussels International Conbention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels,

29 Nobember 1969)

345 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (16 Juni

1972) UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (13 Juni

1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1


100


Corporations346

, dan UN Draft Declaration on Principles on Human Rights and

the Environment.347

Penggugat mendalilkan bahwa terdapat „kepentingan yang

bersifat umum dan universal dari setiap bangsa dan setiap orang‟ di mana dalam

hal kelalaian, dan bahwa „dengan menambahkan lebih banyak pencemaran

dibandingkan yang sebelumnya tidak terelakkan, setiap perusahaan yang

melakukan eksplorasi melakukan perbuatan melawan hukum dalam proporsi

internasional‟.348

Akhirnya, Penggugat mendalilkan bahwa keputusan Texaco

terkait eksploitasi minyak dan pembuangan limbah di Ekuador diambil di tempat

kedudukan pusat di New York.349

Dalam fase awal litigasi, Pengadilan menyatakan bahwa Penggugat dapat

memiliki sebuah sebab tindak (cause of action) terkait larangan internasional

dalam hal menyebabkan pencemaran lingkungan lintas batas negara

(transboundary environmental harm), sebagaimana terdapat dalam Prinsip 2

Deklarasi Rio:

“Negara memiliki, sesuai dengan Piagam Persekutuan Bangsa-Bangsa

dan prinsip-prinsip hukum internasional, hak berdaulat untuk

mengeksploitasi sumber dayanya sendiri menurut kebijakan

lingkungan dan pembangunannya sendiri, dan kewajiban untuk

memastikan bahwa aktivitas dalam yurisdiksi atau kontrolnya tidak

menyebabkan kerugian terhadap lingkungan Negara lain di luar batas-

batas nasionalnya”350

Pengadilan menyatakan bahwa „Deklarasi Rio mungkin menerangkan mengenai

apa yang diperlakukan sebagai prinsip-prinsip yang telah ada sebelumnya (pre-

existing) sebagaimana dalam Deklarasi Kemerdekaan (Declaration of

346

United Nations Centre of Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), „Proposed Text of the

Draft Code of Conduct of Transnational Corporations‟ (12 Juni 1990), UN Doc E/1990/94

347 UNCHR Sub-Commission on the Prevention and Discrimination of Minorities, „Draft

Principles on Human Rights and the Environment‟ (6 Juli 1994) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9,

Annex I.

348 Brief for Plaintiff, op. cit. 27-38.

349 J. A. Cohan, „Environmental Rights of Indigenous Peoples under the Alien Tort Claims

Act, the Public Trust Doctrine and Corporate Ethics, and Environmental Dispute Resolution

(2001-2002) 20, UCLA Journal of Enbironmental Law and Policy, hlm. 133, 161.

350 Rio Declaration of Evironment and Development, … Prinsip 2.


101


Independence)‟.351

Selanjutnya, dinyatakan bahwa pada prinsipnya hukum

internasional mengakui perbuatan melawan hukum dalam hal lingkungan hidup

hingga batas yang diperlukan untuk membicarakan permasalahan yurisdiksi di

bawah ATCA.352

Lebih jauh lagi, Penggugat diberikan pula right to discovery

dalam rangka membuktikan dampak menyeluruh bagi dunia dari akibat pada

hutan hujan tropis dalam setiap dugaan perilaku perusahaan yang mungkin telah

dilakukan di Amerika Serikat.353

Keputusan ini tampaknya telah memajukan

sebuah standar baru untuk litigasi ATCA yang melibatkan pencemaran

lingkungan hidup dengan besaran degradasi akan memberikan alasan adanya

pelanggaran hukum kebiasaan internasional.354

Dalam fase litigasi yang lebih

jauh, bagaimanapun, keputusan yang diberikan selanjutnya menolak perkara

dengan dasar forum non-conveniens, dengan menyatakan bahwa:

“Pandangan Penggugat yang imajinatif mengenai kekuasaan

Pengadilan ini harus menghadapi kenyataan bahwa pengadilan

distrik Amerika Serikat merupakan pengadilan dengan yurisdiksi

yang terbatas. Ketika kekuasaan dalam batasan ini substansial, hal

tersebut tidak mencakup tuntutan umum untuk berhak mengadili

kesalahan dunia”.355

Setelah hampir sepuluh tahun dihabiskan dalam pembahasan forum non-

convenience, pengadilan memberikan yurisdiksi bagi pengadilan Ekuador

terhadap Texaco, dengan ketentuan bahwa putusan pengadilan Ekuador akan

dapat dilaksanakan (enforceable) terhadap aset-aset Texaco di Amerika Serikat

melalui District Court of New York, di mana perkara ini diajukan pertama kali.

Pada Juli 2008, perkara ini tertunda di Pengadilan Tinggi Sucumbios di Ekuador.

351

Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ 7527 (VLB), 1994 U.S. Dist. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994),

hlm. 22-23.

352 J.A. Cohan, „Environmental Rights of Indifenous Peoples...‟, hlm. 162.

353 Aguinda v. Texaco, 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)

354 Saman Zia-Zarifi, Liability of Multinational Corporations Under International Law,

(The Hague: Kluwer, 2000), hlm. 118.

355 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supat 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) dalam teks aslinya

“Plaintiff‟s imaginative view of this Court‟s power must face the reality that United States district

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. While their power within those limits is substantial, it

does not include a general writ to right the world‟s wrongs”


102


Pada akhirnya, putusan dari Pengadilan Amerika Serikat tidak kembali pada

pertanyaan mengenai keberlakuan langsung dari hukum lingkungan internasional

terhadap perusahaan transnasional, tetapi setidaknya menyediakan sebuah dasar

bagi adanya kerjasama antar-negara dalam hal badan peradilan, sehingga putusan

positif oleh pengadilan Ekuador dapat mungkin dilaksanakan di Amerika Serikat

terhadap induk perusahaan.356

Operasi Texaco di Amazon Ekuador melanggar berbagai macam hak

asasi manusia, yang paling jelas ialah pelanggaran hak atas kesehatan dan hak

untuk menikmati lingkungan hidup yang sehat. Selain itu, Texaco melanggar hak

atas air, hak atas makanan, dan berbagai hak-hak masyarakat pribumi termasuk

pula hak atas tanah, hak-hak budaya, dan hak konsultasi.357

4.2. Lubbe v. Cape PLC

Lubbe v. Cape PLC merupakan kasus pencemaran lingkungan yang

melibatkan ribuan mantan pekerja Cape PLC di Afrika Selatan yang menderita

penyakit terkait paparan asbestos. Cape PLC sendiri sebenarnya telah tidak

memiliki keberadaan di Afrika Selatan sejak 1989. Anak perusahaan di Afrika

Selatan tidak lagi memiliki harta kekayaan yang cukup untuk melakukan ganti

rugi ataupun pemulihan bagi para korban, dan Cape PLC, induk perusahaannya,

tidak lagi memiliki aset di Afrika Selatan. Cape PLC merupakan sebuah

perusahaan transnasional yang berasal dari Inggris, yang didirikan pada tahun

1893 dengan Cape Asbestos Company Limited sebagai perusahaan induk.

Berdasarkan laporan "Diamond Jubilee" tahun 1953 dari Cape PLC sendiri,

dinyatakan bahwa Cape dibuat untuk menambang simpanan asbestos di Afrika

Selatan dan sebuah pabrik di Italia untuk memproduksi produk-produk terkait

asbestor dari tambang Asbestos di Afrika Selatan.358

356

Elisa Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law, (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2009), hlm. 125-127.

357 Chris Jochnick dan Nita Rabaeus, "Business and Human Rights..., hlm. 25

358 Richard Meeran, "Cape PLC: South African Mineworkers Quests' for Justice",

International Journal Occup. Environmental Health, Vol. 9, (2003), hlm. 218-229.


103


Putusan Lubbe dari House of Lords merupakan salah satu landmark

judgment terkait permasalahan tanggung jawab perusahaan transnasional dalam

konteks pencemaran lingkungan dan hak asasi manusia. Pasca Lubbe, serta

didahului pula dengan putusan Connely v. RTZ Corp., sebagaimana dinyatakan

oleh Magaisa pada 2001, dapat dikatakan dengan cukup aman bahwa House of

Lords telah secara positif 'victim-friendly' atau memberikan putusan yang

memihak para korban.359

4.2.1. Posisi Kasus

Klaim diajukan di pengadilan Inggris oleh dua mantan pegawai Cape

PLC dan tiga penduduk yang tinggal di dekatnya yang terpapar asbestos, yang

berhasil mendapatkan bantuan hukum di United Kingdom, di antaranya ialah

Schalk Willem Burger Lubbe yang menggugat sebagai penerus dari isterinya,

Rachel Lubbe, yang telah meninggal. Pada 1999, klaim lebih jauh dilakukan oleh

lebih dari 1.500 penggugat. Dan ketika putusan diturunkan dari House of Lord

pada Juli 2000, lebih dari 3.000 orang merupakan bagian dari gugatan dan sekitar

100 diantaranya telah meninggal.

Sejak 1913, Cape telah melaksanakan penambangan crocidolite di Cape

Utara dan memiliki pabrik manufaktur di Barking, London. Operasi di Cape Utara

dilaksanakan secara langsung oleh Cape hingga 1948 dan setelahnya melalui

anak-anak perusahaan yang dimiliki sepenuhnya oleh Cape hingga 1979. Pada

tahun 1925, Cape mengakuisisi operasi pertambangan di Limpopo (dahulu

Transvaal), yang beroperasi juga melalui anak-anak perusahaan yang dimiliki oleh

Cape hingga 1979. Salah satu dari anak-anak perusahaan ini ialah "Egnep", dan

selain itu Cape juga mengoperasikan pabrik manufaktur di Turin, Italia, semenjak

1911 hingga 1968, dan juga di Benoni, Johannesburg, dari 1940 hingga sekitar

1986.360

Di Afrika Selatan sendiri, Cape terlibat dalam pertambangan crocidolite

dan amosit di provinsi Cape Utara dan Limpopo, sedari 1890 hingga 1979.

Koegas, salah satu tambangnya, merupakan tambang crocidolite terbesar di dunia.

359

Ibid., hlm. 374

360 Ibid.


104


Penge, tambang lainnya, merupakan tambang amosit terbesar di dunia. Penge

dinamakan berdasarkan nama Penge di Kent, Inggris, sebuah lokasi tambang

lainnya. Cape juga beroperasi dalam pertambangan crocidolite di Pomfret di

provinsi Cape Barat Laut. Terkait dengan tambang-tambang yang ada, terdapat

pula pabrik-pabrik pengolahan asbestos yang berperan dalam penhancuran batu

mentah asbestos untuk membuka dan mengekstrak serat-serat asbestos. Pabrik

yang paling terkenal terletak di Prieska (Cape Utara), yang berada di tengah kota

di samping sekolah Prieska. Pabrik tersebut berhenti beroperasi sekitar tahun

1964, namun bahaya lingkungan yang telah ditimbulkannya dalam bentuk

kontaminasi umum dan timbunan asbestos tetap ada.361

Selain tambang-tambang

besar tersebut, Cape memiliki pula banyak tambang-tambang kecil di daerah yang

sama. Cape menjual operasi-operasi tambangnya di Afrika Selatan pada 1979.

Tahun 1981, Gefco, anak perusahaan dari Gencor, perusahaan tambang Afrika

Selatan yang kaya, membeli operasi-operasi ini. Tambang Penge terus beroperasi

hingga 1986, di bawah Gefco/Gencor. Hingga 1979, Cape dan Gefco masih

merupakan produsen asbestos terbesar di Afrika Selatan.362

Pada bulan Juli 2000, sebuah landmark decision yang berpihak pada

penggugat, di mana seluruh hakim yang berjumlah lima orang dalam peradilan

tersebut, menyatakan bahwa kasus tersebut dapat diadili di Pengadilan Tinggi

(High Court) Inggris. Para hakim menerapkan prinsip yang telah dibangun

tepatnya tiga tahun sebelumnya dalam perkara Connelly v. RTZ, di mana

Pengadilan menyatakan bahwa perkara dengan magnitude sebesar ini

mensyaratkan kehadiran para ahli hukum dan para ahli terkait permasalahan

teknis dan medis, yang tidak ada satupun diantaranya dapat dibiayai di Afrika

Selatan.

4.2.2. Hak atas Lingkungan Hidup Dalam Dalil Gugatan dan Putusan

Hakim

Pusat dari kasus Cape PLC ialah pertanyaan 'apakah sebuah induk

perusahaan yang terbukti melakukan kontrol de fakto terhadap operasi dari anak

361

Ibid.

362 Ibid.


105


perusahaan (asing) miliknya dan yang mengetahui, melalui direkturnya, bahwa

operasi tersebut melibatkan resiko kesehatan dari pekerja yang dipekerjakan oleh

anak perusahaan dan/atau orang-orang di daerah sekitar pabrik atau bagunan-

bangunan bisnis lainnya, dan dengan demikian memiliki kewajiban kehati-hatian

(duty of care) bagi pekerja-pekerjanya atau orang-orang lain dalam hubungannya

dengan kontrol yang dilakukannya terhadap anak perusahaannya, serta saran yang

diberikan terhadapnya.363

House of Lords menyatakan bahwa gugatan tersebut harus diadili di

Inggris, karena 'penggugat tidak memiliki cara mendapatkan perwakilan

profesional dan kesaksian ahli' di Afrika Selatan. Pada Desember 2001, para

penggugat (lebih dari 7.500 orang pada saat itu) menyetujui sebuah kesepakatan

perdamaian dimana Cape PLC harus membayar £21 juta kepada sebuah dana

perwalian, tetapi perusahaan gagal untuk menghormati kesepakatan tersebut dan

tidak melakukan pembayaran. Litigasi lebih jauh dilakukan dan perusahaan

tambang Afrika Selatan, Gencor, ditambahkan sebagai tergugat bersama dengan

Cape (Gencor telah memperoleh aset yang sebelumnya dimiliki oleh Cape). Pada

kesepakatan baru di bulan Maret 2003, Cape dan Gencor sepakat untuk membayar

secara total £7,5 juta dan £3,21 juta masing-masing bagi 7.500 penggugat yang

terdaftar.364

Lord Bingham menyatakan hal berikut dalam putusannya,

“Isu dalam kasus ini terbagi dalam dua segmen. Segmen pertama

melihat pada pertanggungjawaban tergugat sebagai induk perusahaan

untuk memastikan pengawasan dari standar kesehatan dan keamanan

yang layak oleh anak perusahaannya yang terletak di luar negeri.

Pemecahan mengenai isu ini tampaknya akan meliputi penyelidikan

mengenai dalam bagian apa tergugat berperan dalam mengontrol operasi

dari grup, apa yang diketahui oleh direkturnya dan apa yang diketahui

oleh karyawannya, atau apa yang seharusnya diketahui, tindakan apa

yang diambil dan tidak diambil, apakah tergugat seharusnya melakukan

kehati-hatian terhadap tergugat dari perusahaan grup dan apakah, jika

memang iya, kewajiban tersebut telah dilanggar. Banyak alat bukti

materil terhadap pertanyaan ini akan, dalam cara yang biasa, bersifat

363

Ibid., hlm. 269.

364 Jedrzej George Frynas, "Social and Environmental Litigation Against Transnational

Firms in Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 42/III, (2004), hlm. 363-388


106


dokumenter dan banyak darinya akan ditemukan di kantor perusahaan

induk, termasuk berita acara rapat, laporan-laporan oleh direktur dan

karyawan terkait kunjungan ke luar negeri dan korespondensi.

Segmen kedua dari perkara ini meliputi permasalahan kerugian personal

(personal injury) yang relevan terhadap tiap individu: diagnosis,

prognosis, kausalitas (termasuk kontribusi yang dibuat terhadap sebuah

kondisi penggugat oleh kontaminasi yang bersumber dari manapun di

mana tergugat tidak bertanggungjawab) dan kerugian khusus. Investigasi

terkait permasalahan-permasalahan ini akan secara penting melibatkan

alat-alat bukti dan pemeriksanaan kesehatan dari tiap penggugat dan

sebuah penyelidikan terhadap kondisi di mana penggugat bekerja atau

hidup dan rentang waktu ketika ia melakukannya. Di mana klaim dibuat

untuk dan atas nama orang yang telah meninggal, penyelidikan yang

dilakukan pada dasarnya akan sama, walaupun mungkin lebih sulit.”365

Dapat dilihat dalam paparan di atas, bahwa klaim yang diajukan oleh masyarakat

yang dirugikan dan dilanggar hak asasi atas lingkungan hidupnya ialah dalam

bentuk klaim personal injury.

Klaim personal injury yang diajukan dalam perkara ini meliputi pula

klaim kematian, yang didalilkan diderita oleh para penggugat sebagai hasil dari

paparan asbestos dan produk sampingannya di Afrika Selatan.366

Dalam beberapa

hal, paparan ini disebutkan terjadi karena pekerjaan penggugat pada tambang

asbestos, dan dalam hal lainnya sebagai hasil dari tinggal di area yang

terkontaminasi.367

Dalam konteks hukum, klaim personal injury merupakan

sebuah jenis perbuatan melawan hukum atau kesalahan perdata dimana kerugian

disebabkan terhadap seseorang karena orang lainnya gagal melakukan prinsip

kehati-hatian (reasonable care).368

365

Lubbe And Others v. Cape Plc, House Of Lords, [2000] 4 All ER 268, [2000] 1 WLR

1545, [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 383

366 Lubbe and Others v. Cape PLC, House of Lords Judgment [2000] 4 All ER 268, [2000]

1 WLR 1545, [2000] 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 383, 20 Juli 2000

367 Ibid.

368 HG.org Legal Dictionary, Sumber: http://www.hg.org/torts.html. Lebih lanjut

dipaparkan bahwa “The law recognizes a tort as grounds (legal reasons) to sue the offender in

order to recover for losses caused by an injury or other type of harm, including psychological.

This is referred to as recovery for damages and may involve expected future losses in addition to

actual present losses. Some of the damages one may sue for are reasonable medical expenses,

property damages, pain and suffering, loss of earnings capacity, emotional distress, loss of


http://www.hg.org/torts.html

107


Dalam pertimbangannya, Hakim Bingham mengkonstruksikan dalil

gugatan yang diajukan oleh tergugat sebagai berikut:

“Klaim ini diajukan terhadap induk perusahaan, yang seharusnya

mengetahui bahwa paparan terhadap asbestos membahayakan

kesehatan dengan sangat serius, dan telah gagal untuk mengambil

langkah-langkah yang layak untuk memastikan bahwa penerapan

praktek kerja yang layak (proper working practices) haruslah diikuti

dan tindakan pencegahan keselamatan (proper safety precaution)

haruslah diawasi dalam grup pekerja. Dalam hal ini, didalilkan oleh

para penggugat bahwa Cape PLC melanggar prinsip kehati-hatian

(duty of care) yang seharusnya dilaksanakan atas mereka yang bekerja

pada anak perusahaannya, atau terhadap mereka yang tinggal di

wilayah operasinya,”369

Sejalan dengan klaim personal injury yang diajukan, dapat dilihat pula dalam

perkara ini bahwa dalam bentuk perbuatan melawan hukum yang didalilkan telah

terlanggar pula suatu hak asasi atas lingkungan hidup yang sehat. Paparan yang

terjadi di area kontaminasi mencerminkan adanya wilayah yang tercemar

asbestos, yang ditinggali oleh sekumpulan orang, sehingga menyebabkan orang-

orang yang tinggal di daerah tersebut terkena paparan asbestos.

4.3. Beanal v. Freeport McMoran di Indonesia

4.3.1. Posisi Kasus

Gugatan masyarakat pribumi Papua di Indonesia yang diajukan oleh Tom

Beanal bersama dengan suku Amunge terhadap Freeport McMoran, sebuah

perusahaan Delaware yang berpusat di New Orleans, Lousiana. Freeport

mengoperasikan tambang Grasberg, sebuah tambang pit terbuka penghasil emas,

tembaga, dan perak yang terletak di pegunungan Jayawijaya. Tambang ini

meliputi wilayah seluas lebih kurang 26.400 km2. Beanal adalah penduduk

Timika, Irian Jaya, Indonesia, yang juga merupakan pemimpin suku Amungme,

yang tergabung dalam Lembaga Adat Suki. Pada Agustus 1996, Beanal

memasukkan gugatan terhadap Freeport di pengadilan federal Eastern District of consortium or companionship, and legal costs and attorney fees. The main goal of tort law is to

make the injured party whole again and to discourage others from committing the same offense.”

369Lubbe and Others v. Cape PLC, …


108


Lousiana dengan dalil pelanggaran atas hukum internasional. Beanal

memohonkan yurisdiksinya berdasarkan (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1332, (2) the Alien Tort

Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and (3) the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.370

Secara spesifik, Beanal mendalilkan bahwa operasi pertambangan

Freeport telah menyebabkan bahaya dan kerugian terhadap lingkungan hidup dan

habitat suku Amungme. Freeport memohonkan pengadilan untuk menolak

gugatan Beanal atas dasar 'failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted' yang tercantum dalam Federal Rulings Civil Procedure artikel 12 (b) (6).

Pada April 1997, pengadilan distrik menolak klaim Beanal 'without prejudice' dan

dengan perintah untuk mengamandemen gugatan tersebut.371

Berdasarkan Rule 12 (e) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, pengadilan

distrik menginstruksikan Beanal untuk mengamandemen gugatannya untuk

mencantumkan secara lebih spesifik klaimnya mengenai genosida dan

pelanggaran HAM pribadi. Pada tahun 1997, pengadilan distrik menganugerahkan

motion to strike Freeport terhadap amandemen ke-2 dari gugatan Beanal, karena

Beanal secara tidak pantas telah berusaha untuk menambahkan pihak ketiga. Pada

saat pemeriksaan motion to strike, pengadilan sekali lagi menginstruksikan Beanal

untuk mencantumkan fakta-fakta yang cukup untuk mendukung dalil genosida

dan pelanggaran HAM pribadi (individual human rights violations). Pada Maret

1998, pengadilan distrik mengabulkan motion to strike Freeport terhadap

amandemen ketiga gugatan Beanal dan menolak gugatannya 'with prejudice'.

Selanjutnya Beanal mengajukan banding terhadap putusan pengadilan distrik,


Pengadilan

Gugatan Beanal mendalilkan tiga hal, yaitu bahwa Freeport telah

melakukan perbuatan melanggar hukum dalam hal lingkungan hidup

(environmental torts), pelanggaran hak asasi manusia (human rights abuse), dan

370

Tom Beanal, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Freeport-

McMoran, Inc., and Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold, Inc., No. 98-30235, U.S. Court of

Appeals, 5th Circuit, (29 November 1999)

371 Tom Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, Inc. and Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold, Inc.,

Civil Action no. 96-1474 Section "K", US District Court for the Eastern District of Lousiana, 969

F. Supp. 362; 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, (1997)


109


genosida budaya (cultural genocide).372

Dalam gugatannya, Beanal mendalilkan

bahwa terdapat 3 (tiga) prinsip hukum lingkungan internasional yang dilanggar

oleh Freeport McMoran, yaitu prinsip kehati-hatian (precautionary principle),

prinsip pencemar membayar (polluter pays principle), dan prinsip proksimitas

(proximity principle).373

Beanal menyatakan bahwa Freeport telah menyebabkan

perusakan yang luas (widespread), berjangka-panjang (long-term), dan kerusakan

yang sangat parah (extremely severe damage) terhadap lingkungan hidup tempat

tinggalnya. Kerusakan ini telah mengancam kehidupan dan kesehatan dari seluruh

sukunya melalui paparan bahan kimia beracun, pencemaran terhadap sumber air

dan sumber makanan satu-satunya bagi mereka, dan penghancuran tanah adat

mereka.374

Lebih detail, dalam amandemen ketiga gugatannya, Beanal mendalilkan

bahwa Freeport "menumpuk kira-kira 100.000 ton tailing per hari di Sungai

Aghwagaon, Otomona, dan Akjwa", dan bahwa tumpukan tailing tersebut telah:

"(1) mengalihkan aliran natural sungai tersebut; (2) menyebabkan sungai tidak

dapat digunakan untuk penggunaan tradisional, termasuk mandi dan minum; (3)

mempengaruhi jaringan tubuh dari kehidupan perairan di sungai tersebut; (4)

mengakibatkan meluapnya tailing yang menyebabkan kehancuran vegetasi hutan

hujan dataran rendah; dan (5) semakin meningkatkan kemungkinan banjir di masa

yang akan datang," Selain itu, Beanal mendalilkan pula bahwa Freeport "telah

atau akan mengakibatkan ... 3 miliar ton 'beban yang berlebih' untuk dibuang ke

Wanagon dan Cartenz" yang telah menyebabkan "kecenderungan resiko akan

tanah longsor besar-besaran" dan pengeringan batuan asam "yang menyebabkan

Danau Wanagon menjadi sebuah 'danau asam' dengan konsentrasi tembaga yang

sangat tinggi"375

372

Ibid.

373 Beanal c. Freeport McMorran, Inc., 969 F. Supat 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (No. 96 – 1474)

383-4.

374 Ibid.

375 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, 1998 WL 92246 (E.D. La. 1998) (dismissing third

amended complaint with prejudice).


110


Pengadilan menolak argumen-argumen tersebut, mengingat bahwa

prinsip-prinsip hukum lingkungan yang diajukan bukanlah merupakan bagian dari

hukum kebiasaan internasional, karena tidak terdapat „konsensus universal oleh

masyarakat internasional mengenai status mengikatnya‟. Terkait dengan hal

tersebut, Pengadilan menatakan bahwa kebijakan yang didalilkan yang dilakukan

oleh Freeport merupakan „kebijakan korporasi semata dan, bagaimanapun

merusaknya, bukan merupakan perbuatan melawan hukum yang melanggar

hukum bangsa-bangsa‟. Prinsip-prinsip tersebut didasarkan pada sebuah buku teks

akademik semata, yaitu edisi pertama dari Principles of International

Environmental Law (1995) yang ditulis oleh Phillipe Sands. Selain itu, putusan

Hakim menyatakan bahwa sekalipun prinsip-prinsip tersebut merupakan hukum

kebiasaan internasional, prinsip-prinsip tersebut tidaklah dapat diaplikasikan

terhadap aktor privat, melainkan hanyalah terhadap negara.376

Pengadilan

meluaskan putusannya dalam proses banding, dengan menyatakan:

“Prinsip-prinsip tersebut hanyalah menunjuk pada pemikiran umum

terkait pertanggungjawaban lingkungan dan menyatakan hak-hak dan

kebebasan secara abstrak tanpa standar yang dapat diartikulasikan atau

dipahami dan regulasi untuk mengidentifikasi praktek-praktek yang

merupakan pelanggaran atau perbuatan melawan hukum lingkungan

internasional (...)

“Pengadilan Federal harus sangat berhati-hati ketika mengadili klaim

lingkungan hidup dalam kerangka hukum internasional untuk

memastikan bahwa kebijakan lingkungan hidup Amerika Serikat tidak

menggantikan kebijakan lingkungan hidup dari pemerintahan lain.

Lebih jauh lagi, argumen untuk tidak turut serta melakukan intervensi

dalam praktek-praktek lingkungan hidup sebuah negara merdeka

merupakan suatu kekuatan yang persuasif terutama ketika

penyalahgunaan dan perbuatan melawan hukum lingkungan yang

didalilkan terjadi dalam batas-batas negara merdeka dan tidak

berdampak pada negara tetangganya.”377

376

Zia-Zarifi, Liability of Multinational ..., hlm. 115-116.

377 Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166-67 (5th Circuit 1999), par. 167. R.

Unger, „Brandishing the Precautionary Principle through the Alien Tort Claims Act‟, New York

University School of Law Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 9 (2001), hlm. 638, 646


111


Kutipan di atas sekali lagi melambangkan „pandangan restriktif terhadap hukum

lingkungan internasional‟ di bawah ATCA. Sebagaimana pernyataan di atas tidak

didiskusikan lebih jauh atau diperkuat oleh kutipan apapun selain yurisprudensi

sebelumnya dalam Amlon Metals dan Aguinda v. Texaco, bagian dari doktrin

Amerika tidak mempertimbangan putusan ini sebagai preseden yang valid.378

Sayangnya, putusan-putusan terkait ATCA setelah putusan ini menunjuk secara

tegas terhadap hasil penyelidikan dalam Beanal v. Freeport McMoran untuk

menolak perkara-perkara lingkungan hidup lainnya.379

Salah satu dokumen yang dapat ditinjau terkait dengan dalil

'environmental tort' ini adalah Amici Curiae dari Sierra Club (SC) dan Earthrights

International (ERI). Dalam dokumen ini, SC dan ERI mencoba membahas

mengenai cukupnya klaim lingkungan. Didalilkan di dalamnya bahwa:

“Hukum internasional mengakui sebuah hak atas lingkungan hidup

yang sehat, yang mana didukung oleh hak atas hidup dan hak atas

kesehatan yang telah diakui secara internasional. Hukum internasional

menyatakan dengan jelas bahwa pembuangan secara masif bahan

beracun dan berbahaya ke lingkungan hidup melanggar hak-hak ini”

“Sekalipun dalam keadaan perang, hak terhadap lingkungan hidup

yang sehat melarang disebabkannya kerugian yang berjangka panjang,

berakibat luas dan buruk (long-term, widespread, and severe harm)

terhadap lingkungan hidup. Standar minimum ini memberikan kriteria

yang cukup bagi Pengadilan untuk dapat memastikan apakah Freeport

telah melanggar hak pembanding atas lingkungan hidup yang sehat.

Hak ini bersifat memaksa, diterima secara universal dan terdefinisikan,

dan dengan demikian dapat dilaksanakan di bawah ATCA (obligatory,

universally accepted and definable, and is therefore actionable under

ATCA)”380

Beanal mendalilkan bahwa Pengadilan memiliki yurisdiksi terhadap

perkara ini berdasarkan keragaman yurisdiksi (diversity jurisdiction), berdasarkan

378

Zia-Zarifi, Liability of Multinationals..., hlm. 117

379 Morgera, Corporate Accountability ..., hlm. 128-129.

380 Sierra Club dan Earthrights International, Brief of Amici Curiae for Appeal in U.S. Court

of Appeal, 13 November 1998, dimasukkan dalam upaya banding Beanal di U.S. Court of Appeal


112


28 U.S.C. ß 1332 ("ß 1332"), the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. ß 1350 dan Torture

Victim Protection Act 1991, Bagian 1, et. seq., 28 U.S.C. 1350.

4.4. Analisis Terhadap Pengakuan Atas Tanggung Jawab Perusahaan

Transnasional Terhadap Pelanggaran Hak Atas Lingkungan Hidup

dalam Perkara-Perkara di Atas

Dalam kasus-kasus yang didiskusikan di atas, badan-badan peradilan di

Inggris dan Amerika Serikat tampaknya masih enggan memberikan pengakuan

terhadap hukum lingkungan internasional, terutama terkait aplikasinya terhadap

perusahaan transnasional. Secara ringkas, ketiga kasus di atas dapat diringkas

sebagai berikut:

Aguinda v.

Texaco

Lubbe v. Cape PLC Beanal v. Freeport

McMoran

Forum Home

State

(Transnasional)

Southern District of

New York

House of Lords,

England

Eastern District of

Lousiana dan US Court

of Appeal

Forum Host

State

Diadili di Ekuador -- --

Dalil Gugatan Pencemaran hutan

hujan dan sungai di

Ekuador (dan Peru)

Kegagalan induk

perusahaan untuk

memastikan bahwa

anak perusahaan

Afrika Selatannya

mengadopsi praktek

kerja yang aman

untuk mencegah

munculnya penyakit

yang dikarenakan

paparan asbestor.

Environmental torts,

Human rights abuse,

Cultural genocide

Putusan Hakim

/ Final

Settlement

Ditolak, pada

tahap yurisdiksi.

Diselesaikan

dengan

kesepakatan antara

pemerintah

Ekuador dengan

Texaco.

Ditolak, pada tahap

yurisdiksi. Pada

Maret 2003, Cape

dan Gencor sepakat

membayar secara

total £7,5 juta dan

£3,21 juta masing-

masing bagi 7.500

penggugat yang

terdaftar

Ditolak, dengan alasan

bahwa PMH

Lingkungan bukanlah

pelanggaran hukum

kebiasaan internasional.

Signifikansi

Putusan Hakim

Diberikannya

cause of action

terhadap Penggugat

terkait pencemaran

lingkungan lintas

batas negara,

High Court Inggris

memberikan

yurisdiksi di Inggris:

hal ini merupakan

perkembangan

signifikan yang

Menegaskan pandangan

restriktif terhadap

hukum internasional di

bawah ATCA, di mana

hukum lingkungan

internasional belum


113


pengakuan rezim

PMH dalam hal

lingkungan hidup,

dan diberikannya

right to discovery

kepada Penggugat

untuk

membuktikan

dampak

menyeluruh bagi

dunia dari akibat

pada hutan hujan

tropis dalam setiap

dugaan perilaku

perusahaan yang

mungkin telah

dilakukan di AS.

Sekalipun ditolak,

namun pengadilan

AS memberikan

jaminan bahwa

putusan pengadilan

Ekuador akan dapat

dilaksanakan

terhadap aset-aset

Texaco di AS

melalui DCNY.

menjadikan preseden

bahwa Perusahaan

Transnasional

Inggris dapat diadili

di negara asalnya

atas tindakan

pelanggaran hukum

di negara lain dimana

ia beroperasi.

Kompensasi yang

diberikan Cape dan

Gencor

memperlihatkan

keberhasilan

berbagai upaya yang

dilakukan dalam

memberikan tekanan

bagi perusahaan

transnasional untuk

mempertanggung-

jawabkan akibat dari

operasinya. Putusan

ini menegaskan

bahwa pengadilan

Inggris cukup victim

friendly terkait

kasus-kasus

pelanggaran HAM

oleh perusahaan

transnasional,

khususnya dalam

bidang lingkungan

hidup.

dilihat sebagai hukum

kebiasaan internasional

yang diterima secara

universal. Namun,

Hakim memberikan

kesempatan bagi

Penggugat untuk

memperbaiki

gugatannya, yang

ditafsirkan sebagai

perkembangan positif

dimana hakim

memberikan

kesempatan diadilinya

substansi kasus

pelanggaran HAM atas

lingkungan hidup oleh

perusahaan

transnasional.

Hak atas

Lingkungan

Hidup yang

dapat

didalilkan

dilanggar

(Mengacu pada

Rancangan

Prinsip 5: hak atas

kebebasan dari

rusaknya

lingkungan.381

Prinsip 6: hak atas

perlindungan dan

kelestarian

lingkungan.382

Prinsip 9: hak atas

lingkungan kerja

yang aman dan

sehat.386

Selain itu juga dapat

didalilkan melanggar

Prinsip 5 dan 6.

Prinsip 13: hak atas

manfaat yang adil dari

SDA, baik konservasi

maupun penggunaan

berkelanjutannya, serta

kelestarian situs-situs

unik.387

Prinsip 14: hak untuk

381

“Setiap orang memiliki hak atas kebebasan dari polusi, kerusakan lingkungan, dan

aktivitas yang berdampak buruk pada lingkungan, mengancam kehidupan, kesehatan, mata

pencaharian, kesejahteraan, atau pembangunan berkelanjutan di dalam , melalui, atau di luar batas

teritorial nasional” Prinsip 5 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and Environment.

382 “Setiap orang memiliki hak untuk perlindungan dan kelestarian udara, tanah, air, lautan

es, tumbuhan dan binatang, dan proses dan wilayah esensial yang penting untuk mempertahankan

keberagaman hayati dan ekosistem-ekosistem.” Prinsip 6 Draft Declaration of Principles on

Human Rights and Environment.


114


Deklarasi) Prinsip 7: hak atas

kesehatan.383

Prinsip 8: hak atas

makanan dan air.384

Prinsip 12: hak

atas bantuan tepat

waktu dalam hal

bencana.385

kelestarian cara hidup

tradisional masyakarat

adat.388

Dapat didalilkan pula

pelanggaran atas

Prinsip 5, 6, 7, 8, dan

12.

Tabel 4.1. Ringkasan Analisis Perbandingan Perkara

Ketiga proses judisial terhadap perkara di atas merupakan peradilan

domestik atas perkara dengan isu lintas Negara. Penulis menganalisis penerapan

norma dalam hukum lingkungan internasional ketika diterapkan dalam ketiga

perkara ini. Nilai penting dari analisis ini ialah signifikansi yang diberikan

perkara-perkara ini terhadap perkembangan hukum lingkungan internasional,

karena ketiga perkara di atas merupakan perkara berskala besar, dengan isu

pelanggaran atas lingkungan hidup secara besar-besaran. Namun, hingga saat

perkara tersebut muncul tidak ada forum ataupun mekanisme hukum internasional

yang dapat digunakan untuk mengadili atau menegakkan hukum dalam hal terjadi

pelanggaran tersebut secara langsung terhadap perusahaan transnasional, baik

386

“Setiap orang memiliki hak atas lingkungan kerja yang aman dan sehat.” Prinsip 9 Draft

Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and Environment.

387 “(1) Setiap orang memiliki hak atas manfaat yang adil dari konservasi dan penggunaan

berkelanjutan dari alam dan sumber daya alam untuk kebudayaan, ekologi, pendidikan, kesehatan,

mata pencaharian, rekreasional, spiritual, atau tujuan lainnya. Ini termasuk pula akses yang baik

secara ekologis terhadap alam; dan (2) Setiap orang memiliki hak atas kelestarian situs-situs unik,

sejalan dengan hak-hak fundamental dari orang-orang atau kelompok-kelompok yang hidup dalam

area tersebut.” Prinsip 13 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and Environment.

383 “Setiap orang memiliki hak atas standar kesehatan tertinggi yang dapat dicapai yang

bebas dari kerusakan lingkungan.” Prinsip 7 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and

Environment.

384 “Setiap orang memiliki hak atas makanan yang aman dan sehat dan air yang layak bagi

kesejahteraan mereka.” Prinsip 8 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and

Environment.

385 “Setiap orang memiliki hak atas bantuan yang tepat waktu dalam kejadian bencana alam

maupun bencana teknis, atau yang disebabkan oleh manusia” Prinsip 12 Draft Declaration of

Principles on Human Rights and Environment.

388 “Orang-orang pribumi memiliki hak untuk mengontrol tanah, wilayah, dan sumber daya

alam mereka, dan untuk menjaga cara hidup tradisional mereka. Ini termasuk pula hak atas rasa

aman dalam penikmatan cara penghidupan mereka” Prinsip 14 Draft Declaration of Principles on

Human Rights and Environment.


115


dalam konteks hukum lingkungan internasional maupun dalam konteks hukum

yang mengatur tindakan perusahaan transnasional. Dari analisis perkara ini, dapat

dilihat adanya hal-hal sebagai berikut:

4.4.1. Penerapan Hukum Internasional dalam Ketiga Perkara di Atas

Bukanlah Penerapan Secara Langsung

Pertama, penerapan hukum dalam perkara ini bukanlah penerapan hukum

internasional secara langsung. Tanggung jawab hukum persahaan transnasional

secara langsung yang diberikan oleh hukum internasional sendiri masih

diperdebatkan, sehingga ketentuan perlindungan hak asasi manusia maupun

lingkungan hidup memiliki kekuatan hukum di antara aktor bukan negara (non

state actors) hanya melalui hukum domestik.389

Apabila menilik lebih jauh ke

dalam konsep liability, tidak ada satupun instrumen hukum internasional yang

secara langsung memberikan konsep pertanggungjawaban korporasi dalam hal

liability. Maka itu, pengaturan mengenai hal ini diserahkan sepenuhnya pada

hukum domestik. Hukum domestik sendiri dapat merupakan hukum dari negara

tuan rumah (host country) maupun negara asal korporasi (home country).

Penting untuk diingat, walaupun secara substantif ATCA menunjuk

hukum internasional, namun ATCA pada dasarnya tetaplah merupakan produk

perundang-undangan domestik Amerika Serikat. Hukum yang digunakan dalam

ATCA merupakan hukum internasional yang telah diterjemakan sebagaimana

konsepsi hukum internasional Amerika Serikat. Perspektif Amerika Serikat dalam

melihat „apa itu yang disebut sebagai hukum internasional‟ sangat mempengaruhi

penerapan hukum yang digunakan dalam perkara ini. Hal ini terlihat dari putusan

hakim dalam Beanal v. Freeport, yang cukup banyak didebatkan berbagai

kalangan mengenai pandangan terbatas Amerika Serikat terhadap hukum

lingkungan internasional.

Di Amerika Serikat, walaupun ATCA berpotensi mengizinkan

Pengadilan untuk memproses perkara hingga batas di mana perusahaan

389

Hal ini ditegaskan dalam Penjelasan Umum Komite Hak Asasi Manusia terhadap

Deklarasi Universal Hak Asasi Manusia, yang menyatakan bahwa kewajiban dalam perjanjian

internasional “tidak… memiliki akibat horizontal yang langsung sebagai hukum internasional”.

Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of General Legal Obligation on States

Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.8 at 233 para 8 (29 Maret 2004)


116


transnasional secara langsung terikat oleh prinsip-prinsip dan aturan hukum

lingkungan internasional, klaim-klaim secara eksklusif didasarkan pada prinsip-

prinsip tersebut dibandingkan pada yang didasarkan pada pelanggaran atas hak

asasi manusia, tergagalkan oleh ketidakpastian mengenai status hukumnya.390

Permasalahan hukum mengenai apakah hukum lingkungan internasional yang

merupakan kebiasaan internasional, serta prinsip-prinsip lingkungan internasional,

dapat diaplikasikan secara langsung terhadap aktor bukan negara (non-state

actors) telah dengan demikian menerima sedikit perhatian, dan terkadang dengan

analisis yang dangkal dalam putusan negatif, oleh Pengadilan Amerika Serikat.

Hal ini secara signifikan berkontribusi terhadap hasil yang mengecewakan atas 36

perkara ATCA yang melibatkan perusahaan (terkait lingkungan hidup dan

perbuatan melanggar hukum oleh korporasi lainnya) hingga 2006; di mana 20

perkara telah ditolak, tiga diselesaikan secara damai, dan tidak satupun diputus

memihak penggugat.391

Sementara itu, dalam perkara Lubbe v. PLC yang diadili di Inggris,

hukum internasional dilihat dan diterjemahkan ke dalam hukum domestik, dan

yang pada akhirnya digunakan dalam memutus perkara adalah hukum domestik.

Kasus Lubbe v. PLC merupakan kasus yang signifikan dilihat dari aspek piercing

the corporate veil dan pertanggungjawaban induk perusahaan dalam bentuk

personal injury, dimana Pengadilan memberikan penguatan bahwa forum di

negara asal korporasi litigasi dapat dilakukan dan orang-orang yang tinggal

dimana terjadi pelanggaran hukum oleh induk perusahaan dapat mendapatkan

kompensasi di pengadilan Inggris apabila induk perusahaan dinyatakan bersalah

di forum asalnya.392

Standar hukum yang digunakan dalam hukum Inggris adalah

390

Saman Zia-Zarifi menyatakan bahwa „As a matter of fact, [US] Courts are hesitant to

extend [ATCA] to environmental harms. Terkait hal ini, bagi beberapa penulis, tampaknya „[US]

Courts do not yet believe that this branch of international law has achieved the level of

universality and specificity for supporting ATCA jurisdiction.‟ Lihat: Emeka A. Duruigbo,

Multinational Corporations and International Law: Accountability and Compliance Issues in the

Petroleum Industry, (London: Transnational Pub, 2003), hlm. 184.

391 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, „Interim Report of the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational

Corporations and other Business Enterprises‟ (2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/97, para. 62.

392 International Restructuring Education Network Europe, “Controlling Corporate Wrongs:

The Liability of Multinational Corporation”, Laporan Seminar Internasional IRENE terkait


117


asas kehati-hatian atau „duty of care‟, yang merupakan kewajiban yang

dibebankan kepada semua orang di Inggris, baik natural persoon maupun entitas

hukum. Hak atas lingkungan hidup dapat terlihat diterjemahkan dalam bentuk

klaim personal injury, yang diuraikan dalam bentuk kerugian atas meninggalnya

seseorang dan dampak kesehatan yang ditimbulkan, serta kerugian terkait dengan

pencemaran dan pemulihan lingkungan. Namun, permasalahan hukum lingkungan

internasional tidak banyak disinggung dalam putusan hakim.

John Ruggie mencatat dalam laporannya mengenai bisnis dan hak asasi

manusia bahwa sebenarnya tidak ada larangan bagi negara untuk memaksakan

hukum internasional secara langsung terhadap korporasi. Namun, bukti yang

dihimpun dalam penelitiannya tidak menunjukkan bahwa hal tersebut telah

dilakukan oleh negara secara memuaskan.393

Di samping itu, instrumen-instrumen seperti United Nations Draft Code

of Conduct for Transnational Corporations (1990), 2000 United Nations Global

Compact, 2000 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, WSSD Plan of

Implementation 2002, serta Draft Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational

Corporations and other Business Entities 2003 memang telah memainkan peran

yang cukup krusial dalam mengatur Perusahaan Transnasional. Begitu pula

dengan instrumen-instrumen perjanjian internasional terkait hak asasi manusia

maupun lingkungan hidup seperti International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, ILO

Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,

Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice

in Environmental Matters; serta instrumen soft law hukum lingkungan

internasional seperti Stockholm Declaration, Rio Declaration, Declaration to the

Right to Development, Bruntland Report, dan Johannesburg Declaration. Namun,

instrumen-instrumen tersebut, baik yang berupa hard law maupun soft law,

memiliki sifat yang merintangi penegakan hukum secara efisien dalam hal

Pertanggungjawaban Korporasi dan Hak-hak Pekerja yang diadakan pada 20 dan 21 Maret 2000

di University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom, hlm. 4.

393 John Gerard Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International

Agenda”, Working Paper no. 38 of the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives, (Juni 2007),

hlm. 20.


118


pelaksanaan kewajiban Perusahaan Transnasional. Hard law dalam bentuk

perjanjian internasional tidak mengikat Perusahaan Transnasional secara

langsung, melainkan mengikat negara pesertanya yang harus memastikan

kepatuhan perusahaan terhadap instrumen hukum yang bersangkutan. Hal ini

sebenarnya merupakan suatu hal yang problematis karena beberapa Perusahaan

Transnasional memiliki kekuatan yang lebih dibandingkan negara yang mencoba

untuk mengaturnya. Sedangkan soft law, walaupun terkadang ditujukan langsung

terhadap Perusahaan Transnasional, tidak memiliki sanksi dan mekanisme

penegakan hukum tertentu dan dengan demikian tidak dapat memainkan peran

utama dalam mengatur tindakan Perusahaan Transnasional.394

4.4.2. Ketiga Perkara di Atas Terhenti pada Proses Yurisdiksi

Kedua, semua perkara yang dibahas dalam penelitian ini terhenti pada

proses yurisdiksi, di mana proses yang meneliti secara jauh mengenai substansi

pelanggaran hukum sendiri belum dilakukan. Hal ini terjadi pula pada sebagian

besar perkara dalam litigasi transnasional yang melibatkan perusahaan

transnasional, di mana perusahaan-perusahaan tergugat bertarung habis-habisan

justru bukan dalam permasalahan materiil atau substatif dari perkara tersebut

(yang sebagian besar pada dasarnya jelas-jelas menempatkan tergugat dalam

posisi yang lebih lemah), melainkan dalam permasalahan teknis dari „duty of care‟

yang secara khusus terhubung dengan permasalahan mengenai forum dan

yurisdiksi.

Dalam hal ini, bagaimanapun, perusahaan transnasional cenderung

memanfaatkan sifat hukumnya yang tidak tetap dan tidak kekal, memiliki

keberadaan di berbagai negara pada saat yang bersamaan, untuk berargumen

bahwa ia tidak memiliki keberadaan hukum dan dengan demikian terbebas dari

pengaturan oleh pemerintah manapun selain dari tempat operasinya secara nyata

yaitu hukum tuan rumah.395

Ketika perkara ini mendasarkan argumennya pada

hukum domestik, sistem hukum yang berbeda akan menghasilkan kemungkinan

394

Lea Hanakova, “Accountability of Transnational Corporations under International

Standards”, University of Georgia LLM Theses and Essays, Paper 17, (Juli 2005), hlm. 39.

395 John Gerrard Ruggie, … .,hlm. 3


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dan hambatan yang berbeda.396

Pendekatan mengenai sumber hukum, substansi

dasar hukum, permasalahan yurisdiksi, dan kebijakan negara yang bersangkutan

merupakan faktor yang akan sangat mempengaruhi kemungkinan-kemungkinan

yang timbul dalam peradilan. Bahkan, dari perkara di atas, telah dapat dilihat

perbedaan yang cukup mencolok antara Amerika Serikat dan Inggris yang sama-

sama merupakan negara common law.

Forum non-conveniens merupakan salah satu hambatan yurisdiksi yang

ditemui dalam semua perkara di atas, yang juga menjadi hambatan terbesar dalam

litigasi transnasional tentang lingkungan hidup. Keengganan yang tampak dari

Pengadilan AS untuk menyelenggarakan litigasi transnasional untuk perbuatan

melawan hukum telah memicu reaksi dari sejumlah negara di mana penggugat

bertempat tinggal. Beberapa negara telah mengadopsi undang-undang yang dibuat

untuk mengantisipasi penolakan berdasarkan forum non-conveniens oleh AS

dengan menyatakan bahwa pengadilan mereka secara serta merta kehilangan

yurisdiksi untuk menggelar peradilan begitu gugatan telah dimasukkan di sebuah

pengadilan asing yang memiliki yurisdiksi.397

Sebuah model undang-undang yang

disusun oleh Latin American Parliament (Parlatino), dan diadopsi secara luas di

negara-negara Amerika Latin, mengijinkan kerugian untuk dihitung berdasarkan

hukum dari negara tergugat asing, menghapuskan keuntungan bagi tergugat untuk

bertanggungjawab dalam jumlah yang lebih kecil di pengadilan negara

berkembang.

4.4.3. Permasalahan Pelanggaran HAM atas Lingkungan Hidup oleh

Perusahaan Transnasional Berada dalam Irisan Ranah Hukum

Publik dan Privat

Ketiga, isu dalam semua perkara tersebut merupakan irisan antara rezim

hukum privat dan hukum publik. Permasalahan mengenai yurisdiksi tunduk pada

dalil-dalil hukum perdata internasional. Begitu pula dengan permasalahan ganti

396

Ibid.,hlm. 4

397 Ronald A. Brand dan Scott R. Jablonski, "Model Law on International Jurisdiction and

Applicable Law in Tort Liability", Forum Non-Conveniens: History, Global Practice, and Future

Under the Hague Convetion on Choice of Court Agreements , (Oxford: Oxford University Press),

hlm.132-133.


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rugi individual, yang dalam ketiga perkara tersebut dimintakan dengan dasar

perbuatan melanggar hukum. Dalam Aguinda v. Texaco, pertimbangan mengenai

irisan dari unsur privat dan publik ini digunakan pula oleh hakim dalam

menentukan forum yang sesuai:

“presumsi kuat yang mendukung pilihan forum Penggugat dibantah oleh

faktor-faktor kepentingan privat dan publik sebagaimana diputuskan

dalam perkara Gilbert, yang mana sangat menitikberatkan dukungan

terhadap forum asing sehingga mengalahkan presumsi bagi pilihan forum

Penggugat”398

Dalam perkara-perkara di atas, kesemuanya dilakukan atas dasar klaim privat

perbuatan melawan hukum, dengan proses peradilan yang juga dilaksanakan di

pengadilan perdata.

Di sisi lain, permasalahan hak asasi manusia dan lingkungan hidup

merupakan permasalahan publik yang juga diatur dalam hukum publik

internasional. Di sinilah hukum menjembatani dengan pengaturan akuntabilitas

perusahaan transnasional, khususnya dalam hal lingkungan hidup dan hak asasi

manusia, untuk aspek publik. Namun, perlu diingat bahwa pengaturan

akuntabilitas yang ada hingga saat ini masih bersifat sukarela sehingga tidak

ada mekanisme yang dapat memastikan perusahaan transnasional mematuhi

norma-norma yang telah ditetapkan. Sementara itu, dalam hal penggantian

kerugian yang sudah pasti terjadi terhadap masyarakat, sejauh ini memang

litigasi transnasional masih merupakan mekanisme yang paling efektif. Melihat

praktik dalam litigasi di atas, instrumen-instrumen hukum internasional publik

termasuk hak asasi manusia belum dimanfaatkan secara maksimal. Lubbe v.

Cape PLC mendasarkan argumennya pada kerugian privat semata, tanpa

menyinggung hak asasi manusia dan kerugian lingkungan yang terlanggar,

terlebih lagi merujuk pada norma hukum internasional yang mengatur

mengenai perusahaan transnasional. Sementara, Beanal v. Freeport McMoran

maupun Aguinda v. Texaco juga sama sekali tidak merujuk dokumen

398

Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 547 (mengutipdari DiRienzo v. Philip Servs.Corp., 232

F.3d 49, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2000)) menyatakan “the ordinarily strong presumption favoring plaintiff‟s

chosen forum is countered by the private and public interest factors set out [by the Supreme

Court] in Gilbert, which weigh so heavily in favor of the foreign forum that they overcome the

presumption for plaintiffs choice of forum.”


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internasional, sekalipun yang bersifat sukarela terkait kewajiban-kewajiban

perusahaan transnasional, yang telah ada pada saat perkara-perkara tersebut

diproses, semisal UN Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations.

Memang perlu diakui pula, perhatian terhadap perusahaan transnasional

semisal OECD Guidelines, UN Global Compact, termasuk pula Draft Norms,

baru muncul dan mendapatkan dukungan dari komunitas internasional setelah

tahun 2000, dalam dimensi waktu yang tidak bersamaan dengan dimulainya

gugatan dalam litigasi-litigasi di atas.

4.4.4. Terdapat Pelanggaran Hak atas Lingkungan Hidup Secara Besar-

besaran dalam Ketiga Perkara di Atas

Keempat, secara substansi hukum dapat dilihat bahwa dalam kasus-kasus

yang dianalisis di atas dapat ditemukan adanya pelanggaran hak atas lingkungan

hidup dalam skala besar, baik secara per se maupun dalam bentuk derivatif, yaitu

pelanggaran hak-hak lainnya yang diturunkan dari adanya perusakan lingkungan

hidup. Sekalipun dalam menganalisis permasalahan ini Penulis mengacu pada

Rancangan Deklarasi yang tidak memisahkan antara hak atas lingkungan hidup

secar per se dengan bentuk derivatifnya399

, namun dapat dilihat dalam perkara-

perkara di atas bahwa pencemaran terhadap lingkungan hidup berakibat pula pada

terlanggarnya hak-hak asasi lainnya seperti hak untuk hidup, hak atas kesehatan,

hak atas makanan dan air, dan sebagainya.400

Sebagaimana telah dijabarkan dalam

sub-bab mengenai dalil lingkungan hidup maupun tabel di atas, kerugian yang

ditimbulkan karena aktivitas Perusahaan Transnasional yang mengabaikan

prinsip-prinsip lingkungan telah menghasilkan akibat dalam lingkup kerusakan

lingkungan yang sangatlah besar cakupannya, dimulai dari hilangnya nyawa

399

Hak atas lingkungan hidup yang baik dan sehat secara per se tercermin dalam Prinsip 1

Deklarasi Stockholm, yang kemudian ditegaskan kembali dalam Prinsip 5 dan 6 Draft Declaration

of Human Rights and the Environment, dalam bentuk hak atas kebebasan dari polusi, kerusakan

lingkungan, dan aktivitas yang berdampak buruk pada lingkungan; serta hak untuk perlindungan

dan kelestarian lingkungan.

400 Dalam melakukan analisis, Penulis mengacu pada Rancangan Deklarasi, di mana hak

untuk hidup, hak atas makanan dan air, hak masyarakat adat untuk mempertahankan tradisinya,

hak atas lingkungan kerja yang aman dan sehat, dimasukkan pula sebagai bagian substantif dari

hak asasi manusia atas lingkungan hidup. Fatma Zorah Ksentini, Draft Declaration …, prinsip 7-

14.


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manusia hingga, tercemarnya tempat tinggal, hingga hilangnya kebudayaan

masyarakat adat tertentu sehubungan dengan rusaknya alam tempat mereka

tinggal. Hal lain yang menyebabkan Penulis menyatakan bahwa pelanggaran hak

atas lingkungan hidup ini terjadi secara besar-besaran adalah jumlah korban yang

terlibat dalam ketiga perkara di atas, yaitu lebih kurang berdampak terhadap

25.000 orang dalam kasus Aguinda v. Texaco, 3.000 orang penggugat dalam

Lubbe v. PLC, dan lebih kurang 10.000 orang dalam Beanal v. Freeport

McMoran.401

Berbicara mengenai hak atas lingkungan hidup secara per se, walaupun

masyarakat internasional telah menyepakati adanya hak asasi manusia atas

lingkungan hidup yang sehat dan layak dan terdapat berbagai instrumen

internasional yang menyatakannya, namun hak atas lingkungan hidup secara per

se belum secara tegas dimasukkan dalam perjanjian internasional yang mengikat

secara global. Hal ini menyebabkan, sebagaimana telah dijelaskan dalam bab

sebelumnya, tidak adanya rumusan yang tegas dan pasti secara universal

mengenai hak atas lingkungan hidup secara per se.402

Sebagai konsekuensi,

kriteria terlanggarnya hak asasi manusia atas lingkungan hidup menjadi kurang

terukur dan tidak pasti, meskipun dalam kasus-kasus pelanggaran berskala sangat

besar seperti kasus-kasus di atas memang telah jelas dengan adanya pencemaran

dan penurunan kualitas secara sangat signifikan dari lingkungan hidup tersebut.

Secara derivatif, yang paling mencolok adalah pelanggaran terhadap hak

untuk hidup, hak atas kesehatan, serta hak atas sumber makanan dan sumber air

yang layak bagi kesehatan. Ketiga hak ini merupakan hak yang telah diakui oleh

masyarakat internasional, baik dalam konteks maupun di luar konteks pencemaran

401

“The exact number of class members is not known but it is estimated that the class

includes ten thousand (10,000) indigenous tribes people who have been subject to death of a

family member, assault, rape, torture, false imprisonment, surveillance, extreme mental harm and

loss of traditional land rights by Freeport its agents. The class is so numerous that joinder of

individual members is impracticable” Tom Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, Judgment of Eastern

District For Lousiana, Civil Action Case No. 96-1474, Section K., poin nomor 13.

402 Salma Yusuf, “Human Rights and the Environment: A View From the European Court

of Human Rights”, (Mei 2012), Sumber: International World Observer Official Website,

http://internationallawobserver.files.com/2012/05/salmayusuf_human_rights_and_the_environme

nt.pdf


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lingkungan hidup. Secara lebih jelas, dalam setiap kasus perinciannya adalah

sebagai berikut:

1. Hak untuk hidup

Dalam kasus paparan asbestos yang terjadi dalam perkara Lubbe v. Cape

PLC, lebih dari 100 penggungat telah meninggal, yang terdiri dari para

pekerja di tambang asbestos Cape PLC. Kesehatan yang terus memburuk

juga memiliki resiko memperpendek usia para penambang asbestos ini,

merupakan komponen yang tak terpisahkan pula dari hak untuk hidup.

2. Hak atas kesehatan

Terlanggarnya hak atas kesehatan terlihat jelas dalam ketiga perkara di atas.

Dalam perkara Aguinda v. Texaco, beberapa studi menemukan bahwa

penduduk Oriente terpapar kontaminan terkait minyak yang levelnya

melebihi standar internasional. Hal ini berpengaruh terhadap kesehatan

mereka, terutama mengingat kontaminan tersebut berasal dari minyak

mentah dan limbah-limbahnya. Sebuah studi mengungkapkan penduduk

Oriente menderita penyakit kulit dalam tingkatan yang tinggi. Dinyatakan

pula bahwa temuan tersebut menunjuk pada meningkatnya resiko penyakit

yang lebih serius semisal permasalahan reproduksi dan neurologis, begitu

pula kanker. Namun, bagaimanapun pertimbangan dan pemeriksaan secara

hukum terkait studi-studi ini tidak sempat dilakukan dalam proses

persidangan, karena perkara ini dihentikan sebelum memasuki acara

substansi.

Dalam Lubbe v. Cape PLC, penggugat class action yang berjumlah 3000

orang merupakan para korban yang menderita asbestos-related disease

(ARD), yang antara lain ialah mesothelioma dan kanker paru-paru terkait

asbestos (asbestos-related lung cancer), karena paparan asbestos. Hal ini

disinyalir karena praktik kerja yang tidak aman yang dilakukan oleh Cape

PLC untuk menekan ongkos produksi, yang berakibat pada terekspos-nya

para pekerja pada level asbestos yang tidak aman untuk kesehatan. Beberapa

studi independen oleh badan-badan kesehatan, penggiat HAM, maupun

NGO-NGO internasional telah dilakukan, yang menyatakan bahwa terdapat


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hubungan antara praktik kerja para penambang Cape PLC dengan penyakit

yang diderita mereka.

Sementara itu, dalam perkara Beanal v. FreeportMcMoran, tidak didalilkan

jumlah dan kejadian pasti dari pelanggaran hak atas kesehatan ini, hanya

mencantumkan bahwa Freeport menumpuk kira-kira 100.000 ton tailing per

hari di Sungai Aghwagaon, Otomona, dan Akjwa yang merupakan sumber

air dan makanan suku Amungme. Hal ini berpengaruh terhadap kesehatan

mereka dengan terjadinya gatal-gatal, demam dan sakit kepala, serta gejala-

gejala generik lainnya.

3. Hak atas sumber makanan dan sumber air yang layak bagi kesehatan

Terutama dalam Aguinda v. Texaco dan Beanal v. Freeport McMoran,

perusahaan yang bersangkutan membuang limbah-limbahnya di sungai dan

hutan tempat masyarakat adat tinggal dan menggantungkan hidupnya.

Sungai dan hutan tersebut merupakan tempat masyarakat tersebut mencari

makan dan mendapatkan air bersih, dan hal ini terkait erat pula dengan

menurunnya derajat kesehatan mereka.

4.4.5. Tanggung Jawab Perusahaan Transnasional: Antara Akuntabilitas

dan Liabilitas

Dari ketiga perkara di atas, tercermin bahwa hukum lingkungan

internasional belum sampai pada tingkatan untuk membebankan tanggung jawab

hukum dalam bentuk liability terhadap perusahaan transnasional dalam konteks

pelanggaran hukum lingkungan internasional.

Terminologi akuntabilitas dan liabilitas cukup sering tercampur baur

dalam menunjuk pertanggungjawaban sebuah entitas hukum. Dalam perkara ini,

kesemuanya berbicara mengenai liability, karena terkait dengan tanggung jawab

finansial dan tanggung jawab hukum. Namun, dalam dalil gugatan maupun

pertimbangan hakim, belum digali secara mendalam mengenai norma-norma

akuntabilitas perusahaan transnasional yang diadopsi oleh korporasi-korporasi

tersebut. Tentunya, dapat menjadi acuan dan pertimbangan yang berarti sekalipun

tidak menjadi dasar hukum karena kekuatan mengikatnya yang pada dasarnya

bersifat sukarela.


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4.5. Lex Feranda: Perkembangan Hukum Internasional dalam

Pengakuan Perusahaan Transnasional sebagai Pengemban Hak Atas

Lingkungan Hidup Secara Langsung

Sebagaimana dapat dilihat dari uraian di atas, mekanisme hukum

lingkungan internasional yang mengatur mengenai pelanggaran hak atas

lingkungan hidup yang sehat secara besar-besaran oleh sebuah perusahaan

transnasional belum ada hingga saat ini. Pada akhirnya, forum domestik dari

Negara induk korporasi menjadi pilihan bagi masyarakat yang terlanggar haknya

tersebut. Namun, hukum merupakan suatu skema yang tidak final, namun terus

berubah, bergerak, dan mengikuti kehidupan manusia. Sebagaimana dinyatakan

oleh Phillip Allot mengenai fungsi hukum, masyarakat lah yang membentuk

hukum,

“Hukum merupakan suatu sistem yang mengaktualisasikan nilai-nilai

yang diberikan dalam suatu masyarakat… Apa yang dilakukan hukum

adalah untuk mengizinkan sebuah masyarakat untuk memilih masa

depannya. Hukum dibuat di masa lalu, untuk diaplikasikan di masa kini,

dengan tujuan untuk membuat masyarakat mengambil bentuk tertentu

dalam masa depan. Hukum memikul gagasan dari sebuah masyarakat

mengenai masa depannya sendiri dari masa lalu ke masa depan. Hukum

memikul struktur dan system masyarakat dari masa lalu ke masa depan.

Hukum membuat mungkin kemungkinan mengenai masa depan sebuah

masyarakat”403

Dalam hal ini, secara khusus, maka yang membentuk hukum adalah masyarakat

hukum internasional yang memangku kepentingan yang terwujud dalam bentuk

Negara, organisasi internasional, individu, dan non-state actors.

Dokumen paling komprehensif yang pernah diusulkan terkait kewajiban

hak asasi manusia bagi perusahaan transnasional adalah rancangan proposal dari

„United Nations Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and

Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights‟, yang diadopsi oleh

UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights pada

sesinya di tahun 2003. Dokumen tersebut mengharapkan dapat ditegakkannya

403

Philip Allott, “The True Function of Law in the International Community”, Indiana

Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 5, (1998), hlm. 391, 393–94, 398–99


126


norma-norma oleh 'badan peradilan nasional dan/atau internasional; berdasarkan

hukum nasional dan internasional'.404

Dengan begitu, norma tersebut dapat

membimbing ke sebuah level dari keberlakuan internasional secara langsung dari

kewajiban hak asasi manusia melawan perusahaan transnasional.405

Draft Norms, yang walaupun memberikan tanggung jawab primer kepada

negara dalam pemenuhan hak asasi manusia, juga mengenakan tanggung jawab

secara langsung kepada badan-badan korporasi "dalam ruang lingkup aktivitas

bisnis dan pengaruhnya".406

Juga disyaratkan pengawasan perusahaan-perusahaan

oleh agen-agen nasional dan internasional, serta ganti rugi yang efektif bagi para

korban.

Pada April 2004, dokumen tersebut dipertimbangkan oleh UN Comission

on Human Rights. Komisi tersebut, dengan suara bulat, mengakui pentingnya isu

tanggung jawab hak asasi manusia oleh korporasi, dan merekomendasikan bahwa

the Economic and Social Council yang mengatasinya, memohon kepada High

Commissioner for Human Rights untuk mengkompilasikan laporan komprehensif

dalam topik tersebut, agar dipertimbangkan oleh Komisi pada 2005.

Bagaimanapun, Draft Norms hingga saat ini belum berlaku secara efektif karena

hingga saat ini tidak ada tindakan spesifik yang diambil terkait norma tersebut,

walaupun secara jelas terdapat bagian untuk tindakan di mana depan.407

NGO-NGO HAM internasional mendukung dokumen tersebut, dan mulai

menyebutnya "UN Norms" ketika di sisi lain, komunitas bisnis, diwakili oleh

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) dan International Organization of

Employers (IOE), menolak secara tegas.408

ICC menyatakan bahwa dokumen

404

United Nations, United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational

Corporationsand Other Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc

E/CN/.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), paragraf 18.

405 Sarah Joseph, Human Rights Law in Perspective: Corporations and Transnational

Human Rights Litigation, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), hlm. 20.

406 John G. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda,

American Journal of International Law, Vol. 101, (2007), hlm. 819-820

407 Lih: Decision 2004/116 in UN doc E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.7, p 82.

408 International Chamber of Commerce and International Organization of Employers, Joint

Views of the IOE and ICC on the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational


127


tersebut memuat "elemen dan ide-ide yang dapat digunakan" namun

menambahkan bahwa sebagai rancangan proposal, dokumen tersebut tidak

memiliki kekuatan hukum. Selain itu, Sub-Commission juga dimandatkan untuk

tidak terlibat dalam bentuk pengawasan apapun terhadap aktivitas korporasi.409

Pengenaan hukum internasional secara umum terbatas kepada aktor

negara. Ketika perjanjian-perjanjian internasional terkait hak asasi manusia

memasukkan kewajiban bagi individual dan institusi untuk menghormati dan

memajukan hak asasi manusia, provisi-provisi ini tidak menyebabkan adanya

kewajiban formal bagi aktor-aktor non negara tersebut. Instrumen soft law

memiliki potensi yang besar untuk menjadi "hard law" di masa yang akan datang.

"Pengerasan" soft law ini dapat terjadi dalam dua cara yang berbeda. Pertama,

ketika deklarasi, rekomendasi, dsb, menjadi langkah pertama dalam proses

pembuatan perjanjian internasional, yang akan menunjuk pada prinsip yang telah

dicantumkan dalam instrumen soft law tersebut. Kedua, perjanjian-perjanjian non-

traktat ditujukan untuk memiliki pengaruh langsung terhadap praktek negara

(state practice), sehingga jika berhasil maka dapat menghasilkan pembentukan

hukum kebiasaan internasional. Pada saat yang bersamaan, soft law telah

membentuk sebuah norma bahwa korporasi harus menghormati hak asasi

manusia. Norma dalam soft law ini telah diperkuat dengan naiknya jumlah hukum

domestik dan pendapat untuk mengaplikasikan standar-standar hak asasi manusia

terhadap korporasi.410

Dalam kasus tertentu, keterlaksanaan internasional di masa yang akan

datang cenderung akan terbatas pada sedikit kategori dari kejahatan universal,

dibandingkan daripada norma-norma secara keseluruhan. Sulit untuk

membayangkan pembentukan badan peradilan internasional dengan kapasitas

untuk mengurus segala potensi pelanggaran hak asasi manusia oleh perusahaan

transnasional, mengingat cakupan tanggung jawab yang diberikan dalam norma

Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, (Maret 2004).

Sumber: http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/179849/link_page_view

409 UN Human Rights Commission Resolution 2004/11, U.N. Doc.

E/CN.4/2004/L.73/Rev.1 (20 April 2004)

410 Chris Jochnick dan Nina Rabaeus, "Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New UN

Framework Meets Texaco in the Amazon", Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Vol. 33:3, hlm. 19


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dan begitu banyaknya jumlah perusahaan transnasional di dunia. Maka itu, dalam

waktu singkat atau paling tidak medium, tanggung jawab hak asasi manusia bagi

Perusahaan transnasional akan lebih banyak ditegakkan oleh badan nasional

dibandingkan oleh badan internasional, walaupun jika norma tersebut

ditransformasikan kepada hukum internasional yang mengikat.411

Sekarang,

dalam ketiadaan dokumen internasional mengikat yang memuat kewajiban hak

asasi manusia secara komprehensif bagi perusahaan transnasional, dalam adanya

pelanggaran harus dilihat hukum nasional untuk mengungkapkan derajat

akuntabilitas dari perusahaan transnasional untuk pelanggaran hak asasi

manusia.412

Seiring dengan usaha-usaha yang sedang berjalan untuk membentuk

kewajiban terhadap korporasi melalui paradigma kewajiban negara (state duties),

negara-negara European Union telah melangkah lebih jauh secara cukup

signifikan. Baik dalam Treaty Establishing the European Community (selanjutnya

disebut "Treaty of Rome") yang dibuat pada 1957 beserta perubahannya, serta

putusan-putusan mengikat dari European Council and Commission telah

membentuk seperangkat kewajiban hukum yang luas yang secara langsung dapat

dikenakan terhadap korporasi dan badan usaha lainnya. European Council and

Commission telah mengeluarkan banyak peraturan dan petunjuk yang harus

dipatuhi oleh perusahaan-perusahaan privat, dan European Court of Justice telah

menerima banyak perkara di mana suatu pihak privat telah berupaya untuk

menegakkan Treaty of Rome terhadap pihak privat lainnya.413

Hukum European Community yang merupakan sebuah bagian dari

hukum internasional, menyediakan baik hak maupun kewajiban secara langsung

atas korporasi (tanpa intervensi dari negara) didasarkan pada bahasa yang

digunakan dalam Treaty of Rome414

itu sendiri dan dari penerimaan akibat

411

Sarah Joseph, Human Rights Law in Perspective..., hlm. 23.

412 Ibid., hlm. 24.

413 David J. Gerber, “The Transformation of European Community Competition Law?”,

Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 35, (1994)

414 Treaty Establishing The European Community, dibuat pada 10 November 1997,

(selanjutnya disebut "EC Treaty"), art. 249 menyatakan bahwa peraturan EU "mengikat secara


129


langsung oleh European Court of Justice dan negara-negara anggota EU.415

Kini,

akibat langsung terhadap korporasi telah menjadi fondasi dari sistem hukum EU.

Dapat diargumentasikan bahwa "tertib hukum yang baru dari hukum

internasional" (sebagaimana mengutip putusan kunci ECJ terkait pengenaan

akibat secara langsung)416

ini membuat EU unik dan menunjukkan secara lain,

ketika biasanya tampak bahwa rezim perjanjian internasional-lah yang secara

paling baik dapat menyediakan pertanggung jawaban hukum secara tidak

langsung sebagaimana terlihat dalam konvensi-konvensi lingkungan hidup.

keseluruhan dan berlaku secara langsung dalam semua Negara Anggota" (rumusan teks aslinya

ialah “binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States”)

415 Lih. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen, 1963

E.C.R. 3, 12 (dinyatakan bahwa “[T]his Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates

mutual obligations between the contracting states . . . . [T]he Community constitutes a new legal

order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights,

albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also

their nationals. . . . Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is

also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.” ); Case 6/64,

Costa v. Ente Nazionale per l‟Energia Elettrica (Enel), 1964 E.C.R. 585; lihat juga: S.R.F.

Mathijsen, A Guide to European Union Law, 7th

Ed., (1999), hlm. 26-32, 41-45 (menjelaskan

status hukum dari peraturan (regulations) dan petunjuk (directives))

416 Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. pada poin 12.


130


BAB 5

PENUTUP

5.1. Simpulan

Pertama, hukum internasional, dalam perjanjian internasional yang

bersifat global dan berbentuk hard law belum mengakui secara eksplisit suatu teks

atas hak atas lingkungan hidup yang baik dan sehat sebagai suatu hak asasi

manusia. Namun, hal tersebut bukan berarti hak asasi manusia atas lingkungan

hidup yang baik dan sehat bukanlah merupakan suatu norma dalam hukum

internasional. Sekalipun tidak satupun instrumen hukum yang bersifat global dan

mengikat menyatakan adanya hak tersebut sebagai bagian dari hak asasi manusia,

namun pendekatan derivatif dilakukan pula oleh masyarakat internasional dengan

menghubungkan hak atas lingkungan hidup yang baik dan sehat dengan berbagai

hak asasi lainnya yang telah ada dan telah mapan dalam hukum internasional.

Contoh hak-hak derivatif dari hak atas lingkungan hidup yang kerap digunakan

dalam pelanggaran hak atas lingkungan hidup adalah hak untuk hidup, hak atas

kesehatan, dan hak atas makanan dan sumber air yang bersih dan layak. Beberapa

perjanjian internasional yang bersifat regional pun telah memberikan pengakuan

terhadap hak atas lingkungan hidup, dan menempatkannya sebagai bagian dari

hak asasi manusia. Dukungan lainnya terhadap hak atas lingkungan hidup

termanifestasi dalam berbagai dokumen soft law yang bersifat global. Terdapat

puluhan instrument soft law yang mengakui adanya hak atas lingkungan hidup

yang sehat ini sekalipun dengan perumusan yang berbeda-beda. Selain itu, praktek

dari berbagai Negara mencerminkan inkorporasi dari hak atas lingkungan hidup

ini ke dalam konstitusinya, menandakan adanya state practice yang mengakui hak

atas lingkungan hidup sebagai suatu hak asasi manusia. Opinio juris Negara-

negara atas hak ini tercermin pula dalam tindakan sebagian besar Negara yang

telah mengakomodasi hak ini, setidaknya dalam level domestik, sebagai hak asasi

manusia.

Kedua, perusahaan transnasional merupakan entitas yang masih

diperdebatkan pengaturannya dalam hukum internasional. Pengaturan mengenai

tindakan perusahaan transnasional terkait hak asasi manusia secara umum telah


131


dirumuskan dalam berbagai dokumen internasional dengan inisiatif dari berbagai

organisasi internasional yang bergerak dalam bidang bisnis dan hak asasi

manusia. Namun, tidak satupun dari instrumen tersebut memiliki kekuatan

mengikat yang dapat berlaku secara global. Suatu perkembangan yang cukup

signifikan adalah Draft Norms yang telah diadopsi oleh UN Sub-Commission pada

2003, namun tidak mendapatkan tindak lanjut dari UN Human Rights Commission

sehingga tidak memiliki kekuatan hukum yang diakui oleh masyarakat

internasional, termasuk para pelaku bisnis. Beberapa instrumen hukum

internasional telah mengakui pengenaan tanggung jawab secara langsung terhadap

perusahaan transnasional, namun tidak ada mekanisme yang dapat memastikan

penegakan akuntabilitas korporasi ini, di samping sifat dari instrument-instrumen

tersebut yang pada dasarnya sukarela. Efektivitas dari instrumen-instrumen

sukarela ini juga dipertanyakan oleh masyarakat internasional, karena terkadang

justru digunakan perusahaan transnasional sebagai tameng pencitraan tanpa

melaksanakan ketentuan substansial secara benar. Dalam hal adanya pihak-pihak

ketiga yang dirugikan dan korporasi bertanggungjawab secara finansial maupun

hukum, tidak ada juga mekanisme yang dapat memberikan akses bagi para korban

untuk mendapatkan ganti rugi dan pemulihan yang prompt, effective, dan

adequate. Pada akhirnya cara yang kerap kali digunakan oleh masyarakat

internasional untuk memaksakan liability dari korporasi yang bertanggungjawab

ialah dengan mekanisme gugatan transnasional di Negara asal korporasi induk.

Alien Tort Claim Act dari Amerika Serikat merupakan salah satu contoh

mekanisme gugatan transnasional berdasarkan pelanggaran hukum internasional

yang kerap digunakan oleh para pencari keadilan. Begitu pula hukum di Inggris,

yang berdasarkan presedennya memberikan kesempatan bagi para korban untuk

melakukan proses litigasi di Inggris sebagai Negara asal dari korporasi induk.

Ketiga, berdasarkan analisis atas tiga perkara litigasi transnasional yang

dilakukan di Amerika Serikat dan Inggris, yaitu Aguinda v. Texaco dan Beanal v.

Freeport McMoran (Amerika Serikat); serta Lubbe v. Cape PLC (Inggris), tidak

satupun dari ketiga gugatan tersebut yang berhasil menuntut liability dari

perusahaan transnasional melalui proses peradilan yang sampai pada putusan

akhir. Pertanggungjawaban perusahaan transnasional terhadap pelanggaran hak


132


atas lingkungan hidup dalam ketiga kasus yang dibahas menunjukkan bahwa

penegakan akuntabilitas tidak terlaksana sesuai dengan kewajiban yang

dibebankan oleh instrumen-instrumen internasional yang mengatur mengenai

akuntabilitas perusahaan transnasional, karena ketiadaan mekanisme. Akibat yang

ditimbulkan oleh aktivitas perusahaan transnasional yang tidak akuntabel

menyebabkan kerusakan yang sangat parah terhadap lingkungan hidup maupun

masyarakat di sekitar tempat perusahaan beroperasi, dan menyebabkan

terlanggarnya hak masyarat atas lingkungan hidup yang sehat, baik secara per se

maupun hak-hak derogatifnya yang antara lain ialah hak hidup, hak atas

kesehatan, hak atas makanan dan sumber air yang bersih. Dalam proses peradilan,

kesemua penggugat terganjal dan berjuang habis-habisan dalam masalah

yurisdiksi dan pada akhirnya ditolak pada proses awal sebelum memasuki

substansi perkara. Forum non-conveniens merupakan permasalahan utama, dan

sekalipun Pengadilan di Inggris pada akhirnya menyatakan bahwa pengadilan

berwenang, motion to strike dari pihak tergugat selalu kembali

mempermasalahkan kewenangan forum Negara asal korporasi untuk mengadili

perkara tersebut. Selain itu, ketiga perkara ini pada akhirnya memang diselesaikan

dengan kesepakatan dari para pihak, yang memberikan ganti kerugian bagi para

korban dalam jumlah yang cukup besar, namun hal ini dikarenakan tekanan dunia

internasional, bukanlah karena adanya putusan atau perintah yang bersifat hukum

yang mengamini bahwa telah terjadi pelanggaran hak asasi atas lingkungan hidup

oleh perusahaan-perusahaan transnasional tersebut.

5.2. Saran

Berdasarkan pemaparan dan analisis dalam karya tulis ini, maka terdapat

beberapa rekomendasi terkait dengan permasalahan pelanggaran hak atas

lingkungan hidup oleh perusahaan transnasional, sebagai berikut:

1. Instrumen internasional yang bersifat global, yang mengakui dan secara

komprehensif memberikan pengaturan hak atas lingkungan hidup, perlu

untuk segera disepakati dan diadopsi. Dalam hal ini, Draft Declaration Of

Principles On Human Rights And The Environment merupakan dokumen

yang telah cukup komprehensif dan telah banyak mendapatkan dukungan


133


internasional. Selama proses politik menuju diadopsinya Draft Declaration

tersebut, maka komunitas internasional perlu berusaha untuk menggunakan

hak atas lingkungan hidup yang sehat dalam ranah internasional sebagai

suatu hak asasi manusia dalam mekanisme-mekanisme internasional, dalam

kaitannya pula dengan hak-hak lainnya yang telah mapan dalam dunia

internasional.

2. Diperlukan adanya adopsi dari Human Rights Commission terhadap Draft

Norms, sehingga Draft Norms dapat memiliki kekuatan hukum dan dapat

dipaksakan terhadap perusahaan transnasional. Mekanisme pengawasan

akuntabilitas perusahaan transnasional perlu dimandatkan dan dilaksanakan

secara transparan dan ketat.

3. Dalam gugatan-gugatan (termasuk pula amici curiae) maupun putusan-

putusan berikutnya, komunitas internasional perlu untuk lebih

menggunakan, mencantumkan dan menegaskan kembali norma-norma

hukum internasional yang telah ada dalam litigasi atau proses peradilan

untuk pertanggungjawaban perusahaan transnasional terutama dalam

hubungannya dengan hak atas lingkungan hidup dan akuntabilitas korporasi.

Selain itu, dalam menghindari permasalahan yurisdiksi yang berbelit-belit,

legislasi nasional dapat membuat provisi yang menyatakan dilepaskannya

yurisdiksi secara serta merta ketika gugatan telah dimasukkan di Negara

lain.


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This is the original complaint in the Aguinda case:

Joseph C. Kohn (JK-1755)Myles H. Malman (MM-2897)Martin J. D'Urso (MD-6576)Diana Liberto (DL-8313)KOHN, NAST & GRAF, P.C.2400 One Reading Center1101 Market StreetPhiladelphia, PA 19107(215) 238-1700

Cristobal Bonifaz (CB-2949)John Bonifaz (JB-0987)Steven R. Donziger (SD-5700)Tucker Taft Building48 North Pleasant StreetAmherst, MA 01002(413) 253-5626

Amy Damen (AD-1758)SULLIVAN & DAMENOne North BroadwayWhite Plains, New York 10601(914) 428-9414

Attorneys for Plaintiffsand the Class

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

___________________________________:

MARIA AGUINDA, CARLOS GREFA, : CIVIL ACTION NO.individually and as guardians for :GESICA GREFA; :CATARINA AGUINDA; MERCEDES GREFA; : CLASS ACTIONLIDIA AGUINDA; :PATRICIO CHIMBO, :individually and as guardian for : JURY TRIAL DEMANDEDhis minor children; :ELIAS PIYAGUAJE, individually :


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and as guardian for :LOLA PIYAGUAJE, EDISON PIYAGUAJE, :PAULINA PIYAGUAJE, JIMENA PIYAGUAJE:and ELIAS PIYAGUAJE; :DELFIN PAYAGUAJO, individually :and as guardian for his minor :children; :JAVIER PIYAGUAJE; :HOMER CONDE, individually and as :guardian for his minor children; :SANTO GUILLERMO RAMIREZ, :individually and as guardian for :DANILO RAMIREZ; :JUANA TANGUILA, individually and :as guardian for her minor children;:[Additional Plaintiffs Listed in :Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" hereto :and incorporated herein by :reference], :individually and on behalf of all :others similarly situated, :

:Plaintiffs, :

:v. :

:TEXACO INC. :2000 West Chester Avenue :White Plains, New York 10650, :

:Defendant. :

___________________________________:

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, Maria Aguinda, Carlos Grefa, Catarina

Aguinda, Gesica Grefa, Mercedes Grefa, Lidia Aguinda, Patricio

Chimbo, Elias Piyaguaje, Lola Piyaguaje, Edison Piyaguaje,

Paulina Piyaguaje, Jimena Piyaguaje, Elias Piyaguaje, Delfin

Payaguajo, Javier Piyaguaje, Homer Conde, Santo Guillermo


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Ramirez, Danilo Ramirez, Juana Tanguila, individually and

pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on

behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, bring this

action to remedy the negligent, reckless, intentional and

outrageous acts and omissions of defendant Texaco Inc. in

connection with its oil exploration and drilling operations

which have caused plaintiffs and the class to suffer property

damage, personal injuries, increased risks of cancer and other

diseases, and has resulted in the degradation and destruction of

the environment in which plaintiffs and their families live. In

support thereof, plaintiffs aver as follows:

I.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

. This Court has jurisdiction over this action

under and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), § 1331 and § 1350.

Plaintiffs are citizens of Ecuador. Defendant is a citizen of

the states of New York and Delaware. The matter in controversy

for each plaintiff and for each member of the class, exclusive

of interest and costs, exceeds the sum or value of $50,000.

. Venue is proper in this district under and

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and § 1391(b). Defendant has

its principal place of business in this judicial district, and

continuously and systematically transacts business in this

district. A substantial part of the tortious acts and omissions

giving rise to this Complaint took place in this judicial

district. The policies, procedures and decisions relating to


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oil exploration and drilling in Ecuador were set and made in New

York.

II.NATURE OF THE ACTION AND

SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

3. This is a class action brought on behalf of

citizens and residents of the Amazon region of Ecuador known as

the "Oriente" against Texaco Inc. ("Texaco"). Plaintiffs and

the class seek compensatory and punitive damages, and equitable

relief, to remedy the pollution and contamination of the

plaintiffs' environment and the personal injuries and property

damage caused thereby.

4. In 1964, Texaco acquired rights to explore and

drill for oil in the Oriente. From approximately 1972 through

1992, Texaco drilled more than 400 oil wells in the region and

extracted approximately 220,000 barrels of oil per day.

5. As more fully set forth in the "Factual

Background" and "Claims for Relief" sections of this Complaint,

Texaco did not use reasonable industry standards of oil

extraction in the Oriente, or comply with accepted American,

local or international standards of environmental safety and

protection. Rather, purely for its own economic gain, Texaco

deliberately ignored reasonable and safe practices and treated

the pristine Amazon rain forests of the Oriente and its people

as a toxic waste dump.

6. Texaco failed to pump unprocessable crude oil and

toxic residues back into the wells as is the reasonable and


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prudent industry practice. Instead, Texaco disposed of these

toxic substances by dumping them in open pits, into the streams,

rivers and wetlands, burning them in open pits without any

temperature or air pollution controls, and spreading oil on the

roads. Texaco designed and constructed oil pipelines without

adequate safety features resulting in spills of millions of

gallons of crude oil.

7. Texaco's practices of disposing of untreated

crude and waste by-products into the environment has

contaminated the drinking water, rivers, streams, ground water

and air with dangerously high levels of such known toxins as

benzene, toluene, xylene, mercury, lead and hydrocarbons, among

others. Texaco's acts and omissions have resulted in the

discharge of oil into the plaintiffs' environment at a rate in

excess of 3,000 gallons per day for 20 years. Many times more

oil has been spilled in the Oriente than was spilled in the

Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska.

8. Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent

have suffered severe personal injuries and are at an increased

risk of suffering other diseases, including cancers. Their

sources of potable water have been contaminated, their

properties polluted, their livestock killed or made ill, and

their very existence as a people jeopardized.

9. Plaintiffs seek damages under common law theories

of negligence (Count I), public and private nuisance (Count II

and Count III), strict liability (Count IV), medical monitoring

(Count V), trespass (Count VI), and civil conspiracy (Count


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VII). Plaintiffs seek damages under the Alien Tort Victims Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Count VIII). Plaintiffs also seek equitable

relief (Count IX).

10. Plaintiffs and the class have no means to redress

these wrongs other than through this action in this Honorable

Court. Texaco's activities in Ecuador were at all relevant

times designed, controlled, conceived and directed by defendant

Texaco Inc. through its operations in the United States. Texaco

no longer does business in Ecuador.

III.

THE PARTIES

A. Plaintiffs

11. Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of the

nation of Ecuador who live in the geographic area adversely

affected by defendant Texaco's oil drilling and exploration

activities. This region is depicted on the map attached hereto

as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. Some of

the plaintiffs are indigenous to this region. Others have

immigrated from other parts of Ecuador, all as more fully set

forth below. All plaintiffs have been exposed to toxic

substances as a direct result of defendant's tortious conduct

and have or will suffer property damage, personal injuries, and

increased risks of disease including cancer.

12. Plaintiff, Maria Aguinda, is a resident of the

rural area located on the main road south of Coca, Ecuador, in

the immediate vicinity of a road marking denoting kilometer 156.


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She is married with children and suffers from illnesses

including body growths directly related to oil contamination.

She is also at an increased risk of developing cancer. The only

water available to her for drinking is water that she collects

from the rain as all the rivers, springs and wetlands in the

vicinity of her home have been contaminated with toxic crude

oil. Furthermore, she is constantly subjected to chemical

poisoning as she must wash her feet regularly with gasoline to

remove oil contamination acquired from walking on the crude oil

contaminated roads. During the summer months when there is very

little rain, due to the constant spreading of crude oil on the

roads, she is subjected to inhalation of heavy levels of dust

particles covered with oil that are damaging her respiratory

system. She is a Quichua Indian.

13. Plaintiff, Carlos Grefa, is a resident of the



He is married with children and suffers from illnesses directly

related to oil contamination. He is also at an increased risk

of developing cancer. The only water available to him for

drinking is water that he collects from the rain as all the

rivers, springs and wetlands in the vicinity of his home have

been contaminated with toxic crude oil. Furthermore, he is

constantly subjected to chemical poisoning as he must wash his

feet regularly with gasoline to remove oil contamination

acquired from walking on the crude oil contaminated roads.

During the summer months when there is very little rain, due to


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the constant spreading of crude oil on the roads, he is

subjected to inhalation of heavy levels of dust particles

covered with oil that are damaging his respiratory system. He

is a Quichua Indian.

14. Plaintiffs, Carlos Grefa and Maria Aguinda also

sue as guardians of their minor child Gesica Grefa. Gesica

Grefa, is a resident of the rural area located on the main road

south of Coca, Ecuador, in the immediate vicinity of a road

marking denoting kilometer 156. She suffers from illnesses

including body growths directly related to oil contamination.

She is also at an increased risk of developing cancer. The only

water available to her for drinking is water that she collects

from the rain as all the rivers, springs and wetlands in the

vicinity of her home have been contaminated with toxic crude

oil. During the summer months when there is very little rain,

due to the constant spreading of crude oil on the roads, she is


covered with oil that are damaging her respiratory system. She


15. Plaintiff, Catarina Aguinda, is a resident of the



She suffers from illnesses including body growths directly

related to oil contamination. She is also at an increased risk

of developing cancer. The only water available to her for

drinking is water that she collects from the rain as all the

rivers, springs and wetlands in the vicinity of her home have


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been contaminated with toxic crude oil. Furthermore, she is

constantly subjected to chemical poisoning as she must wash her




the constant spreading of crude oil on the roads, she is




16. Plaintiff, Mercedes Grefa is a resident of the

















17. Plaintiff, Lidia Aguinda is a resident of the


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18. Plaintiff, Patricio Chimbo is a resident of the



He sues on his own behalf and as guardian of his minor children.

He and his family suffer from illnesses including body growths

directly related to oil contamination. They are at an increased

risk of developing cancer. The only water available to him and

his children for drinking is water that he collects from the

rain as all the rivers, springs and wetlands in the vicinity of

his home have been contaminated with toxic crude oil. He owns a

farm from which he derived his living. In the past few years


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all his animals have died from drinking the water of the

contaminated streams and he has been forced to stop raising

cows, goats and chickens. Furthermore, he is constantly

subjected to chemical poisoning as he and his wife and his

children must wash their feet regularly with gasoline to remove

oil contamination acquired from walking on the crude oil

contaminated roads. During the summer months when there is very

little rain, due to the constant spreading of crude oil on the

roads, he and his family are subjected to inhalation of heavy

levels of dust particles covered with oil that are damaging

their respiratory system. He, his wife and his family are

Quichua Indians.

19. Plaintiffs named above and other plaintiffs named

in Exhibit "B" are all similarly situated and all are bringing

this Complaint on their behalf and the behalf of all other

Quichua Indians similarly situated as well as members of other

indigenous communities similarly situated, all residing in the

region of Ecuador that comprises the area surrounded on the

North by the Ecuadorian frontier with Colombia, on the South by

the Parallel at 1.5 degrees south of the Equator, on the West by

the Meridian located at 77.5 degrees West of Greenwich England,

and on the East by the 76th Meridian West by Greenwich England.

For the convenience of the Court and parties, the plaintiffs

named in this Complaint who are Quichua and Cofan Indians

similarly situated to the plaintiffs are listed in alphabetical

order in Exhibit "B" which is incorporated into this Complaint

as if set forth fully herein.


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20. Plaintiff, Elias Piyaguaje, is a resident of San

Pablo de Aguarico in the Province of Sucumbios, in Ecuador

Amazonian lands. His land is located in the rain forest in the

vicinity of the Aguarico River and the town of Shusufundi. He

sues on his own behalf and as guardian for his minor children,

Lola who is eighteen years old; Edison, who is fifteen years

old; Paulina, who is ten years old; Jimena who is seven years

old and Elias who is five months old. Plaintiff Piyaguaje and

his family suffer from illnesses caused by oil contamination of

their air, ground and water sources. Defendant has contaminated

the river from which he and his family derived their sustenance

to a degree that has practically eliminated fish from his diet

and the diet of his wife and children. All the waters

previously used by him and his family for drinking and bathing

are contaminated with crude oil and they are forced to drink and

bathe only in rain water collected in barrels. Even this rain

water, however, has been determined to be contaminated with

Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons a carcinoginc by-product of oil

contamination. They are also at an increased risk of developing

cancer. He and his family can no longer swim in the rivers, as

is the Sekoya's ancient tradition, to cool from the tropical

heat during the day or to warm from the coolness of the Amazon

nights at sun rise, due to the high levels of oil contamination

of the river waters. He and his family's way of life has been

dramatically changed due to the oil contamination including

their culture, their diet and other ancient traditions. He and

his family are Sekoya Indians.


-13 -

21. Plaintiff, Delfin Payaguajo, is a resident of San




sues on his own behalf and as guardian for his minor children.

He and his family suffer from illnesses caused by oil

contamination of their water sources. Defendant has

contaminated the river from which he and his family derived

their sustenance to a degree that has practically eliminated

fish from his diet and the diet of his family. All the waters

previously used by him and his family for drinking and bathing

are contaminated with oil crude and they are forced to drink and

bathe only in rain water collected in barrels. Even this rain

water, however, has been determined to be contaminated with

Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons a carcinoginc by-product of oil

contamination. They are also at an increased risk of developing

cancer. He and his family can no longer swim in the rivers, as

is the Sekoya's ancient tradition, to cool from the tropical

heat during the day or to warm from the coolness of the Amazon

nights at sun rise, due to the high levels of oil contamination

of the river waters. He and his family's way of life has been

dramatically changed due to the oil contamination including

their culture, their diet and other ancient traditions. He and

his family are Sekoya Indians.

22. Plaintiff, Javier Piyaguaje is a resident of San




-14 -


suffers from illnesses caused by oil contamination of his water

sources. Defendant has contaminated the river from which he

derived his sustenance to a degree that has practically

eliminated fish from his diet. All the waters previously used

by him for drinking and bathing are contaminated with crude oil

and he is forced to drink and bathe only in rain water collected

in barrels. Even this rain water, however, has been determined

to be contaminated with Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons a

carcinoginc by-product of oil contamination. He is also at an

increased risk of developing cancer. He can no longer swim in

the rivers, as is the Sekoya's ancient tradition, to cool from

the tropical heat during the day or to warm from the coolness of

the Amazon nights at sun rise, due to the high levels of oil

contamination of the river waters. His way of life has been

dramatically changed due to the oil contamination including his

culture, his diet and other ancient traditions. He is a Sekoya

Indian.


in Exhibit "C" are all similarly situated and all are bringing

this Complaint on their own behalf and on behalf of all other

Sekoya Indians similarly situated as well as members of other

indigenous communities similarly situated, all residing in the

region of Ecuador that comprises the area surrounded on the

North by the Ecuadorian frontier with Colombia, on the South by

the Parallel at 1.5 degrees south of the Equator, on the West by

the Meridian located at 77.5 degrees West of Greenwich England,


-15 -

and on the East by the 76th Meridian West by Greenwich England.

For the convenience of the Court and parties, the plaintiffs

named in this Complaint who are Sekoya Indians similarly

situated to the plaintiffs are listed in alphabetical order in

Exhibit "C", which is incorporated into this Complaint as if set

forth fully herein.

24. Plaintiff, Homer Conde is a thirty year old

resident of land located adjacent to the road South of Coca,

Ecuador, near a marking denoting kilometer 128. Homer Conde

moved to this land in 1984 with his family. He is bringing this

law suit on his behalf and as guardian of his minor children.

In 1986, defendant opened an oil well near his home and the lake

behind his home which is on his property became contaminated.

Conde and his family suffer from illnesses related to drinking

and bathing in water contaminated with crude oil. They are also

at an increased risk of developing cancer. Defendant has since

1986 ruined all sources of water in the vicinity of plaintiff's

home. His cows have suffered spontaneous abortions after

drinking the contaminated water of the streams. During the

summer months when there is very little rain, due to the

constant spreading of crude oil on the roads, he and his

children are subjected to inhalation of heavy levels of dust

particles covered with oil that are damaging their respiratory

systems. He is an immigrant to this region of the Amazon.

25. Plaintiff, Santo Guillermo Ramirez is a resident

of land located adjacent to the road south of Coca, Ecuador,

near a marking denoting kilometer 143. He brings this law suit


-16 -

on his behalf and as guardian of his minor child. His child,

Danilo, suffers from body growths directly attributable to the

water contamination of the region with oil crude. Santo

Guillermo Ramirez also suffers from illnesses related to the

contamination of the water of the region with crude oil. All

the fish in the stream that passes through his property have

died from the oil contamination. They are also at an increased

risk of developing cancer. Whenever it rains, the oil that is

constantly being discarded by spreading the same on the roads

washes on the land owned by Ramirez and his family making it

impossible for Danilo, Santo Guillermo or other inhabitants of

the region not to be exposed and contaminated daily with toxic

crude oil. During the summer months when there is very little

rain, due to the constant spreading of crude oil on the roads,

they are subjected to inhalation of heavy levels of dust

particles covered with oil that are damaging his respiratory

system. Ramirez and his family are immigrants to this region of

the Amazon.

26. Plaintiff Juana Tanguila is a resident of the

Pimampiro Community located near La Joya de los Sachas, in

Sucumbios, Ecuador. Juana moved to Pimampiro twenty years ago

with her family. Her husband died five years ago and she is the

head of a household composed of herself and her children. She

and her children suffer from many illnesses related to the

contamination of the river near their home with crude oil

including but not limited to: growths on their bodies, fevers,

migraine headaches, and corporal pains. They are also at an


-17 -

increased risk of developing cancer. In addition, her married

daughter, Fabiola, who resides with her, suffered a spontaneous

abortion after bathing in the river on a day when the oil

contamination was particularly heavy. She and her family are

limited to drinking rain water that is collected in barrels

during the rainy season. During the dry season they are forced

to drink the water from the heavily contaminated river. The

river water contains high levels of Polycyclic Aromatic

Hydrocarbons at levels capable of causing cancers in those who

drink the water. She and her family have also attempted to draw

water from a small well on the ground to avoid the oil

contamination and have reason to believe that the water from

this shallow well is also contaminated from the oil spread on

the roads and the contamination of the ground water caused by

oil spilling from the oil lagoons created by defendant to

dispose of unmarketable and toxic crude. During the summer

months when there is very little rain, due to the constant

spreading of crude oil on the roads, she and her family are


covered with oil that are damaging their respiratory systems.

She and her family are immigrants to this region of the Amazon.


in Exhibit "D" are all similarly situated and all are bringing

this Complaint on their behalf and the behalf of all other

immigrants to this region of the Amazon who are similarly

situated. All plaintiffs named above and those named in Exhibit

"D" as well as all other plaintiff members of the class reside


-18 -

in the region of Ecuador that comprises the area surrounded on

the North by the Ecuadorian frontier with Colombia, on the South

by the Parallel at 1.5 degrees south of the Equator, on the West

by the Meridian located at 77.5 degrees West of Greenwich

England, and on the East by the 76th Meridian West by Greenwich

England. For the convenience of the Court and parties, the

plaintiffs named in this Complaint who are immigrants to the

region are listed in alphabetical order in Exhibit "D" which is

incorporated into this Complaint as if set forth fully herein.

B. Defendant

28. Defendant, Texaco Inc. is a Delaware Corporation,

with its principal place of business at 2000 West Chester

Avenue, White Plains, New York 10650. Texaco is a vertically

integrated enterprise engaged in the exploration, extraction,

production, transportation, refining, distributing and marketing

of oil, natural gas and petroleum products worldwide. Texaco

operated oil exploration, drilling and crude transportation

activities in the Oriente region of Ecuador, which activities

were directed, designed, controlled and conceived by defendant

in the United States.

IV.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

29. Plaintiffs bring this action individually, and


-19 -

pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23 (b)(3), on behalf of the following

class:All individuals who at any time from 1972 to thepresent reside in the region of Ecuador comprisedby the area bounded on the North by Colombia, onthe South by the Parallel at 1.5 degrees south ofthe Equator, on the West by the Meridian locatedat 77.5 degrees West of Greenwich England and onthe East by the 76th Meridian West of GreenwichEngland.

30. The class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable. Plaintiffs believe there are at least

30,000 members of the class.

31. There are questions of law and fact common to the

class.

32. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of

the class. Plaintiffs seek redress for the same conduct which

has affected all class members and press legal claims which are

the same for all class members.

33. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent

the class. Plaintiffs do not have any conflicts of interest

with the members of the class and they have retained counsel who

are experienced in complex litigation, including class actions,

who will vigorously prosecute this action.

34. Common questions of law and fact predominate over

any individual issues. Such common questions include, but are

not limited to, the following:

a) the policies, procedures and guidelines used

by defendant in exploring and drilling for oil;


-20 -

b) the policies, procedures and guidelines used

by defendant in handling and disposing of crude oil and waste

by-products of oil exploring and drilling;

c) the technological suitability of defendant's

exploration and drilling practices;

d) whether defendant's exploration, drilling

and disposal practices were negligent;

e) whether defendant's exploration, drilling

and disposal practices constitute intentional malfeasance;

f) the policies, procedures and guidelines used

by defendant in transporting oil;

g) whether defendant's conduct in transporting

oil was negligent;

h) whether defendant's design, construction and

maintenance of oil pipelines in the Oriente was negligent;

i) whether defendant's design, construction and

maintenance of oil pipelines in the Oriente constituted

intentional malfeasance;

j) whether the region defined in the class

definition has been contaminated with crude oil as a result of

defendant's activities and the extent of such contamination;

k) whether the region defined in the class

definition has been contaminated with by-products, wastes,

chemicals and other toxins as a result of defendant's

activities, and the extent of such contamination;

l) whether the pollutants which defendant has

discharged into the environment are toxic;


-21 -

m) whether defendant's conduct constitutes a

nuisance;

n) whether the class should receive medical

monitoring;

o) whether defendant is liable for compensatory

damages and the measure of such damages;

p) whether the defendant's conduct was wanton

and outrageous;

q) whether defendant is liable for punitive

damages and the amount of such damages, and

r) whether the class is entitled to equitable

relief.

35. A class action is the superior method for

adjudication of this controversy. In the absence of a class

action, the courts will be unnecessarily burdened with multiple,

duplicative individual actions. Moreover, if a class is not

certified, many meritorious claims will go unredressed as the

individual class members are not able to prosecute complex

litigation against a large, multi-national corporation.

V.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

36. The region of Ecuador in which plaintiffs and the

class reside contains some of the most ecologically diverse

tropical rain forests in the world. This region, known as the


-22 -

Oriente, lies in the Eastern half of Ecuador, on the downward

slope of the Andes Mountains.

37. The Oriente rain forests lie at the head waters

of the Amazon river system, and are vital to the flood control

of the entire river. The rain forests regulate the climate not

only of the Oriente region, but indeed, contribute to climate

conditions throughout the world. It is well accepted that

destruction of the tropical rain forests contributes to global

warming, a major environmental problem with potentially

disastrous effects for the entire planet.

38. Approximately eight groups of indigenous people

live in the Oriente. These people have lived for centuries in

the rain forests and depend on them for their livelihoods and

their very existence. While of general concern to everyone,

Texaco's destruction of the rain forests already has caused

physical injury to plaintiffs and the class and continues to

threaten their health, way of life, and very survival as a

people.

39. In or about 1964, defendant Texaco began oil

exploration and drilling activities in the Oriente region of

Ecuador. Texaco's activities as described herein have

devastated the rain forests of the Oriente and the health of the

people who live there.

40. Texaco's activities led to the discovery of many

oil fields. Eventually, these fields would, according to

Texaco, produce at their peak 220,000 barrels of crude oil per

day, from over 400 wells.


-23 -

41. In 1972, Texaco completed construction of a 500

kilometer oil pipeline which it designed. Texaco also designed

and constructed numerous subsidiary pipelines. These pipelines

have had repeated ruptures, leaks and discharges of oil causing

damage to the plaintiffs and the class.

42. Texaco directly operated oil facilities in

Ecuador up to July, 1990. From July 1990 through 1992, Texaco

remained involved in the operation of these facilities.

43. Texaco's acts and omissions have inflicted damage

on the people and environment of the Oriente of outrageous

proportions. In conducting its oil exploration, drilling and

transportation activities, Texaco failed to exercise due care,

failed to abide by industry standards, failed to follow accepted

international rules and standards, and failed to follow its own

stated guidelines which it contends were used in Ecuador.

Instead, Texaco acted with callous disregard for the health,

well being and safety of plaintiffs and the class. For example:

(a) Texaco's exploratory drilling practices

generate waste products which contain toxic substances. Rather

than contain these wastes, or dispose of them in environmentally

sound ways, these wastes were discharged into open pits. The

pits would overflow, allowing these toxins to discharge into

streams, rivers and groundwater from which plaintiffs and the

class obtain drinking water and food;

(b) Texaco also burned off the waste oil

products in the open pits or lagoons without sound or prudent

temperature or air pollution controls. As the result, the air


-24 -

plaintiffs and the class breath is contaminated with toxic

particles;

(c) Defendant has also placed these wastes in

crude "landfills," without proper linings or capping. As a

result, the toxins leak and are discharged from these

"landfills";

(d) The problems identified in subparagraphs (a)

- (c) above in connection with exploratory drilling were

repeated and exacerbated with production drilling. Large

quantities of toxic wastes are generated and discharged,

untreated, into the open pits, burned off in an unsafe manner,

or "landfilled";

(e) In addition to the waste products, crude oil

itself is highly toxic. Through the negligent, reckless and

intentional practices of defendant, crude oil has been

repeatedly spilled and discharged in the Oriente. Streams and

rivers in the region are black with untreated, discharged crude

oil. Aquatic life in the streams has been destroyed;

(f) Defendant intentionally disposed of oil on

the roads in the Oriente. Plaintiffs and the class have their

bodies and vehicles covered with this oil and are constantly

exposed to dust covered with the oil;

(g) The major pipeline designed, constructed,

maintained and operated by Texaco has repeatedly ruptured and

leaked. The Ecuadorian government estimates that 16.8 million

gallons of oil have spilled from the pipeline. That is

approximately 6 million gallons more than was spilled in the


-25 -

Exxon Valdez oil spill. The pipeline was negligently designed

and constructed by defendant with an inadequate number of shut-

off valves, so that when a rupture occurs, oil will flow

unchecked for days. Various secondary pipelines were also

constructed without due care in light of the unique topography

of the land resulting in the discharge of oil into the

environment;

(h) The defendant failed to have equipment for

cleaning up oil spills available. Accordingly, no effort was

made by defendant to clean up spills from the pipelines;

(i) The defendant never warned plaintiffs and

the class of the dangers of exposure to oil and the by-products

of oil drilling.

44. The defiling of the Oriente has had grave

consequences for plaintiffs and the class. The waste products

discharged in open pits typically contain such toxins as

arsenic, lead, mercury, benzene, naphthalene and other

hydrocarbons. These substances are toxic to animals and humans

and are known or suspected carcinogens.

45. These heavy metals, hydrocarbons and other

substances bioaccumulate in the environment and in the food

chain.

46. Plaintiffs and the class continuously ingest

these substances through dermal contact, breathing the polluted

air, drinking polluted water and eating fish and other foods

contaminated with these substances.

47. Oil discharge is so prevalent that the dirt roads


-26 -

in the region are covered with oil. Texaco also intentionally

dumped oil on the dirt roadways. In the dry season, oil laden

dust "storms" further expose the class to these poisons. The

plaintiffs and the class members frequently become covered with

oil, particularly on their feet and are forced to apply gasoline

to their bodies as a solvent to remove the oil. Similarly,

vehicles become heavily coated with oily dust so that they can

only be cleaned with gasoline.

48. The streams, rivers, lakes and aquifers of the

Oriente have become so contaminated with oil and oil by-products

that the water is unsuitable for drinking. Testing of the water

has revealed the presence of hydrocarbons and other carcinogens

at levels many times higher than EPA's recommended safety

levels.

49. Recently, testing of rain water has revealed that

even the rain water contains dangerous levels of toxic

substances attributable to oil exploration and production. As a

result, plaintiffs and the class have no source of safe water

for drinking, cooking or bathing.

50. Plaintiffs and the class members have been

exposed to toxic substances from at least the early 1970's or

the length of their lives, whichever is shorter. Plaintiffs

have suffered physical injuries, including rashes, skin

irritations, cancers, emotional distress and other ailments as a

direct result of this exposure.

51. Plaintiffs and the class are at a significantly

increased risk of developing cancer as a result of their


-27 -

exposure to these toxins.

52. The acts and omissions described herein were

committed by defendant maliciously, intentionally, and with a

flagrant disregard for the rights of plaintiffs and the class,

and with actual awareness on the part of the defendant that the

acts and omissions would, in reasonable probability, result in

great bodily harm to plaintiffs.

VI.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Count I

Negligence

53. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1

through 52 of this Complaint as fully as if set forth herein.

54. Defendant owed a duty to plaintiff and the class

to exercise reasonable care in conducting its oil exploration,

oil drilling, pipeline construction and other activities in

connection with the extraction of oil from the Oriente.

55. Defendant breached its duty of care by engaging

in the negligent activity set forth above and by otherwise

failing to employ safe, prudent and technologically current

techniques to prevent the discharge of oil and other by-products

into the environment.

56. The defendant was negligent in one, some and/or

all of the following respects:

(a) In using oil drilling technology inadequate

for the tropical region of the Amazon;

(b) In failing to develop proper technology to


-28 -

prevent the contamination of the pristine and fragile Amazon

environment with crude oil and its by-products;

(c) In failing to exercise due care in the

exploration and extraction of oil;

(d) In failing to exercise due care in the

design and construction of oil pipelines;

(e) In failing to prevent spills, discharges and

leaks of oil and its by-products;

(f) In failing to warn the inhabitants of the

region of the toxicity of crude oil and its by-products;

(g) In failing to adequately warn the immigrants

to the region and the indigenous inhabitants in their respective

languages of the toxicity of oil and its by-products;

(h) In failing to take reasonable precautions or

exercise reasonable care to publish, adopt and enforce safe

methods of disposal of unprocessable crude oil and its by-

products;

(i) In failing to reveal to the inhabitants of

the region tests conducted by defendant on the toxicity of the

products released by defendant into the environment;

(j) In failing to test all chemical products

released into the environment for adverse health effects, or to

cause said products to be tested;

(k) In concealing from plaintiffs information

concerning the effects of such products in humans and animals;

(l) In failing to adequately monitor the health

of plaintiffs exposed to toxic crude oil or its by-products.


-29 -

57. Defendant's breach of duty was wanton,

outrageous, reckless and intentional. Defendant made the

decision for its own economic gain to dump unprocessed oil into

the environment, and thereby to expose plaintiffs and the class

to toxic crude oil, and to benzene, toluene, arsenic, lead,

mercury, hydrocarbons and other toxins, knowing that such

substances were toxic to humans.

58. As a direct and proximate result of defendant's

breaches of duty, plaintiffs and the class have suffered

injuries to their persons and property. Plaintiffs and the

class are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages

in amounts to be ascertained at trial.

Count II

Public Nuisance



60. Defendant's conduct and the resulting

contamination of the Oriente environment has created a public

nuisance which endangers and will continue for many years to

endanger the safety, health and comfort of a large number of

persons.

61. Plaintiffs and class members have suffered

special and peculiar harm of a kind different from that suffered

by others, in that their health already has been injured, their

properties already have been damaged and their sources of clean


-30 -

water and food already have been curtailed.

62. Though it may be liable irrespective of fault,

defendant's conduct was unreasonable, wanton, outrageous,

reckless and intentional, and plaintiffs and the class are

entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in amounts

to be ascertained at trial.

Count III

Private Nuisance



64. Defendant's conduct has caused nontrespassory (as

well as trespassory) invasions of plaintiffs' and class members'

private use and enjoyment of their land.

65. Defendant's conduct has been unreasonable in that

it has caused severe annoyance, harm, inconvenience and damage

to plaintiffs' and class members' enjoyment of their private

properties.

66. Though it may be liable irrespective of fault,

defendant's conduct was unreasonable, wanton, outrageous,

reckless and intentional, and plaintiffs and the class are

entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in amounts


Count IV

Strict Liability



68. The technology used by defendant for extraction


-31 -

of crude oil from the Oriente was designed, created and used by

defendant to maximize its profits. This technology was

defective and unreasonably dangerous in the following respects:

(a) The technology lead to the contamination of

the waters of the region with toxic crude oil and its by-

products without providing adequate warning to plaintiffs and

the class in their own languages, of the health hazards

associated with the exposure to crude oil and its by-products

resulting from defendant's defective and unreasonably dangerous

technology.

(b) The technology was defectively designed and

unreasonably dangerous in that at all times alternative

technology existed for extraction of oil without discarding

toxic crude oil and its by-products into the environment, and

without creating unreasonable health hazards to plaintiffs and

the class.

(c) Defendant was in the business of extracting

and selling oil, and defendant by use of unreasonably dangerous

technology contaminated the environment, and this contamination

is the direct cause of the damages sustained by plaintiffs and

the class.

(d) Plaintiffs and the class were unaware of the

dangerous propensities of crude oil and its by-products which

rendered them unsafe if spilled and discarded into the

environment. Plaintiffs and the class were exposed to crude oil

and its by-products in manners that were reasonably anticipated

by defendant. Defendant intentionally exposed plaintiffs and


-32 -

the class to crude oil and its by-products by deliberately

discarding oil and its by-products into the environment.

69. Plaintiffs and the class are entitled to recover

compensatory and punitive damages in amounts to be ascertained

at trial.

Count V

Medical Monitoring



71. As a result of defendant's negligent and reckless

conduct, plaintiffs and the class have been significantly

exposed to known hazardous substances.

72. As a result of such exposure, plaintiffs and the

class are at an increased risk of contracting latent diseases,

including cancers.

73. Early detection and treatment of these diseases

is medically necessary and advisable.


the costs of a medical monitoring program, and to recover

punitive damages in amounts to be ascertained at trial.

Count VI

Trespass



76. Defendant's intentional and reckless acts and

omissions have resulted in the discharge of oil and other

pollutants onto the real property of the plaintiffs and the


-33 -

class.

77. Such acts and omissions constitute a trespass

upon the properties of plaintiffs and the class.


compensatory and punitive damages as a result of defendant's

trespass in amounts to be ascertained at trial.

Count VII

Civil Conspiracy



80. Defendant and its subsidiaries, affiliates and

others knowingly agreed, contrived, combined, confederated, and

conspired among themselves to cause plaintiffs injury, illness

and disease by exposing plaintiffs to harmful crude oil.

Defendant and its co-conspirators committed the above described

wrongs by intentionally dumping, spilling and discharging crude

oil and other toxins into the environment and by willfully

misrepresenting and suppressing the truth as to the risks and

dangers associated with exposure to crude oil and its by-

products.

81. In furtherance of said conspiracy, defendant

performed the following overt acts, among others, and in

addition to the acts and omissions described in Counts I through

V which are incorporated herein by reference:

(a) For many years defendant, individually,

jointly, and in conspiracy with others, has possessed medical

and scientific data, literature, and test reports which clearly


-34 -

indicated that Amazon crude oil and its by-products were

unreasonably dangerous, hazardous, deleterious, carcinogenic,

and potentially deadly;

(b) Despite the medical and scientific data,

literature, and test reports by and available to defendant,

defendant jointly and in conspiracy with others, fraudulently,

willfully and maliciously:

(i) withheld, concealed and suppressed said

medical and scientific data, literature, and test reports

regarding the health risks associated with Amazon crude oil and

its by-products, from plaintiffs;

(ii) caused to be released, published and

disseminated literature containing information and statements

regarding the risks of exposures of plaintiffs to Amazon crude

oil and its by products which defendant knew were incorrect,

incomplete, outdated, and mislead;

(iii) by the false and fraudulent

misrepresentations, omissions, and concealments set forth above,

defendant intended to induce plaintiffs to rely upon said false

and fraudulent misrepresentations, omissions, and concealments

and to continue to expose them to the dangers inherent in

exposure by plaintiffs to crude oil and its by-products.

82. Plaintiffs and the class reasonably and in good

faith relied upon the false and fraudulent representations,

omissions and concealments made by defendant regarding the lack

of health risks to humans of oil extraction activities as well

as the lack of risk of contaminating the environment with toxic


-35 -

and harmful products. Plaintiffs and the class have suffered

personal injuries and property damages as a result of the

tortious conduct which defendant committed in conspiracy with

others.

83. As a direct and proximate result of defendant's

conspiratorial acts, plaintiffs have suffered damages.

Plaintiffs and the class are entitled to recover compensatory

and punitive damages in amounts to be ascertained at trial.

Count VIII

Violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1350



85. Defendant's acts and omissions of intentionally

and tortiously discharging crude oil and other toxins into the

environment; in damaging the pristine rain forests of the

Oriente; in destroying the streams, rivers, waterways and

acquifers, and in threatening the survival of the indigenous

people of the Oriente violate the law of nations, international

law, worldwide industry standards and practices, as well as the

laws of the United States.

86. Defendant's conduct in violation of the law of

nations has caused plaintiffs and the class damages in amounts


Count IX

Equitable Relief




-36 -

88. As a result of defendant's conduct, plaintiffs'

properties and environment are highly contaminated with toxic

substances. Plaintiffs' drinking water supplies have been

contaminated with carcinogens, rendering them unsuitable for

consumption.

89. In the absence of injunctive relief, plaintiffs

will suffer irreparable harm. Plaintiffs do not have an

adequate remedy at law.

90. Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief to

remedy the contamination and spoliation of their properties,

water supplies and environment.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

91. Plaintiffs demand trial by jury on all issues.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request the Court

to:

(a) determine that this case may be maintained as a

class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Fed.R.Civ.P.;

(b) enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs and the

class and against defendant on all counts of the Complaint;

(c) award plaintiffs and the class compensatory and

punitive damages;

(d) grant plaintiffs and the class equitable relief;

(e) award plaintiffs and the class the costs of suit,

and


-37 -

(f) award plaintiffs and the class such other and

further relief as the Court deems just under the circumstances.

DATED: November 3, 1993 Respectfully submitted,

___________________________________Joseph C. Kohn (JK-1755)Myles H. Malman (MM-2897)Martin J. D'Urso (MD-6576)Diana Liberto (DL-8313)KOHN, NAST & GRAF, P.C.2400 One Reading Center1101 Market StreetPhiladelphia, PA 19107(215) 238-1700

Cristobal Bonifaz (CB-2949)John Bonifaz (JB-0987)Steven R. Donziger (SD-5700)Tucker Taft Building48 North Pleasant StreetAmherst, MA 01002(413) 253-5626

Amy Damen (AD-1758)SULLIVAN & DAMENOne North BroadwayWhite Plains, New York 10601(914) 428-9414

Attorneys for Plaintiffsand the Class


United States District Court,S.D. New York.

Maria AGUINDA, et al., Plaintiffs,v.

TEXACO, INC., Defendant.Gabriel Ashanga Jota, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Texaco, Inc., Defendant.

Nos. 93 CIV. 7527, 94 CIV. 9266.May 30, 2001.

Citizens of Peru and Ecuador brought suit al-leging that oil company polluted rain forests andrivers in those two countries, causing environ-mental damage and personal injuries. The UnitedStates District Court for the Southern District ofNew York, Rakoff, J., 945 F.Supp. 625, dis-missed complaint on grounds of internationalcomity, forum non conveniens, and failure to joinindispensable parties. The Court of Appeals, 157F.3d 153, vacated and remanded. The DistrictCourt denied motion for recusal, and the Court ofAppeals, 241 F.3d 194, affirmed. Thereafter, oilcompany renewed motion for dismissal on forumnon conveniens grounds, after supplying addi-tional information and consenting to suit inEcuador and Peru. The District Court held that:(1) Ecuador was adequate alternate forum; (2)Ecuadorian law, providing that filing of lawsuitoutside of country precluding bringing of similaraction in Ecuador, did not preclude dismissal; (3)private and public factors favored dismissal and(4) presence of claim under Alien Tort ClaimsAct (ATCA) did not preclude dismissal.

Case dismissed.

West Headnotes

[1] Federal Courts 170B 45

170B Federal Courts170BI Jurisdiction and Powers in General

170BI(B) Right to Decline Jurisdiction;Abstention Doctrine

170Bk45 k. Forum non conveniens.

Most Cited CasesTo prevail on a motion to dismiss on the

grounds of forum non conveniens, a defendantmust demonstrate (1) that there exists an adequatealternative forum, and (2) that the ordinarilystrong presumption favoring the plaintiff's chosenforum is overcome by a balance of the relevantfactors of private and public interest weighingheavily in favor of the alternative forum.




170Bk45 k. Forum non conveniens.Most Cited Cases

Oil company seeking, on forum non conveni-ens grounds, dismissal of tort suit, brought byclaimants alleging damages arising out of negli-gent management of oil pipelines on land ownedby Ecuadorian government, satisfied requirementthat it show courts of Ecuador to be satisfactoryalternate forum, even though claimants arguedthat tort claims were seldom brought in Ecuador.





Oil company seeking, on forum non conveni-ens grounds, dismissal of tort suit, brought byclaimants alleging damages arising out of negli-gent management of oil pipelines on land ownedby Ecuadorian government, satisfied requirementthat it show courts of Ecuador to be satisfactoryalternate forum, despite unavailability of class ac-tions in Ecuador; many world nations did not au-thorize class actions, and due to differing circum-stances of individual cases it was unlikely thatcase could proceed as class action in UnitedStates.

FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 1142 F.Supp.2d 534(Cite as: 142 F.Supp.2d 534)

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Oil company seeking, on forum non conveni-ens grounds, dismissal of tort suit, brought byclaimants alleging damages arising out of negli-gent management of oil pipelines on land ownedby Ecuadorian government, satisfied requirementthat it show courts of Ecuador to be satisfactoryalternate forum, despite claims of Ecuadorianprocedural deficiencies, including need for pro-tracted administrative proceedings prior to suit,discovery restrictions, cross-examination limita-tions and tendency to have court appointed ex-perts.





Oil company seeking, on forum non conveni-ens grounds, dismissal of tort suit, brought byclaimants alleging damages arising out of negli-gent management of oil pipelines on land ownedby Ecuadorian government, satisfied requirementthat it show courts of Ecuador to be satisfactoryalternate forum, despite claims that Ecuadorianjudiciary was corrupt.





Ecuadorian law, providing that filing of law-suit outside of country precluded bringing of sim-ilar action in Ecuador, did not preclude dismissalon forum non conveniens grounds of tort suit,

brought by claimants alleging damages arisingout of negligent management of oil pipelines onland owned by Ecuadorian government; law wasadopted after suit in question was commenced,and it was doubtful that it would be interpreted tobar suit in Ecuador following foreign dismissalon forum non conveniens grounds.





Private factors favored dismissal, on forumnon conveniens grounds, of tort suit, brought byclaimants alleging damages arising out of negli-gent management of oil pipelines on land ownedby Ecuadorian government; claimants lived inEcuador or nearby in Peru, site inspection couldbe conducted in Ecuadorian action but not inAmerican, Ecuador could be joined as party inEcuadorian suit, and only conduct arguably in-volving sued oil company was participation byfourth tier subsidiary, not joined as party, in con-sortium causing damages, with most of subsidi-ary's activities occurring in Ecuador





Private factors favored dismissal, on forumnon conveniens grounds, of tort suit, brought byclaimants alleging damages arising out of negli-gent management of oil pipelines on land ownedby Ecuadorian government; Ecuadorian local in-terest in problems of environmental pollution andalleged government corruption, relating topipelines, exceeded any possible American in-terest in problems, and local courts were betterequipped to handle evidence and language prob-lems.
































Court would dismiss, on forum non conveni-ens grounds, tort suit brought by claimants al-leging damages arising out of negligent manage-ment of oil pipelines on land owned by Ecuadori-an government, even though suit included claimunder Alien Tort Claims Act, which providedfederal forum for aliens suing United States entit-ies for violations of law of nations; alleged con-duct of oil company being sued was not suffi-ciently egregious. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.





Alien Tort Claims Act, which provided fed-eral forum for aliens suing United States entitiesfor violations of law of nations, did not alter bal-ance of private and public factors undertaken indetermining whether to dismiss suit on forum nonconveniens grounds, in favor of litigation in othernations. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.

*536 Cristobal Bonifaz,Law Offices of CristobalBonifaz, Amherst, MA, Martin J. D'Urso, JosephC. Kohn, Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C., Philadelphia,PA, for Plaintiffs.

George S. Branch, Daniel J. King, King & Spald-ing, Atlanta, GA, Milton Schubin, Kaye, Scholer,Fierman, Hays & Handler, LLP, Ronald Minkoff,Beldoch Levine & Hoffman LLP, Jonathan S.Abady, Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP,New York City, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDERRAKOFF, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is the renewed mo-tion of defendant Texaco to dismiss these cases infavor of their being pursued in the courts ofEcuador (or in the courts of Peru by any Peruvianplaintiff who prefers*537 that forum). BecauseTexaco has carried its burden on every element ofthe motion, and because the record establishesoverwhelmingly that these cases have everythingto do with Ecuador and nothing to do with theUnited States, the Court grants the motion anddismisses the cases on the ground of forum nonconveniens.

Familiarity with the facts and prior proceed-ings in these cases is here assumed. See, e.g.,Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F.Supp. 625(S.D.N.Y.1996), reconsid. denied, 175 F.R.D. 50(S.D.N.Y.1997), vacated sub nomine, Jota v.Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir.1998). To re-capitulate briefly, plaintiffs in the Aquinda suitare 76 residents of the Oriente region of Ecuadorand plaintiffs in the Ashanga suit are 23 residentsof the adjoining area in Peru (and four related or-ganizations), each group of plaintiffs purportingto sue on behalf of a corresponding class of thou-sands of such residents. See Complaint, Aguindav. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y.April 11, 1994) (“Aguinda Compl.”), at ¶¶ 3–4 &Exs. B, C, D; Complaint, Ashanga v. Texaco,Inc., 94 Civ. 9266 (“Ashanga Compl.”), at ¶¶ 3,13.

Neither lawsuit alleges any injury to persons,property, or commerce in the United States. In-stead, plaintiffs allege they “have or will sufferproperty damage, personal injuries, and increasedrisk of disease,” Aguinda Compl. ¶ 11, inEcuador and Peru respectively, as a result of neg-ligent or otherwise improper oil piping and wastedisposal practices that were initiated several dec-ades ago, on lands owned by the Republic ofEcuador, by a consortium (the “Consortium”) inwhich Texaco held an indirect interest. SeeAshanga Compl. ¶¶ 6–7; Aguinda Compl. ¶¶ 6–7;Defendant Texaco, Inc.'s Appendix of Affidavits,Documents and Other Authorities in Support ofIts Renewed Motions to Dismiss (“TexacoApp.”), Ex. 2, Affidavit of Texaco Petroleum Co.(“TexPet Aff.”), at ¶ 7.








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No present or former member of the Consor-tium is a party to these lawsuits. That includes theGovernment of Ecuador, which, either directly orthrough the state-owned corporation PetroE-cuador, regulated the Consortium from the outset,acquired a minority stake in 1974, acquired fulloperational control in 1990, and acquired exclus-ive ownership in 1992. See, e.g., Jota, 157 F.3d at156; Texaco App., Ex. 2, TexPet Aff. at ¶¶ 6–10& Ex. B; Texaco App., Ex. 3, Deposition of Wil-liam C. Benton (“Benton Dep.”) at 201. Not onlyis the Government of Ecuador not named as aparty but also it cannot be sued as a third-partydefendant, since it has now formally affirmed thatit will not waive sovereign immunity with respectto these cases, see infra.

Even before the Government of Ecuador tookcomplete control of the Consortium, Texaco'sonly interest consisted of its indirect investmentin Texaco Petroleum Company (“TexPet”), aDelaware corporation and fourth-tier subsidiaryof Texaco, which initially operated the petroleumconcession for the Consortium and held varyinginterests in the Consortium until 1992. See Jota,157 F.3d at 156; TexPet Aff. at ¶¶ 2, 3, 10. ButTexPet, though sued in the courts of Ecuador, seeinfra, is not named as a party here.

Instead, the sole defendant is Texaco, basedon broad but conclusory allegations that Texacodirectly controlled the Consortium's activitiesfrom the United States, see Aguinda Compl. at ¶¶2, 28; Ashanga Compl. at ¶¶ 11, 25. Faced withsimilar allegations in a parallel action broughtagainst Texaco by some of the same plaintiffs ashere, the United States District Court for theSouthern District of Texas dismissed the case infavor of its being pursued in the courts ofEcuador. See *538 Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847F.Supp. 61, 63 (S.D.Tex.1994). Here, however,the late Judge Broderick (to whom these caseswere originally assigned)—while expressingdoubts that these suits would survive a similarmotion to dismiss, see Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,1994 WL 142006, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994)—allowed plaintiffs to conduct considerable dis-covery as to the alleged Texaco involvement.

Nonetheless, the plaintiffs, after taking nu-merous depositions and obtaining responses to nofewer than 81 document requests and 143 inter-rogatories, were unable to adduce material com-petent evidence of meaningful Texaco involve-ment in the misconduct complained of—to thepoint that plaintiffs essentially stipulated asmuch. See Texaco App., Ex. 21, Stipulation andOrder, Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., 93 Civ. 7527,dated July 12, 1995. Accordingly, this judge (towhom the cases were ultimately reassigned fol-lowing Judge Broderick's death) dismissed thecases on the ground, inter alia, of forum non con-veniens. See Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945F.Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y.1996), reconsid. denied,175 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y.1997); Ashanga v.Texaco, Inc., 94 Civ. 9266 (judgment, Aug. 13,1997). The Court of Appeals reversed, however,finding, so far as forum non conveniens was con-cerned, that the district court had failed to obtain“a commitment by Texaco to submit to the juris-diction of the Ecuadoran courts for purposes ofthis action” and, further, had relied too heavily onthe determinations of the District Court for theSouthern District of Texas in weighing the factorsrelevant to a forum non conveniens dismissal.Jota, 157 F.3d at 159.

Following remand, Texaco provided themissing commitment to submit to the jurisdictionof the courts of Ecuador (and Peru, as well) andthen renewed its motion to dismiss on ground offorum non conveniens. After receiving furtherbriefing from the parties and obtaining clarifica-tion from the Government of Ecuador as to itscurrent posture respecting these lawsuits, cf. Jota,157 F.3d at 160, this Court, by Order dated Janu-ary 21, 2000, indicated that it was leaning towardgranting the motion but would defer ruling in or-der to give the plaintiffs the chance to reopen anissue they had previously abandoned, i.e., wheth-er the courts of Ecuador (and/or Peru) are suffi-ciently independent and impartial to provide therequisite modicum of due process. See BridgewayCorp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 141–42 & n. 1(2d Cir.2000).

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damus petition to the Court of Appeals seekingthis Court's recusal. That petition having nowbeen denied, see In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194,2000 WL 33182244 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2001), andplaintiffs' further petition for rehearing en banc ofthat denial having also been denied by order ofthe Court of Appeals filed May 29, 2001, theCourt is now free to rule on the pending motion.

[1] To prevail on a motion to dismiss on theground of forum non conveniens, a defendantmust demonstrate (1) that there exists an adequatealternative forum, see DiRienzo v. Philip Servs.Corp., 232 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir.2000); EvolutionOnline Sys., Inc. v. Koninklijke PTT NederlandN.V., 145 F.3d 505, 510 (2d Cir.1998); PT UnitedCan Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65,73 (2d Cir.1998), and (2) that the ordinarilystrong presumption favoring the plaintiff's chosenforum is overcome by a balance of the relevantfactors of private and public interest weighingheavily in favor of the alternative forum, seePiper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,255–57, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981),reh'g denied, *539455 U.S. 928, 102 S.Ct. 1296,71 L.Ed.2d 474 (1982); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,330 U.S. 501, 508–10, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed.1055 (1947) (“ Gilbert ”); DiRienzo, 232 F.3d at56–57; PT United Can Co., 138 F.3d at 73–74.

[2] The requirement of an adequate alternat-ive forum “[o]rdinarily ... will be satisfied whenthe defendant is ‘amenable to process' in the otherjurisdiction.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255 n.22, 102 S.Ct. 252 (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at506–07, 67 S.Ct. 839); see also Blanco v. BancoIndustrial de Venezuela, S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 980(2d Cir.1993). Furthermore, “[a]n agreement bythe defendant to submit to the jurisdiction of theforeign forum can generally satisfy this require-ment.” DiRienzo, 232 F.3d at 57; see also Jota,157 F.3d at 159. Here, Texaco has now unam-biguously agreed in writing to being sued onthese claims (or their Ecuadorian equivalents) inEcuador, to accept service of process in Ecuador,and to waive for 60 days after the date of this dis-missal any statute of limitations-based defensesthat may have matured since the filing of the in-stant Complaints. See Texaco Inc.'s Memorandum

of Law In Support of Its Renewed Motions toDismiss Based on Forum Non Conveniens and In-ternational Comity (“Def.'s Mem.”) at 12–13;Texaco App., Exs. 18 & 19, Texaco Inc.'s Noticeof Agreements in Satisfying Forum Non Conveni-ens and International Comity Conditions; tran-script of hearing on defendant's renewed motionto dismiss, Feb. 1, 1999 (“Tr.”) at 5. Though notrequired to do so by the Court of Appeals, Texacohas also provided identical assurances with re-spect to a Peruvian forum, should any of the Per-uvian residents in Ashanga prefer that forum. SeeDef.'s Mem. at 12–13; Texaco App., Ex. 19.

While plaintiffs argue that these commit-ments by Texaco do not extend beyond the namedplaintiffs to other, unnamed members of the pu-tative classes, this is not a reasonable reading ofthe commitments and the Court does not so con-strue them. Lest there be any doubt, however, theCourt directs that if Texaco does not agree thatthese commitments extend, mutatis mutandis, toall members of the putative classes, it must so in-form the Court in writing within three businessdays of receiving this Opinion and Order, inwhich case the Court will re-open the otherwisefinal dismissal of these cases.

Even though, as mentioned, such submissionby a defendant to being sued in a foreign forum isnormally sufficient in itself to satisfy thethreshold requirement of an adequate alternativeforum in a motion to dismiss on grounds of forumnon conveniens, plaintiffs, in their opposition todefendant's instant motion, raise several addition-al objections to the adequacy of an Ecuadorianforum. The first is that “Ecuador Is Not An Ad-equate Forum Because Its Jurisprudence, For AllPractical Purposes, Does Not Recognize TortClaims.” Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'Reply to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Com-plaint, dated Jan. 25, 1999 (“Pls.' Jan. 25, 1999Mem.”) at 5. Rather remarkably, this argumentignores the undisputed evidence that certainmembers of the putative Aguinda class, as well asthree affected Ecuadorian municipalities, havealready brought tort actions in the Ecuadoriancourts, on some of the very claims here alleged,against TexPet, Petroecuador and other present or




















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former members of the Consortium, and have, insome of these cases, obtained tort judgments inplaintiffs' favor. See Texaco App., Ex. 14, Affi-davit of Dr. Vicente Bermeo Lañas at ¶ 13;Texaco App., Ex. 15, Affidavit of Dr. RodrigoPerez Pallares (“Perez Aff.”) at ¶ 4 & Ex. A; seealso Texaco App., Ex. 13, Affidavit of Dr. AdolfoCallejas Ribadeneira, dated Dec. 28, 1998(“Callejas Aff. I”) at ¶¶ 2–5 *540 & Exs. A—D;Texaco, Inc.'s Reply Memorandum of Law inSupport of Its Renewed Motions to DismissBased on Forum Non Conveniens and Interna-tional Comity (“Def.'s Reply Mem.”), Ex. 1, Affi-davit of Dr. Adolfo Callejas Ribadeneira, datedJan. 22, 1999 (“Callejas Aff. II”) at ¶¶ 3–4 & Ex.A. Likewise, although unrelated to the particularclaims here made, numerous Ecuadorian oilfieldworkers have brought personal injury suitsagainst TexPet in Ecuador based on claims of al-leged negligence and have prevailed in several ofthese cases. See Perez Aff., Exs. A, B.

More generally, section 2241 of theEcuadorian Civil Code expressly provides thatpersons injured in their person or property by an-other's negligence or intentional wrongdoing maysue in the Ecuadorian courts for monetary dam-ages and equitable relief. See Texaco App., Ex.10, Affidavit of Dr. Enrique Ponce y Carbo(“Ponce y Carbo Aff.”) at ¶¶ 12–14; see also Del-gado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F.Supp. 1324, 1359–60(S.D.Tex.1995), aff'd, 231 F.3d 165 (5thCir.2000). Plaintiffs concede as much, but never-theless assert, through their “legal expert,” that“very few such actions are filed in the[Ecuadorian] courts.” See Plaintiffs' Appendix ofAffidavits, Documents and Other Authorities inOpposition of [sic ] Texaco's Motions to Dismiss,Ex. 79, Affidavit of Alberto Wray (“Wray Aff.”)at ¶ 8. Professor Wray, however, supplies littleexplanation or description of his methodology inreaching this conclusion, and it appears to bebased on nothing more than a tenuous inferencefrom the fact that in Ecuador (as in the UnitedStates) few tort cases reach the nation's SupremeCourt. Comparable inferences have been held in-sufficient to deem a foreign forum inadequate.See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Dis-aster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634

F.Supp. 842, 848–52 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (Indian for-um found adequate for mass tort case despite as-sertions of “little reported case law in the tortfield,” “no tort law relating to disputes arising outof complex product or design liability,” and otherindications of lesser-developed tort law), aff'd asmodified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.1987); see alsoAlnwick v. European Micro Holdings, Inc., 2001WL 391952, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001)(Dutch forum adequate “even assuming thatDutch law does not recognize the tort of fraud”);and cf. Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. NationalWestminster Bank PLC, 155 F.3d 603, 609–11(2d Cir.1998) (England adequate forum despitefact that English courts had never awarded moneydamages in antitrust case).

Here, moreover, any speculation about theEcuadorian courts' alleged unreceptiveness to tortcases is put to rest by the undisputed evidence,supra, that tort claims based on the very occur-rences here at issue have been successfully pro-secuted in the Ecuadorian courts. Furthermore,several United States courts have previouslyfound Ecuador to be an adequate forum to ad-dress similar (and, in some cases, identical) tortclaims to those of plaintiffs here. See, e.g., Del-gado, 890 F.Supp. at 1359–61 (Ecuador adequatefor personal injury cases based on pesticide ex-posure); Sequihua, 847 F.Supp. at 64 (Ecuadoradequate to address personal injury and propertydamage from oil pollution); Ciba–Geigy Ltd. v.Fish Peddler, Inc., 691 So.2d 1111, 1117(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (Ecuador adequate to ad-dress property damage from fungicide exposure).In short, plaintiffs' first objection to the adequacyof an Ecuadorian forum is entirely without found-ation.

[3] Plaintiffs' second objection to the ad-equacy of an Ecuadorian forum is that “Ecuadoris Not an Adequate Forum For This LitigationBecause Ecuador Does Not *541 Recognize ClassActions and Has No Comparable Procedure toGrant Plaintiffs the Equitable Remedy They ArePrincipally Seeking.” Pls.' Mem. at 10. This,again, is unpersuasive. The class action mechan-ism, added to the Federal Rules of Civil Proced-ure in 1937, is ultimately nothing more than a





























“convenient procedural device,” Beamon v.Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 969 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting3B James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's FederalPractice ¶ 23.02 (2d ed.1980)), which most of theworld's nations have chosen not to adopt and themerits of which continue to be debated even inthe United States. Its absence does not ordinarilyrender a foreign forum “inadequate” for purposesof forum non conveniens analysis. See, e.g., Bea-mon, 125 F.3d at 969–70; In re Union CarbideCorp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India inDecember, 1984, 809 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir.1987); In re Lloyd's Am. Trust Fund Litig., 954 F.Supp.656, 673 (S.D.N.Y.1997); and cf., e.g., Murray v.British Broadcasting Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 292–93(2d Cir.1996) (England adequate forum despiteplaintiff's claim that American contingency feewas only way he could afford a lawyer).

It seems doubtful, moreover, that the instantcases would qualify for class action status even ifthey were to remain in the United States, see gen-erally Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997), andhence the alleged deprivation of this device maybe no deprivation at all. To begin with, there areimmense due process problems inherent inproviding adequate notice and representation tothe thousands of Amazonian residents thatplaintiffs seek to include in their proposedclasses, see generally, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,527 U.S. 815, 843–48, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144L.Ed.2d 715 (1999); Allison v. Citgo PetroleumCorp., 151 F.3d 402, 412 (5th Cir.1998). It is alsoobvious that the multiplicity of ways in whichplaintiffs allege that the Consortium's activitieshave directly and indirectly impacted variousplaintiffs' various interests, or will impact them inthe future, renders it problematic whether ques-tions of law or fact common to the members ofthe class predominate over questions affecting in-dividual members. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at623–25, 117 S.Ct. 2231; see also Aguinda, 1994WL at *2.

Even the bare question of liability could notreadily be handled here as a class action, giventhe multiple causation issues raised by plaintiffs'claims of indirect injuries extending over hun-

dreds of miles and dozens of years and affectingindividual members of the classes (including fu-ture claimants) in a multitude of different ways,ranging from the pollution of wells to the devel-opment of “pre-cancerous growths.” See Jota,157 F.3d at 155–56. Indeed, many of the injuriesclaimed by even the named plaintiffs are in thenature of “increased risks” and other future con-tingent claims that have not yet ripened into actu-al injuries. See, e.g., Aguinda Compl. ¶¶ 11–26;Ashanga Compl. ¶¶ 13–23. While conceivablysome of these problems might be mitigatedthrough the creation and adequate representationof numerous subclasses (none of which plaintiffsprovide for), it is difficult to see how the vastlycomplicated, if not entirely unmanageable lawsuitthat would then emerge would offer greater effi-ciencies than could be achieved in Ecuadorthrough more conventional lawsuits invoking tra-ditional principles of stare decisis and joinder. In-deed, even where class actions are permitted, asin the United States, experience has shown thatthe premature and undifferentiated aggregation ofhundreds or thousands of tort claims has oftenproved counterproductive. See Report on MassTort Litigation To the Judicial Conference of the*542 United States (“Judicial Conference Report”) 5–6, 22, 36, 39–40 (1999).

While plaintiffs try to skirt some of these ob-jections by claiming in conclusory fashion thatthey are “principally” seeking equitable, injunct-ive relief, see Pls.' Mem. at 10, they have in norespect relinquished their claims for billions ofdollars in damages and other legal relief, seeJota, 157 F.3d at 161. Without such relinquish-ment, it is highly doubtful that the equitable as-pects of these cases could be separately litigatedin a way that would satisfy Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.See Allison, 151 F.3d at 425–26. Indeed, much ofthe equitable relief here sought (such as “medicalmonitoring” for a variety of potential future med-ical injuries) is inextricably intertwined with theindividualized claims for damages and the indi-vidualized issues of multiple causation.

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ful, as the Court of Appeals recognized, see Jota,157 F.3d at 162, that a United States court could,in the absence of the Government of Ecuador,fully address many of plaintiffs' claims for equit-able relief; and that Government has now madeclear that it will neither waive sovereign im-munity nor participate as a party in these actionshere, see Texaco App., Ex. 17, Letter to the Courtfrom Ambassador of Ecuador; see also Tr. at 59.Since, by contrast, the Government of Ecuadorcan be joined as a party in Ecuador, an Ecuadori-an forum, even in the absence of the class actiondevice, might well be a more adequate forum thanthe United States for purposes of providing com-plete equitable relief. In short, the absence of theclass action device in Ecuador is not a sufficientimpediment to render the Ecuadorian forum inad-equate.

[4] Plaintiffs' final objection to the adequacyof an Ecuadorian forum is that “Procedural Pro-cesses in Ecuador Make It Difficult if Not Im-possible to Litigate These Tort Actions There.”Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defend-ant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Jan. 11,1999 (“Pls.' Jan. 11, 1999 Mem.”) at 9; see alsoid. at 13–14. Under this heading, plaintiffs firstargue that claims of environmental contaminationcommenced in Ecuador must initially be filedwith administrative agencies and that these agen-cies are slow to take action. See id. at 9.Plaintiffs' only support for these assertions is atypically conclusory opinion from ProfessorWray, who cites no authority to justify his con-clusions in this regard. See Wray Aff. ¶ 12. De-fendant, by contrast, has adduced detailed affi-davits from its Ecuadorian legal experts specific-ally denying that any such impediment exists tofiling these claims directly with the Ecuadoriancourts and asserting, instead, that the administrat-ive agencies simply provide an alternative forumfor certain of plaintiffs' claims. See Ponce yCarbo Aff. at ¶ 17; Callejas Aff. I at ¶ 5; CallejasAff. II at ¶¶ 3–5. Moreover, even if ProfessorWray were right and plaintiffs had to first pursuetheir administrative remedies, such an“exhaustion” requirement, commonplace to muchUnited States litigation, is hardly a ground fordeeming the Ecuadorian forum inadequate. See

generally DiRienzo, 232 F.3d at 57 (“Even if par-ticular causes of action or certain desirable rem-edies are not available in the foreign forum, thatforum will usually be adequate so long as it per-mits litigation of the subject matter of the dispute,provides adequate procedural safeguards and theremedy available in the alternative forum is notso inadequate as to amount to no remedy at all.”).

Plaintiffs' other argument under their thirdheading essentially consists of listing some of thedifferences between United *543 States proced-ures and those of civil law systems like Ecuador'sthat make the former a more favorable forum forplaintiffs generally. Such differences include, forexample, Ecuador's tighter restrictions on discov-ery, its denial of oral cross-examination in certaincircumstances, and its preference for court-appointed experts over party-retained experts. SeeWray Aff. ¶¶ 4–7. Some would argue that thesefeatures of civil law systems render those systemsmore, not less, adequate to the fair determinationof justice; and certainly in recent years the UnitedStates has itself moved in the direction of impos-ing more limits on discovery and giving courtsmore control over expert testimony. But whateverthe merits of these debates, the notion that any ofthese differences renders “inadequate” in any fun-damental sense the civil law system employed byEcuador, by most other nations in South America,and by most of the nations of Europe is insultingto those nations and absurd on its face.FN1 Seegenerally DiRienzo, 232 F.3d at 57–59; LockmanFound. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d764, 768 (9th Cir.1991); Borden, Inc. v. MeijiMilk Prods. Co., 919 F.2d 822, 829 (2d Cir.1990); Potomac Capital Inv. Corp. v. KoninklijkeLuchtvaapt Maatschapplj N.V., 1998 WL 92416,at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1998); Manela v.Garantia Banking Ltd., 940 F.Supp. 584, 590–91& n. 11 (S.D.N.Y.1996); Polanco v. H.B. FullerCo., 941 F.Supp. 1512, 1527 (D.Minn.1996).

FN1. Following remand from the Courtof Appeals, the Government of Ecuadorexpressly confirmed to this Court, at ahearing attended not only by its counselbut also by its Procurador General andits United Nations Ambassador, that it




























believed that, while its legal procedureswere different from those of the UnitedStates, it nonetheless could provide anadequate forum for this litigation. See Tr.at 63.

Further still, the asserted procedural differ-ence between the United States and Ecuadorianlegal systems of which plaintiffs most complain,i.e., the supposed inability of an Ecuadorian courtto compel discovery from Texaco even if Texacosubmits to the court's jurisdiction, see Pls.' Jan.11, 1999 Mem. at 13, not only is challenged byTexaco's legal expert as an inaccurate assertion,see Ponce y Carbo Aff. at ¶ 18, but also is, in anyevent, rendered largely irrelevant by the fact thatTexaco has expressly stipulated that the very sub-stantial discovery plaintiffs have already obtainedfrom Texaco in these cases, see Aguinda v.Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.Apr. 11, 1994), can be utilized in the Ecuadorcourts by any plaintiff bringing suit there, seeDef.'s Mem. at 13.

In sum, none of the objections to the ad-equacy of an Ecuadorian forum that plaintiffshave specifically raised in response to the instantmotion has merit.

[5] Earlier in this litigation, plaintiffs also ap-peared to raise, and then abandon, the further ob-jection that the Ecuadorian courts were subject tocorrupting influences and outside pressures, espe-cially from the military, that rendered them inad-equate to dispense independent, impartial justicein these cases. Compare, e.g., Plaintiffs' Memor-andum in Opposition to Texaco, Inc.'s Motions toDismiss, dated Feb. 20, 1996 (“Pls.' 1996 Mem.”)at 40 n. 72 (“Even since the military junta relin-quished power in 1979, corruption has tainted theEcuadorian judiciary.”) with id. at 42 (“Plaintiffsdo not rely on any such assumption [thatEcuadorian courts are unable to dispensejustice].”). When the instant motion was renewedon remand from the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs,in their memoranda in opposition, made no men-tion of this issue whatever.

*544 Nevertheless, in late January 2000,after members of the Ecuadorian military joined

protestors (including indigenous dissidents) inwhat ultimately proved to be an abortive coup,this Court, sua sponte, invited renewed considera-tion of this issue, see Memorandum Order datedJan. 31, 2000. In response, submissions wereeventually received not only from the parties butalso from the U.S. Department of State and theGovernment of Ecuador. Unfortunately, most ofthese papers proved of little use to the Court,since they largely consisted (perhaps understand-ably) of broad, conclusory assertions as to the rel-ative corruptibility or incorruptibility of theEcuadorian courts, with scant reference to specif-ics, evidence, or application to the instant cases.As Judge Broderick pointed out early in this litig-ation, “the courts of the United States are prop-erly reluctant to assume that the courts of a sisterdemocracy are unable to dispense justice,”Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006 at *2,and something more than bald assertion is re-quired to overcome this presumption. See, e.g.,El–Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668,678 (D.C.Cir.1996); Blanco, 997 F.2d at 982;Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 981 F.2d 1345,1351 (1st Cir.1992).

When one looks beyond gross generalizationsto relevant particulars, one finds the following:

(1) There is not the slightest indication, inany of the papers submitted on this issue, of anyimpropriety on the part of Texaco or any of its af-filiates, or indeed on the part of any present orformer member of the Consortium, with respectto any judicial or administrative proceeding ofany kind in Ecuador. Indeed, as previously men-tioned, TexPet and PetroEcuador have alreadybeen sued in Ecuador on some of the same or re-lated claims by some of the same or relatedplaintiffs as are involved here, and several ofthese suits have resulted in judgments involvingsubstantial payments to certain of the plaintiffs.See Callejas Aff. I at ¶¶ 2–5 & Exs. A–K;Texaco, Inc.'s Appendix of Rebuttal Exhibits inSupport of Its Reply Memorandum of Law(“Texaco Rebuttal App.”), Ex. 22, Affidavit ofDr. Ricardo Vaca Andrade (“Vaca Aff.”), at ¶ 1.

(2) There are presently pending in Ecuador's



















courts numerous cases against multinational cor-porations. See Callejas Aff. I at ¶ 5; Texaco Re-buttal App., Ex. 25, Supplemental Aff. of Dr.Alejandro Ponce Martinez, at ¶ 2. None of thesubmissions here alleges corruption of the judi-ciary or the judicial process on the part of any ofthese corporations. On the contrary, the Chairmanof Ecuador's judicial disciplinary committee, whowhile in private practice successfully litigated nu-merous cases against TexPet, affirms thatEcuadorian courts do not give preferential treat-ment to multi-national companies like Texaco.See Vaca Aff. at ¶¶ 1,6.

(3) The failure of the military coup of Janu-ary 21, 2000 reaffirmed Ecuador's insistence ondemocratic, civilian control of its institutions.While no one claims the Ecuadorian judiciary iswholly immune to corruption, inefficiency, oroutside pressure, the present Government ofEcuador, headed by a former law school dean,has taken vigorous steps to further the independ-ence and impartiality of the judiciary, see TexacoRebuttal App., Ex. 34, Declaration of Dr. RamonJiménez–Carbo, Ecuador's Attorney General,dated Apr. 5, 2000. As summarized by the U.S.Department of State in its most recent HumanRights “Country Report” on Ecuador, dated Feb-ruary, 2000 (“2000 Country Report”), availableat http://www.state.gov, at 5:

The Supreme Court that took office in 1997publicly recognized the shortcomings of the ju-dicial system and pledged *545 to improve thequality and training of judges. In May 1998, theSupreme Court supervised the selection byopen competition of all appellate judges. A Ju-dicial Council, charged with administering thecourt system and disciplining judges, took of-fice in the fall of 1998. In November 1999, theCouncil's disciplinary committee fired twojudges and two court employees for their rolein the release of suspected drug traffickers. Allfour faced criminal charges. During the year,the Judicial Council removed at least twojudges and a number of minor officials fromtheir jobs.

See also Letter to A.U.S.A. Edward

Scarvalone from U.S. Dept. of State, dated June8, 2000, Ex. A (1999 Country Report forEcuador) at 6 (to same effect); Bridgeway Corp.,201 F.3d at 142–43 (2000) (status of Country Re-ports).

(4) While the State Department nonethelesscontinues to describe Ecuador's legal and judicialsystems as “politicized, inefficient, and some-times corrupt” so far as certain “human rights”practices are concerned, see 2000 Country Reportat 1, this is based, as the Country Reports makeclear, on cases largely involving confrontationsbetween the police and political protestors. Id. Bycontrast, not one of the cases described by the1999 and 2000 Country Reports as evidence ofsuch conclusions remotely resembles the kind ofcontroversy here at issue. See 1999 and 2000Country Reports; see also Diaz v. AeroviasNacionales De Colombia, 1991 WL 35855, at *1(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1991), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1276(2d Cir.1991).

(5) As previously noted, in the past decadealone numerous United States courts have foundEcuador to be an adequate alternative forum forthe determination of civil disputes involvingUnited States companies, see, e.g., Patrickson v.Dole Food Co., Civil No. 97–01516(D.Haw.1998) (slip op. at 41–51), available atTexaco App., Ex. 25; Espinola–E v. CoahomaChem. Co., Civil No. 96cv360RR(S.D.Miss.1998) (slip op. at 5–9), available atTexaco App., Ex. 26; Delgado, 890 F.Supp. at1359–60; Sequihua, 847 F.Supp. at 64;Ciba–Geigy Ltd., 691 So.2d at 1117. Nor has anycase held to the contrary since Ecuador became ademocratic constitutional republic in 1979.

(6) Finally, the underlying claims here in is-sue have been and continue to be the subject ofpublic scrutiny and political debate in Ecuador, afact made prominent even by the Government ofEcuador's own statements to this Court, see, e.g.,Plaintiffs' Supplemental Submission In FurtherResponse To This Court's January 31, 2000Memorandum Order And This Court's May 2,2000 Conference, Ex. 46, Letter from Ecuador'sAttorney General to Nina Pacari Vega, Second



















Vice–President of the Ecuadorian National Con-gress, dated Apr. 26, 2000. FN2 Given such pub-lic scrutiny in Ecuador, even the possibility thatcorruption or undue influence might be brought tobear if this litigation were pursued in Ecuadorseems exceedingly remote. See Texaco RebuttalApp., Ex. 23, Affidavit of Dr. Fabian CorralBurbano de Lara at ¶ 9.

FN2. Pacari is the leader of Pachakutik,an Ecuadorian political party of substan-tial and increasing power having itsprimary support among indigenousgroups in the Amazon and Sierra regionsof Ecuador. See U.S. Dept. of State, FY2001 Country Commercial Guide:Ecuador (“2001 Ecuador CommercialGuide”) at 18, available at ht-tp://www.state.gov.

Accordingly, the Court is satisfied on thebasis of the record before it that the courts ofEcuador can exercise with respect to the partiesand claims here presented that modicum of inde-pendence and *546 impartiality necessary to anadequate alternative forum. See Bridgeway Corp.,201 F.3d at 141–42 & n. 1. While the Court hasbeen presented with less information on which toassess the adequacy of the Peruvian courts in thisrespect, but see Torres v. Southern Peru CopperCorp., 965 F.Supp. 899, 903 (S.D.Tex.1996),aff'd, 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir.1997) (finding Peruto be an adequate alternative forum); Vargas v.M/V Mini Lama, 709 F.Supp. 117, 118(E.D.La.1989) (same), the Ecuadorian courtsprovide in any event an adequate forum in whichthe Peruvian plaintiffs here can bring theirclaims. See Callejas Aff. I at ¶¶ 11–13; Ponce yCarbo Aff. at ¶¶ 9, 11, 14.FN3 The Peruvian for-um, therefore, is simply an alternative option thatthe Peruvian plaintiffs may, if they wish, elect.

FN3. While plaintiffs claim theEcuadorian courts are biased against Per-uvians, they adduce no competent evid-ence of this allegation but simply makereference to the border dispute betweenthe two countries that was settled in1998.

While Ecuador therefore provides an ad-equate alternative forum for these cases, theUnited States, by contrast, is a palpably inad-equate forum for these cases in some notable re-spects. As Judge Broderick stated in indicating, atthe very outset of this litigation, his preliminarybelief that dismissal on forum non conveniensgrounds might well be appropriate: “[d]isputesover class membership, determination of indi-vidualized or common damages, and the need forlarge amounts of testimony with interpreters, per-haps often in local dialects, would make effectiveadjudication in New York problematic at best.”Aguinda, 1994 WL 142006 at *2, quoted also inJota, 157 F.3d at 156–57. Similarly, in itsMemorandum Order of January 31, 2000, thisCourt noted that “the notion that a New York jury(which plaintiffs have demanded) applyingEcuadorian law (which likely governs the claimshere made) could meaningfully assess what oc-curred in the Amazonian rainforests of Ecuador inthe late 1960's and early 1970's is problematic onits face.” Aguinda, 2000 WL 122143, at *1. Acourt, no matter how steeped in due process,whose fact-finders are called upon to adjudicatematters so extremely far removed from theireveryday experience may not itself provide an ad-equate forum.

[6] Although not strictly an issue of“adequacy,” mention should also be made underthis rubric of the fact that in early 1998 Ecuador,apparently in reaction to the fact that certain dis-putes between Ecuadorian shrimp farmers and anAmerican pesticide manufacturer were the subjectof parallel litigation in both the Ecuadorian courtsand the state courts of Florida, see Tr. at 17–18,passed Interpretive Law 55, which reads in per-tinent part as follows:

Without prejudice to the meaning of its literaltone let articles 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Codeof Civil Procedure be interpreted in the sensethat when dealing with concurrent internationalcompetency, the claimant will be able tochoose freely between filing the lawsuit inEcuador or abroad ... Should the lawsuit befiled outside Ecuadorian territory, this will def-initely terminate national competency as well




















as any jurisdiction of Ecuadorian judges overthe matter.

Exhibits In Support of Plaintiffs' Oppositionto Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint,Ex. 1.

Plaintiffs argue that, under Law 55, their fil-ing of these suits in the United States has de-prived the Ecuadorian courts of jurisdiction. Thisargument, however, rests on two doubtful as-sumptions. The first is that Law 55 is retroactiveand applies to lawsuits, like these, that were filedprior to the enactment of Law 55 in 1998. Thisseems dubious on its face, *547 since it positsthat such plaintiffs would be conclusively held toa choice of forum made before they had any reas-on to believe either that such a choice would beconclusive or that it would forever deprive themof even the possibility of an alternative forum.The second assumption is that Law 55 applieseven after a case is dismissed on grounds like for-um non conveniens. This also seems highlydoubtful, since the ostensible purpose of the lawis to require plaintiffs to proceed in a single for-um, not to be deprived of any forum whatever (letalone the forum found most relevant). See Poncey Carbo Aff. at ¶ 32.

While the Ecuadorian courts have yet to re-solve these issues, see Tr. at 59–61; see alsoCallejas Aff. II at ¶¶ 6–11 & Ex. B, and while theGovernment of Ecuador has taken no position asto applicability vel non of Law 55 to the instantcase, see Tr. at 59–61, the unlikelihood thatEcuadorian courts would ultimately adopt boththese dubious assumptions makes Law 55 an in-sufficient basis for concluding that the Ecuadori-an forum is unavailable. See Patrickson v. DoleFood Co., slip op. at 43–44. Nevertheless, as asafeguard, this Court, like the Court in Patrick-son, supra, will qualify the dismissals here toprovide that in the event that a court of last re-view in Ecuador finally affirms the dismissal forlack of jurisdiction pursuant to Law 55 of any ac-tion raising the claims here at issue pursued ingood faith in Ecuador by any of the plaintiffshere, this Court, upon motion made within 60days, will resume jurisdiction over that action.

[7] Having carried its burden of proving thatan adequate alternative forum exists, defendantmust next “demonstrate that the ordinarily strongpresumption favoring the plaintiff's chosen forumis countered by the private and public interestfactors set out in Gilbert, which weigh so heavilyin favor of the foreign forum that they overcomethe presumption for plaintiffs' choice of forum.”DiRienzo, 232 F.3d at 56–57. See also, e.g., PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 255–56, 102 S.Ct. 252; Gil-bert, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839. It is true thatin certain circumstances “a foreign plaintiff'schoice deserves less deference,” Piper Aircraft,454 U.S. at 256, 102 S.Ct. 252, notably where, ashere, the plaintiffs involved are all foreign nation-als residing abroad. See, e.g., Wiwa v. RoyalDutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103 (2dCir.2000); In re Union Carbide, 809 F.2d at 198.But the Second Circuit has also chosen not to ap-ply this lesser deference “when a treaty with aforeign nation accords its nationals access to ourcourts equivalent to that provided American cit-izens.” Blanco, 997 F.2d at 981. Since it appearsthat the United States has such a treaty withEcuador, see Treaty with Ecuador, June 13, 1839,art. 13, 8 Stat. 534, 538, this Court will assumearguendo that plaintiffs' choice of forum carries astrong presumption of validity that may only beovercome by a balance of relevant factors thatheavily favors dismissal in favor of an alternativeforum. See, e.g., Evolution Online Sys., 145 F.3dat 510.

In weighing this balance, the Court must con-sider the “private interest” and “public interest”factors set out in Gilbert, as well as other relevantfactors special to the case. See Gilbert, 330 U.S.at 508–09, 67 S.Ct. 839. In so doing, a prudentdistrict court should proceed with caution, sincethe assigning of relative weights in such circum-stances often calls for a nice exercise of discre-tion. The fact that, because of the district court'sgreater familiarity with the full “feel” and“flavor” of the case, such exercise of discretion issubject to limited appellate review, see, e.g., Al-fadda v. Fenn, 159 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir.1998), isonly the more reason for the district court to pro-ceed with care and circumspection. *548 But hav-ing done its level best to proceed in this manner,































this Court is of the view that the balance of bothprivate and public interest factors tips here over-whelmingly in favor of dismissal of these cases.

Under Gilbert, the “private interest” factorsinclude the relative ease of access to sources ofproof, the cost of obtaining the attendance ofwilling witnesses, the availability of compulsoryprocess for obtaining attendance of unwilling wit-nesses, the possibility of viewing the relevantpremises, and other such practical concerns. Gil-bert, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839. Here, thesefactors weigh heavily in favor of an Ecuadorianforum. On plaintiffs' own submissions, thesecases concern the ongoing contamination of therain forest of eastern Ecuador and adjoining areasas a result of allegedly negligent oil piping andwaste disposal practices undertaken there. AnEcuadorian court would be able to view thosepremises and assess the allegations made in re-spect to them in ways no New York jury couldhope to approximate. Likewise, all plaintiffs, aswell as all members of their putative classes,reside in eastern Ecuador or nearby areas of Peru,all of their alleged personal and property injuriesoccurred there, and virtually all witnesses to themanner in which such injuries occurred residethere, along with all the relevant medical andproperty records. See Texaco App., Ex. 1, Affi-davit of Daniel J. King (“King Aff.”) at ¶¶ 24–29;Ashanga Compl. at ¶¶ 41–48, 64; Aguinda Com-pl. at ¶¶ 3, 11. Further still, defendant has madean essentially unrebutted showing that both thedocumentary and testamentary evidence of the al-legedly negligent acts and decisions taken by theConsortium resides in Ecuador, see King Aff. at ¶26, along with the primary evidence supportingdefendant's defenses including evidence bearingon the key roles of Petroecuador and the Govern-ment of Ecuador, see id. at ¶¶ 22, 24–26, 28.

By contrast, what, if anything, occurred inthe United States? While plaintiffs continue to al-lege in conclusory fashion that Texaco directedthe Consortium's oil operations from the UnitedStates, they have wholly failed, despite years ofdiscovery, to adduce competent evidence to sup-port this assertion. On the contrary, the record be-fore the Court, when scrutinized in terms of ad-

missible evidence, establishes overwhelminglythat Texaco's only meaningful involvement in theactivities here complained of was its indirect in-vestment in its fourth-tier subsidiary, TexPet,which is not a party here and which conducted itsparticipation in the activities here complained ofalmost exclusively in Ecuador. See, e.g., TexPetAff. at ¶¶ 3–10.

The record before the Court also clearly es-tablishes that all of the Consortium's key activit-ies, including the decisions and practices here atissue, were managed, directed, and conducted byConsortium employees in Ecuador, see, e.g.,Texaco App., Ex. 5, Deposition of William P.Doyle (“Doyle Dep.”) at 101, 104, 109; TexacoApp., Ex. 6, Deposition of Robert M. Bischoff(“Bischoff Dep.”) at 219; Texaco App., Ex. 8,Deposition of Robert C. Shields (“Shields Dep.”)at 57, 136, 142, 184–85; Benton Dep. at 202, 206.By contrast, no one from Texaco or, indeed, any-one else operating in the United States, made anymaterial decisions as to the Consortium's activit-ies and practices that are at issue here, id.; seealso, e.g., Benton Dep. at 170–84; Texaco App.,Ex 11, Deposition of Richard K. Meyers(“Meyers Dep.”) at 149–51; Bischoff Aff. at 219;Texaco App., Ex. 9, Deposition of Denis YorkLecorgne at 72–73.

In response, plaintiffs rely on conjecture orirrelevancy—as well as misstatement*549 andmiscitation FN4 —to try to supplant what theirevidence wholly fails to show. For example,plaintiffs emphasize certain indications that thepresident of TexPet reported as a general matterto the president of Texaco's Latin American/WestAfrica division (“LAWA”), based in CoralGables, Florida, and that the budgets of TexPet,along with those of many other subsidiaries, werereviewed by LAWA. See Pls.' 1996 Mem. at11–14; see also Pls.' App., Ex. 21, Doyle Dep. at32–33, 47–51. Plaintiffs also provide some evid-ence that certain unbudgeted and other contractsby TexPet were required to receive LAWA ap-proval, largely for financial, legal, and tax pur-poses. See Pls.' 1996 Mem. at 15–17; see also,e.g., Pls.' App., Ex. 20, Benton Dep. at 31–33,48–49, 92–93. But at most this evidence simply






establishes the obvious fact that Texaco, as a cor-porate parent, exercised some general oversightover the expenses and revenues of its subsidiar-ies. None of these procedures indicates any par-ental control or direction over the pipe design,waste disposal, and other allegedly negligentpractices of the Consortium that are at issue inthis case.

FN4. For example, even though plaintiffsstate that “TexPet required the approvalof Texaco personnel regarding the meritsof all proposed wells in Ecuador,” Pls.'1996 Mem. at 17 (emphasis in original),the evidence they cite in support of thisstatement shows only that Texacoprovided some funding and occasionaltechnical assistance. See Pls.' App., Ex.2, Shields Dep. at 77–80, 326; Pls.' App.,Ex. 35. Indeed, the witness whose depos-ition plaintiffs cite in support of theirstatement actually testified to the con-trary, affirming that “Texaco, Inc. had noinvolvement in drilling wells inEcuador.” Pls.' App., Ex. 2, Shields Dep.at 325.

Plaintiffs also emphasize that the Consortiumfrom time to time went beyond TexPet to contractwith various other U.S.-based subsidiaries ofTexaco (also non-parties here) for technical andother assistance, largely with regard to specificissues or in response to special requests. For ex-ample, the U.S.-based Texaco Marine Departmentand the Central Offshore Engineering Departmentprovided advice, pursuant to contracts with theConsortium, regarding offshore oil installationsand equipment, see Pls.' App., Ex. 20, BentonDep. at 150–51, 158–60, and the Consortium alsoreceived technical assistance from the U.S.-basedTexas Pipeline Company, also a subsidiary ofTexaco, for certain pipeline problems, see, e.g.,Pls.' App., Ex. 2, Shields Dep., at 157–58. Sometechnical advice was even procured fromTexaco's U.S.-based Environmental Health andSafety Division. See, e.g., Pls.' App., Ex. 20,Benton Dep. at 159–60. However, the record isclear that all these services were limited toproviding specific technical analyses requested

by the Consortium to help implement design andother decisions previously reached in Ecuador,and it is the design and other decisions reached inEcuador that are challenged in these lawsuits.Conversely, there is no evidence that any of theseservice contractors exercised any authority or dir-ection, or engaged in any decision-makingwhatever, as to the Consortium's activities here atissue. For example, while plaintiffs allege thatchemical analyses of samples used for environ-mental monitoring were performed in the UnitedStates, see Pls.' 1996 Mem. at 28 n. 57; Pls.'App., Ex. 54, Meyers Dep. at 68–71, they offerno evidence to rebut defendant's evidence that theanalyses themselves were neutral and accurateand that the decisions of what actions to take onthe basis of these analyses were made solely bythe Consortium in Ecuador, see, e.g., TexacoApp., Ex. 3, Benton Dep. at 174–77; TexacoApp., Ex. 5, Doyle Dep. at 155–57, 168, 251–52.

*550 In similar fashion, while plaintiffs al-lege in conclusory fashion that “Texaco personnelin the United States directed the response to[some] environmental problem[s] in Ecuador,”the only evidence they adduce in support of thisstatement is an indication that some U.S.-basedTexaco personnel provided technical informationrequested by TexPet on such topics as the maxim-um safe levels of salt and oil in water and how toclean up oil spills, see Pls.' 1996 Mem. at 29,which was then forwarded to the Consortium forits use and decision-making. Thus, far from“directing” the response, Texaco simply providedsome data for a decision made in Ecuador by theConsortium. Furthermore, while plaintiffs em-phasize that another Texaco subsidiary, the TexasPipeline Company, received contractor bids for aplanned expansion of the main Ecuadorianpipeline and recommended a contractor for theproject, see Pls.' 1996 Mem. at 23–24; Pls.' App.,Ex. 45, they offer no evidence that Texas PipelineCompany personnel decided the design or spe-cifications of the proposed expansion or that suchdecisions caused any portion of the environment-al harms that are the subject matter of this litiga-tion. Indeed, they concede that they do not evenknow whether the proposed expansion was everbuilt in accordance with these specifications, see



Pls.' 1996 Mem. at 23 n. 48; and, in fact (as thedefendant has now shown) it was not, but ratherwas built in accordance with different specifica-tions decreed by the Ecuadorian Government. SeeTexaco App., Ex. 4, Executive Decree No. 925, at§ 18.2.

The simple fact of the matter is that, afterhaving deposed numerous Texaco witnesses andreviewed tens of thousands of Texaco documentsin an effort to establish a meaningful nexusbetween the United States and the decisions andpractices here complained of, plaintiffs havecome up bone dry.FN5 Indeed, on July 11, 1995,after much of this discovery had been completed,plaintiffs stipulated that they had:

FN5. It should also be noted that, to theextent any of this discovery taken fromTexaco is even arguably relevant to anyaction brought in any Ecuadorian or Per-uvian court by any plaintiff here, Texacohas agreed to its admissibility there. SeeDef.'s Mem. at 13; Texaco App., Exs. 18& 19, at § B.4.

no knowledge, information or documents hav-ing any tendency to prove or disprove (or oth-erwise lead to the discovery of information ordocuments that might tend to prove or dis-prove) the existence or non-existence of anyfacts relating to...

(a) “events relating to the harm alleged byplaintiffs occurring in the United States, includ-ing specific or generalized directions initiatingevents to be implemented elsewhere, commu-nications to and from the United States and dis-cussions in the United States concerning, or as-sistance to or guidance for events occurringelsewhere; and

(b) events occurring outside the United Statesto the extent the information can be furnishedor secured voluntarily or through directives toparties in the United States to secure the in-formation; and

(c) the extent, if any, to which conduct in theUnited States caused actionable harm under the

criteria discussed in [Judge Broderick's April11, 1994 discovery Order].”

Texaco App., Ex. 21 (quoting Aguinda, 1994WL 142006 at *1; Mem. Decision and Order,dated June 19, 1995, at 2–3) (emphasis in ori-ginal). Nothing plaintiffs have discovered sincethen in any way modifies these concessions orsupplies the missing nexus.

Finally, in any fair balancing here of the rel-evant “private interests,” reference *551 mustagain be made to the glaring facts that neither theGovernment of Ecuador nor PetroEcuador, thestate-run oil company that owns the Consortiumand had primary control of it through much of therelevant time period, are parties to the instantsuits, whereas they could be joined in any similarsuit brought in Ecuador, see Bermeo Aff. at ¶ 11.Indeed, Petroecuador was in fact so impleaded inone of the similar suits brought against TexPet inEcuador. See Callejas Aff. I at ¶ 2.

Accordingly, the balance of the Gilbert“private interest” factors heavily supports dis-missal of this case in favor of Ecuador (and, ifany Peruvian resident prefers, Peru). See, e.g.,Stewart v. Dow Chemical Co., 865 F.2d 103, 107(6th Cir.1989); De Melo v. Lederle Labs., 801F.2d 1058, 1062–63 (8th Cir.1986); Doe v. Hy-land Therapeutics Div., 807 F.Supp. 1117,1125–26 (S.D.N.Y.1992); Abouchalache v.Hilton Int'l Co., 464 F.Supp. 94, 97–98(S.D.N.Y.1978).

[8] The Gilbert “public interest” factors in-clude local interest in the controversy, court con-gestion, avoidance of unnecessary problems inapplication of foreign law, and avoidance of im-posing jury duty on residents of a jurisdictionhaving little relationship to the controversy. SeeGilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09, 67 S.Ct. 839. Here,these factors also overwhelmingly support anEcuadorian (and to a lesser extent Peruvian) for-um in preference to one in this District or any-where else in the United States.

The Ecuadorian local interest in the contro-versy is, on plaintiffs' own showing, very sub-stantial, whereas the public interest of the United






















States is much more modest. According toplaintiffs, the acts complained of resulted in en-vironmental pollution of Ecuador's rainforest re-gions and other property, and thereby injured tensof thousands of Ecuadorian and Peruvian citizensin their property and/or persons. While, if theseallegations are true, the United States still has aninterest in not permitting its companies to parti-cipate in such misconduct, the uncontested role ofthe Government of Ecuador in authorizing, direct-ing, funding, and profiting from these activitiesnecessarily lessens the United States' interest inthe litigation while further increasing that ofEcuador.

On any fair view of the evidence so far ad-duced in this case, the alleged preference givenby the Consortium to oil exploitation over envir-onmental protection was a conscious choice madeby the Government of Ecuador in order to stimu-late its economy.FN6 The public interest of theUnited States in second-guessing those decisionsis modest indeed. While plaintiffs allege that thepiping and waste disposal practices used to im-plement this choice were “negligent” (in thesense of causing more environmental harm thanother, more expensive alternatives available tothe Consortium would have caused), they havenot adduced anything but conclusory statementsto suggest that the Government of Ecuador wasunaware of the trade-off; and, in any case, wheth-er or not the Government of Ecuador was or wasnot aware of these alleged consequences can onlybe determined, in any meaningful way, if the lit-igation is brought in Ecuador, where (as noted)the Government of Ecuador can be joined as aparty.

FN6. According to the U.S. State Depart-ment, “Until the 1970's, Ecuador was anagrarian country dependent on commod-ity exports.... Starting in 1972, oil devel-opment in the Amazon basin fueled adecade of rapid growth, averaging 9 per-cent annually, that financed expandedpublic services, state enterprises, infra-structure, and import-substitution manu-facturing.” 2001 Ecuador CommercialGuide at 4.

*552 While bringing these suits in Ecuadorand/or Peru may impose material burdens on thecourts there, the well-known congestion of Amer-ican dockets is undoubtedly greater than that ofless litigious societies like Ecuador and Peru. In-deed, in terms of engendering inordinate delays,the history of mass tort class litigation in theUnited States is not such as to inspire confidence,see Judicial Conference Report, supra. On itsface, it seems more likely that the individualplaintiffs in the instant cases would obtain any re-covery to which they are entitled much faster bybringing the kind of individualized actions thathave already been brought against TexPet inEcuador, and successfully prosecuted to comple-tion there, than by serving as named plaintiffs inthe massive lawsuits the U.S.-based plaintiffs'counsel here propose.

As to applicable law, it follows from the factsthat Ecuadorian lands and Ecuadorian people arethe primary focus of this case that Ecuador's in-terests in this case vastly outweigh those of NewYork and that Ecuadorian law will therefore ap-ply to most, if not all of, the claims raised inthese cases. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Shearson Leh-man Hutton, Inc., 84 N.Y.2d 309, 319, 618N.Y.S.2d 609, 642 N.E.2d 1065 (N.Y.1994);Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d189, 201, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d 679(N.Y.1985) (citing Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31N.Y.2d 121, 128, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 286 N.E.2d454 (N.Y.1972)). Because the courts of Ecuadorare in the best position to find and apply theirown law, this factor weighs significantly in favorof dismissal. See Hyland Therapeutics, 807F.Supp. at 1129–30; Travelers Indem. Co. v. S/SAlca, 710 F.Supp. 497, 501–02 (S.D.N.Y.1989),aff'd, 895 F.2d 1410 (2d Cir.1989); Abiaad v.General Motors Corp., 538 F.Supp. 537, 543(E.D.Pa.1982), aff'd, 696 F.2d 980 (3d Cir.1982).

Finally, as already discussed, the notion thata New York federal jury is better equipped thanan Ecuadorian judge to apply Ecuadorian law toSpanish-language testimony and documents relat-ing to 30 years' of activities by an Ecuador-sponsored Consortium in an Amazonian rainforest is preposterous.



























[9] Plaintiffs argue, however, that this bal-ance of Gilbert factors heavily favoring dismissalneeds to be re-weighed in light of the fact that, inaddition to their more conventional claims, theyhave also alleged a claim under the Alien TortClaims Act (“ATCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, whichprovides a federal forum for aliens suing UnitedStates entities for violations of the law of nations.Whatever the abstract merits or demerits of thisargument, discussed infra, it is of little relevanceto this case, for two reasons.

First, the specific claim plaintiffs purport tobring under the ATCA—that the Consortium's oilextraction activities violated evolving environ-mental norms of customary international law, see,e.g., Pls.' Jan. 11, 1999 Mem. at 18–19; Pls.' 1996Mem. at 64–68—lacks any meaningful preceden-tial support and appears extremely unlikely tosurvive a motion to dismiss. See Beanal v. Free-port–McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166–67 (5thCir.1999); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775F.Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y.1991). As the FifthCircuit Court of Appeals stated in dismissing asubstantially similar claim in Beanal, supra, “the[ATCA] ‘applies only to shockingly egregious vi-olations of universally recognized principles ofinternational law.’ See Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d691, 692 (2d Cir.1983) (per curiam)... [F]ederalcourts should exercise extreme caution when ad-judicating environmental claims under interna-tional law to insure that environmental policies ofthe United States do not displace environmental*553 policies of other governments.” Beanal, 197F.3d at 167.

Second, even if the ATCA claim had greaterfacial promise, the discovery already taken in thiscase has established overwhelmingly that no acttaken by Texaco in the United States bore materi-ally on the pollution-creating activities of whichplaintiffs complain. This is not a case, then,where the United States was specially used as abase from which to direct violations of interna-tional law visited on some foreign site. Con-versely, the actions in question occurred over-whelmingly in Ecuador, where courts are fullycapable of interpreting alleged violations of inter-national law. The United States therefore has no

special public interest, under the ATCA or other-wise, in providing a forum for plaintiffs pursuingan international law action against a United Statesentity that plaintiffs can adequately pursue in theplace where the violation actually occurred.

[10] As a more general matter, moreover, thepresence of a claim under the ATCA does not al-ter the standard forum non conveniens analysis toanything like the degree suggested by plaintiffs.While “the original purposes of the ATCA remainthe subject of some controversy... the mostlearned exposition of the statute's original pur-poses ... suggest[s] that the statute was originallymotivated by a desire to insure that claims by analien against U.S. citizens or for incidents occur-ring in the United States were litigated in federalcourt rather than state court, so as to prevent thestates from mishandling such cases and creatinginternational incidents.” Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 105 n.10. See also Tel–Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Edwards, J.concurring) (“There is evidence ... that the intentof this section was to assure aliens access to fed-eral courts to vindicate any incident which, ifmishandled by a state court, might blossom intoan international crisis.”); Filartiga v. Pena–Irala,630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.1980) (the kinds ofquestions that arise under the FTCA “are fraughtwith implications for the nation as a whole, andtherefore should not be left to the potentiallyvarying adjudications of the courts of the fiftystates”). While the apparent purpose of ATCA,then, was simply to afford aliens a federal forumin preference to a state forum, the effect of itstext is to afford aliens a forum in the UnitedStates to assert violations of international law.But nothing in that text suggests that the UnitedStates forum should therefore be given preferenceover a more convenient foreign forum which isadequate to handle the case.

Accordingly, courts have applied forum nonconveniens analysis to cases involving claimsbrought under the ATCA in essentially the samemanner as applied to all other cases. See, e.g., Inre Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human RightsLitig., 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir.1992) (“Suchlimitations as venue and the doctrine of forum






























non conveniens are available in [ATCA] cases asin any other.”); Cabiri v. Assasie–Gyimah, 921F.Supp. 1189, 1199 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (conductingforum non conveniens analysis in case involvingclaims under the Alien Tort Claims Act); East-man Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F.Supp. 1078,1084 (S.D.Fla.1997) (same); see also Kadic v.Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir.1995) (notingthe United States' statement suggesting that or-dinary forum non conveniens analysis should ap-ply to the ATCA claims there stated).FN7

FN7. Similarly, ordinary forum non con-veniens analysis has been held to applyto claims under a variety of other federalstatutes providing for special federal jur-isdiction and/or special venue rules. See,e.g., Capital Currency Exch. v. NationalWestminster Bank PLC, 155 F.3d 603,608–09 (2d Cir.1998) (forum non con-veniens applies to Sherman Act claimsdespite special federal venue provision);TransUnion Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., 811F.2d 127, 129–30 (2d Cir.1987) (same,for RICO claims); Cruz v. Maritime Co.of Philippines, 702 F.2d 47, 48 (2dCir.1983) (same, for Jones Act claims);Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Ex-press Co., 556 F.2d 406, 431 (9thCir.1977) (same, for Lanham Actclaims); see generally Gilbert, 330 U.S.at 507, 67 S.Ct. 839 (forum non conveni-ens available “even when jurisdiction isauthorized by the letter of a general ven-ue statute.”).

*554 In support of their contrary position thatthe ATCA materially alters forum non conveniensanalysis, plaintiffs point to Flatow v. Islamic Re-public of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 25 (D.D.C.1998),in which a district court held that forum non con-veniens review is inappropriate for cases broughtunder the state-sponsored terrorism exception tothe Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.§ 1605(a)(7). However, that statute applies onlywhere the plaintiff or victim of terrorism is aUnited States national at the time of the incident,28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii), so that the UnitedStates has a special interest in “ensuring that its

citizens have an opportunity to seek redress in theUnited States,” Flatow, 999 F.Supp. at 25, where-as the ATCA, by contrast, only applies to alienplaintiffs.

More importantly, the Second Circuit re-cently had occasion to review the entire issue incomparing the wording of the original ATCA,here applicable, with the wording of an amend-ment to the ATCA, known as the Torture VictimsProtection Act (“TVPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350App., that extends jurisdiction under the ATCAto cases brought, not by aliens but by U.S. resid-ents, who have been victims of foreign torture.See Wiwa, supra. Based on the wording differ-ences between the original ATCA and the amend-ment, the Court divined a special United Statesreceptivity to TVPA suits not necessarily presentin the case of other ATCA suits. See Wiwa, 226F.3d at 104–05. But even then the court con-cluded that “[t]his is not to suggest that the TVPAhas nullified, or even significantly diminished,the doctrine of forum non conveniens.” Id. at 106.A fortiori, the doctrine applies in undiminishedfashion to ATCA suits that do not fall within thepurview of the TVPA.

Accordingly, even if one assumes for thesake of argument the hypothesis that Texaco par-ticipated in a violation of international law thatwould support the claim here brought under theATCA, neither that assumption nor any of theother considerations special to these cases materi-ally alters the balance of private and public in-terest factors that, as previously discussed, “tilt[s]strongly in favor of trial in the foreign forum,”Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 106 (quoting R. Maganlal &Co. v. M.G. Chemical Co., 942 F.2d 164, 167 (2dCir.1991)), and, indeed, virtually mandates dis-missal in favor of Ecuador or, if any plaintiffprefers, Peru.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant'smotion to dismiss these cases on grounds of for-um non conveniens is hereby granted. Clerk toenter judgment in both cases.

SO ORDERED.

S.D.N.Y.,2001.


































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Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.142 F.Supp.2d 534

END OF DOCUMENT



United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit.

Maria AGUINDA, Individually, and as guardiansfor Gesica Grefa, Carlos Grefa, Individually and

as guardians for Gresica Grefa, Gesica Grefa,Catarina Aguinda, Mercedes Grefa, Lidia

Aguinda; Patricio Chimbo, Individually and asguardian for his minor children, Elias Piyaguaje,Individually and as guardian for Lola Piyaguaje,

Edicon Piyaguaje, Paulina Piyaguaje, Jimena Piy-aguaje and Elias Piyaguaje, Lola Piyaguaje, Edis-

on Piyaguaje, Paulina Piyaguaje, Jimena Piy-aguaje, Elias Piyaguaje, Delfin Payaguajo, Indi-vidually and as guardian for his minor children,Homer Conde, Individually and as guardian for

his minor children, Santo Guillermo Ramirez, In-dividually and as guardian for Danilo Ramirez,

Danilo Ramirez, Juana Tanguila, AdditionalPlaintiff, Listed In Exhibits “B”, “C” and “D”Hereto and Incorporated Herein by Reference.,

Individually and on behalf of all others similarlysituated, Gabriel Ashanga Jota, individually andas Guardian for Raul Antonio Ashanga Casteno,

Paula Nerida Ashanga Casteno, ChristianAshanga Casteno and Judith Reutegui Casteno,

Manuel Antonio Canelos Duende, AlimpioCoquinche Noteno, Arsenio Condo, Juan MarcosCoquinche Mercier, Ronald Coquinche Noteno,

indivudally and as Guardian for Tarcila Con-quinche and Saul Coquinche, Santiago, individu-

ally and as Guardian for Julian Coquinche andSantiago Coquinche, Florentino Noteno, indi-

vidually and as Guardian for Mery Noteno,Greine Noteno, Armilda Noteno and Noris

Noteno, Remedia Paz Duende, individually andas Guardian for Lizzie Pena Paz and Jackie PenaPaz and on behalf of all others similarly situated,Associacion Internica De Desarrollo de la SelvaPeruana-Aidesep, (Multi-Ethnic Association ofthe Development of the Peruvian Rainforest), inrepresentation of its members and of its memberorganizations, Organizacion Kichuaruna wangur-ina-Orkiwan, (Organization Quichua Wangurina),Federacion de Comunidades Nativas Del MedioNapo-Feconamn, (Federation of Native Com-

munities of the Middle Napo), Federacion delPueblo Yagua del Bajo Amazona y Bajo Napo-Fepybaban (Federation of the Yagua People of

the Lower Amazon and Lower Napo), Federaciondel Bajo Amazona y Bajo Napo-Fepybaban

(Federation of the Yagua People of the LowerAmazon and Lower Napo), Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.TEXACO, INC., 2000 Westchester Avenue,

White Plains, New York 10650, Defendant-Ap-pellee.

Docket Nos. 01-7756L, 01-7758C.Argued March 11, 2002.Decided Aug. 16, 2002.

Citizens of Peru and Ecuador brought twoputative class actions alleging that oil companypolluted rain forests and rivers in those two coun-tries, causing environmental damage and personalinjuries. The United States District Court for theSouthern District of New York, Jed S. Rakoff, J.,945 F.Supp. 625, dismissed complaint in one ac-tion on grounds of international comity, forumnon conveniens, and failure to join indispensableparties, and denied reconsideration and Ecuador'smotion to intervene, 175 F.R.D. 50. After secondcomplaint was dismissed and citizens appealed,the Court of Appeals, 157 F.3d 153, vacated andremanded. Oil company renewed motion for dis-missal on forum non conveniens grounds, aftersupplying additional information and consentingto suit in Ecuador and Peru. The District Court,142 F.Supp.2d 534, granted motion. Citizens ap-pealed. The Court of Appeals, Leval, CircuitJudge, held that: (1) courts of Ecuador providedadequate alternative forum for citizens' claims,and (2) balance of private and public interestfactors weighed strongly in favor of trial inEcuadorian courts, warranting conditioned dis-missal on forum non conveniens grounds.

Affirmed as modified.

West Headnotes


FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 1303 F.3d 470, 157 Oil & Gas Rep. 33, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,010(Cite as: 303 F.3d 470)










170Bk45 k. Forum Non Conveniens.Most Cited Cases

After determining the degree of deferenceowed to plaintiff's choice of forum, a districtcourt deciding motion to dismiss on forum nonconveniens grounds engages in a two-step in-quiry, first considering whether an adequate al-ternative forum exists, and, if so, balancing aseries of factors involving the private interests ofthe parties in maintaining the litigation in thecompeting fora and any public interests at stake.





Defendant seeking dismissal on forum nonconveniens grounds bears the burden both as towhether adequate alternative forum exists andbalancing of public and private interest factors.





Ordinarily, under forum non conveniens ana-lysis, the requirement of an adequate alternativeforum will be satisfied when defendant is amen-able to process in the other jurisdiction; in rarecircumstances, however, where the remedyoffered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfact-ory, the other forum may not be an adequate al-ternative.





Courts of Ecuador provided adequate altern-ative forum for claims in which citizens of Peruand Ecuador alleged that United States-based oilcompany polluted rain forests and rivers in theircountries, causing environmental and personal in-juries, satisfying requirement for actions to bedismissed on forum non conveniens grounds; cit-izens failed to show that Ecuadorian law deprivedEcuador courts of jurisdiction because actionswere first filed in United States and thatEcuadorian courts were unreceptive to tortclaims, unavailability of class action was not soburdensome as to deprive citizens of effectiveforum in light of ability to join similar litigantstogether in lawsuit under Ecuadorian law, allegedavailability of more streamlined procedures inUnited States did not make Ecuador courts inad-equate as alternative forum, and finding that un-due influence over Ecuadorian courts was un-likely in citizens' actions was not abuse of discre-tion.





In dismissing on forum non conveniensgrounds class actions in which citizens of Peruand Ecuador alleged that United States-based oilcompany polluted rain forests and rivers in theircountries, causing environmental and personal in-juries, one year, as opposed to 60 days, was ap-propriate time period to allow for assertion ofclaims in Ecuadorian courts exempt from limita-tions defenses based on limitations periods expir-ing after date of filing of United States actions,given that class action procedures were not recog-nized in Ecuador, and that citizens, who hadsought to represent nearly 55,000 plaintiffs,would therefore be required to obtain signed au-thorizations for each individual plaintiff.
































Balance of private and public interest factorsweighed strongly in favor of trial in Ecuadoriancourts, warranting conditioned dismissal on for-um non conveniens grounds of putative class ac-tions in which citizens of Peru and Ecuador al-leged that United States-based oil company pol-luted rain forests and rivers in their countries,causing environmental and personal injuries; rel-ative ease of access to sources of proof favoredproceeding in Ecuador, it would be onerous forNew York court to manage translation difficultiesarising from cases with 55,000 putative classmembers of different indigenous groups speakingvarious dialects, view of polluted areas would bemore feasible for Ecuadorian court, and Republicof Ecuador and state-owned oil agency could bejoined as parties in Ecuador.





Private interests considered in determiningwhether dismissal on grounds of forum non con-veniens is warranted include the relative ease ofaccess to sources of proof, availability of com-pulsory process for attendance of unwilling, andcost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses,possibility of view of the premises, if view wouldbe appropriate to the action, and all other practic-al problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-tious, and inexpensive.



170BI(B) Right to Decline Jurisdiction;

Abstention Doctrine170Bk45 k. Forum Non Conveniens.

Most Cited CasesPublic interest considerations in deciding

motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non con-veniens include administrative difficulties associ-ated with court congestion, the unfairness of im-posing jury duty on a community with no relationto the litigation, the interest in having localizedcontroversies decided at home, and avoiding dif-ficult problems in conflict of laws and the applic-ation of foreign law.

*472 Cristóbal Bonifaz, Law Offices of CristóbalBonifaz (John C. Bonifaz, Steven Donziger onthe brief), Amherst, MA; Sarah Altschuler, TonyaL. Putnam, Amherst, MA, law clerks; Joseph C.Kohn, Martin D'Urso, Craig Hillwig, Kohn Swift& Graf, Philadelphia, PA; Amy Damen, Sullivan& Damen, White Plains, NY; Arthur L. Berney,Boston College Law School, Newton, MA, on thebrief, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Ronald C. Minkoff, Beldock Levine & HoffmanLLP, New York, NY; Jonathan S. Abady, EmeryCuti Brinckerhoff & Abady, P.C., New York,NY, on the brief, for the Republic of Ecuador,amicus curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

J. Martin Wagner, EarthJustice Legal DefenseFund, San Francisco, CA, submitted a brief foramicus curiae the Sierra Club in support ofPlaintiffs-Appellants.

Richard L. Herz, EarthRights International,Washington, DC, submitted a brief for amicuscuriae EarthRights International in support ofPlaintiffs-Appellants.

George S. Branch, King & Spalding (Daniel J.King, Richard T. Marooney, Jr., Jeanette M. Vig-giano on the brief), Atlanta, GA and New York,NY, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CARDAMONE, LEVAL, and SOTO-MAYOR, Circuit Judges.

LEVAL, Circuit Judge.These are consolidated appeals from judg-








































ments of the United States District *473 Court forthe Southern District of New York (Jed S.Rakoff, Judge ) dismissing two putative class ac-tions for forum non conveniens. Plaintiffs are res-idents of the Oriente region of Ecuador and anadjoining area in Peru. Defendant is Texaco, Inc.(“Texaco”), a United States-based oil company,which, at the pertinent time, was headquartered inNew York. The complaints allege environmentaland personal injuries arising out of Texaco's oilexploration and extraction operations in the Ori-ente region between 1964 and 1992.

We modify the judgments in one respect ex-plained below, but otherwise affirm the dismissalof the actions by reason of forum non conveniens.

BACKGROUNDThe background of this case is described in

detail in the decisions of the district court, seeAquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F.Supp. 625(S.D.N.Y.1996); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142F.Supp.2d 534 (S.D.N.Y.2001), and in our Octo-ber 1998 opinion in the appeal from the districtcourt's 1996 decision, see Jota v. Texaco, Inc.,157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir.1998). We briefly summar-ize the background as follows.

A. Texaco's Oil Operations in EcuadorIn 1964, Texaco Petroleum Company

(“TexPet”), a fourth-level subsidiary of the de-fendant Texaco, began oil exploration anddrilling in the Oriente region of eastern Ecuador.In 1965 TexPet started operating a petroleumconcession for a consortium (the “Consortium”)owned in equal shares by TexPet and Gulf OilCorporation. In 1974 the government of the Re-public of Ecuador (“Republic” or “Ecuador”),through its state-owned oil agency known as Pet-roEcuador, obtained a 25 percent share in theConsortium. Within two years, PetroEcuador ac-quired Gulf Oil's interest and became the majoritystakeholder in the Consortium. Through 1989TexPet operated a Trans Ecuadorian oil pipeline,at which time PetroEcuador took over that func-tion. TexPet operated the Consortium's drillingactivities until July 1990, when PetroEcuadortook over that responsibility as well. In June1992, TexPet relinquished all its interests in the

Consortium, leaving it owned entirely by PetroE-cuador. See Jota, 157 F.3d at 155-56 & n. 4.

B. Prior Proceedings and Proceedings Below

1. The Complaints and Proceedings Before JudgeBroderick

In November 1993, Ecuadorian plaintiffsfiled the first of two class action lawsuits againstTexaco in the Southern District of New York onbehalf of some 30,000 inhabitants of the Orienteregion. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., Dkt. No. 93Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 3, 1993) (“Aguinda plaintiffs”). In December 1994, resid-ents of Peru living downstream from Ecuador'sOriente area brought a separate class actionagainst Texaco in the Southern District of NewYork on behalf of at least 25,000 residents ofPeru. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., Dkt. No. 94 Civ.9266 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 28, 1994) (“ Jotaplaintiffs”). Both complaints alleged that between1964 and 1992 Texaco's oil operation activitiespolluted the rain forests and rivers in Ecuador andPeru. The complaints alleged that Texaco's activ-ities in Ecuador were “designed, controlled, con-ceived and directed ... through its operations inthe United States.”

The complaints sought money damages undertheories of negligence, public and private nuis-ance, strict liability, medical monitoring, trespass,civil conspiracy, and violations of the Alien TortClaims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“ATCA”). Theyalso sought extensive equitable relief to redresscontamination of the water supplies and environ-ment, including: financing for environmental*474cleanup to create access to potable water andhunting and fishing grounds; renovating or clos-ing the Trans Ecuadorian Pipeline; creation of anenvironmental monitoring fund; establishingstandards to govern future Texaco oil develop-ment; creation of a medical monitoring fund; aninjunction restraining Texaco from entering intoactivities that risk environmental or human injur-ies, and restitution. See Jota, 157 F.3d at 156 n. 2.

Both cases were initially assigned to JudgeVincent Broderick. In December 1993, before theJota action was filed, Texaco moved to dismiss


























the Aquinda complaint on grounds of 1) failure tojoin the Republic of Ecuador; 2) internationalcomity; and 3) forum non conveniens. Along withthis motion, Texaco submitted a letter fromEcuador's ambassador to the United States ad-dressed to the U.S. Department of State, assertingthat the Government of Ecuador considered thesuit an affront to Ecuador's national sovereignty.While reserving decision, the district court statedthat dismissal might be appropriate as to themoney damages claims because “[d]isputes overclass membership, determination of individual-ized or common damages, and the need for largeamounts of testimony with interpreters, perhapsoften in local dialects, would make effective adju-dication in New York problematic at best.”Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994WL 142006, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994). Thecourt specified, however, that any dismissal onforum non conveniens grounds would be condi-tioned upon Texaco's consent to jurisdiction inEcuador. Concluding that dismissal was prema-ture, the court ordered discovery as to whetherTexaco in fact directed activities in Ecuador fromthe United States and whether extensive evidencefrom Ecuador would be necessary to proveplaintiffs' claims. Id. at *3-4.

2. Proceedings Before Judge RakoffAfter Judge Broderick's death in March 1995,

the cases were reassigned, ultimately to JudgeRakoff. Following discovery, in November 1996Judge Rakoff granted Texaco's motion to dismissthe Aquinda suit on grounds of forum non con-veniens and international comity. See Aquinda,945 F.Supp. at 627-28. The court also justifieddismissal by reason of the failure to join PetroE-cuador and the Republic of Ecuador, on the the-ory that they were indispensable parties becausetheir absence would make it impossible for thecourt to order the extensive equitable reliefsought by plaintiffs. Id. at 627. The court foundthat the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28U.S.C. §§ 1603(b) and 1604 prevented the asser-tion of jurisdiction over either. Finally, the courtordered the Jota plaintiffs to show cause whytheir case should not be controlled by theAquinda dismissal. Id. at 628.

The Republic of Ecuador then filed a motionto intervene on behalf of the plaintiffs, and sub-mitted the affidavit of Ecuador's Attorney Gener-al stating that the Republic sought “to protect theinterests of the indigenous citizens of theEcuadorian Amazon who were seriously affectedby the environmental contamination attributed tothe defendant company.” Jota, 157 F.3d at 158.The district court found that in making the motionthe Republic did not express willingness to waiveits sovereign immunity. The Ecuadorian AttorneyGeneral responded that the Republic ratified “it[s]participation in this lawsuit ... to procure the ne-cessary indemnization in order to alleviate the en-vironmental damages caused by Texaco,” id.(first alteration in original), but refused to waivethe Republic's sovereign immunity as to anyclaims made by the Jota plaintiffs or counter-claims asserted by Texaco. The Aquinda plaintiffsalso had requested reconsideration*475 of thecourt's prior dismissal. The district court deniedboth the Aquinda plaintiffs' motion for reconsid-eration and the Republic's motion to intervene.See Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 50(S.D.N.Y.1997). Shortly thereafter, the court dis-missed the Jota complaint as well.

3. Plaintiffs' First AppealOn appeal, this court vacated the dismissal

and remanded for reconsideration. We ruled thatforum non conveniens dismissal was inappropri-ate, “at least absent a commitment by Texaco tosubmit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadoriancourts....” Jota, 157 F.3d at 159. We instructedthe district court to “independently reweigh thefactors relevant to a forum non conveniens dis-missal, rather than simply rely” on the reasoningof Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 61(S.D.Tex.1994). Jota, 157 F.3d at 159. As tocomity, we advised the district court to weigh thesame considerations as with respect to forum nonconveniens, and to reexamine the issue “in lightof all the then current circumstances, includingEcuador's position with regard to the maintenanceof this litigation” in the United States. Id. at160-61. We also ruled that the district court's“reasoning regarding the plaintiffs' failure to joinan indispensable party sufficed only to supportdismissing so much of the complaint as sought to











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enjoin activities currently under the Republic'scontrol.” Id. at 155. Regarding Ecuador's post-judgment motion to intervene, we agreed with thedistrict court that Ecuador's motion was untimelyand insufficient to waive sovereign immunity. Id.at 162-63.

4. Events Following RemandFollowing our decision, Ecuador's ambassad-

or to the United States informed the district courtthat the Republic “is not willing, under any cir-cumstance, to waive its sovereign immunity andbe subject to rulings by Courts in the UnitedStates.... Therefore, the intervention of the Re-public of Ecuador as a party is not necessary.”Ecuador's attorney general agreed to the sameview in a separately submitted declaration, statingthat Ecuador “will accept any decision of the U.S.courts as to whether they have jurisdiction overthe matter or not, ... [b]ut the Republic will notaccept or agree in any manner to become or betreated as a party to the Lawsuit.”

Texaco consented to personal jurisdiction inEcuador as to the Aquinda plaintiffs and in Peruor Ecuador as to the Jota plaintiffs. Texaco stipu-lated it would waive its statute of limitations de-fenses that matured during the period of timebetween the filing of the complaint and the 60thday after the dismissal of the action by the districtcourt. It preserved such defenses, however, withrespect to the passage of time prior to the initialfiling of the complaints. It also offered to stipu-late that plaintiffs could utilize the discovery ob-tained thus far in resumed proceedings in Ecuadoror Peru. Texaco then renewed its motion to dis-miss by reason of forum non conveniens.

5. Judge Rakoff's Second Dismissal of Plaintiffs'Complaints

The district court deferred ruling on Texaco'smotion to dismiss “in order to give plaintiffs thechance to reopen an issue they had previouslyabandoned, i.e., whether the courts of Ecuador(and/or) Peru are sufficiently independent and im-partial to provide” due process. After briefing onthis issue was completed, plaintiffs moved to dis-qualify Judge Rakoff. Judge Rakoff denied themotion, see Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 139

F.Supp.2d 438 (S.D.N.Y.2000), and we deniedplaintiffs' subsequent petition for a writ of man-damus, see In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194 (2dCir.2001).

* On May 30, 2001, the district court grantedTexaco's motions to dismiss the Aquinda andJota complaints. See Aguinda, 142 F.Supp.2d at554. The court ruled that Texaco had demon-strated the availability of an adequate alternativeforum and that the ordinarily strong presumptionfavoring the plaintiffs' chosen forum was over-come by a balance of the relevant private andpublic interest factors tilting heavily in favor ofthe alternative forum. The district court under-scored that Texaco had now consented to jurisdic-tion in Ecuadorian and Peruvian courts. The courtrejected each of plaintiffs' objections to the ad-equacy of an Ecuadorian forum, which it found tobe adequate for the Jota plaintiffs as well.Plaintiffs also contested the adequacy of Ecuadoras a forum on the basis of a recent Ecuadorianstatute, Law 55, which plaintiffs argued stripsEcuador's courts of concurrent jurisdiction oversuits which have been filed first in a foreign for-um. The court expressed doubt about plaintiffs'interpretation of Law 55, but qualified its dis-missal, expressing willingness to reconsider if anEcudorian court of last review were to upholddismissal on grounds of Law 55. See id. at538-52.

With regard to the private and public in-terests, the court found that “[t]hese cases haveeverything to do with Ecuador and nothing to dowith the United States.” Id. at 537. The court wasnot persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that the bal-ance of public interests should be re-weighed inlight of their claim under the Alien Tort ClaimsAct. It concluded: 1) the conventional doctrine offorum non conveniens “applies in undiminishedfashion” to ATCA claims, id. at 554 (citing Wiwav. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88,104-06 (2d Cir.2000)); 2) because environmentaltorts are unlikely to be found to violate the law ofnations, plaintiffs' ATCA claim is unlikely to sur-vive dismissal; 3) the United States has no specialpublic interest in hosting an international law ac-tion against a U.S. entity that can be adequately

































pursued in the place where the violation actuallyoccurred; and 4) the ATCA does not compelproviding a U.S. forum when an adequate andmore convenient foreign forum exists. See id. at552-53.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSIONPlaintiffs contend that the district court ab-

used its discretion in determining that Ecuadorwas an adequate alternative forum and that thebalance of private and public interest factorstilted in favor of dismissal. See Iragorri v. UnitedTechs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.2001) (enbanc). Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirmwith modification.

[1][2] After determining the degree of defer-ence owed to a plaintiff's choice of forum, a dis-trict court engages in a two-step inquiry. First, thecourt must consider whether an adequate alternat-ive forum exists. If so, it must “then balance aseries of factors involving the private interests ofthe parties in maintaining the litigation in thecompeting fora and any public interests at stake.”Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 100; see also Iragorri, 274F.3d at 73. The defendant seeking dismissal bearsthe burden as to both questions. Wiwa, 226 F.3dat 100. After assuming a strong presumption ofvalidity for plaintiffs' choice of forum, the districtcourt found that the presumption was overcomeby the balance of public and private interestfactors.

A. Does an Adequate Alternative Forum Exist?[3][4] Ordinarily, the requirement of an ad-

equate alternative forum “will be satisfied whenthe defendant is ‘amenable to process' in the otherjurisdiction. In rare circumstances, however,where the remedy *477 offered by the other for-um is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum maynot be an adequate alternative....” Piper AircraftCo. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 n. 22, 102 S.Ct.252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981); DiRienzo v. PhilipServs. Corp., 232 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir.2000)(“[A]n agreement by the defendant to submit tothe jurisdiction of the foreign forum can generallysatisfy th[e] [alternative forum] requirement.”),vacated on other grounds, 294 F.3d 21 (2d

Cir.2002). Plaintiffs raise several objections tothe availability and adequacy of an Ecuadorianforum.FN1

FN1. The district court's assessment ofan alternative forum focused primarilyon Ecuador. As to Peru, the court ob-served that “[w]hile [it] has been presen-ted with less information on which to as-sess the adequacy of the Peruvian courts,... the Ecuadorian courts provide in anyevent an adequate forum in which thePeruvian plaintiffs here can bring theirclaims. The Peruvian forum, therefore, issimply an alternative option that the Per-uvian plaintiffs may, if they wish, elect.”Aguinda, 142 F.Supp.2d at 546. The dis-trict court considered plaintiffs' claimthat Ecuadorian courts are biased againstPeruvians, but dismissed the objectionbecause plaintiffs could “adduce no com-petent evidence of this allegation butsimply make reference to the border dis-pute between the two countries that wassettled in 1998.” Id. at 546 n. 3. Asneither party on appeal concentrates at-tention on Peru as an alternative opinion,we limit our analysis to Ecuador andconclude that it is a suitable forum forboth sets of plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs contend first that Ecuador does notoffer an alternative forum because Law 55 pre-cludes them from proceeding in Ecuadoriancourts. Law 55 provides, “[S]hould the lawsuit befiled outside Ecuadorian territory, this will defin-itely terminate national competency as well asany jurisdiction of Ecuadorian judges over thematter.” Plaintiffs argue that Law 55 deprivesEcuadorian courts of competency to assert juris-diction because both suits were first filed in theUnited States. They contend that dismissal forforum non conveniens would leave them withouta forum in which to proceed. We agree with thedistrict court's skepticism as to the law's retro-activity, as well as its application to cases dis-missed for forum non conveniens. We note fur-thermore that following oral argument the partiessubmitted to us an April 30, 2002 decision of the





























Ecuadorian Constitutional Court declaring Law55 unconstitutional. We need not determine thescope of Law 55, as the district court qualified itsdismissal specifying that, in the event the caseswere dismissed in Ecuador under Law 55 and thisresult were affirmed by Ecuador's highest court, itwould be open to reconsider the question.FN2

But see Bank of Credit and Commerce Int'l v.State Bank of Pak., 273 F.3d 241, 248 (2dCir.2001) (suggesting that the degree of protec-tion that must be afforded by a conditional dis-missal on forum non conveniens grounds willvary depending on how certain the court is that,under unsettled foreign law, the foreign forumwill be available).

FN2. Plaintiffs make a similar argumentwith respect to Ecuador's Code of CivilProcedure Article 15, which providesthat “the judge ... who summons the de-fendant first, acquires exclusive jurisdic-tion.” Plaintiffs did not raise this issuebelow, and, in any event, we find the ar-gument to be without merit.

We find no merit in plaintiffs' further argu-ment that Ecuadorian courts are unreceptive totort claims. The record shows that severalplaintiffs have recovered judgments against Tex-Pet and PetroEcuador for claims arising out of thevery facts here alleged. Other U.S. courts havefound Ecuador to be an adequate forum for host-ing tort suits. See, e.g., Delgado v. Shell Oil Co.,890 F.Supp. 1324, 1359-60 (S.D.Tex.1995)(Ecuador adequate to host mass tort suit for pesti-cide exposure); Ciba-Geigy Ltd. v. Fish Peddler,Inc., 691 So.2d 1111, 1117(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) *478 (finding Ecuadorianforum adequate for hosting suit for fungicide ex-posure). In addition, Texaco has offered unrebut-ted evidence of other types of successful tortclaims brought in Ecuadorian courts, includingpersonal injury claims by Ecuadorian oilfieldworkers against TexPet.

Plaintiffs' contention is predicated on the ab-sence of tort actions on the docket of Ecuador'sSupreme Court. Given Texaco's showing that tortjudgments are awarded by Ecuador's courts, their

absence from the docket of the Supreme Court ofEcuador appears to be of little significance.

Plaintiffs' third objection is that Ecuadoriancourts do not recognize class actions. On the oth-er hand, Ecuador permits litigants with similarcauses of action arising out of the same facts tojoin together in a single lawsuit. While the needfor thousands of individual plaintiffs to authorizethe action in their names is more burdensomethan having them represented by a representativein a class action, it is not so burdensome as to de-prive the plaintiffs of an effective alternative for-um. Cf. Blanco v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela,S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 982 (2d Cir.1993) (“[T]he un-availability of beneficial litigation proceduressimilar to those available in the federal districtcourts does not render an alternative forum inad-equate.”).

Plaintiffs point further to several respects inwhich Ecuadorian procedure is less efficient thanU.S. procedure. While Ecuador's judicial proced-ures may be less streamlined than ours, that doesnot make Ecuador's procedures ineffective orrender Ecuador inadequate as an alternative for-um. See id., 997 F.2d at 982; DiRienzo, 232 F.3dat 58-59.

Plaintiffs contend that Ecuadorian courts aresubject to corrupt influences and are incapable ofacting impartially. After ordering supplementalbriefing on this question, Judge Rakoff made de-tailed findings. He found: 1) no evidence of im-propriety by Texaco or any past member of theConsortium in any prior judicial proceeding inEcuador; 2) there are presently pending inEcuador's courts numerous cases against multina-tional corporations without any evidence of cor-ruption; 3) Ecuador has recently taken significantsteps to further the independence of its judiciary;4) the State Department's general description ofEcuador's judiciary as politicized applies primar-ily to cases of confrontations between the policeand political protestors; 5) numerous U.S. courtshave found Ecuador adequate for the resolution ofcivil disputes involving U.S. companies; and 6)because these cases will be the subject of closepublic and political scrutiny, as confirmed by the






















Republic's involvement in the litigation, there islittle chance of undue influence being applied.See Aguinda, 142 F.Supp.2d at 544-46. We can-not say that these findings were an abuse of dis-cretion. See Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d1305, 1313 n. 3 (11th Cir .2001).

[5] Finally, plaintiffs challenge the districtcourt's allowance of only 60 days for the asser-tion of plaintiffs' claims in Ecuador exempt fromclaims of preclusion. We agree with this objec-tion. In the district court, timely claims werebrought on behalf of nearly 55,000 plaintiffs. InEcuador, because class action procedures are notrecognized, signed authorizations would need tobe obtained for each individual plaintiff. Thispresents a formidable administrative task forwhich we believe 60 days is inadequate time. Wetherefore direct the district court to modify its rul-ing to make dismissal conditioned on Texaco'sagreeing to waive any defense based on a statuteof limitations for limitation periods expiringbetween the date of filing these United States ac-tions and one year (rather *479 than 60 days) fol-lowing the dismissal of these actions.

B. Balancing Private and Public InterestFactors

[6] Having demonstrated the availability ofan adequate alternative forum, Texaco must nextestablish that the balance of private and public in-terest factors “tilt[s] strongly in favor of trial inthe foreign forum.” Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 100.

1. Private Interest Factors[7] Private interests include “the relative ease

of access to sources of proof; availability of com-pulsory process for attendance of unwilling, andthe cost of obtaining attendance of willing, wit-nesses; possibility of view of the premises, ifview would be appropriate to the action; and allother practical problems that make trial of a caseeasy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Gulf OilCorp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct. 839,91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947). We find no abuse of dis-cretion in the district court's conclusion that theseinterests “weigh heavily” in favor of an Ecuadori-an forum. The relative ease of access to sourcesof proof favors proceeding in Ecuador. All

plaintiffs, as well as members of their putativeclasses, live in Ecuador or Peru. Plaintiffs sus-tained their injuries in Ecuador and Peru, andtheir relevant medical and property records arelocated there. Also located in Ecuador are the re-cords of decisions taken by the Consortium, alongwith evidence of Texaco's defenses implicatingthe roles of PetroEcuador and the Republic. Bycontrast, plaintiffs have failed to establish that theparent Texaco made decisions regarding oil oper-ations in Ecuador or that evidence of any such de-cisions is located in the U.S.

If these cases proceeded to trial, it would beonerous for a New York court to manage thetranslation difficulties arising from cases with55,000 putative class members of different indi-genous groups speaking various dialects. In addi-tion, it would be far more feasible for anEcuadorian court to view the polluted areas inquestion than for a New York court to do so. Wealso find significant that the Republic and PetroE-cuador, neither of which are parties to the currentsuits, could be joined if the cases were resumed inEcuador. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 259, 102S.Ct. 252 (noting that “inability to implead poten-tial third-party defendants” supports holding trialin Scotland). We agree with the district court'sobservation that in the absence of the EcuadorianRepublic as a party, a U.S. court would be incap-able of effectively ordering several aspects of theequitable relief sought in the complaints.

To the extent that evidence exists within theU.S., plaintiffs' concerns are partially addressedby Texaco's stipulation to allow use of the dis-covery already obtained. Furthermore, Texaco'scounsel agreed at oral argument that Texacowould not oppose further discovery in Ecuadorthat would otherwise be available in the U.S.

Finally, plaintiffs raise two additional prac-tical concerns: 1) They contend the filing fee forany civil action in Ecuador is cost prohibitive forplaintiffs, many of whom are low-income subsist-ence farmers; and 2) there is currently a travel ad-visory by the U.S. State Department for theEcuadorian province of Sucumbios, whereplaintiffs assert trial would be held. It is sufficient

















answer that these contentions need not be recog-nized when raised for the first time on appeal. Inaddition, however, plaintiffs acknowledge thepassage of new law in Ecuador whereby filingfees for indigent persons are reduced to a minimallevel. With regard to the travel advisory,plaintiffs have given no explanation as to why lit-igation must be conducted in the Sucumbiosprovince.

*480 2. Public Interest Factors[8] Public interest considerations include ad-

ministrative difficulties associated with courtcongestion; the unfairness of imposing jury dutyon a community with no relation to the litigation;the interest in having localized controversies de-cided at home; and avoiding difficult problems inconflict of laws and the application of foreignlaw. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09, 67 S.Ct. 839.The district court was within its discretion in con-cluding that the public interest factors tilt in favorof dismissal.FN3

FN3. Plaintiffs contend we should inter-pret the ATCA to encompass their envir-onmental claim, cf. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5thCir.1999), and to express, like the Tor-ture Victims Protection Act, a strongU.S. policy interest in providing a forumfor the adjudication of such claims. Com-pare Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 105. We have noneed to pass on either question. Even ifwe were to accept plaintiffs' view of thelaw on both questions, the private andpublic interest factors that affect thiscase would nonetheless require that weaffirm the district court's judgment.

We conclude that the district court was with-in its discretion in dismissing the actions on thebasis of forum non conveniens.FN4

FN4. Plaintiffs also cursorily argue thatinternational comity considerations mil-itate against dismissal and that JudgeRakoff should have recused himself. Wehave considered both claims and findthem to be without merit.

CONCLUSIONThe district court's judgment dismissing for

forum non conveniens is AFFIRMED, subject tothe modification that the judgment be conditionedon Texaco's agreement to waive defenses basedon statutes of limitation for limitation periods ex-piring between the institution of these actions anda date one year subsequent to the final judgmentof dismissal.

C.A.2 (N.Y.),2002.Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.303 F.3d 470, 157 Oil & Gas Rep. 33, 33 Envtl.L. Rep. 20,010

END OF DOCUMENT












LAMPIRAN 4

BAILII Citation Number: [1998] EWCA Civ 1351

QBENI 98/0192/1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (SIR MICHEL KALLIPETIS QC (Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge))

Royal Courts of Justice

The Strand London WC2

30th July 1998

B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE EVANS LORD JUSTICE MILLETT

LORD JUSTICE AULD ____________________

(1) RACHEL LUBBE

(2) NKALA JOHANNES MAILE

(3) MATLANENG JOHANNES

MOHLALA

(4) CATHERINE EKSTEEN NEL

(suing as Administratrix of the

Estate of MATHYS CHRISTOFEL NEL)

(5) SEBUSHI PAULINE SELWANA

Appellants

- v -

CAPE PLC

Respondents

____________________

(Handed down Transcript of Smith Bernal Reporting Ltd 180 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD

Tel: 0171 421 4040 Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

____________________


LAMPIRAN 4

MISS B DOHMANN QC and MR G READ (Instructed by Messrs Leigh Day & Co.,

London EC1M 4LB) appeared on behalf of the Appellants MR S KENTRIDGE QC, MR B DOCTOR and MR COLEMAN (Instructed by Messrs

Davies Arnold Cooper, London EC4Y 8DD) appeared on behalf of the Respondents ____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT

____________________

Crown Copyright ©

(see: Lubbe and Others and Cape Plc. and Related Appeals [2000] UKHL 41 (20th July, 2000))

1. LORD JUSTICE EVANS: The issue raised by this appeal is whether an action brought by South African plaintiffs against the defendant company, which is incorporated and domiciled in England, should be stayed on grounds of forum non conveniens, in favour of proceedings which the defendant says the plaintiffs could commence against it in South Africa. The claim is for damages for personal injuries which were sustained in South Africa, caused over a long period during which, it is alleged, the plaintiffs were exposed to the risks of inhaling asbestos dust. Michel Kallipetis Q.C. sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court ordered a stay, and the plaintiffs now appeal.

2. Barbara Dohmann Q.C. counsel for the appellants submits alternatively that the stay is contrary to the Brussels Convention 1968 (Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982) and that the matter should be remitted to the European Court of Justice for its ruling on whether the Convention applies. A ruling that it does apply would involve a departure from the decision of this Court in Re. Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1992] Ch.72.

3. The defendant's application was by Summons dated 7 March 1997 claiming :-

"3. A declaration that in the circumstances the Plaintiff's action should not be allowed to proceed on the principles of forum non conveniens."

4. The judge made the following Order dated 22 January 1998 :-

"AND UPON the Defendant giving the undertaking recorded in Appendix "A" hereto

IT IS ORDERED that :-

(1) All further proceedings in this action be stayed on the grounds that the appropriate forum for the trial of this action and the issues therein is the High Court of South Africa, ....".

5. Appendix "A" contained five numbered undertakings, the essential one being -

"(2) the defendant consents to these actions by these plaintiffs relating to Prieska, Koegs and Penge being heard together in any provisional division of


http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2000/41.html

LAMPIRAN 4

the High Court of South Africa having jurisdiction in respect of them , provided that all cases of each of these Plaintiffs are brought in the same Court ; ....".

6. In other words, that the Defendant would submit to the jurisdiction of the High Court of South Africa, if the proceedings were brought there. Prieska, Koegas and Penge are the names of asbestos mines and mills in South Africa where local deposits of asbestos were exploited from the late 19th century until 1979, when the defendants ceased to have any connection with them. Prieska and Koegas are in the Northern Cape district. Prieska ceased operations and the area was "rehabilitated" in 1994. The Penge Mines which are in Transvaal closed in June 1992.

7. The forum non conveniens application is of course governed by the principles stated in The Spiliada [1987] 1 A.C. 460. Because the plaintiffs bring the proceedings in this jurisdiction `as of right', the defendant company being incorporated and domiciled here, the defendant has the burden of proving that South Africa is an "available forum which is clearly and distinctly more appropriate than the English forum" for the trial of the action (per Lord Goff at 477E). The judge held that the defendant succeeded in doing so, although his conclusion was expressed in the Order in apparently less restrictive terms ("the appropriate forum [is]").

8. A point was raised in the course of argument by Millett L.J. which was not relied upon before the judge and which introduces a factor which was not present or taken into account in Spiliada. The defendant company is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the South African Courts, save with its consent. This was the reason for the undertakings recorded in the Order.

9. We were given an agreed statement of South African law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court of South Africa in an action in tort (delict) brought by a resident (incola) against a non-resident (peregrinus). The requirements are (1) a ratio jurisdiction in the form of a cause of action arising (at least in part) within the area of the Court's jurisdiction, and (2) an arrest of the person or attachment of property (no matter how small) ad confirmandum jurisdictionem, or failing that a submission by the defendant to the Court's jurisdiction. There is said to be "no common law jurisdiction of forum conveniens in South Africa" which we take to mean, for present purposes, that there is no basis for extending the jurisdiction extra-territorially as the English Courts do under R.S.C. Order 11. We are told, finally, that jurisdiction must exist at the time when the action is instituted by issue of Summons.

10. The first requirement is satisfied in the present case, or so it would seem, but the second is not. The defendant company does not carry on business in South Africa and it has no assets there, or none which are liable to attachment or have been attached. Hence the undertaking to submit to proceedings, if and when they are issued. Without it there would be no basis on which South African jurisdiction could be exercised. This undertaking enables the defendants to contend that the South African courts are "available" to the plaintiffs for the purposes of the Spiliada principles. The undertaking was first offered during the hearing before the judge and therefore came after the defendant's summons was issued ; a matter of timing which may be relevant to the question whether it should be taken into account.

Background


LAMPIRAN 4

11. The judge's summary can be quoted in full. Following the discovery of blue asbestos

near Prieska in South Africa,

"It was a Cornish engineer named Frances Oates who was the driving force behind a consortium formed to mine the asbestos at the end of the 19th Century and in 1893 this cave birth to the predecessor of the defendant company The Cape Asbestos Company Limited ("London Cape"). Their operations centred on mines at Prieska and Koegas.

From its inception, the English company established a local agency to run the South African operations and appointed local directors to operate under regulations drawn up by the English company. Francis Oates was among the first of the local directors to be appointed and later that same year he was appointed as a director to the Board of the English company. The Defendants claim that the English company did not concern itself with the actual mining operations but merely owned the land and the mineral rights over the land and paid anyone who brought mineral fibre to its store. This appears to have been the pattern in the early days, according to the potted history reproduced at E/47 of exhibit "RM1".

Another development which may have some relevance in view of a late application by the Plaintiffs, was the acquisition of an Italian factory near Turin in 1894 to experiment in the manufacture of goods from Cape Blue. These operations were funded from London and the history of the company (E/52) describes the position thus : "After a year the company had little to show financially, but it had its two legs firmly planted in South Africa and Italy, a virile system of arteries running from London to many countries abroad, and an energetic leader in the shape of the peripatetic Mr Oates" There then follows on that page an extract from his speech to the shareholders in which he extols the virtues of the company and the operations in mining and manufacturing of blue asbestos.

The Boer War interrupted the mining of Cape Blue until 1903 and by 1905 the mine at Prieska was in full operation. In 1914 brown asbestos, called Amozite was mined in Penge, named after the London suburb. In 1916 Egnep Limited and Amosa Limited were registered to exploit the deposits of brown asbestos or amosite at Penge. London Cape bought amozite and processed it at its factory in Barking, Essex. In the early 1920s London Cape contemplated acquiring the mines at Penge, but the depression intervened and it was not until September 1925 that London Cape acquired both Egnep and Amosa.

After the Second World War the demand for asbestos increased. The Cape Blue mining operations were run from Kimberley by the local Board of Directors established in 1894 and the amozite mining at Penge was run by Egnep from Cape Town. It is not disputed that up to 1948, London Cape controlled the operations in South Africa.

In 1948 two new companies were formed : Cape Asbestos South Africa (Pty) Limited ("CASAP") a subsidiary of London Cape as a holding company, and Cape Blue Mines (Pty) Limited to acquire the Cape Blue mining assets. A Mr Riley was sent out from London to take up a permanent appointment


LAMPIRAN 4

controlling the whole of London Cape's asbestos operations in South Africa. He retained his seat on the Board of Cape London and reorganised the structure of the South African companies by transferring them all to Johannesburg.

By the end of the Second World War London Cape controlled the whole operations of asbestos production from "mine to manufacture" through a host of subsidiary companies. At E/78 is a family tree of the Cape organisation which is described in more detail at pages E/72 to 108.

The 1948 reorganisation, claimed the Defendants, resulted in the cessation of Cape London's control of operations in South Africa and the resumption of total control and thereby legal responsibility, by CASAP which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Cape London. The defendants allege that day to day control of each mine was entirely in the hands of local management. The Plaintiffs rely on the part played by Mr Riley to demonstrate that there was still a vital element of control by Cape London. The precise nature of the control if any exercised by Cape London over the South African subsidiaries is very much in issue but I do not have to decide that matter on this application."

Plaintiffs

12. Again, the judge's summary can be quoted here :-

"Mrs Lubbe : She lived in the area of Koegas and Prieska mines. Unfortunately since the inception of this action and just before the hearing of the application she died. No point is taken by the Defendants and I am asked to consider her case along with the others on the basis that her husband will subsequently have himself substituted as Plaintiff on behalf of her estate.

Mr Maile : worked at the Penge mine and lived in the mine hostel. It is alleged that at all times both while working in the mine and while living in the mine hostel he was exposed to asbestos dust and fibres.

Mr Mohlala : worked at the Penge mine from the age of 12 packing asbestos fibre with his bare hands for some 14 years during which he also lived in the mine hostel.

Mrs Nel : The wife of Mr Nel who died in November 1995 from mesothelioma. It is said that he lived in the environment of the Prieska mine and mill and was exposed to the asbestos dust fibres in the atmosphere.

Mrs Selwana : worked as a servant for a family living at the Penge mine and was exposed to asbestos dust and fibre in the atmosphere. She also washed the overalls of her husband who worked in the mine and thereby it is said was further exposed to asbestos dust and fibres".


LAMPIRAN 4

Allegations in Statement of Claim

13. The plaintiffs allege that the defendant company "operated and/or had responsibility for, inter alia, asbestos mines and mills in South Africa from which asbestos was mined and milled and a substantial proportion of which asbestos was transported to and used in factories in the United Kingdom which factories the Defendant Company operated and/or had responsibility for" (paragraph 1.2). Further facts are alleged in paragraph 2, including, with reference to the three named sites, "the Defendant company operated and/or had responsibility" for them either itself or through wholly owned subsidiaries (paragraphs 2.7 and 2.8). Particulars are given of the individuals who acted on behalf of the defendant and whose knowledge should be attributed to it, including knowledge of the alleged risks involved in the asbestos processes. The alleged duty of care is pleaded in paragraph 5, arising because the defendant "operated or had responsibility for "processes" either directly or through its wholly owned subsidiaries". The alleged breaches include negligently allowing the plaintiffs to be exposed to asbestos dust and fibres (paragraph 12).

Italian action

14. Reference is also made to an action commenced by Writ issued on 3 October 1997 against the defendant by four Italian plaintiffs claiming damages for personal injury. They worked in or lived near the Turin factory similarly operated by the defendant, it is alleged, either directly or through a subsidiary. The same allegations are made as in the present action, and the fact that the Italian action is pending is a reason, the plaintiffs submit, why the present actions should not be stayed. The Italian action cannot be stayed, because the defendant company is domiciled here and so is rightly sued by Italian plaintiffs in the English court, under the Brussels Convention Article 2. Mr Kentridge submits that the existence of separate proceedings is wholly irrelevant to the defendant's application in this case.

Issues

15. The judge stated the issues as follows :-

"(1) Did each of the Plaintiffs suffer the injuries of which they complain?

(2) Were these injuries caused by inhalation of asbestos dust and fibre present in the atmosphere where they worked and lived?

(3) Did that asbestos dust and fibre escape from the mines and mills at Prieska, Koegas and Penge?

(4) Were the companies which ran those mines and mills liable in law to each Plaintiff for the escape of asbestos dust into the atmosphere? This can effectively be broken down in legal terms to the following two questions :-

(a) Did those companies owe a duty to those living and working in the vicinity of the mines and mills? and

(b) Did those companies or any of them commit breaches of that duty?


LAMPIRAN 4

(5) Is Cape London liable in law for the breaches of duty by the South African companies?

16. His conclusions were set out after a lengthy review of the authorities which were cited to him. He held that "questions (1) to (4) are governed by South African law and the answer to them has its closest and most natural connection with South Africa", referring to a list of connecting factors to England and South Africa respectively which counsel placed before him (paragraph 16). He then referred to the plaintiffs' submission that the defendant owed a duty "to anyone worldwide who foreseeably might be injured by the negligent escape of asbestos dust into the atmosphere" and to various factors affecting the relative convenience of trials in South Africa or England. He said :-

"It does seem to me that this is an action, which given the modern methods of communication could be tried either in South Africa or in this jurisdiction. However that is not the question with which I am concerned. I have to decide which jurisdiction has the most natural and closest connection with the causes of action raised in the Statement of Claim". (paragraph 17).

17. His overall conclusion was :-

"In my discretion I have to decide not which is the more convenient forum for the purposes of the parties but which is the most natural forum for the trial of this action. On balance it seems to me that everything in this action points to South Africa as the most natural forum for the trial of this action. If there is the duty contended for by Mr Johnson upon the English company it seems to me that that can easily be litigated in South Africa. All the other matters, notably those listed in issues (1) to (4) above, quite clearly in my judgment have their closest and most significant connection with South Africa which is the most natural forum for the trial of those issues. In all the circumstances in exercising my discretion I am satisfied that the Defendants have discharged the burden upon them and therefore I would grant the stay under the first limb in Spiliada."

Submissions

18. Miss Dohmann's submission can be summarised, I hope accurately, under three heads. First, the plaintiffs do not allege that the defendant is liable for breaches of duty by the South African companies (the judge's issue (5)). They allege that the defendant is liable for breaches of a duty of care owed by it to classes of person including the individual plaintiffs. Secondly, that duty arose under English law and in England, and the breaches of it for which the defendant is responsible, whether by its directors or senior personnel, occurred for the most part in England, where board meetings were held, policy decisions made and instructions given. The judge was wrong, she submits, to identify those factual allegations with South Africa. Thirdly, she relies on the "available forum" point which was not taken before the judge.

19. Mr Kentridge Q.C. for the defendant submits that the judge was right, essentially for the reasons he gave. The plaintiffs suffered their alleged injuries in South Africa in consequence, they say, of physical conditions there. The judge was right to hold that essentially the factual allegations are based in South Africa and that convenience dictates that the trial should be held there. The question whether the defendant owed


LAMPIRAN 4

the duty of care alleged by the plaintiffs is likewise governed by South African law. The South African courts are an "available forum," for the plaintiffs, because the defendant is willing to submit to their jurisdiction, and the fact that such submission is necessary has not given rise to a similar objection in any reported case, in particular Connolly v. R.T.Z. plc and Tulloch v. Williams (1846) 8D 657 where the point could have been taken, but was not.

Authorities

20. The judge referred to the authorities which were cited to him under four heads vis. The Asbestos Cases, The Forum Conveniens Cases, The Liability of Parent Company Cases and The question of Legal Aid (ref. Connelly v. RTZ Corp. plc (House of Lords). Legal aid apparently is available to the plaintiffs, and that factor is not relied upon in the present case (judgment para. 13.2). The `Liability of Parent Company Cases' likewise are not relevant to the appeal, because Miss Dohmann accepts, indeed she asserts, that the plaintiffs do not allege that the defendants are responsible for the acts of their subsidiary companies in South Africa, whether vicariously or on some other ground which might otherwise be suggested, for example, by submitting that the Courts should `pierce the corporate veil' in the circumstances of this case. The plaintiffs allege that their injuries were at least partly caused by negligence of the defendant company itself, through its directors and employees. As stated above, Miss Dohmann submits that the judge misunderstood the nature of the allegations, confusing them with some form of vicarious responsibility for the acts of agents or subsidiaries in South Africa, and that this led him to the wrong conclusion, that the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants are governed by South African law.

21. It is unnecessary in my judgment to refer to any of the forum conveniens cases except Spiliada and also a more recent Privy Council decision in Red Sea Inc Company Ltd v. Bouygues S.A. [1995] 1 A.C. 1990, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Hong Kong. The judgment of Lord Stynn includes the following passage :-

"The law of England recognizes that a particular issue between the parties to litigation may be governed by the law of the country which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties. They agree with the statement of Lord Wilberforce at page 391 to 392, which has been set out above as to the extent of an application of the exception. they accept, as he did, that the exception would not be successfully invoked in every case or even, probably, in many cases, and at page 391H, that "the general rule must apply unless clear and satisfying grounds are shown why it should be departed from and what solution, derived from what other rule, should be preferred.""

22. The Asbestos cases are relevant because they show, first, how claims for personal injuries caused by exposure to asbestos dust have been handled by the English Courts (Smith v. Asbestos Industries Ltd [1971] 3 All E.R. 204 (C.A.) and Margereson v. J.W. Roberts Ltd (1966) P.I.Q.R. 358 (Holland J. and C.A.)) and in Western Australia( Barrow and Others v. C.S.R. Ltd 4 August 1988, Supreme Court), and secondly, how related procedural and jurisdictional issues have been handled by the courts. These cases are Ngcobo v. Thor Chemical Holdings Ltd (C.A. 9 October 1995, unreported) and Adams v. Cape industries plc [1990] 1 Ch.473 and Durham v. T & N plc (C.A. 1 May 1996, unreported).


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23. The present defendants were parties to the second of these, Adams v. Cape

Industries plc, being joined as the parent company of subsidiaries who were defendants in an action brought before the U.S. District Court of Texas. Although the claims arose out of the supply of asbestos fibres mined in South Africa, the judgments of Scott J. and the Court of Appeal were concerned with the enforceability of the judgment of the United States Court and with the non-liability of a parent company for the action of its subsidiaries. They therefore are not relevant to the issues now raised.

24. Both Ngcobo v. Thor Chemical Holdings Ltd and Durham v. T & N plc, however, should be referred to in greater detail. The plaintiffs in Ngcobo were admittedly exposed to hazardous and unsafe quantities of mercury, mercury vapour and mercury components in the course of their employment in South Africa by a South African company whom they could not sue, by reason of the provisions of the South African Workmans Compensation Act 1941. "In short, the Ngcobo Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had developed an unsafe plant and system of work in England, exported it to South Africa and thereafter commissioned it and operated it knowing it to be hazardous to the workmen employed there." The alleged torts were committed in South Africa. Mr Recorder Stewart Q.C. sitting as a deputy High Court Judge was not persuaded to grant a stay. The defendants' appeal was struck out on procedural grounds. The judge in the present case rightly regarded this as an important decision, and of some assistance to the plaintiffs, but the facts can be distinguished and for present purposes I do not give it any significant weight.

25. The facts in Durham v. T & N plc are to some extent parallel with those in the present case. The plaintiff was an injured Canadian employee of a subsidiary company of the defendants ; they were "the parent company of a multinational group with extensive experience of resisting asbestos related claims in the Unites States and elsewhere" (judgment page 4). The case was pleaded as "a straightforward claim in tort for personal injuries against an employee or occupier of premises" (page 6). Even making the assumption that the defendant company rather than the subsidiary should be regarded as the plaintiff's employer and occupier of the factory, nevertheless the law of Quebec was the governing law of the alleged tort and the action was precluded by the provisions of Quebec law. The plaintiff's appeal was dismissed, by a Court of which I was a member. The decision was as to the governing law of the torts which were alleged, and the plaintiffs in the present case make entirely different allegations as to the basis on which they say the defendant is liable to them.

26. Also relevant, in my judgment, are the authorities which establish the principles of comparative law (private international law) which determine the proper law of a tort committed either partly or wholly outside the territorial jurisdiction of the English Court ; strictly, what system or systems of municipal law govern the question whether acts committed outside England and Wales give rise to liabilities in tort. Where the composite acts which together constitute a tort under English law took place in different jurisdictions, then the Court must identify the substance and decide accordingly what system of law governs the tort: Metall and Rohstoff A.G. v. Donaldson Luftkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 Q.B. 391 and see Distillers Co. Ltd v. Thompson [1971] A.C. 458 :-

"The right approach is, when the tort is complete, to look back over the series of events constituting it and ask where in substance did this cause of action arise?" (per Lord Pearson at 468E)


http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1971/1971_3.html

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27. Allied to this is the so-called `Rule in Phillips v. Eyre' which in the light of Boys v.

Chaplin [1971] A.C. 356 is summarised in Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws 12th ed. (1993) as follows :-

"Rule 203 -(1) As a general rule, an act done in a foreign country is a tort and actionable as such in England, only if it is both

(a) actionable as a tort according to English law, or in other words is an act which, if done in England, would be a tort ; and

(b) actionable according to the law of the foreign country where it was done.

(2) But a particular issue between the parties may be governed by the law of the country which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship with the occurrences and the parties."

28. The House of Lords' decision in Boys v. Chaplin illustrates the application of sub-rule (2) and is consistent with the passage from the judgment in Red Sea Inc. Company Ltd. v. Badges S.A. which I have quoted above. (See now the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995.)

The plaintiffs' claim re-formulated

29. Faced with the imprecise wording of the Statement of Claim, which alleges that until 1978/9 "the defendant company operated and/or had responsibility [through its subsidiaries] for the mines and mills" in South Africa (para. 2.8) coupled with a later reference to "its control over asbestos and asbestos related products, from mining to sale" (para.5.1), and with her concession that the defendant company was sought to be held liable for its own tortious acts, rather than liable for its subsidiaries', Miss Dohmann re-formulated the plaintiffs' central allegation as follows :-

"Whether a parent company which is proved to exercise de facto control over the operations of a (foreign) subsidiary and which knows, through its directors, that those operations involve risks to the health of workers employed by the subsidiary and/or persons in the vicinity of its factory or other business premises, owes a duty of care to those workers and/or other persons in relation to the control which it exercises over and the advice which it gives to the subsidiary company?"

Governing law

30. The Spiliada judgment refers expressly to "the law governing the relevant transaction" as one of the factors determining whether the alternative foreign forum is "clearly and distinctly more appropriate" than England (pp. 477E and 478A). Naturally, therefore, both Miss Dohmann and Mr Kentridge made submissions to us as to whether English or South African law governs the tortious liability which the plaintiffs allege against the defendant. There are strong arguments in favour of each. Miss Dohmann emphasises that the negligence alleged against the defendant company, which acted through its directors and senior employees, consists of


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instructions and advice which they gave, or failed to give, to their South African employees and to the South African subsidiaries who operated the mines and mills, in the course of carrying on business internationally, there and elsewhere. The instructions and advice, it is alleged, showed a careless disregard for the foreseeable risks of injury to those who were closely affected by the asbestos operations in South Africa, taking account of the knowledge which they had or ought to have had of the health risks involved. These matters were determined at Board or a senior level in England as part of company policy and they were implemented by directors and senior personnel in England and elsewhere, including South Africa during regular visits there. She submits that the question whether the defendant owed a duty of care at this level towards individual workmen centres upon decisions made and activities undertaken in England, and should be governed by English law. Moreover, considerations of English public policy are involved in deciding whether or not a duty of care should be imposed in a given set of circumstances : Caparo Industries v. Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 650 passim. The English Courts are the correct forum to decide such matters : Du Pont v. Agnew [1987] 23 Lloyd's Rep. 585 at 594/5.

31. Mr Kentridge on the other hand submits that the claim has its closest and real connection with South Africa. The claims are "quintessentially fact-based" (skeleton argument para.21). They are for injuries allegedly suffered by individual plaintiffs by reason of their physical exposure to asbestos dust in the vicinity of the mines and mills. The suggestion that the defendant formulated its policy in England takes the matter no further ; the plaintiffs were not injured by the formulation of policy, but by exposure to asbestos dust in South Africa. Apart from the defendant's incorporation and domicile in England, "none of the legal or factual issues in this case are connected with England" (skeleton argument para.24.1), and for the same reasons "English law is likely to be the law of the alleged tort or at least a substantial element" (ibid. para.26).

32. In short, Miss Dohmann submits that the defendant owed the plaintiffs a duty of care in respect of their activities which took place largely in England, whilst Mr Kentridge relies rather upon the alleged consequences of breaches of the duty, which occurred in South Africa, and on the nature of the individual claims. From the point of view of individual plaintiffs, breach, causation and injury all took place in South Africa, and policy decisions made in London or instructions which emanated in London but which took effect in South Africa were remote from them.

33. These submissions overlap the question whether factual issues may be more conveniently heard in South Africa than in London, and in my judgment it is right to pause in order to consider what weight the governing law factor has in this case.

34. The judge said this :-

"The Plaintiffs, or their deceased relatives on whose behalf they sue, all contracted one form or another of mesothelioma. It is against this background that I turn to the application before me. At the heart of the action is the question of whether or not Cape London has any liability in law for any injuries which the Plaintiffs may subsequently prove that they sustained as a result of inhaling asbestos dust in the atmosphere in South Africa. This may well be a difficult question for the Plaintiffs to prove but it is not one which is before me and not one that I have to decide.


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Although it was accepted by both Counsel in the course of their submissions that the question of whether or not a duty was owed was not one for me, nonetheless a great deal of the argument by each Counsel has been directed to this question. In deference to the weighty arguments advanced by both sides I shall attempt to deal with as many of the matters as I think are relevant for the decision that I have to make but I trust that both Counsel will forgive me if I do not repeat in this Judgment every single matter that they have raised and every single submission."

35. Having defined the issues as already stated above, he then held that questions (1) to (4) "are governed by South African law and the answer to them has its closest and most natural connection with South Africa" (para. 16). He did not state any conclusion as regards question (5), but he added this when considering the general issue of appropriate forum :-

"In effect the Plaintiff contends that the duty is owed by an English company to anyone worldwide who foreseeably might be injured by the negligent escape of asbestos dust into the atmosphere" (para.17)

36. The reference to a "world wide" tort is taken up in the defendants' skeleton argument where Mr Kentridge submits :-

"38. The duty of care, if it existed, did not exist in England. If it has a locus, it must be where the person who falls within its ambit is situated" (citing Caparo v. Dickman per Lord Oliver at 651).

37. In my judgment, this submission confuses two separate questions. First, what law governs the tort alleged in a particular case? Secondly, what was the location of the constituent elements of the tort? As already observed from the Metall und Rohstoff judgment, the law governing the tort depends upon the location of its substantial elements, but this does not mean that the duty of care exists in a particular place. The most that can be said is that one system of law rather than another will govern the alleged liability of the tortfeasor towards the injured claimant, wherever they may be situated, and even this is subject to the possibility that, under English law, an individual issue may be determined by a different system from that which otherwise governs the tort.

38. The submissions demonstrate that there is much room for argument as to whether on the alleged facts the defendant company owed a duty of care to individuals who lived in the vicinity of the mines and mills in South Africa, whether under English or South African law, and as to which law applies to the alleged tort or, possibly, to that issue. This is a substantial question of law, not suitable for determination in these proceedings to have the action stayed. The plaintiffs have suggested that it could be tried as a preliminary issue, but the defendants do not agree, and the judge felt unable to direct a trial of the issue without their assent. In these circumstance, it would be wrong in my view to make any assumption as to what is or is likely to be held to be the governing law of this transaction. Furthermore, it is an issue of law which can be decided in either South Africa or England, although prima facie the allegation of a common law duty of care owed by an English defendant, albeit to a class of persons situated overseas, should more appropriately be decided by the English Courts.


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39. Although he gave no express ruling, the judge indicated in the passages referred to

above that in his view the defendant's alleged liability is governed by South African law, and if he did so, then in my judgment he misdirected himself. It is an open issue, and at best for the defendant a neutral factor in the circumstances of this case.

40. Moreover, I would accept Miss Dohmann's submission that the judge's formulation of issue (5) was incorrect. As already explained, the plaintiffs do not allege that the defendant is "liable in law for the breaches of duty by the South African companies" : no form of vicarious liability is relied upon. The difference is important, because the alleged breaches of an independent duty of care owed by the defendant took place in England rather than in South Africa.

41. I should add two further comments, although these were not developed in argument. First, the issue whether a duty of care was owed by the defendant, in England, may be governed by English law, even if the other factors making up the alleged tort of negligence are governed by South African law : the kind of hybrid situation envisaged by Dicey and Morris' Rule 203(2).

42. Secondly, it seems to me that the role of the South African companies as operators of the mines and mills is of limited relevance to the allegations made against the defendant. Even if it is assumed that all South African regulations were complied with, and even that the operations were in no way unlawful under South African law, the allegation of negligence remains. Where business is carried on in this country, the fact that statutory regulations were not breached does not mean that the defendant was not negligent, although if the regulations take account of contemporary knowledge then it is clear evidence that reasonable standards were achieved : Budden v BP & Shell (C.A. April/May 1980). A fortiori where it is alleged that the defendants were situated in England and ought reasonably to have taken account of scientific knowledge that was available to them here.

Convenience, etc

43. The judge referred comparatively briefly to factors such as the availability of witnesses and documents, the convenience of the parties and their representatives as well as witnesses and suggested differences between South African and English court procedures. He concluded that "this is an action which, given the modern methods of communication could be tried either in South Africa or in this jurisdiction" (para.17). He did not refer to a suggested "Cambridgeshire factor" (the availability in London of experienced personnel and relevant documentary records, by reason of other litigation, here including the pending Italian action) but I would not regard that as a significant factor in the present case. He appears to have placed some reliance on the fact that a South African judge could more readily carry out a site inspection, which I would have discounted, because (1) the mines are now closed and the sites "rehabilitated", (2) an English judge could, if necessary, travel to South Africa for the same purpose, albeit at much greater expense, and (3) the trial judge's findings of fact will depend upon the evidence that is put before him in the court-room, wherever that may be. None of these comments, however, comes close to providing grounds for differing from the judge's exercise of discretion, so far as the convenience factor is concerned.

The judge's decision


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44. This is contained in paragraph 19, which I have quoted above. There is some force, I

think, in Miss Dohmann's submission that the question which the judge asked himself was not the correct one, given that the plaintiff can invoke the English Court's jurisdiction as of right : it should be, is South Africa nevertheless shown "distinctly and clearly" to be the more appropriate forum? It is not enough, she submits, that South Africa is "the most natural" forum or that the issues can easily be litigated there. This particular criticism, however, is little more than semantic, and it should not be given undue weight.

Available forum,

45. The judge referred to the need for the defendant company to submit to the jurisdiction of the South African court, before that forum could become `available' to the plaintiffs, but only as a "potential difficulty", equivalent to different rules as to discovery, etc, which was removed by the undertakings offered by the defendant and subject to which the Order staying the proceedings was made (see page 49).

46. In my judgment, the difficulty is greater than this. The question is, whether the courts of another country can be said to offer an "available forum" to a plaintiff who cannot bring proceedings there, without the defendant's consent. Clearly not, at the time when the plaintiff brings proceedings in England, unless the defendant has already indicated his willingness to be sued there, whether in reply to a letter before action or for some other reason. If the relevant time is when the defendant's Summons is issued (cf.Mohammed v. Bank of Kuwait [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1483), then the requirement was not satisfied in the present case : the undertakings were suggested or offered subsequently, when the Summons was heard.

47. Putting aside these technical objections, it can be said that the defendant's offer only becomes relevant if the Court finds that the forum in which he indicates his willingness to be sued is "clearly and distinctly" more appropriate for the hearing of the action, "in the interests of both parties and the ends of justice". Viewed in this light, the defendant's offer can be seen as contributing towards those ends.

48. But the effect of treating the foreign jurisdiction as available to the plaintiff in these circumstances is to give the defendant a choice of jurisdiction, if he is sued in England. He can accept that jurisdiction, if it suits him to do so, or he can elect in favour of the foreign jurisdiction, if that appears more favourable for him. The latter presumably is the situation here. It becomes almost a case of forum shopping in reverse, and it was the English Court's reluctance to allow plaintiffs to choose an inappropriate jurisdiction when more than one forum was available to them which led to the disinterested approach based on doing justice to both parties which underlies the Spiliada judgment.

49. Seeking therefore to give a principled answer to the question whether a foreign jurisdiction can be regarded as available to the plaintiff, when its availability depends on the defendant submitting to it, it seems to me that there could be extreme cases where the defendant is sued "as of right' in a jurisdiction which has no connection whatsoever with the subject-matter of the dispute and where the foreign jurisdiction in question is "clearly and distinctly" the only one which could be regarded as appropriate in the circumstances. Even in such a case the plaintiff might seek, not unreasonably, to obtain a judgment in England which could more readily or more


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effectively be enforced against the defendant or his assets, and so I will say no more than that such a case could perhaps exist.

50. But that is not the situation here. There are factual connections with England. Indeed, Miss Dohmann submits that the central allegations relate to the defendant's activities in this country, although its business was carried on directly or through subsidiaries abroad. The judge in my view did underestimate the extent to which factual issues arise here in this country : he said that there were none, apart from the presence of the defendant company, when clearly there are some. It is not the extreme case, in my judgment, where possibly the defendant's choice of jurisdiction should be allowed to prevail.

51. Under the heading "Submission as a basis of jurisdiction", Mr Kentridge contends that the jurisdiction of a foreign court only becomes effective when the plaintiff chooses to invoke it, and that that forum is "available" to the plaintiff when the defendant agrees or has agreed to submit to it, in the event that the plaintiff issues proceedings there. There is no distinction, he submits, between an undertaking which precedes the issue of South African proceedings and a previous contractual agreement to the jurisdiction of a foreign court. A jurisdiction clause, he submits, which, although not a submission `in the face of' the foreign court, nevertheless is evidence of a submission to it (supplementary skeleton para. 11) and will be accepted as such.

52. In my judgment, a different principle governs the effects of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. It founds jurisdiction as a matter of discretion in England (Order 11 Rule 1(1)). In South Africa, as I understand Mr Kentridge's submission, it is treated as equivalent to a submission to the jurisdiction, when the jurisdiction is invoked. The latter may mean that the plaintiff in South Africa is able to issue proceedings "as of right" when the defendant's prior acceptance of the jurisdiction is evidenced in that way. But when there is no prior agreement, the plaintiff cannot make any such claim. Whether the Court's jurisdiction will become effective depends upon the willingness of the defendant to submit to it : the antithesis of jurisdiction asserted "as of right".

53. Lord Goff's speech in Spiliada includes the following :-

"(c) The question being whether there is some other forum which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, it is pertinent to ask whether the fact that the plaintiff has, ex hypothesi, founded jurisdiction as of right in accordance with the law of this country, of itself gives the plaintiff an advantage in the sense that the English court will not lightly disturb jurisdiction so established. Such indeed appears to be the law in the United States,where "the court hesitates to disturb the plaintiff's choice of forum and will not do so unless the balance of factors is strongly in favour of the defendant," : see Scoles and Hay, Conflict of Laws (1982), p.366, and cases there cited ; and also in Canada, where it has been stated (see Castel, Conflict of Laws (1974), p.282) that "unless the balance is strongly in favour of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." This is strong language."

54. He then considered English and other authorities which demonstrated a "more neutral position" (p.477A), and proceeded to state English law in terms of the "clearly or distinctly more appropriate" test. He added "In this way, proper regard is paid to


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the fact that jurisdiction has been founded as of right," citing Lord Salmon's speech in MacShannon [1978] A.C. 795 sc. at pp. 819-820.

55. It can be said, therefore, that due weight is given to the plaintiff's ability to bring proceedings in England`as of right' by the application of what is called stage 1 of the Spiliada test. If this is correct, then that same right is not a `juridical advantage' of the kind which makes the stage 2 test relevant also. I mention this because the judge's passing reference to the defendant's willingness to submit to South African jurisdiction was in the context of considering whether stage 2 arises in this case (judgment para.20). That might make it necessary to consider whether the plaintiffs acted reasonably in bringing their action here. If that is a relevant consideration (I do not say that it is) then there is nothing inherently wrong or unreasonable in bringing proceedings in England against an English defendant in respect of alleged negligence committed for the most part in this country, even though having its injurious effects abroad.

56. The fact that this point was not taken in the cases cited by Mr Kentridge, including Sarrio v. Kuwait Investment Authority [1996] 1 Ll.R. 650, should not deter this Court, in my judgment, from applying the principles correctly now

Overview

57. The plaintiffs bring these proceedings "as of right" meaning that they invoke the territorial jurisdiction of the English Court over a defendant who is resident (incorporated and domiciled) here. The Court has a discretionary power to refuse to entertain the proceedings, which may be stayed in accordance with Spiliada principles. Those principles, based primarily on Scottish authorities, give priority to "the interests of both parties and the ends of justice" over the plaintiff's right to choose a forum and, I would add, over the right to choose which the Courts allow to the defendant if the availability of an alternative foreign forum depends upon the defendant's willingness to submit to that jurisdiction.

58. The question whether a foreign forum is clearly and distinctly more appropriate for the trial of the action cannot be answered without first identifying the subject-matter of the action - what the trial will be about.

59. Where as here the claim is land-based, the plaintiffs alleging that they were injured by industrial activities in the area where they lived and worked, then the same territorial principle which enables the defendant to be sued `as of right' in the courts of the country where it is based means that there are strong and often compelling reasons why the action should be heard in the local courts.

60. But there is a strong countervailing factor also. The defendant company is alleged to have "controlled" the operation of the mines and mills in South Africa, meaning that its directors and senior personnel were responsible for the decisions which led to the business being carried on in the way that it was, in terms of policy and instructions to the local workforce rather than the day-to-day implementation of those policies and instructions. The decisions were taken in England and communicated to South Africa. If modern communications had been available, there would have been less need for personal visits. The alleged breaches of duty occurred essentially in England, although their effects were felt by the plaintiffs in South Africa where the decisions were implemented.


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61. At this point, it seems to me, the international nature of the defendant company's

alleged interests becomes relevant. It is said to have started asbestos production facilities in Italy and in this country and to have marketed the products worldwide. This was of no concern to individuals in South Africa or to others who may or may not have suffered similarly in other countries. But the allegations which the plaintiffs make in this action, and likewise the plaintiffs in the Italian action, are directed to what the defendants did here. It seems to me that that is an important factor to take into account when deciding whether the defendants have discharged the burden of persuading the Court that precedence should be given to the overseas jurisdiction from which particular individual plaintiffs come.

Conclusion

62. The judge failed to give any weight to the fact that the negligence alleged against the defendant company is distinct from any allegations which might be made against the person or subsidiaries responsible for running their South African businesses from time to time. He took no account of the fact that a South African forum was and is unavailable to the plaintiffs until the defendant offered undertakings during the hearing before him, and it remains conditional upon them. If these factors are taken into account, I would hold that the defendants do not show that South Africa is so clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum that the action here should be stayed, and I would allow the appeal accordingly.

63. The need for a European Court Ruling therefore does not arise.

64. LORD JUSTICE MILLETT: I agree.

65. LORD JUSTICE AULD: I also agree.

ORDER: Appeal allowed with costs. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused.

(Order not part of approved judgment)

_____________________


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LexisNexis™ Academic

LUBBE AND OTHERS v CAPE PLC

HOUSE OF LORDS

[2000] 4 All ER 268, [2000] 1 WLR 1545, [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 383

HEARING-DATES: 19, 20, 21, 22 June, 20 July 2000

20 July 2000

CATCHWORDS:

Practice -- Stay of proceedings -- Jurisdiction -- South African plaintiffs claiming

damages in English actions against English company -- Claims for personal injuries

arising out of commercial activities in South Africa of South African subsidiaries --

Actions raising substantial and complex issues proceeding as group action -- Funding

unavailable to plaintiffs in South Africa -- Defendant applying to stay actions and

undertaking to submit to South African jurisdiction -- Real and substantial connection

with South Africa -- Whether South African forum available to plaintiffs -- Whether

public interest relevant factor -- Whether actions to be stayed

HEADNOTE:

In 1997 in a number of actions begun in England the plaintiffs, who were almost all

South African citizens resident in South Africa, claimed damages for personal injury,

and in some cases death, against the defendant, a company registered in England

which owned a number of subsidiary companies in South Africa engaged in the

mining and processing of asbestos and the sale of asbestos-related products. The

plaintiffs alleged that, in respect of periods before 1979, the defendant, while

knowing of the injurious effect of exposure to asbestos, had failed, as the parent

company, to take appropriate steps to ensure the adoption of proper working practices

and safety precautions throughout its subsidiary companies and had thereby acted in

breach of a duty of care it owed to employees of its subsidiary companies or to those

living in the area of their operations. The defendant, which had ceased to trade in

South Africa and had no assets there, sought to stay the first action and, on the

hearing of the application, undertook to submit to that jurisdiction. The judge granted

the stay, concluding that South Africa was the natural forum and that justice did not

require him to order otherwise. On the plaintiffs' appeal, the Court of Appeal

considered that the judge had failed to take into account that the South African forum

was unavailable to the plaintiffs until the undertakings had been given and that its

availability remained conditional on their being fulfilled. The court concluded that the

defendant had not shown South Africa to be clearly the more appropriate forum and

allowed the appeal.


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Thereafter writs in nine further actions were issued by more than 3,000 plaintiffs,

South African citizens resident in South Africa, who made similar allegations against

the defendant. Those cases were ordered to proceed as a group action and the

defendant applied for a stay of all the proceedings against it. The judge, considering

South Africa to be clearly the more appropriate forum and rejecting the plaintiffs'

objection that legal aid would not be available to them there, concluded that there was

no sufficient reason to refuse a stay and granted the defendant's application. On the

plaintiffs' appeal the Court of Appeal, aware that legal aid had been withdrawn from

personal injury cases in South Africa, considered that the actions had their most real

and substantial connection there, that convenience and expense pointed to that forum

and that considerations of public interest supported that conclusion. The court,

expressing confidence that legal representation could be made available there to the

extent necessary to achieve proper consideration of the plaintiffs' cases, dismissed

their appeal.

On the defendant's appeal against the decision of the first Court of Appeal and the

plaintiffs' appeal against the decision of the second Court of Appeal:-

Held, (1) dismissing the defendant's appeal, that, where a plaintiff sued a defendant as

of right in the English court the defendant's application for a stay on the ground of

forum non conveniens could not succeed unless the court was satisfied that there was

another tribunal of competent jurisdiction in which the case might be tried more

suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice; that the

defendant, in undertaking to submit to the South African jurisdiction, had sufficiently

satisfied the requirement that the alternative forum was available and, since the

undertakings were before the judge when he considered the issue of forum non

conveniens, their timing was not a relevant factor for the first Court of Appeal to have

taken into account; but that, on the plaintiffs' case as then presented, the first Court of

Appeal's assessment of the balance between the issues relating to the responsibility of

the defendant parent company and the personal injury claims was not shown to be

unreasonable or wrong and it was open to that court to conclude that South Africa

was not clearly the more appropriate forum (post, pp 1553H-1554A, 1556C-E,

1562B-E, 1565H-1566B, 1567D).

Sim v Robinow (1892) 19 R 665 applied.

(2) Allowing the plaintiffs' appeal, that, given the enhanced significance of the

personal injury issues after the institution of the nine further actions, both the judge

on the second stay application and the second Court of Appeal had correctly regarded

South Africa as clearly the more appropriate forum; but that since the proceedings

could only be handled efficiently, cost-effectively and expeditiously on a group basis,

since the preparation and conduct of the personal injury issues, if the plaintiffs

succeeded on the defendant's responsibility issue, was a heavy and difficult task

requiring the services or supervision of professional lawyers and the obtaining of


LAMPIRAN 5

expert advice and evidence, and since no convincing evidence suggested the

availability of appropriate funding in South Africa, whether by legal aid, contingency

fee arrangements or otherwise, the probable effect of a stay would be to deprive the

plaintiffs of the means of obtaining the representation and evidence essential to the

just disposal of their claims, and in consequence would amount to a denial of justice;

and that, accordingly, in the unusual circumstances of the proceedings, lack of means

in South Africa to prosecute the claims required the stay to be refused (post, pp

1556F-H, 1557E, G-H, 1558E-F, 1559C-G, 1562B-E, 1567D).

Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, HL(E) and Connelly

v RTZ Corporation Plc [1998] AC 854, HL(E) applied.

(3) That the principles applied by the court on an application for a stay on the ground

of forum non conveniens required it to exercise jurisdiction where a plaintiff sued the

defendant as of right in England unless it was satisfied that the case might be tried in

the other forum more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of

justice; and that, accordingly, considerations of public interest and public policy

which did not relate to the private interests of any of the parties and to securing the

ends of justice in the particular case should be left out of account in determining the

application (post, pp 1561E-G, 1566C-D, F-1567D).

Decision of the Court of Appeal [1998] CLC 1559 affirmed.

Decision of the Court of Appeal [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 139 reversed.

CASES-REF-TO:

Clements v Macaulay (1866) 4 Macph 583

Connelly v RTZ Corporation Plc [1996] QB 361; [1996] 2 WLR 251; [1996] 1 All

ER 500, CA; [1998] AC 854; [1997] 3 WLR 373; [1997] 4 All ER 335, HL(E)

Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd, In re [1992] Ch 72; [1991] 3 WLR 397; [1991] 4 All ER

334, CA

Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] 3 All ER 421, CA

MacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd [1978] AC 795; [1978] 2 WLR 362; [1978] 1 All

ER 625, HL(E)

Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197

Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno (1981) 454 US 235

Sim v Robinow (1892) 19 R 665

Societe du Gaz de Paris v Societe Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Francais,"

1925 SC 332; 1926 SC (HL) 13, HL(Sc)

Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460; [1986] 3 WLR 972;

[1986] 3 All ER 843, HL(E)

Tulloch v Williams (1846) 8 D 657

Union Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December 1984, In

re (1986) 634 F Supp 842; (1987) 809 F.2d 195


LAMPIRAN 5

CASES-CITED:

AB v John Wyeth & Brother Ltd [1993] 4 Med LR 1, CA

Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433; [1990] 2 WLR 657; [1991] 1 All ER

929, CA

Agnew v Lansforsakringsbolagens AB [2000] 2 WLR 497; [2000] 1 All ER 737,

HL(E)

Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119; [1998] 2 WLR 686; [1998] 2 All ER

257, HL(E)

Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) (1993)

102 DLR (4th) 96

Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co [1982] 1 WLR 961;

[1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep 638

Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co v Bryanston Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 QB 649;

[1990] 3 WLR 705; [1990] 2 All ER 335

Askin v ABSA Bank Ltd (unreported), 29 January 1999; Court of Appeal (Civil

Division) Transcript No 86 of 1999, CA

Atlantic Star, The [1974] AC 436; [1973] 2 WLR 795; [1973] 2 All ER 175, HL(E)

Banco Atlantico SA v British Bank of the Middle East [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep 504, CA

Berisford (S & W) Plc v New Hampshire Insurance Co [1990] 2 QB 631; [1990] 3

WLR 688; [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 454

Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004; [2000] 2 All ER 986, HL(E)

Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation

Ltd [1981] AC 909; [1981] 2 WLR 141; [1981] 1 All ER 289, HL(E)

Bulmer (HP) Ltd v J Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401; [1974] 3 WLR 202; [1974] 2 All

ER 1226, CA

Canea Catholic Church v Greece (1997) 27 EHRR 521

Caparo Industries Ltd v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358; [1990] 1 All

ER 568, HL(E)

Chapman v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (1990) 134 SJ 726

Connelly v RTZ Corporation Plc (No 2), The Times, 12 July 1996, Court of Appeal

(Civil Division) Transcript No 590 of 1996, CA; [1998] AC 854, [1997] 3 WLR 373;

[1997] 4 All ER 335, HL(E)

Connelly v RTZ Corporation Plc (No 3) (unreported), 4 December 1998, Wright J

Cardoba Shipping Co Ltd v National State Bank, Elizabeth, New Jersey [1984] 2

Lloyd's Rep 91, CA

Davies (Joseph Owen) v Eli Lilly & Co [1987] 1 WLR 1136; [1987] 3 All ER 94, CA

Duijnstee v Goderbauer (Case 288/82) [1983] ECR 3663, ECJ

Durham v T & N Plc (unreported), 1 May 1996; Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

Transcript No 419 of 1996, CA

GKR Karate (UK) Ltd v Yorkshire Post Newspapers Ltd [2000] 2 All ER 931, CA

Gulf Oil Corporation v Gilbert (1947) 330 US 501

Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton [1983] 1 AC 191; [1982] 2 WLR 322; [1982] 1

All ER 1042, HL(E)


LAMPIRAN 5

Haji-Ioannau v Frangos [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 337, CA

Hamed El Chiaty & Co v Thomas Cook Group Ltd [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 399

Handelskwekerij GJ Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace SA (Case 21/76) [1978]

QB 708; [1977] 3 WLR 479; [1976] ECR 1735, ECJ

Happy Fellow, The [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 13, CA

Heil v Rankin [2000] 2 WLR 1173; [2000] 3 All ER 138, CA

Hoffman v Blaski (1960) 363 US 335

Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529; [1981] 3

WLR 906; [1981] 3 All ER 727, HL(E)

Islamic Arab Insurance Co v Saudi Egyptian American Reinsurance Co [1987] 1

Lloyd's Rep 315, CA

Kongress Agentur Hagen GmbH v Zeehaghe BV (Case 365/88) [1990] ECR I-1845,

ECJ

Margereson v JW Roberts Ltd [1996] PIQR P154; [1996] PIQR P358, CA

Marinari v Lloyds Bank Plc (Case C-364/93) [1995] ECR I-2719, ECJ

Niderost-Huber v Switzerland (1997) 25 EHRR 709

North Central and South Central Metropolitan Substructure Councils of the Durban

Metropolitan Area, Ex parte, 1998 (1) SA 78 (LCC)

Owens Bank Ltd v Bracca (Case C-129/92) [1994] QB 509; [1994] 2 WLR 759;

[1994] 1 All ER 336; [1994] ECR I-117, ECJ

Pafitis v Greece (1998) 27 EHRR 566

Practice Direction (Court of Appeal (Civil Division)) [1999] 1 WLR 1027; [1999] 2

All ER 490, CA

Reunion Europeenne SA v Spliethoff's Bevrachtingskantoor BV (Case C-51/97)

[1998] ECR I-6511, ECJ

Radakrishna Hospitality Service Private Ltd v EIH Ltd (unreported), 4 February

1999, Newman J

Richardson-Merrell Inc, In re (1982) 545 F Supp 1130; sub nom Dowling v

Richardson-Merrell Inc (1984) 727 F.2d 608

Rofa Sport Management AG v DHL International (UK) Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 902;

[1989] 2 All ER 743, CA

Sanicentral GmbH v Collin (Case 25/79) [1979] ECR 3423, ECJ

Sarrio SA v Kuwait Investment Authority [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 650; [1997] 1 Lloyd's

Rep 113, CA

Schertenleib v Traum (1978) 589 F.2d 1156

Slabbert v Herbst, 1981 (4) SA 257

Societe d'Informatique Service Realisation Organisation v Ampersand Software BV

(Case C-432/93) [1995] ECR I-2269, ECJ

Sithole v Thor Chemical Holdings Ltd (unreported), 31 July 1998, Garland J

Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Bloch [1983] 1 WLR 730, [1983] 2 All ER

72, CA

Veneta Mineraria SpA v Carolina Collieries (Pty) Ltd, 1985 (3) SA 633

Xin Yang, The [1996] 2 Lloyds Rep 217

INTRODUCTION:


LAMPIRAN 5

LUBBE AND OTHERS (RESPONDENTS) v CAPE PLC (APPELLANT)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeal.

This was an appeal by the defendant, Cape Plc, with leave of the Appeal Committee

of the House of Lords (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord

Millett) given on 30 March 2000, and vacating the order of the Appeal Committee

(Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Hutton) given on 14

December 1998 refusing leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal

(Evans, Millett and Auld LJJ) on 30 July 1998 allowing an appeal by the plaintiffs,

Schalk Willem Burger Lubbe (suing as administrator of the estate of Rachel Lubbe)

and four others, from Mr Michel Kallipetis QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the High

Court who, on 12 January 1998, had granted a stay of their action against the

defendant.

The facts are stated in the opinion of Lord Bingham of Cornhill.

LUBBE AND OTHERS (APPELLANTS) v CAPE PLC (RESPONDENT) AND

RELATED APPEALS

APPEAL from the Court of Appeal.

This was an appeal by the plaintiffs, Schalk Willem Burger Lubbe (suing as

administrator of the estate of Rachel Lubbe) and four others, Pauline Nel (suing as

administratrix of the estate of Jacobus Nel), Hendrik Ismael Afrika and 1538 others,

Elizabeth Cocks and six others, Ramathabathe Mphahlele and 374 others, Abraham

Alexander and 99 others, Cecilia Beukes and 26 others, Frederick Van Wyk and 57

others, Fanani Bembe and 12 others, Bosole Abram Chidi and 127 others and

Mokganyetji Lidah Angwadi and 851 others, with leave of the Appeal Committee of

the House of Lords (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope of

Craighead) given on 7 February 2000, from the judgment of the Court of Appeal

(Pill, Aldous and Tuckey LJJ) given on 29 November 1999 dismissing their appeals

from Buckley J, who on 30 July 1999 had stayed their actions against the defendant,

Cape Plc.

The facts are stated in the opinion of Lord Bingham of Cornhill.

COUNSEL: Michael Beloff QC, Lord Brennan QC, Graham Read and Nicholas Khan for the

plaintiffs; Brian Doctor QC, Charles Gibson, Richard Coleman and Alan Dashwood

for the defendant.

JUDGMENT-READ:

Their Lordships took time for consideration. 20 July.


LAMPIRAN 5

PANEL: Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of

Craighead, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough

JUDGMENTBY-1: LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL

JUDGMENT-1: LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL: My Lords, the central issue between the

plaintiffs and the defendant in these interlocutory appeals is whether proceedings

brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant should be tried in this country or in

South Africa.

There are at present over 3,000 plaintiffs. Each of them claims damages in one of the

11 writs issued against the defendant between February 1997 and July 1999. All the

plaintiffs claim damages for personal injuries (and in some cases death) allegedly

suffered as the result of exposure to asbestos and its related products in South Africa.

In some cases the exposure is said to have occurred in the course of the plaintiff's

employment, in others as a result of living in a contaminated area. The exposure is

said to have taken place in different places in South Africa and over varying, but

sometimes lengthy, periods of time, ending for claim purposes in 1979. One of the

plaintiffs (Mrs Pauline Nel, suing as personal representative of her deceased husband)

is a British citizen resident in England. All the others are South African citizens

resident in South Africa. Most of the plaintiffs are black and of modest means.

Instructions to sue have been given to English solicitors by more than 800 additional

claimants.

The defendant is a public limited company. It was incorporated in England in 1893

under the name Cape Asbestos Company Ltd, principally to mine and process

asbestos and sell asbestos-related products. From shortly after 1893 until 1948 it

operated a blue asbestos (or crocidolite) mine at Koegas and a mill at Prieska, both in

the Northern Cape Province. In 1925 the defendant acquired the shares in two

companies, both incorporated in 1916: these were Egnep Ltd and Amosa Ltd, which

operated a brown asbestos mine and mill at Penge in Northern Transvaal. For

practical purposes the head office of these companies was in Cape Town. In 1940 a

factory was opened at Benoni, near Johannesburg, to manufacture asbestos products.

It was owned by a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant.

In 1948 the corporate structure of the defendant's group was changed. The mine at

Koegas and the mill at Prieska were transferred to a newly-formed South African

company, Cape Blue Mines (Pty) Ltd. The shares in Cape Blue Mines, Egnep and

Amosa were transferred to a newly-formed South African holding company, Cape

Asbestos South Africa (Pty) Ltd ("CASAP"). The offices of all these companies were

in Johannesburg. All the shares in CASAP were owned by the defendant. In 1979

CASAP sold its shares in Cape Blue Mines, Egnep and Amosa to an unrelated third

party buyer, which shortly thereafter sold them on. The defendant continued to hold

an interest in the South African companies which operated out of the factory at


LAMPIRAN 5

Benoni until 1989 (although the factory had been closed earlier). Since then the

defendant has had no presence anywhere in South Africa, and when the first of the

writs in the current proceedings was served the defendant had no assets in South

Africa.

Although originating in South Africa, the defendant's asbestos-related business has

not been confined to that country. From 1899 the defendant operated a number of

factories in England engaged in processing asbestos and manufacturing asbestos

products. A factory at Barking was run by the defendant from 1913 until 1962, and

then by a wholly-owned subsidiary until the factory was closed in 1968. Another

subsidiary, incorporated in Italy, operated a factory in Turin which made asbestos

products from 1911 until 1968, with an intermission during the war years.

Some of the claims made in these actions date back to times when the defendant was

itself operating in Northern Cape Province. But the central thrust of the claims made

by each of the plaintiffs is not against the defendant as the employer of that plaintiff

or as the occupier of the factory where that plaintiff worked, or as the immediate

source of the contamination in the area where that plaintiff lived. Rather, the claim is

made against the defendant as a parent company which, knowing (so it is said) that

exposure to asbestos was gravely injurious to health, failed to take proper steps to

ensure that proper working practices were followed and proper safety precautions

observed throughout the group. In this way, it is alleged, the defendant breached a

duty of care which it owed to those working for its subsidiaries or living in the area of

their operations (with the result that the plaintiffs thereby suffered personal injury and

loss). Some 360 claims are made by personal representatives of deceased victims.

As reformulated during the first Court of Appeal hearing the main issue raised by the

plaintiffs' claim was put in this way:

"Whether a parent company which is proved to exercise de facto control over the

operations of a (foreign) subsidiary and which knows, through its directors, that those

operations involve risks to the health of workers employed by the subsidiary and/or

persons in the vicinity of its factory or other business premises, owes a duty of care to

those workers and/or other persons in relation to the control which it exercises over

and the advice which it gives to the subsidiary company?"

The first of the writs in these proceedings was issued by Mrs Lubbe and four other

plaintiffs on 14 February 1997 (and when she died the action was continued by Mr

Lubbe as her personal representative). The defendant promptly applied to stay the

proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens. This application came before

Mr Michel Kallipetis QC sitting as a deputy judge of the Queen's Bench Division,

who acceded to it. He sought to apply the principles authoritatively laid down by this

House in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, and for

reasons given in a lengthy and careful judgment dated 12 January 1998 he concluded

that everything pointed towards South Africa as the natural forum for the trial of the


LAMPIRAN 5

action and that there was no pressing circumstance which would justify him in

deciding that the interests of justice required a trial in this country instead of the

natural forum in South Africa.

The plaintiffs appealed and on 30 July 1998 the Court of Appeal (Evans, Millett and

Auld LJJ) allowed the appeal [1998] CLC 1559. Like the judge, the Court of Appeal

also sought to apply the principles in the Spiliada case. But it reached a different

conclusion, holding that the judge had failed to give weight to the fact that the

negligence alleged was against the defendant company as opposed to those persons or

companies responsible for running its South African businesses from time to time,

and that the judge had failed to take account of the fact that the South African forum

had been unavailable to the plaintiffs until the defendant offered undertakings during

the hearing before the judge, the availability of the South African forum being

conditional upon those undertakings being fulfilled: see p 1573. Taking those matters

into account, the Court of Appeal ("the first Court of Appeal") held that the defendant

did not show that South Africa was clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum.

In fairness to the judge it should be observed that the second of these points was not

raised before him (it was indeed raised by the first Court of Appeal itself) and he

could not therefore be reproached for failing to take it into account.

At that stage, therefore, the plaintiffs were at liberty to pursue their action in England.

Before either of these decisions the sole plaintiff resident in England (Mrs Nel) had

also issued proceedings as personal representative of her husband, joining no other

plaintiff. The defendant sought to challenge the decision of the first Court of Appeal

but leave to do so was refused by that court and, following an oral hearing, by your

Lordships' House on 14 December 1998.

After the refusal of leave by your Lordships in December 1998, writs were issued by

all the remaining plaintiffs in these proceedings. It is unnecessary to summarise the

detailed procedural steps which followed. It is enough to note that the defendant

applied to stay all the actions, including the Lubbe action, on grounds of forum non

conveniens and abuse of process, and directions were given to consolidate the various

proceedings (without prejudice to the position of the Lubbe plaintiffs) into a group

action.

The defendant's summons to stay came before Buckley J who heard detailed

submissions and considered copious documentary material. He gave a full judgment

in writing [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 139, 141 on 30 July 1999. He concluded that South

Africa was clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum for trial of this group

action and that there were no sufficient reasons for nevertheless refusing a stay: see p

151. In reaching this last opinion he considered and discounted a number of

objections raised by the plaintiffs, including the alleged unavailability of legal aid in

South Africa. Of that submission he said, at p 150:

"In all the circumstances, I cannot find that legal aid would not be granted, if applied


LAMPIRAN 5

for in South Africa. I readily accept there may be difficulties and some delay but that,

at least in part, must flow from the claimant's decision not to apply for legal aid in

South Africa and to issue proceedings here, when, as [the plaintiffs' solicitor] well

knew, the defendant would contest jurisdiction."

The judge accordingly ordered a stay of proceedings. He considered an argument

advanced by the defendant that the proceedings were an abuse. The basis of this

argument was that the solicitors representing the Lubbe plaintiffs had misled the first

Court of Appeal and the House of Lords by failing to disclose their intention, if

jurisdiction in England was established in the Lubbe case, to launch a multi-plaintiff

group action, and also that the bringing of a group action was oppressive and an

abuse. The judge expressed criticism of the solicitors representing the Lubbe

plaintiffs but stopped short of finding abuse of the process: see p 154. The judge also

considered an argument, advanced by the defendant, suggesting that there were public

interest grounds for concluding that the proceedings should be tried in South Africa:

the judge reached his decision independently of this argument (see p 154), but

considered that it reinforced his decision. He gave both sides leave to appeal.

Thus the matter came before the Court of Appeal (Pill, Aldous and Tuckey LJJ, "the

second Court of Appeal") again [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 139, and in judgments given on

29 November 1999 the appeals were dismissed. Pill LJ described the factors pointing

towards South Africa as the more appropriate forum as "overwhelming:" see p 160.

The action had the most real and substantial connection with South Africa and

considerations of expense and convenience pointed strongly in that direction: see p

161. The public interest considerations supported that conclusion: see pp 161-162. He

was not persuaded by the argument that the South African High Court would be

unable to handle these actions (see p 162), and with reference to legal representation

he said, at p 164:

"I have already referred to the high repute in which the South African courts are held.

There is also in South Africa a legal profession with high standards and a tradition of

public service, though I do not suggest that lawyers in South Africa, any more than

those anywhere else, can be expected to act on a large scale without prospects of

remuneration. While I would not be prepared to apply the second stage of the Spiliada

test, so as to permit English litigation, even in the absence of evidence that legal

representation will be available, I am unable to conclude that in the circumstances it

would not become available for claims in South African courts. Moreover, given the

accessibility to the wealth of scientific, technical and medical evidence available in

this context, I am confident that it could be made available in a South African court to

the extent required to achieve a proper consideration of the plaintiffs' cases. The

action would by no means be novel or speculative."

Pill LJ was not prepared to strike out the proceedings as an abuse of process: see pp

164-165. He recorded that the plaintiffs had not pursued their contention that article 2

of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in


LAMPIRAN 5

Civil and Commercial Matters (1968) (Cmnd 7395) deprived the English court of any

discretion to stay an action brought against a defendant domiciled here, since they did

not wish the proceedings to be delayed while a reference was made to the European

Court of Justice: see pp 164-165. He considered that the bringing of the multi-

plaintiff group action entitled the Court of Appeal to reconsider the decision of the

first Court of Appeal in the Lubbe action and to reach a different conclusion: see p

165. He dismissed the appeal.

Aldous LJ agreed, while recording earlier reservations about the availability of legal

representation: see p 166. He also expressed strong criticism of the solicitors

representing the Lubbe plaintiffs but agreed with Pill LJ that what had happened did

not mean that there was an abuse of process such that the group action and the Lubbe

action should be stayed: see p 167. Tuckey LJ also agreed: he deprecated the

acrimony caused by the Lubbe solicitors' failure to inform the Court of Appeal and

the House of Lords of the plan to launch a group action and attached less weight than

the first Court of Appeal had done to the fact that the South African forum had only

become available because of the defendant's undertaking to submit: see p 168. The

second Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, but leave was given by your

Lordships to the plaintiffs on 7 February 2000. On 30 March 2000 your Lordships

also vacated the earlier order refusing leave to appeal in the Lubbe action and gave

leave to the defendant to challenge the decision of the first Court of Appeal.

Reference should be made, finally, to an action which is not directly involved in these

proceedings. On 3 October 1997 proceedings were issued by Vincenzina Gisondi and

three other plaintiffs against the defendant making claims on grounds similar to those

relied on by the plaintiffs in the proceedings before the House. The significant

difference is that these plaintiffs complain of exposure to asbestos and asbestos

products not in South Africa but in Italy. Thus the plaintiffs are resident in a state

which is a party to the Brussels Convention and sue a defendant domiciled in

England, another contracting state. It has not been suggested that the English court

could under the Convention decline jurisdiction in favour of an Italian forum, and no

application for a stay has been made by the defendant in that case. There appears to

be no jurisdictional objection to the prosecution of that action here, and no

application has been made to strike out the claim as disclosing no cause of action.

The applicable principles

Where a plaintiff sues a defendant as of right in the English court and the defendant

applies to stay the proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens, the principles to

be applied by the English court in deciding that application in any case not governed

by article 2 of the Brussels Convention are not in doubt. They derive from the

judgment of Lord Kinnear in Sim v Robinow (1892) 19 R 665, 668 where he said:

"the plea can never be sustained unless the court is satisfied that there is some other

tribunal, having competent jurisdiction, in which the case may be tried more suitably


LAMPIRAN 5

for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice."

Thus it is the interest of all the parties, not those of the plaintiff only or the defendant

only, and the ends of justice as judged by the court on all the facts of the case before

it, which must control the decision of the court. In the Spiliada case [1987] AC 460,

476 it was stated:

"The basic principle is that a stay will only be granted on the ground of forum non

conveniens where the court is satisfied that there is some other available forum,

having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the

action, ie in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the

parties and the ends of justice."

In applying this principle the court's first task is to consider whether the defendant

who seeks a stay is able to discharge the burden resting upon him not just to show

that England is not the natural or appropriate forum for the trial but to establish that

there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than

the English forum. In this way, proper regard is had to the fact that jurisdiction has

been founded in England as of right: see the Spiliada case, at p 477. At this first stage

of the inquiry the court will consider what factors there are which point in the

direction of another forum: see the Spiliada case [1987] AC 460, 477; Connelly v

RTZ Corporation Plc [1998] AC 854, 871. If the court concludes at that stage that

there is no other available forum which is clearly more appropriate for the trial of the

action, that is likely to be the end of the matter. But if the court concludes at that

stage that there is some other available forum which prima facie is more appropriate

for the trial of the action it will ordinarily grant a stay unless the plaintiff can show

that there are circumstances by reason of which justice requires that a stay should

nevertheless not be granted. In this second stage the court will concentrate its

attention not only on factors connecting the proceedings with the foreign or the

English forum (the Spiliada case, at p 478; the Connelly case, at p 872) but on

whether the plaintiff will obtain justice in the foreign jurisdiction. The plaintiff will

not ordinarily discharge the burden lying upon him by showing that he will enjoy

procedural advantages, or a higher scale of damages or more generous rules of

limitation if he sues in England; generally speaking, the plaintiff must take a foreign

forum as he finds it, even if it is in some respects less advantageous to him than the

English forum (the Spiliada case, at p 482; the Connelly case, at p 872). It is only if

the plaintiff can establish that substantial justice will not be done in the appropriate

forum that a stay will be refused (the Spiliada case, at p 482; the Connelly case, at p

873).

This is not an easy condition for a plaintiff to satisfy, and it is not necessarily enough

to show that legal aid is available in this country but not in the more appropriate

foreign forum. Lord Goff of Chieveley said in the Connelly case, at p 873:

"I therefore start from the position that, at least as a general rule, the court will not


LAMPIRAN 5

refuse to grant a stay simply because the plaintiff has shown that no financial

assistance, for example in the form of legal aid, will be available to him in the

appropriate forum, whereas such financial assistance will be available to him in

England. Many smaller jurisdictions cannot afford a system of legal aid. Suppose that

the plaintiff has been injured in a motor accident in such a country, and succeeds in

establishing English jurisdiction on the defendant by service on him in this country

where the plaintiff is eligible for legal aid, I cannot think that the absence of legal aid

in the appropriate jurisdiction would of itself justify the refusal of a stay on the

ground of forum non conveniens. In this connection it should not be forgotten that

financial assistance for litigation is not necessarily regarded as essential, even in

sophisticated legal systems. It was not widely available in this country until 1949; and

even since that date it has been only available for persons with limited means. People

above that limit may well lack the means to litigate, which provides one reason for

the recent legalisation of conditional fee agreements. Even so, the availability of

financial assistance in this country, coupled with its non-availability in the

appropriate forum, may exceptionally be a relevant factor in this context. The

question, however, remains whether the plaintiff can establish that substantial justice

will not in the particular circumstances of the case be done if the plaintiff has to

proceed in the appropriate forum where no financial assistance is available."

In the Connelly case a majority of the House held that the case before it was such an

exceptional case. The nature and complexity of the case were such that it could not be

tried at all without the benefit of legal representation and expert scientific assistance,

available in this country but not in the more appropriate forum, Namibia. That being

so, the majority of the House concluded that the Namibian forum was not one in

which the case could be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and for

the ends of justice.

The present cases

The issues in the present cases fall into two segments. The first segment concerns the

responsibility of the defendant as a parent company for ensuring the observance of

proper standards of health and safety by its overseas subsidiaries. Resolution of this

issue will be likely to involve an inquiry into what part the defendant played in

controlling the operations of the group, what its directors and employees knew or

ought to have known, what action was taken and not taken, whether the defendant

owed a duty of care to employees of group companies overseas and whether, if so,

that duty was broken. Much of the evidence material to this inquiry would, in the

ordinary way, be documentary and much of it would be found in the offices of the

parent company, including minutes of meetings, reports by directors and employees

on visits overseas and correspondence.

The second segment of the cases involves the personal injury issues relevant to each

individual: diagnosis, prognosis, causation (including the contribution made to a

plaintiff's condition by any sources of contamination for which the defendant was not


LAMPIRAN 5

responsible) and special damage. Investigation of these issues would necessarily

involve the evidence and medical examination of each plaintiff and an inquiry into

the conditions in which that plaintiff worked or lived and the period for which he did

so. Where the claim is made on behalf of a deceased person the inquiry would be

essentially the same, although probably more difficult.

In his review of the Lubbe case, which was alone before him, Mr Kallipetis

considered that the convenience of trying the personal injury issues in South Africa

outweighed any benefit there might be in trying the parent company responsibility

issue here. That was in my opinion a tenable though not an inevitable conclusion on

the case as then presented. The two reasons given by the first Court of Appeal for

disturbing that exercise of judgment are not to my mind convincing. Mr Kallipetis's

judgment does not suggest that he overlooked the way in which the plaintiffs put their

case, although he did not express it very clearly (perhaps because the pleading Was

not very clear). The first Court of Appeal thought it undermined the defendant's

application for a stay that the South African forum only became available as a result

of the defendant's undertaking to submit, but for reasons given by my noble and

learned friend, Lord Hope of Craighead (with which I fully agree) this was not a

factor which should have weighed in the balance either way. I would not accept the

argument advanced by the plaintiffs on this point. I question whether the first Court

of Appeal was justified in disturbing Mr Kallipetis's conclusion and substituting its

own. But its own assessment of the balance between the parent company

responsibility issue and the personal injury issues is not shown to be unreasonable or

Wrong. On the case as then presented there was room for the view that South Africa

was not shown to be a clearly more appropriate forum. This is a field in which

differing conclusions can be reached by different tribunals without either being

susceptible to legal challenge. The jurisdiction to stay is liable to be perverted if

parties litigate the issue at different levels of the judicial hierarchy in the hope of

persuading a higher court to strike a different balance in the factors pointing for and

against a foreign forum.

The emergence of over 3,000 new plaintiffs following the decision of the first Court

of Appeal had an obvious and significant effect on the balance of the proceedings.

While the parent company responsibility issue remained very much what it had

always been, the personal injury issues assumed very much greater significance. To

investigate, prepare and resolve these issues, in relation to each of the plaintiffs,

would plainly involve a careful, detailed and cumbersome factual inquiry and, at least

potentially, a very large body of expert evidence. In this changed situation Buckley J,

applying the first stage of the Spiliada test, regarded South Africa as clearly the more

appropriate forum for trial of the group action and the second Court of Appeal agreed.

Both courts were in my view plainly correct. The enhanced significance of the

personal injury issues tipped the balance very clearly in favour of South Africa at the

first stage of the Spiliada exercise, and no effective criticism has been made of that

conclusion. The brunt of the plaintiffs' argument on these appeals to the House has

been directed not against the decisions of Buckley J and the second Court of Appeal


LAMPIRAN 5

on the first stage of the Spiliada test but against their conclusion that the plaintiffs had

not shown that substantial justice would not be done in the more appropriate South

African forum.

Funding

The plaintiffs submitted that legal aid in South Africa had been withdrawn for

personal injury claims, that there was no reasonable likelihood of any lawyer or group

of lawyers being able or willing to fund proceedings of this weight and complexity

under the contingency fee arrangements permitted in South Africa since April 1999

and that there was no other available source of funding open to the plaintiffs. These

were, they argued, proceedings which could not be effectively prosecuted without

legal representation and adequate funding. To stay proceedings in England, where

legal representation and adequate funding are available, in favour of the South

African forum where they are not would accordingly deny the plaintiffs any realistic

prospect of pursuing their claims to trial.

The defendant roundly challenged these assertions. Reliance was placed on the facts

that the plaintiffs had not applied for legal aid in South Africa before its withdrawal

and had made no determined effort to obtain funding in South Africa. Even if legal

aid was no longer available in South Africa, contingency fee agreements were now

permissible and it was unrealistic to suppose that South African counsel and attorneys

would be any less ready to act than English counsel and solicitors if the claims were

judged to have a reasonable prospect of success. If contingency fee arrangements

could not be made in South Africa because South African counsel and attorneys did

not judge the claims to have a reasonable prospect of success, that did not involve a

denial of justice to the plaintiffs. In any event there were other potential sources of

assistance available to the plaintiffs in South Africa.

The material placed before the House (and the lower courts) relevant to these issues is

very extensive and cannot conveniently be summarised. The following conclusions

are in my opinion to be drawn from it.

(1) The proceedings as now constituted can only be handled efficiently, cost-

effectively and expeditiously on a group basis. It is impossible at this stage to predict

with accuracy what procedural directions might on that basis be given in future

(although the directions could only relate to the conduct of proceedings in England).

Obvious possibilities include the trial of a preliminary issue on the parent company

responsibility question and the trial of selected lead cases to test the outcome in

different factual situations. It would be very highly desirable, if possible, to avoid

determination of these claims on a plaintiff by plaintiff basis.

(2) The plaintiffs' claims raise a serious legal issue concerning the duty of the

defendant as a parent company, and it would be necessary to decide whether that duty

was governed by English or South African law. If a duty were held to exist, there


LAMPIRAN 5

would be a serious factual issue whether the defendant was in breach of it. If the

plaintiffs were successful on these questions, the personal injury issues would have,

even in the context of a group action, to be investigated, prepared and quantified. This

would be a heavy and difficult task. It could only be done by, or under the

supervision of, professional lawyers. It would call for high quality expert advice and

evidence, certainly on medical and industrial issues, very possibly on other issues

also. I see no reason to question the judgment of a South African attorney instructed

by the defendant who swore:

"The magnitude and complexity of both the factual and legal issues will require the

application in South Africa of considerable financial resources and manpower, if

there is to be any reasonable prospect of addressing the plaintiffs' allegations

meaningfully."

It is significant that Professor Unterhalter, an independent expert approached by the

defendant, observed:

"Detailed expert evidence would be required on a number of aspects of the matter.

Without agreement between the parties as to how the issues might be limited, I would

venture no opinion as to the length and magnitude of this litigation, save to say that it

is likely to be drawn out and complex, and would almost certainly come before the

Supreme Court of Appeal in due course."

(3) A possibility must exist that the proceedings may culminate in settlement. The

plaintiffs confidently predict such an outcome if they succeed on the parent company

responsibility issue. But the defendant has given no indication that the claims will not

be fully contested. In the Spiliada case Staughton J thought it right to decide the stay

application on the assumption that there would be a trial, and it would seem to me

wrong in principle to reject a submission that justice will not be done in a foreign

forum on the basis of a speculative assumption that, if a stay is granted, proceedings

in the foreign forum will culminate in a just settlement without the need for a trial.

(4) In a letter dated 20 September 1999 to Leigh Day & Co representing some of the

plaintiffs, the Legal Aid Board of South Africa wrote:

"It will however be of interest to you to note that on 13 September 1999 the Legal

Aid Board resolved, because of the financial crisis faced by it, as per the attached

letter to the Minister of Justice, to exclude from the operation of the legal aid scheme

operated by the South African Legal Aid Board with effect from 1 November 1999

funding in respect of personal injury claims and all other claims sounding in the

money."

Other material before the House makes plain that before this decision the Legal Aid

Board had experienced a period of extreme financial stringency. Despite suggestions

to the contrary there is no convincing evidence to suggest that legal aid might be


LAMPIRAN 5

made available in South Africa to fund this potentially protracted and expensive

litigation. Written submissions on behalf of the Republic of South Africa contain no

hint that public funds might, exceptionally, be made available to fund it.

(5) The South African Contingency Fees Act (No 66 of 1997) sanctioned a new

regime similar (although not identical) to that governing conditional fees in this

country. It enables counsel and attorneys to undertake work for plaintiffs on the basis

that if the claim is successful they will receive a fee in excess of that ordinarily

chargeable, and that they receive nothing if the claim fails. This regime does not

apply to the fees of expert witnesses, who may not be engaged on the basis that they

are paid only if the plaintiff by whom they are called is successful. The defendant

referred to an affidavit sworn by very experienced South African counsel who

deposed:

"In my view, if a firm of attorneys with a reasonable infrastructure is of the view that

the claims of the present plaintiffs are good, this would mean that the firm would be

able to earn very substantial sums of money by way of fees. At the same time, one

should not lose sight of the fact that this case is likely to have a very high profile and

that the plaintiffs' attorney(s) would be accorded a great deal of positive publicity in

the media. This would be a further inducement to take on a case of this nature. There

is every reason to believe that there would be no shortage of firms of attorneys who

would be desirous of taking on such a case if they believed that it had good prospects

of success. Accordingly, if there are attorneys in South Africa who are as positive

about the prospects of success as [the plaintiffs' solicitor] is (as conveyed in his

affidavit), I feel sure that there will be no lack of attorneys in South Africa prepared

to represent these plaintiffs under contingency fee arrangements."

This very general assertion of belief by a member of the Bar was flatly contradicted

by a number of other equally distinguished counsel who provided sworn statements to

the plaintiffs, and counsel for the defendant indicated that he placed no reliance on it.

More significantly, it received no support from any practising attorney, and it would

be attorneys who would be required, if these proceedings were undertaken for the

plaintiffs on a contingency fee basis, to finance the investigation of the claims, the

obtaining and calling of evidence and the conduct of the trial during a period which

would inevitably last for months and, very much more probably, years. The clear,

strong and unchallenged view of the attorneys who provided statements to the

plaintiffs was that no firm of South African attorneys with expertise in this field had

the means or would undertake the risk of conducting these proceedings on a

contingency fee basis. The defendant suggested that financial support and

professional assistance might be given to the plaintiffs by the Legal Resources

Centre, but this suggestion was authoritatively contradicted. In a recent affidavit the

possibility was raised that assistance might be forthcoming from the European Union

Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa, but the evidence did not support the

possibility of assistance on the scale necessary to fund this litigation.


LAMPIRAN 5

(6) If these proceedings were stayed in favour of the more appropriate forum in South

Africa the probability is that the plaintiffs would have no means of obtaining the

professional representation and the expert evidence which would be essential if these

claims were to be justly decided. This would amount to a denial of justice. In the

special and unusual circumstances of these proceedings, lack of the means, in South

Africa, to prosecute these claims to a conclusion provides a compelling ground, at the

second stage of the Spiliada test, for refusing to stay the proceedings here.

(7) The conclusions on the funding issue reached by the second Court of Appeal did

not in my opinion take account of the evidence, which did not permit the finding

which the court made.

The plaintiffs, as a ground for challenging the appropriateness of the South African

forum, relied on the absence of established procedures in South Africa for handling

group actions such as the present. They compared that situation with the procedural

situation here, where the conduct of group actions is governed by a recently-

developed but now tried and established framework of rules, practice directions and

subordinate legislation. I do not regard this objection, standing alone, as compelling.

It involves the kind of procedural comparison which the English court should be

careful to eschew (the Spiliada case, at p 482; the Connelly case, at p 872), and the

evidence is clear that South African courts have inherent jurisdiction to adopt

procedures appropriate to the cases they are called upon to handle. There is force in

the observations of Pill LJ [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 139, 162:

"I am entirely unpersuaded by arguments that the South African High Court would be

unable to handle these actions efficiently either on the ground that there are territorial

divisions within South Africa or because there is at present no procedure expressly

providing for group actions. It is common ground that the law potentially to be

applied is the same throughout South Africa. In England, there has been a vast

amount of litigation by victims of asbestos dust without resort to group actions.

Whether by a form of group action or otherwise, I have no doubt that the High Court

of South Africa will be able to devise and adopt suitable procedures for the efficient

despatch of business such as this. None of the evidence or submissions on behalf of

the plaintiffs suggests any significant obstacle to that efficient despatch by the court

of cases before it."

I do, however, think that the absence, as yet, of developed procedures for handling

group actions in South Africa reinforces the submissions made by the plaintiffs on the

funding issue. It is one thing to embark on and fund a heavy group action where the

procedures governing the conduct of the proceedings are known to and understood by

experienced judges and practitioners. It may be quite another where the exercise is

novel and untried. There must then be an increased likelihood of interlocutory

decisions which are contentious, with the likelihood of appeals and delay. It cannot be

assumed that all judges will respond to this new procedural challenge in the same

innovative spirit. The exercise of jurisdiction by the South African High Court


LAMPIRAN 5

through separate territorial divisions, while not a potent obstacle in itself, could

contribute to delay, uncertainty and cost. The procedural novelty of these

proceedings, if pursued in South Africa, must in my view act as a further disincentive

to any person or body considering whether or not to finance the proceedings.

Third parties

Both before Buckley J and the second Court of Appeal it was contended by the

defendant and accepted as a factor pointing towards the appropriateness of the South

African forum that the defendant, if sued there, could make and enforce claims

against third parties who could be shown to have contributed to the plaintiffs'

condition, whereas it might be difficult to join such parties and enforce judgments if

the actions were pursued here. The plaintiffs have sought to meet this point by

questioning whether, in truth, the defendant has disclosed any potential claim against

an identified third party with assets or insurance sufficient to meet any significant

claim; by relying on Court of Appeal authority (see Holtby v Brigham & Cowan

(Hull) Ltd [2000] 3 All ER 421) for the proposition that a defendant is only liable for

such proportion of a plaintiff's damage as he is shown to have caused; and by

formally undertaking, in asbestos (but not mesothelioma) cases, to limit their claim to

compensation for loss and damage for asbestos-related disease to such sum as would

reflect the proportion of a plaintiff's total asbestos exposure as was shown to be the

defendant's responsibility. The courts below were in my judgment right to treat the

third party consideration as one strengthening the appropriateness of the South

African forum, but I am persuaded by the plaintiffs' response that the refusal of a stay

will not expose the defendant to a significant risk of prejudice so long as any new

claimants are admitted to the group only upon their binding themselves by the

undertaking of the present plaintiffs.

Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights

The plaintiffs submitted that to stay these proceedings in favour of the South African

forum would violate the plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by article 6 of the European

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953)

(Cmd 8969) since it would, because of the lack of funding and legal representation in

South Africa, deny them a fair trial on terms of litigious equality with the defendant.

For reasons already given, I have concluded that a stay would lead to a denial of

justice to the plaintiffs. Since, as the Spiliada case [1987] AC 460 makes clear, a stay

will not be granted where it is established by cogent evidence that the plaintiff will

not obtain justice in the foreign forum, I cannot conceive that the court would grant a

stay in any case where adequate funding and legal representation of the plaintiff were

judged to be necessary to the doing of justice and these were clearly shown to be

unavailable in the foreign forum although available here. I do not think article 6

supports any conclusion which is not already reached on application of Spiliada

principles. I cannot, however, accept the view of the second Court of Appeal that it

would be right to decline jurisdiction in favour of South Africa even if legal


LAMPIRAN 5

representation were not available there.

Public interest

Both the plaintiffs and the defendant placed reliance on public interest considerations

as strengthening their contentions that these proceedings should be tried in the forum

for which they respectively contended. I agree with my noble and learned friend,

Lord Hope of Craighead, for the reasons which he gives, that public interest

considerations not related to the private interests of the parties and the ends of justice

have no bearing on the decision which the court has to make. Where a catastrophe has

occurred in a particular place, the facts that numerous victims live in that place, that

the relevant evidence is to be found there and that site inspections are most

conveniently and inexpensively carried out there will provide factors connecting any

ensuing litigation with the court exercising jurisdiction in that place. These are

matters of which the Spiliada test takes full account. It is important that the focus

should remain on the principle so clearly stated by Lord Kinnear: in applying this

principle questions of judicial amour propre and political interest or responsibility

have no part to play.

Article 2 of the Brussels Convention

The House received and heard erudite argument on the applicability of article 2 of the

Brussels Convention to a case such as the present. The plaintiffs submitted that the

court was precluded by article 2 from granting a stay. The defendant argued that the

jurisdiction of the court to grant a stay in favour of a forum in a non-contracting state

was unaffected by article 2. The correctness of the Court of Appeal decision in In re

Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1992] Ch 72 was in issue. Both parties argued that the

answer for which they respectively contended was clearly correct. If it was not, the

plaintiffs invited the House to seek a ruling from the European Court of Justice, a

course which the defendant resisted.

For reasons already given, I am unwilling to stay the plaintiffs' proceedings in this

country. It is accordingly unnecessary to decide whether the effect of article 2 is to

deprive the English court of jurisdiction to grant a stay in a case such as this. Had it

been necessary to resolve that question, I would have thought it necessary to seek a

ruling on the applicability on article 2 from the European Court of Justice, since I do

not consider the answer to that question to be clear.

Conclusion

I would dismiss the defendant's appeal against the decision of the first Court of

Appeal. I would allow the plaintiffs' appeal against the decision of the second Court

of Appeal and remove the stay which that court upheld. The defendant must bear the

costs of both appeals, and also the costs of the proceedings before Buckley J and the

second Court of Appeal.


LAMPIRAN 5

JUDGMENTBY-2: LORD STEYN

JUDGMENT-2: LORD STEYN: My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speeches

of my noble and learned friends, Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Hope of

Craighead. For the reasons they give I would also make the order which Lord

Bingham of Cornhill proposes.

JUDGMENTBY-3: LORD HOFFMANN

JUDGMENT-3: LORD HOFFMANN: My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the

speeches of my noble and learned friends, Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Hope

of Craighead. For the reasons they give, I would also make the order which Lord

Bingham of Cornhill proposes.

JUDGMENTBY-4: LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD

JUDGMENT-4: LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD: My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in

draft the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Bingham of Cornhill. I agree

with it, and for the reasons which he has given I, too, would allow the claimants'

appeals and dismiss the appeal by the defendant. I should however like to add some

observations on two matters that were raised in the course of the argument about the

doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Available forum

It is clear that the decision of the first Court of Appeal [1998] CLC 1559 to refuse a

stay was much influenced by the view which they formed about the defendant's

submission that the South African courts were available to the plaintiffs because it

had offered during the hearing before the judge to submit to the jurisdiction of those

courts.

It was not suggested to the judge that there were any reasons for doubting that this

offer had removed the difficulty that the defendant was not otherwise subject to the

jurisdiction of the South African courts as it was neither present nor had any assets in

South Africa. But in the Court of Appeal it was contended that the offer was

objectionable, for two reasons. The first was that the courts in South Africa were not

available at the time when the plaintiffs brought their proceedings in England, as the

defendant did not indicate its willingness to be sued in South Africa until after the

proceedings had been brought. The second was that the effect of treating the South

African courts as available in these circumstances was to give the defendant a choice

of jurisdiction, enabling it to elect for the court that was more favourable to it and


LAMPIRAN 5

thus indulge in forum shopping. Evans LJ did not go so far in his judgment as to say

that the South African courts were not to be regarded as available in these

circumstances. But he made it clear that in his opinion the fact that the South African

courts were not available until the defendant offered the undertakings, and that their

availability remained conditional upon them, were factors which should be taken into

account in the application to the case of the principles stated in Spiliada Maritime

Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460. The implication was that these were

factors to be weighed in the balance against the defendant in the decision whether or

not the action should be stayed.

This is not a point that required to be considered in Connelly v RTZ Corporation Plc

[1998] AC 854, and I think that counsel for the defendant was in error when he

submitted to the Court of Appeal in the present case that it could have been: [1998]

CLC 1559, 1565F. In Connelly's case the two defendant companies, like the

defendant in this case, were English companies which had their registered offices in

England. But the basis upon which they were being sued in England was that they

were responsible, either directly in fact or vicariously in law, for defects in the health

and safety arrangements at the mine which was operated in Namibia by a subsidiary

of the first defendant by whom the plaintiff was employed while he was working

there: see the issues which were identified in the Court of Appeal by Waite LJ [1996]

QB 361, 364B-D. The subsidiary, against which the plaintiff had previously directed

his claim at the suggestion of the first defendant, was present and available to be sued

in Namibia. It was common ground that Namibia was a forum that was available to

the plaintiff for his claim of damages. No doubt this was on the view that for all

practical purposes no distinction was to be drawn between the first defendant, which

as my noble and learned friend, Lord Hoffmann, observed [1998] AC 854, 876G, was

a multinational company present almost everywhere, and its subsidiary in Namibia.

In the present case the asbestos mines and mills in South Africa which were operated

by the defendant's subsidiaries are all closed, and its subsidiaries are no longer

present or available to be sued in that country. The question whether the South

African courts are available to the claimants is thus entirely dependent upon the

proposition that the defendant itself is subject to the jurisdiction of those courts. As

the defendant has no presence in that country, and as it has no assets there which

could be attached to found jurisdiction, the only ground on which its courts could

exercise jurisdiction against it is that of prorogation. The validity of the defendant's

undertakings is therefore critical to its argument that the South African courts are

available to the claimants as a forum in which their actions should be tried.

The approach that is to be taken to this question has been examined in a number of

Scottish cases to which it may be helpful to refer, as the underlying principles which

Lord Goff of Chieveley described in the Spiliada case were derived from the Scottish

authorities.

In Clements v Macaulay (1866) 4 Macph 583 an objection was taken to the


LAMPIRAN 5

jurisdiction of the Scottish courts in an action to enforce a contract entered into

between two Americans on the plea of forum non competens. This was on the

grounds that Texas where the agreement was entered into was the only proper forum

for the dispute and that the Scottish court was an inconvenient and improper forum.

The Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Inglis, having concluded that the view that the courts of

Texas would have jurisdiction was plainly untenable, said, at p 592:

"But then I am bound to inquire, if this is an inconvenient and incompetent forum,

where is the proper forum? Apart from the suggestion of Texas, no other suggestion

is made, and I know no case of a plea of this kind being sustained, where the defender

did not satisfy the court that there was another court where the cause could be tried

with advantage to the parties and to the ends of justice. The defender does seem to

have thought himself under obligation to suggest what was the proper forum, but he

has unfortunately suggested one which has no jurisdiction."

Lord Cowan said, at p 594:

"Your Lordship has conclusively shown that there is no jurisdiction in the courts of

Texas, on the ground stated by the defender, to entertain this action. Where, then, is

the forum on which the defence is founded? When the court has given effect to such a

plea, it has always been because another forum, specially referred to by the defender

as that in which he undertakes to plead, has been regarded as the more convenient and

preferable for securing the ends of justice. Here the elements for disposing of this

defence, pleaded on this, its essential ground, do not exist."

In Societe du Gaz de Paris v Societe Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs

Francais," 1925 SC 332, 347 the Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Alness, said that the result

of the cases was that it must be plain that "another forum is open to the parties." His

analysis of the law was approved by Lord Dunedin, 1926 SC (HL) 13, 18, in your

Lordships' House. There is no indication here or in any of the other Scottish cases that

this matter ought to be approached on any other basis than that this is a requirement

that must be satisfied in a practical manner when the question of forum non

conveniens is being considered by the court.

In Clements v Macaulay the defender did not offer an undertaking to submit to the

jurisdiction of the Texas courts. But in Tulloch v Williams (1846) 8 D 657 two

actions had been raised against the defender when he was on a visit to Scotland

relating to his conduct while acting as the pursuer's commissioner and attorney in

Jamaica. He lodged with his defences in each action a minute stating that he was

ready and willing to answer in the courts of Jamaica to any writ or action that the

pursuer might bring against him with reference to that subject matter. The Lord

Ordinary said that he was not aware of any authority for taking the course desired by

the defender, which was to decline to proceed with the case in the meantime leaving

it to the pursuer to institute proceedings against the defender in the courts of Jamaica.

In the absence of such authority he repelled the plea. But he invited the pursuer to


LAMPIRAN 5

consider the defender's offer as providing the most satisfactory and least expensive

way of having justice administered between them, saying that to go on with the

litigation in Scotland could not fail to be productive of much delay and additional

expense. In the Inner House the process was sisted for three months in the light of

these observations to allow the pursuer an opportunity to bring an action in the proper

court in Jamaica. Lord President Boyle explained, at p 659, that it was a question of

convenience whether the case should go on in Jamaica or whether it should proceed

in Scotland upon evidence of the law and custom of Jamaica.

It was not suggested in Tulloch v Williams that the fact that the defender did not offer

to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Jamaica until he lodged his defences

presented any difficulty, either on the ground that the offer came too late or on the

ground that he ought not to be allowed to choose the jurisdiction in which he was to

be sued. His undertaking was seen as the obvious solution to the difficulty that,

although the most expedient course in the interests of both parties was for the case to

be dealt with not in Scotland but in Jamaica, the defender was not otherwise subject

to the jurisdiction of the Jamaican courts.

In Sim v Robinow, 19 R 665 the defender was sued in Scotland on the ground that he

had been resident there for more than 40 days. He maintained that he was only a

temporary visitor to Scotland, that he was domiciled in South Africa, that he intended

to return to his business in that country and that the courts of that country were the

proper forum for determining the matter in dispute as they related to transactions

between the parties when they were both in South Africa. His plea that the Scottish

courts should decline jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens was

repelled. Lord Kinnear, who delivered the leading judgment, said that he was not

satisfied that it had been shown that there was another court in which the action ought

to be tried as being more convenient for all the parties and more suitable for the ends

of justice. In regard to the question whether the courts of South Africa were available,

he noted that the defender had not offered the same undertaking as was offered in

Tulloch v Williams. All that he had said was that he intended to go to South Africa,

as to which Lord Kinnear observed, at p 669:

"I do not think that the pursuer can be asked to wait till the defender carries out this

intention, or that he ought to be sent to a court which may be unable to exercise any

jurisdiction over the defender in consequence of his continued absence from South

Africa."

He described Tulloch v Williams, at p 669, as a very exceptional case and indicated

that it ought not to be followed. But this was not because he thought that it was wrong

for the court to proceed on the defender's undertaking to submit to the jurisdiction of

the other court which he offered after the action had been raised. His criticism of the

decision in Tulloch's case was that the court ought not to have sisted the action for a

short period to await events, but that it ought to have determined the matter either one

way or the other there and then. This was on the ground that, as he put it at p 669:


LAMPIRAN 5

"if this court is not a convenient forum for the trial of the cause, then the action ought

to be dismissed, but, if this court is a convenient forum, then I can see no reason why

the action should not go on in the ordinary way."

Under Scots procedure a decree of dismissal is a decree which is used when it is

intended to decide that the particular action should not be allowed to Fl proceed

against the defender, but which is intended to leave it open to the pursuer to bring

another action: Maclaren, Court of Session Practice (1916), p 1093.

In the light of these authorities I would have regarded the undertakings which were

offered by the defendant in this case as sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the

alternative forum in South Africa was available because it had undertaken to submit

to the jurisdiction of the courts of that country. Nothing turns on the time when the

undertakings were given. It is sufficient that they were before the judge when he was

considering the question of forum non conveniens. As for the suggestion that the

defendant was choosing its jurisdiction and thus indulging in a kind of forum

shopping, this overlooks the fact that the issue as to forum non conveniens is for the

court itself to resolve. It is not a matter that is left to the choice of the defender.

Furthermore the court resolves the issue by looking to the interests of all parties and

the ends of justice. As the Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Alness, said in Societe du Gaz de

Paris v Societe Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Francais," 1925 SC 332,

347, it does not do so from the point of view of the defender only. The only purpose

of the undertaking is to satisfy the requirement that the other forum is available. The

ground on which the jurisdiction of the courts in the other forum is available to be

exercised is of no importance either one way or the other in the application to the case

of the Spiliada principles.

Public interest

In my opinion the principles on which the doctrine of forum non conveniens rest

leave no room for considerations of public interest or public policy which cannot be

related to the private interests of any of the parties or the ends of justice in the case

which is before the court.

In Societe du Gaz de Paris v Societe Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs

Francais," 1925 SC 332, 361, where jurisdiction was established over the defender by

an arrestment to found jurisdiction, Lord Anderson rejected the extreme argument

that that case ought not to be litigated in Scotland at all as it was an action between

two foreigners. He said:

"Anyone who succeeds in founding jurisdiction in this way seems to me to be

entitled, as of right, to invoke the exercise of the jurisdiction so founded, and the

court can only refuse to exercise the jurisdiction invoked if a defence of forum non

conveniens is established."


LAMPIRAN 5

In the House of Lords, 1926 SC (HL) 13, 21 Lord Sumner was alluding to the same

point when he said:

"Obviously the court cannot allege its own convenience, or the amount of its own

business, or its distaste for trying actions which involve taking evidence in French, as

a ground for refusal . . . the court has to proceed until the defender objects, but, as

against the pursuer's right, the defender has an equal right to plead forum non

conveniens."

In MacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd [1978] AC 795, 822D, Lord Salmon said that

he did not think that matters of general policy should play any part in deciding issues

of this kind, and Lord Keith of Kinkel made an observation to the same effect, at p

833D.

The proper approach therefore is to start from the proposition that a claimant who is

able to establish jurisdiction against the defendant as of right in this country is

entitled to call upon the courts of this country to exercise that jurisdiction. So, if the

plea of forum non conveniens cannot be sustained on the ground that the case may be

tried more suitably in the other forum, in the words of Lord Kinnear in Sim v

Robinow, 19 R 665, 668, "for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of

justice," the jurisdiction must be exercised -- however desirable it may be on grounds

of public interest or public policy that the litigation should be conducted elsewhere

and not in the English courts. On the other hand, if the interests of all parties and the

ends of justice require that the action in this country should be stayed, a stay ought to

be granted however desirable it may be on grounds of public interest or public policy

that the action should be tried here.

I would therefore decline to follow those judges in the United States who would

decide issues as to where a case ought to be tried on broad grounds of public policy:

see Union Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December

1984 (1986) 634 F Supp 842 and Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno (1981) 454 US 235. I

respectfully agree with Deane J's observation in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping

Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197, 255 that the court is not equipped to conduct the

kind of inquiry and assessment of the international as well as the domestic

implications that would be needed if it were to follow that approach. However

tempting it may be to give effect to concerns about the expense and inconvenience to

the administration of justice of litigating actions such as these in this country on the

one hand or in South Africa on the other, the argument must be resolved upon an

examination of their effect upon the interests of the parties who are before the court

and securing the ends of justice in their case. I would hold that considerations of

policy which cannot be dealt with in this way should be left out of account in the

application to the case of the Spiliada principles.

JUDGMENTBY-5: LORD HOBHOUSE OF WOODBOROUGH


LAMPIRAN 5

JUDGMENT-5: LORD HOBHOUSE OF WOODBOROUGH: My Lords, for the reasons given by my

noble and learned friends, Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Hope of Craighead, I,

too, agree with the order which Lord Bingham of Cornhill has proposed.

DISPOSITION:

Orders accordingly.

SOLICITORS: Leigh Day & Co; Davies Arnold Cooper.


LAMPIRAN 6

Tom Beanal vs. Freeport Filing

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT FOR LOUISIANA

CIVIL ACTION

CASE NO: 96-1474, SECTION: SECT.K MAG.3

TOM BEANAL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS

SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

FREEPORT-McMoRan, INC. AND FREEPORT-McMoRan COPPER AND

GOLD, INC., DEFENDANTS

COMPLAINT

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, comes the above listed

plaintiff individually and on behalf of all similarly situated class members and

represents that:

1. The plaintiff, TOM BEANAL, a resident of Timika, Irian Jaya (West Papua)

within the Republic of Indonesia and a leader of the Amungme Tribal Council

Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme (LEMASA) represents that the

complaint is brought individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated class

members (Indigenous people of Irian Jaya (West Papua)) because: (1) joinder of all

members of the class is impractical (numerosity); (2) there are multiple questions of

law and/or fact common to the class (commonality); (3) the claims of plaintiff are

typical of the claims of the class (typicality); and (4) plaintiff as a tribal council leader

will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Furthermore, the plaintiff

alleges that the predominate human rights, environmental and cultural causes of

action of the class members present common legal and factual issues. Finally, the

plaintiff contends that a class action is the superior method of adjudicating the claims,

herein, which have global significance.


LAMPIRAN 6

2. Made defendant herein is FREEPORT-McMoRan, INC., a domestic corporation

incorporated in the State of Delaware having as its primary corporate domicile

located at 1615 Poydras Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70112. Also made defendant

herein is FREEPORT-McMoRan COPPER AND GOLD, INC., a domestic

corporation incorporated in the State of Delaware and also having its primary

corporate domicile at 1615 Poydras Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70112.

Hereinafter defendants referred to collectively as FREEPORT.

3. The proper Agent for service of process for both Freeport McMoRan, INC. and

FREEPORT-McMoRan COPPER AND GOLD, INC. is C.T. Corporation Systems

located at 8550 United Plaza, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809.

JURISDICTION

4. Jurisdiction is proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana, United States District

Court based upon 28 U.S.C. 1332 in that the amount of controversy asserted herein is

in excess of $50,000.00 and that the controversy is between corporate citizens of a

state and/or subjects of a foreign state. Additionally, jurisdiction is proper herein

pursuant to the Alien Tort Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350 and the Torture Victim

Protection Act of 1991, Section 1, et seq. (PUB.L. 102-256).

VENUE

5. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. 1391 in that both corporate defendants have

their primary corporate headquarters located at 1615 Poydras Street, New Orleans,

Louisiana 70112 and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims herein

arose at the corporate headquarters of FREEPORT McMoRan, INC., and

FREEPORT-McMoRan COPPER and GOLD located at 1615 Poydras Street, New

Orleans, Louisiana, including but not limited to all corporate decisions relative to the

conduct of FREEPORT security personnel, the conducting of mining operations and

the conceptions of any and all "environmental policies" or lack thereof affecting the

defendant's mining operation in the Republic of Indonesia.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

6. In 1967, defendant, FREEPORT-McMoRan, INC., by and through its

predecessor corporation(s), initiated development of the Ertsberg Mine within the

region commonly known as Irian Jaya (West Papua), a Province of the Republic of

Indonesia.


LAMPIRAN 6

7. In 1988, defendant, FREEPORT-McMoRan, INC. by and through its

subsidiaries and/or affiliates discovered within the Jayawijaya Mountain an enormous

deposit of ore containing copper, gold and silver. Thereafter, the defendants began

operating an open pit mine referred to as the Grasberg Mine. Included in the Grasberg

open pit mining facility of the defendants is a mill, tunnels, slurry pipe lines and a

corporate port located at Amamapare. The aforesaid Grasberg open pit mining

operation encompasses an approximately 26,400 square kilometer area.

8. The Grasberg Mine site, including the cities of Tembagapura and Timika were at

all pertinent times "policed" by the defendants' security personnel who maintain

security stations, vehicles and a staff of paramilitary type security officers.

Additionally, upon information and belief, the corporate defendants maintain a

military presence within its mining operation wherein troops of the Republic of

Indonesia are fed, transported, paid and provided equipment from the defendants in

order to assist its operations.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

9. Plaintiff herein reiterates each and every foregoing paragraph of this Complaint.

10. The plaintiff herein submits under the Alien Tort Claim Act and the Torture

Victim Protection Act of 1991 that defendant corporations, FREEPORT-McMoRan,

INC. AND FREEPORT McMoRan COPPER AND GOLD, INC. have systematically

engaged in a corporate policy both directly and indirectly through third parties which

have resulted in human rights violations against the Amungme Tribe and other

Indigenous tribal people. Said actions include extra judicial killing, torture,

surveillance and threats of death, severe physical pain and suffering by and through

its security personnel employed in connection with its operation of the Grasberg

mine.

11. Pursuant to the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, plaintiff herein

represents that all available and adequate remedies within the Province of Irian Jaya

(West Papua), Republic of Indonesia have been exhausted, including but not limited

to complaints to the Indonesian National Commission of Human Rights

(KOMNASHAM) and the Australian Human Rights Commission.

12. Upon information and belief, the plaintiff, individually and on behalf of those

similarly situated, complain that the defendants' security guards in conjunction with

third parties acting by and through the corporate policy of the defendants have


LAMPIRAN 6

engaged in summary executions, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture,

disappearances, surveillance and the destruction of property. Said violations have

occurred on FREEPORT buses, within FREEPORT workshops, at FREEPORT

security command centers, FREEPORT security stations, FREEPORT Private

Roadways and containers owned by said corporate defendants.

13. On December 25, 1994, on FREEPORT bus #44, while being operated on the

road from Timika to Tembagapura, Wendy Tambuni was stabbed and shot to death

while being transported on said bus.

14. Also on December 25, 1994, at the FREEPORT workshop located at

Koperapoka, three civilians were killed after being tortured.

15. On December 26, 1994, four civilians, arbitrarily and without lawful cause,

were arrested at the FREEPORT security station and imprisoned in FREEPORT

containers at Banti.

16. Repeated acts of torture have been conducted at FREEPORT security stations

and FREEPORT containers throughout the FREEPORT concession in Irian Jaya

(West Papua), Indonesia. Said torture included kicking about the stomach, chest and

head regions while FREEPORT security personnel were wearing military boots,

beatings engaged in with fists, sticks, rifle butts, stones, starvation, kneeling on iron

bars, standing with heavy weights on the subject's heads, shackling of thumbs, wrists

and legs, stabbing, taping eyes closed and forced labor.

17. Throughout the operation of the Freeport concession in Irian Jaya (West

Papua), Indonesia, the defendant corporations have engaged in security surveillance

of the indigenous people, including the plaintiff, throughout the region and said

surveillance has resulted in fear, tension and severe mental distress resulting from the

conduct of FREEPORT security personnel.

18. Torture victims have been kept in FREEPORT containers where they are

required to stand for periods of up to and including seven days in water which was

calf high and reeked of human feces.

19. Indigenous people have also been detained at FREEPORT workshops and

security stations throughout the region where their eyes were taped shut, thumbs tied

and were subject to repeated beatings and torture by FREEPORT security personnel

and are (rsb: sic -- probably meant "or") third parties acting in conjunction with said

personnel.


LAMPIRAN 6

20. The plaintiffs assert that the indigenous people were never subject to the

aforestated human rights violations prior to the presence of the defendant

corporations in their region.

21. The Australian Counsel (rsb: sic) for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) (rsb: missing

word "report") contain (rsb: sic) repeated first hand accounts of the brutal human

rights violations of the FREEPORT security personnel whose conduct is acquiesced

to, accepted, adopted and/or ratified by the defendant corporations as part of their

corporate policy in operating and expanding the FREEPORT mining concession in

Irian Jaya (West Papua), Indonesia at the expense of the local indigenous people.

22. The plaintiffs allege that FREEPORT security personnel or third parties

supported by defendant corporations were acting under actual or apparent authority of

the defendant corporations. The plaintiffs allege that the aforesaid conduct is

egregious violations of international law (Law of Nations) for which the defendant

corporations are accountable under the Alien Tort Claim Act and/or the Torture

Victim Protection Act. (rsb: sic period) of 1991.

23. The plaintiffs specifically allege that international law (Law of Nations) as

understood in the modern era does not confine its reach to state action in that certain

forms of conduct violate the Law of Nations whether undertaken by those acting

under the auspices of state or only as private individuals, including corporations.

ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS

24. The plaintiffs allege that the mining operations conducted by defendant

corporations referred to herein as the Grasberg mining operation resulted in the

destruction of the indigenous peoples' natural waterways within the region; the

deforestation of rain forest and the contamination of the region's surface and ground

water through ore leachate. Said violations of international environmental law are

tantamount to acts of eco-terrorism.

25. The Grasberg mining operation deposits in the local waterways approximately

120,000 metric tons of tailings (rsb: per day) which contain trace amounts of metals

and are the waste product of the open pit mining operation of defendant corporations

at Grasberg.

26. The environmental ramifications of the tailings released into the waterways of

the plaintiff's natural living area include toxicity, volume and mass which have

resulted in the disruption of the nature (rsb: sic) waterways, the pollution of natural


LAMPIRAN 6

waterways, the overflow and alteration of the natural waterways leading to the

deforestation of the region.

27. The FREEPORT mining concession has discharged tailings resulting in

massive deposition of tailings of Ajkwa River and the sheet flow of tailings which

has substantially destroyed a significant area of the low land rainforest between the

Ajkwa River and the Minajeri River. The destruction of said areas has resulted and

caused a major environmental, health and safety hazard within Irian Jaya (West

Papua).

28. Additional problems resulting from the operation of the FREEPORT mining

concession include acid mine drainage from the tailings, the concentration,

mobilization and bio availability of non-toxic and toxic materials in the tailings, the

degradation of surface and ground water quality, increased sedimentation, sheeting

and other adverse affects that have been caused by the higher percentage of coarser

grain tailings, and the mismanagement of solid and hazardous waste at the site.

29. The FREEPORT mining concession additionally has caused the hollowing of

several mountains which are beautiful, natural resources of the glacial mountain

range in the region, spontaneous re-routing of major rivers, the death of a large track

of the sago Forest and the increase in levels of toxic and non-toxic materials and

metals within the river systems of the area.

30. Other major rivers affected by the dumping of the tailings into the rivers of the

indigenous peoples' region are the Aghawagon River and the Otomona River equally

affected by the mismanagement of the tailing released by the defendant corporations.

31. As a result of the lack of a proper tailings management program by defendant

corporations, areas as large as 50 square kilometers of fresh water swamp forest have

been transformed into a denuded tailings deposit area.

32. The contamination of the waterways by the enormous tonnage of tailings

dumped by the defendant corporations prevents sunlight penetration into the water,

prevention of oxygen dilution and is a practice which is unacceptable anywhere on

this plant.

33. The plaintiffs allege that acid mine drainage from the Grasberg ore zone is an

equally significant international environmental violation caused by the defendant

corporations and is caused by chemical and biological oxidation of sulfides and

excavation of sulfide containing waste materials during mining which exposes


LAMPIRAN 6

previously unweathered rock to oxygen thereby greatly accelerating the oxidative

process.

34. One of the by products of sulfide oxidation is sulfuric acid which in turn can

dissolve residual metals and other metals such as arsenic in the mine waste to produce

an extremely toxic leachate.

35. Plaintiffs allege that defendant corporations have failed to engage in adequate

acid mine drainage management programs and have failed to develop a

comprehensive mining and waste handling plan to ensure prevention of acid

generation from waste rock tailings, open pits and underground work areas.

36. The Grasberg mining operation within the FREEPORT concession already

exhibits visual evidence of acid mine draining which is the result of sulfide oxidation

within its property.

37. The plaintiffs allege that due to the mismanagement of the defendant

corporations that toxic leachates from the open pits of the Grasberg mining operation

have been widely disbursed into the ground water and surface waterways within the

FREEPORT concession.

38. Defendant corporations (rsb: sic -- missing apostrophe) mining operations in

Irian violate every acceptable international norm and has and will result in the

continued destruction of the beautify valleys, glacial mountain ranges and rain forests

of the region.

39. The corporations (rsb: sic -- missing apostrophe) mining operations disrupted

the delicate ecosystem balance between the sea, the beaches, the swamp, the rain

forest and the alpine areas within the FREEPORT mining concession.

40. Plaintiffs specifically allege that the defendant corporations have failed to

engage in a zero waste policy, an acceptable enclosed waste management system,

have failed to maximize environmental rehabilitation, have failed to engage in an

appropriate acid leachate control policy, have failed to adequately monitor the

destruction of the natural resources of Irian Jaya (West Papua) and have disregarded

and breached its international duty to protect one of the last great natural rain forests

and alpine areas in the world.

CULTURAL GENOCIDE


LAMPIRAN 6

41. The plaintiffs specifically reallege each and every paragraph of the foregoing

Complaint as if repeated herein.

42. The plaintiffs allege that the human rights violations and the eco-terrorism

engaged in by defendant corporations have destroyed the rights and culture of the

Amungme and other Indigenous tribal people.

43. Since defendant corporations have commenced their operations, many of the

Amungme people have displaced and relocated to areas in the lowlands away from

their cultural heritage of highland living.

44. Other Indigenous tribal people, including but not limited to the Komora Tribe,

have met the same fate.

45. The egregious human rights and environmental violations, which have

terrorized the tribal communities of the Amungme and other Indigenous Tribal

people, destroyed their natural habitats and caused dislocation of the populations have

resulted in the purposeful, deliberate, contrived and planned demise of a culture of

indigenous people whose rights were never considered, whose heritage and culture

were disregarded and the result of which is ultimately to lead to the cultural demise of

an unique pristine heritage which is socially, culturally and anthropologically

irreplaceable.

DAMAGES

46. Plaintiff and others similarly situated incurred damages proximately and

directly caused by the acts and/or omissions of defendant corporations set out

heretofore said damages which include but are not necessarily limited to:

a. bodily injury;

b. physical injury in the past;

c. bodily injury and physical impairment in the future;

d. physical pain, suffering and mental anguish in the past;

e. physical pain, suffering and mental anguish in the future;

f. emotional distress in the past;

g. emotional distress in the future;

h. increased risks of disease or other ailments;

i. cost of medical monitoring with regards to toxic exposure;

j. medical expenses and services in the past;

k. medical expenses and services in the future;


LAMPIRAN 6

l. disfigurement;

m. loss of earning capacity;

n. devaluation and/or loss in use and enjoyment of personal property;

o. devaluation and loss of vegetation;

p. loss of consortium; and

q. loss of services.

47. Additionally, all plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages or exemplary

damages as may be shown by the grossly negligent acts and omissions of defendant

corporations as well as human rights violations and cultural genocide amounting to a

sum to be determined hereinafter.

REMEDIES

48. Require defendant corporations to put into affect (rsb: sic):

a. an appropriate tailing disposal policy to implement a waste rock dumping

policy;

b. to cease and desist all open pit mining operations;

c. to release all relevant environmental data;

d. the defendant corporations to fund an independent soil and monitoring

program;

e. to force defendant corporations to demilitarize its security forces;

f. to require the implementation of mediation panels between FREEPORT-

McMoRan and the indigenous people; and

g. to create a trust fund to be administered, operated and for the exclusive sole

benefit of the indigenous people.

The plaintiff, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, assert that

damages against defendant corporations total Six Billion Dollars ($6,000,000,000.00)

exclusive of punitive damages.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays:

(1) that process in due form of law, according to the course and practice of this

Honorable Court, issue against said defendants;


LAMPIRAN 6

(2) that after due proceedings be had, judgment be entered in the favor of plaintiff,

TOM BEANAL AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED, and against the

defendants, jointly, severally and in solido, for damages and punitive damages in an

amount to compensate for the aforedescribed conduct of the defendants in an amount

to be determined by this Honorable Court, plus prejudgement interest from the date of

filing, costs, punitive damages and that the plaintiff(s) have such other relief as in law

and justice they may be entitled to recover.

Respectfully submitted:

REGAN, MANASSEH & BOSHEA, P.L.C.

(signature)

MARTIN E. REGAN, JR.

LSBA No. 11153

Attorney for Plaintiffs

2125 St. Charles Avenue

New Orleans, LA 70130

(504) 522-7260

PLEASE SERVE:

FREEPORT McMoRan, INC.

C.T. Corporation Systems

8850 United Plaza

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809

FREEPORT-McMoRan COPPER AND GOLD, INC.

C.T. Corporation Systems

8850 United Plaza

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809


LAMPIRAN 7

Federal Court Ruling in Beanal v. Freeport, April 9, 1997

MINUTE ENTRY

DUVAL, J.

APRIL 9, 1997

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-1474 SECTION "K"

TOM BEANAL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY

SITUATED

VERSUS FREEPORT-MCMORAN, INC., AND

FREEPORT-MCMORAN COPPER AND GOLD, INC.

Before the court is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Tom Beanal's ("Beanal") claims against Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. and Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, Inc. (collectively

"Freeport" ), which motion was heard with oral argument on October 23, 1996. Having

reviewed the pleadings, the memoranda, and the applicable law, the court finds as follows for

the reasons set forth below: (1) Plaintiff has standing to bring claims on his own behalf for cultural genocide of the Amungme tribe, certain human rights violations, and environmental

claims, but lacks standing to bring claims on behalf of others for summary execution and

disappearances; (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for genocide in violation of the law of nations, pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute; (3) Plaintiff has failed to allege state action as

required under the Alien Tort Statute because he failed to allege that Freeport acted under

color of Indonesian law; (4) The Torture Victim Protection Act does not supersede or impliedly repeal the causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute for torture and extrajudicial

killing committed in violation of the law of nations; (5) The Torture Victim Protection Act

does not apply to corporations; and (6) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for an

environmental tort in violation of the law of nations.

The Parties

Plaintiff Tom Beanal ("Beanal") is a resident of Tamika (sic), Irian Jaya (West Papua) within the Republic of Indonesia. He is a leader of the Amungme Tribal Counsel of Lambaga

Adat Suku Amungme (LEMASA). He filed suit against Freeport on April 29, 1996,

individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on May 16, 1996. Since no class has been certified, Beanal is the lone plaintiff at

this stage.

Defendants Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. and Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, Inc. are

Delaware corporations headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana. Freeport owns an

Indonesia-based subsidiary named P.T. Freeport Indonesia ("PT-FI").


LAMPIRAN 7

Freeport operates the "Grasberg Mine," an open pit copper, gold and silver mine situated in

the Jayawijaya Mountain (sic) in Irian Jaya (West Papua), Indonesia. The mine allegedly

encompasses approximately 26,400 square kilometers.

The Complaint

Beanal's first amended complaint alleges that Freeport has committed environmental torts, human rights abuses, and cultural genocide. Beanal states that the court has jurisdiction over

this case based on diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 ("§ 1332"), the Alien

Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 ("§ 1350"), and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, SEC. 1, et. seq., 28 U.S.C. 1350 note. Freeport's motion to dismiss focuses solely on the latter

basis for jurisdiction under § 1350, and does not mention Plaintiff's diversity based claims.

Accordingly, the court does not address those claims for damages and specific relief, if any, based on diversity jurisdiction. Since the prerequisites for diversity jurisdiction appear to

have been satisfied and are not contested, this court has subject matter jurisdiction so long as

Plaintiff can state at least one claim for relief. The court could exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over other claims against Freeport. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

The court reviews the claims made pursuant to § 1350 to determine if a cause of action exists.1 The current view of § 1350 is that it grants a federal cause of action as well as a

federal forum in which to assert the claim. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 179

(D.Mass. 1995) (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit has acknowledged the generally held view that section 1350 is appropriately used by individuals asserting claims for violation of

international law of human rights. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.3d

1385, 1396, n. 16 (5th Cir. 1985). Freeport appropriately moved to dismiss for failure to state

a cause of action, under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Procedure, rather than for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1) and (6).

Summary of Freeport's Bases for Dismissal

Freeport asserts numerous reasons for the court to dismiss the claims for human rights violations and the environmental claims. First, Freeport argues that Beanal lacks standing to

bring human rights claims in his own behalf or on behalf of others. As to the human rights claims asserted pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, Freeport argues: (1) The Alien Tort Statute

does not provide a private right of action; (2) Freeport is not a state actor; and (3) The TVPA

supersedes the Alien Tort Statute for claims of torture and extrajudicial killings. As to the

human rights violations asserted under the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), Freeport argues that Beanal has failed to state a claim because: (1) The TVPA does not apply to

corporations; (2) Beanal has not alleged that Freeport acted under color of foreign law; (3)

Plaintiff failed to exhaust local remedies.

Freeport asserts five bases for dismissal of claims for international environmental torts brought under section 1350: (1) Beanal lacks standing to bring the environmental claims; (2)

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because environmental practices do not violate the law of

nations; (3) The act of state doctrine bars Plaintiff's claims; (4) The local action doctrine mandates dismissal; and (5) The claims should be dismissed for failure to join an

indispensable party, namely, the Republic of Indonesia.


http://www.utwatch.org/corporations/freeportfiles/duval-970409.html#fn1

LAMPIRAN 7

The court discusses each issue in turn.

Standard for Motion to Dismiss

Freeport filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court confirmed by Minute Entry that it would not consider any matters outside the pleadings in deciding this

motion. Minute Entry of Oct. 17, 1996, Record, Doc. No. 95. Further, Plaintiff cannot amend

his complaint by briefs submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Car Carriers, Inc. v.

Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985); Jojoja v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 494 (10th Cir. 1995). Beanal's opposition memorandum

presented summaries of the allegations which varied slightly from those contained in his

amended complaint which the court disregards.

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all material allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in favor of the non-moving party. Blackburn v. City of

Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). The court may only grant dismissal if it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief. Id., citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102 (1957). The court is not required to "conjure up unpled allegations" to save a complaint. Systems

Contractors Corporation v. Orleans Parish School Board, et al., 1996 WL 547414, *1, (E.D.

La. Sept. 24, 1996), citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988).

The court may treat a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion as a motion for a more definite statement, even if the motion is not so styled. See C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 1378, at 634 (1991); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541

(D.C.Cal. 1987), reconsidered on other grounds, 694 F.Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988). This

would be appropriate, for example, in order for Plaintiff to state specific facts on which he bases his individual allegations of human rights violations. Forti, 672 F.Supp. at 1541. This

way, the court can remain true to the notice pleading permitted under the federal rules and at

the same time accurately assess the facts pled.

A. STANDING

Beanal stands as the lone plaintiff in this case since no class has been certified. Uniform Louisiana Local Rule 1.12B provides that a plaintiff must move for class certification within

90 days after filing a complaint, unless the period is extended for good cause by motion.

Plaintiff Beanal filed this action on April 29, 1996 and moved for an extension of time within

which to seek class certification on August 1, 1996, approximately four days after the ninety-day period had lapsed. Plaintiff's motion for more time was denied on August 6, 1996 and he

did not seek reconsideration of said denial. Record, Doc. No. 56.

Beanal has standing to assert claims on his own behalf. Beanal does not purport to be an

organizational representative. Beanal identifies himself as "a leader of the Amungme Tribal Council Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme ("LEMASA")," but does not appear to

be suing on behalf of "LEMASA" since he sued "individually and on behalf of all other

similarly situated class members (Indigenous People of Irian Jaya (West Papua))." Unlike


LAMPIRAN 7

Beanal, LEMASA is not listed as a party and the complaint does not indicate that LEMASA

is bringing suit.

Furthermore, Beanal has not alleged facts which would entitle him to bring claims on behalf of a third party. Typically, there are three instances in which third party standing is

permissible: (1) where individuals can represent the interests of parties who are unlikely to be

able to represent their own interests; (2) where there is a close relationship between the

advocate and the third party; and (3) where a statute is challenged as being unconstitutionally over broad. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.3.4 (2d. 1994) (hereinafter

"Federal Jurisdiction"). Beanal has not alleged facts that would entitle him to claim any of

these exceptions to the general rule against third party standing.

By definition, claims for disappearance and summary execution are based on harm to a third party. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 189 (D.Mass. 1995). Section 1350 is silent

concerning a plaintiff's standing to bring suit based on an injury to another. Id. It is generally

assumed that where Congress is silent as to such a detail, federal courts borrow from state

law, unless its application would defeat the purpose of the federal statute. Id. at 190. In Xuncax the court determined who could bring a claim under § 1350 for summary execution

and disappearances by following the approach used by other courts in determining the statute

of limitations applicable under § 1350. Id. "To determine whether to apply federal or state limitations period, the Court must first identify the closest analogies under both federal and

state law. . . . " Id. The Xuncax court found that the statute most analogous to § 1350 was the

Torture Victim Protection Act, which provides that the victim's "legal representative" or "any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death," may recover based on an

extrajudicial killing. The House Report on the TVPA states that "[c]ourts look to state law for

guidance as to which parties would be proper wrongful death claimants." H.R. Rep. No. 256,

102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1991). This court is also persuaded that the Torture Victim Protection Act is most analogous to § 1350. Accordingly, the court turns to Louisiana law to

determine who can bring suit under the Alien Tort Statute.

Louisiana law does not permit the bringing of a wrongful death action by a non-relative of

the victim. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.2 lists the following surviving relatives of the deceased who may bring a wrongful death action: spouse, children, father, mother, brothers,

sisters. La. C.C. Art. 2325.2. The court finds that Beanal, who has not identified himself as a

relative of any victim, would be unable to bring a wrongful death action in Louisiana, and

therefore lacks the standing to sue on behalf of victims of disappearance or summary

execution under § 1350.

To meet the standing requirements under Article III, the Fifth Circuit requires that plaintiff

demonstrate two things:

[1] First, that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a

result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and [2] second, a causal connection between the injury and the conduct such that the injury is "likely to

be redressed by a favorable decision. The Supreme Court has recognized that

injuries to a plaintiff's aesthetic, conservational and recreational interests are

sufficient to meet the first requirement of Article III standing.


LAMPIRAN 7

International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund, 895 F.2d 1056, 1058 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), reversed on other grounds, 500 U.S. 72, 11 S.Ct. 1700 (1991). For purposes of determining standing on a motion to dismiss, the

court "presumes that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to

support the claim." Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 886, 889, 110 S. Ct.

3177, 3189 (1990). The Lujan Court acknowledged that the burden of meeting the standing requirement on a motion to dismiss is considerably less onerous than on a motion for

summary judgment. Id.

In light of Beanal's status as the sole named plaintiff, the court finds that he has standing to

bring claims on his own behalf for certain human rights violations, genocide and environmental torts. Beanal alleges in his complaint that he has been personally injured by

certain human rights abuses and environmental practices. The court finds that Beanal has

standing to assert those claims for which he alleges an individualized injury. Beanal requests a judgment for money damages as well as specific relief, either of which would redress the

harm caused by Freeport for its alleged wrongdoing, if any.

Disregarding those allegations which appear to have been made on behalf of other putative

class members,2 the following specific injuries shall be regarded as have (sic) been asserted

by Plaintiff individually:

(1) Torture, detention, surveillance, destruction of property. Amended Complaint ¶ 12. Plaintiff may have experienced such practices personally and

claims damages for associated injuries. Id. ¶ 46.

(2) Purposeful, deliberate, contrived and planned cultural demise of the

Amungme culture due to various human rights and environmental violations. Id.

¶¶ 41-45. The court permits Beanal to make his claim for "cultural genocide" as

a member of the Amungme tribe only.

(3) All alleged environmental violations from various mining practices carried

out in and nearby the locality where Plaintiff resides, including: destruction,

pollution, alteration, and contamination of natural waterways, as well as surface and ground water sources; deforestation; destruction and alteration of physical

surroundings. Id. ¶¶ 24-40. Plaintiff alleges that he is a resident of Tamika (sic),

Irian Jaya (West Papua), Indonesia, where the Grasberg mine is located, and is a

member of an indigenous tribe that inhabits the area. As a local inhabitant, Plaintiff has a palpable interest in the damage Freeport allegedly causes to

nearby waterways and water source, soil, and forests, as well as any aesthetic

injuries.

B. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Beanal seeks to redress human rights violations under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act. As noted above, Beanal complains individually of (1)

arbitrary arrest and detention, (2) torture, (3) surveillance, (4) destruction of property, and (5)

severe physical pain and suffering. Id. ¶ 12. Beanal alleges that Freeport engaged in these

abuses through its security guards "in conjunction with third parties."



LAMPIRAN 7

Based on a liberal construction of his complaint, Plaintiff may have been injured in

connection with the following incidents described in the complaint:

(1) Repeated acts of torture have occurred at Freeport security stations and Freeport containers, which conduct includes kicking with military boots, beating

with fists, sticks, rifle butts, stones; starvation, standing with heavyweights on

the subject's (sic) heads, shackling of thumbs, wrists and legs, Id. ¶ 16;

(2) Security surveillance of Plaintiff and others resulting in fear and mental

stress, Id. ¶ 17;

(3) Torture victims were forced to stand in Freeport containers in water calf-

high which reeked of human feces, Id. ¶ 18;

(4) Indigenous people have been detained with their eyes taped shut, thumbs

tied, subject to repeated beatings by Freeport security personnel and third parties

acting in conjunction with said personnel, Id. ¶ 19.

The court must determine whether Beanal has stated a cause of action under the Alien Tort

Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act for any of these alleged injuries.

1. § 1350: The Alien Tort Statute

The Alien Tort Statute provides:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations.

28 U.S.C. § 1350. Beanal has not pled nor argued that a treaty applies. Rather, Beanal

asserts that Freeport's conduct violated the law of nations.

Though mostly ignored since its enactment in 1789, § 1350 has more recently been used in

connection with international human rights litigation. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,

887 (2d. Cir. 1980). Courts have recognized important precepts which relate to this case, namely, where a private individual asserts a claim against a private actor for violation of the

law of nations. First, § 1350 provides a private right of action. Id. at 887; In re Estate of

Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 115 S.Ct. 934 (1994); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); Abebe-Jira v.

Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996);; (sic) Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. at 179; Forti, 672

F.Supp. at 1539 (N.D.Cal. 1987). Second, an individual found to have violated the law of nations may be held liable under § 1350. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239;

Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 179; Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1540.

To make out a claim under § 1350, three elements must be satisfied: (1) an alien sues (2)

for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of nations. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238, citing

Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2nd Cir. 1987),


LAMPIRAN 7

reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428, 109 S. Ct. 683 (1989). The first two requirements

are satisfied here: Beanal is an alien and has alleged tortious conduct.

The issue before the court, therefore, is to determine whether the alleged conduct sets forth a violation of the law of nations. To do so, the court must determine, first, whether there is an

applicable norm of international law and, second, whether it has been violated. Xuncax, 886

F. Supp. at 184. To be recognized as an international tort under § 1350, the alleged violation

must be definable, obligatory (rather than hortatory), and universally condemned. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. In making its determination, a court is guided by the sources from which

customary international law is derived, including the usage of nations, judicial opinions and

the works of jurists. Id., citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884; cf. Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1985). Filartiga instructed that the law of

nations is dynamic, rather than static: "[C]ourts must interpret international law not as it was

in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. In sum, an international tort, i.e. one that violates the law of nations, should

satisfy the following requirements:

(1) no state condones the act in question and there is a recognizable "universal"

consensus of prohibition against it; (2) there are sufficient criteria to determine

whether a given action amounts to the prohibited act and thus violates the norm; (3) the prohibition against it is non-derogable and therefore binding at all times

upon all actors. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184, citing Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1539-

1540; Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 701-702 ("Restatement").

Freeport first contends that state action is required to violate international law. Freeport argues that Beanal has failed to allege state action and therefore cannot state a claim for

violation of the law of nations. Carmichael, 835 F.2d at 113 (claim for official torture

pursuant to § 1350 dismissed for failure to allege that defendant corporation conspired, aided or abetted a foreign state actor). Freeport further maintains that Beanal has failed to allege

facts to state a claim for genocide even if the court should find that state action is not a

required element of that claim.

The court must determine whether state action is required to state a claim in violation of the law of nations. On this point, the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d

232 (2d Cir. 1995), is instructive. In Kadic, two groups of victims, Croat and Muslim citizens

of Bosnia Herzegovina, filed suit against Radovan Karadzic, the self-proclaimed President of

Bosnian-Serb Republic within Bosnia Herzegovina. The plaintiffs complained that they were the victims of various human rights violations, including rape, forced prostitution, forced

impregnation, torture, summary execution, genocide, other cruel, inhuman, and degrading

treatment, assault and battery, sex and ethnic inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death. The victims sought relief under the Alien Tort Statute, The Torture Victim Protection

Act, and federal question jurisdiction. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 237. The district court dismissed the

suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the

case to the district court for further findings as to genocide, war crimes, state action, torture

and extrajudicial killing.3 Id. at 250.



LAMPIRAN 7

In Kadic, the Second Circuit held that state action is not required for all international torts.

Id. at 239. Certain conduct violates the law of nations whether committed by a state or private actor, whereas other conduct only violates the law of nations if committed by a state actor.

This court, as guided by the analysis in Kadic, reaches the same conclusion. Genocide, for

example, violates international law, whether undertaken by a state or non-state actor. Id. The

Restatement provides that a state has jurisdiction "to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern," such as

piracy, hijacking, genocide, war crimes, and certain acts of terrorism. Restatement § 404. So-

called "universal jurisdiction" exists over the specified offenses, as a matter of customary law, "as a result of universal-condemnation of those activities and general interest in

cooperation to suppress them, as reflected in widely accepted international agreements and

resolutions of international organizations." Id., comment a. Where a state has universal jurisdiction, it may punish conduct although the state has no links of territoriality or

nationality with the offender or victim. Id. Universal jurisdiction includes civil tort actions.

Id., comment b. Though the list of offenses specified in section 404 is not static,4 genocide is

the only relevant offense for which universal jurisdiction exists and no state action must be

proven.

A broader range of conduct is actionable as violative of the law of nations only when

committed by a state actor. Restatement section 702 provides:

A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,

encourages, or condones

(a) genocide;

(b) slavery or slave trade;

(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals;

(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment

(e) prolonged arbitrary detention;

(f) systematic racial discrimination; or

(g) a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognized human

rights.

As discussed below, some of the acts listed under section 702, e.g., murder and torture, could be actionable without proof of state action if committed as acts of genocide. Standing

alone, however, the acts of murder and torture are only actionable by proof of state action.5

2. § 1350 Claim Not Requiring State Action: Genocide

Beanal's complaint of genocide is less than crystal clear. One portion of the first amended complaint is entitled "Cultural Genocide," but the word "genocide" does not otherwise




LAMPIRAN 7

appear. Beanal essentially complains that the alleged human rights abuses and environmental

violations have resulted in the demise of the culture the indigenous tribal people.

The court reviews the facts Beanal alleges under the caption "Cultural Genocide":

¶ 41. The Plaintiffs specifically reallege each and every paragraph of the

foregoing complaint.

¶ 42. The Plaintiffs allege that the human rights violation and the eco-terrorism engaged in by the defendant corporations have destroyed the rights and

culture of the Amungme and other Indigenous tribal people.

¶ 43. Since defendant corporations have commenced their operations, many

Amungme people have been displaced and relocated to areas in the lowlands

away from their cultural heritage of highland living.

¶ 44. Other Indigenous tribal people, including but not limited to Komora

Tribe, have met the same fate.

¶ 45. The egregious human rights and environmental violations, which have

terrorized the tribal communities of the Amungme and other Indigenous tribal

people, destroyed their natural habitats and caused dislocation of the populations have resulted in the purposeful, deliberate, contrived and planned demise of a

culture of indigenous people whose rights were never considered, whose

heritage and culture were disregarded and the result of which is ultimately to lead to the cultural demise of unique pristine heritage which is socially,

culturally and anthropologically irreplaceable.

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 41-45. Since Plaintiff realleges the human rights and

environmental practices in connection with the cultural genocide claim, the court may

consider whether any of those allegations would be redressable if committed as acts of

genocide.

Genocide is an international tort. The crime of genocide was clearly recognized in the

aftermath of the Second World War by the United Nations, international conventions, United

States law and case law. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (citations omitted). Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S 277,

("Convention on Genocide"), defines the crime of genocide as:

[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,

a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;


LAMPIRAN 7

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring

about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births with the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

This definition is generally accepted for purposes of customary law. Restatement § 702,

comment d. The Convention on Genocide unambiguously applies to all: "[p]ersons committing genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible

rulers, public officials, or private individuals." Convention on Genocide, art. IV. This

language squares with the Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988), 6 and the Restatement, Restatement § 702, note d.: both non-state actors and state actors may

be held liable for genocide.

The application of the definition of genocide to Beanal's complaint causes the court to

pause. As mentioned above, Beanal does not allege genocide, but rather "cultural genocide." The court focuses on the allegation that Freeport's conduct has resulted in displacement,

relocation and "purposeful, deliberate, contrived and planned demise of a culture of

indigenous people." As defined, genocide means the destruction of a "group" not a "culture."

Convention on Genocide art. II. The court accepts at face value that as a tribe, the Amungme would constitute a "group." Furthermore, as defined, genocide includes deliberate acts on the

group conditions of life "calculated to bring about its physical destruction," but does not

purport to include acts which cause "displacement" and "relocation" absent any physical destruction. Id. Finally, the acts of killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm

constitute genocide only if they are carried out with the specific intent to destroy the group.

The court is unwilling to make leaps of logic necessary to support a claim for genocide based

on unpled facts. Clearly, Beanal has alleged certain acts, such as torture, which, if committed with the requisite intent, could constitute an act of genocide.7 The problem is that Beanal has

failed to make the core allegation that Freeport is committing genocide on a group of people.

If Beanal in fact means that Freeport is destroying the Amungme culture, then he has failed to state a claim for genocide. On the other hand, if Beanal intended to state that Freeport is

committing acts with the intent to destroy the Amungme group, i.e. its members, then he has

failed to make this allegation sufficiently explicit. The court finds that a claim for genocide is not sufficiently clear and Beanal shall be given the opportunity to make a more definite

statement, pursuant to Rule 12(e).

3. § 1350 Claims Requiring State Action

Beanal must allege state action in order to state a claim for under (sic) § 1350 for non-genocide related human rights violations abuses.8 Restatement §702, Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244.

International law prohibits states from engaging in certain human rights abuses, including genocide, murder, causing disappearance, torture, cruel and inhuman treatment or

punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention and systematic race discrimination. Restatement §

702. The Restatement provides that "a state violates international law, if as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones" certain proscribed conduct. Id. With the

exception of genocide, Plaintiff must allege state action in order to state a claim for any of

these violations. Id.





LAMPIRAN 7

To allege state action, the challenged conduct must be attributable to the state, in other

words, it must be official conduct. Restatement § 207, comment c. A state is responsible for any violation of its obligations under international law resulting from action or inaction by,

"any organ, official, employee, or other agent of a government or of any political subdivision,

acting within the scope of authority or under color of such authority." Id. Freeport does not

satisfy the definition of a "state" as that term is defined in international law. Restatement §

201.

Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a

permanent population, under the control of its own government and that engages

in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.

Id. The fact that Freeport is itself not a "state" does not preclude its liability for violation of the law of nations since state actors, not merely the state itself, can be held liable for such

violations. Restatement § 207.

The court must determine whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Freeport's alleged

conduct constitutes state action. Preliminarily, the court noted that nowhere in his complaint

does Plaintiff allege that Freeport is a state actor, that Freeport was clothed with actual or apparent authority of the Republic of Indonesia, that Freeport aided or abetted official

conduct or that Freeport acted under color of Indonesian law. As discussed below, any such

terminology is used in the complaint to link the alleged conduct to Freeport, rather than to link Freeport to the Indonesian government. In an effort to liberally construe the complaint,

the court probes the allegations to determine if such facts could form a basis for state action.

To determine whether state action has been alleged, the court considers the test contained

in Restatement section 207 and the "under color of law" jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

("§ 1983"). Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245; Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1545; Restatement § 207, note 4. It is difficult to discern from his complaint the theory of state action that Beanal seeks to

establish. In his memorandum, Beanal argues that the allegations contained in Paragraph 8 of

the Amended Complaint satisfy the state action requirement. Plaintiff argues that "the "symbiotic relationship" between FREEPORT's employees, within its security force, and the

Indonesian military" satisfies the requirement that those individuals acted under the "actual or

apparent authority" of the Republic of Indonesia. Opposition Memorandum, Record Doc. No. 81. Though this argument lends some insight into a Plaintiff's theory of state action, Plaintiff

cannot augment his complaint through his opposition memorandum. The facts forming a

basis for state action must be discernible from the face of the complaint. The following

allegations implicate some governmental involvement:

¶ 8.. The corporate defendants maintain a military presence within its mining operation wherein troops of the Republic of Indonesia are fed, transported, paid

and provided equipment from the defendants in order to assist its operations.

¶ 10. . . . [Freeport has] systematically engaged in a corporate policy both

directly and indirectly through third parties which have resulted in human violations against the Amungme tribal people and other Indigenous tribal

people.


LAMPIRAN 7

¶ 11. . . . The Indonesian Government is a major shareholder of the P.T.

Freeport Indonesia, an affiliate of the defendants, Freeport, and the defendants'

principle source of corporate income.

¶ 12. . . . [D]efendants' security guards in conjunction with third parties acting

by and through the corporate policy of the defendants have engaged in summary

execution, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, disappearances, surveillance

and the destruction of property. Said violations have occurred on FREEPORT buses, within FREEPORT workshops, at FREEPORT security command

centers, FREEPORT security stations, FREEPORT private roadways and

containers owned by said corporate defendants.

¶ 21. That various human rights reports contain repeated first hand accounts of the brutal human rights violations of the FREEPORT security personnel

and/or agents of FREEPORT whose conduct is acquiesced to, accepted, adopted

and/or ratified by the defendant corporations as part of their corporate policy in

operation and expanding their FREEPORT mining concession in Irian Jaya,

Indonesia at the expense of the local indigenous people.

¶ 22. The Plaintiffs allege that FREEPORT security personnel or third parties

supported by defendant corporations were acting under actual or apparent

authority of the defendant corporations.

The court analyzes these allegations using the "under color of authority" test contained in

the comments to Restatement section 207.

In determining whether an act was within the authority of an official or an

official body, or was done under color of such authority, (clause (c)), one must

consider all the circumstances, including whether the affected parties reasonably

considered the action to be official, whether the action was for public purpose or for private gain, and whether the persons acting wore official uniforms or used

official equipment."

Restatement § 207, comment d. Applying the considerations noted in the Restatement reveals no easy conclusions regarding an allegation of state action. First, it is unclear whether the "affected parties reasonably considered the action to be official." Beanal does not allege

what exactly happened to him, who exactly he thought was involved in the challenged

conduct, or whether he considered such person(s) to be engaging in official conduct. Second,

it is unclear what purpose such abusive "security" practices could serve. Ostensibly, Freeport is motivated by "private gain", i.e. corporate profit seeking, and the "security" practices and

presence of Indonesian military personnel are designed to "assist [Freeport's] operations."

Amended Complaint ¶ 8. The fact that the Indonesian Government funds Freeport does not convert Freeport's alleged practices into official action. Beanal has not alleged that Freeport

is carrying out some "public purpose" through its harsh security practices on behalf of the

Indonesian government. Beanal does allege that Freeport maintains, i.e. feeds, transports, pays and equips, Indonesian military personnel on the premises. One could draw the

inference that the military personnel participate first hand in the challenged conduct, help to

create a martial atmosphere or lend an air of authority to Freeport's security practices. These


LAMPIRAN 7

are mere inferences; not allegations. Beanal alleges that the Indonesian military personnel

uses equipment supplied by Freeport, not the government and does not indicate whether the military personnel wear official uniforms. Based on the Restatement test for official conduct,

some of Plaintiff's allegations point to official action involving Indonesian Government

personnel, while other allegations indicate that Freeport engaged in private conduct which

occurred in the presence of Indonesian military personnel. Since the foregoing analysis is

inconclusive, the court further probes the allegations pertaining to state action.

The court considers the "under color of law" jurisprudence of § 1983. In Kadic, the Second

Circuit declared that plaintiff could meet the state action requirement by alleging that

defendant "acted in concert with a foreign state." Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244-245. In Carmichael, the Fifth Circuit stated, without deciding, that a private actor could be liable in tort for

violation of international law by conspiring in, aiding or abetting official acts. Carmichael,

835 F.2d at 114. In determining whether defendant "acted in concert" with a foreign state the court is guided by the "under color of law" jurisprudence applied in § 1983 cases. Id. at 245,

citing Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1549, cf. Restatement § 207, note 4. Section 1983 provides a

cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges rights

created by the Constitution and the law of the United States. Federal Jurisdiction § 8.1. Section 1983 grants a remedy for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution, which provides, "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law." In deciding whether the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated, courts distinguish between private and governmental conduct. See Jackson v.

Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349, 95 S. Ct. 449, 452-53 (1974), quoting Shelley v.

Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 842 (1948) (describing the "essential dichotomy"

between governmental action, which is subject to constitutional scrutiny, and private conduct, which is not). By condemning only certain official conduct, these laws exclude a vast range

of conduct visited upon victims at the hands of private actors. This dichotomy between

private and official conduct is mirrored in international law. See Restatement § 207, comment c (A state is responsible under international law only for official acts, but not for acts by

private actors.)

A private actor can be found liable under § 1983 for engaging in conduct which constitutes

state action. The proper defendants in a § 1983 claim are those who represent the state in

some capacity. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1995). National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191, 109 S. Ct. 454,

462 (1988) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172, 81 S.Ct. 473, 476 (1961). Similarly,

in customary international law, a state is liable for official conduct committed by state officials. Restatement § 207, comment c, and § 702. The court understands the term "state" as

it is used in the Restatement to be consistent with that term under § 1983 jurisprudence, i.e.,

"those who represent the state." Accordingly, to make out his claim Beanal must allege that Freeport engaged in state action in violation of his rights under the international law of

human rights.

Corporations can represent the state. Both private individuals and private entities can be

state actors and can be held liable under § 1983. Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Ass'n, 778

F.2d 1068, 1076 (5th Cir. 1985). Section 1983 does not require that the defendant be an officer of the State. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186 (1980). "Private

persons jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting under color of


LAMPIRAN 7

law for purposes of § 1983 purposes." Id. at 28, citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1605 (1970). Section 1983 applies to all persons, including corporations. The Restatement does not address who can be sued for human rights violations.

Comment b to Restatement section 702 provides:

In general, a state is responsible for acts of officials or official bodies, national

or local, even if the acts were not authorized by or known to the responsible

national authorities, indeed even if expressly forbidden by law, decree or instruction. The violations of human rights cited in this section, however, are

violations of customary international law only if practiced, encouraged, or

condoned by the government of a state as official policy.

Restatement § 702, comment b. Section 702 uses the term "state," and the comments refer to "officials or official bodies." This language does not preclude corporate liability. Indeed,

the term "official bodies" could cover private entities, rather than individuals, which engage

in official conduct. Carmichael contemplated such corporate liability for a private actor

which conspired in, aided or abetted official torture. Carmichael, 835 F.2d at 113-114. Thus, the court finds that a corporation found to be a state actor can be held responsible for human

rights abuses which violate international customary law. Having so concluded, the court now

considers four tests used to determine whether a private actor has engaged in state action for

purposes of § 1983.

The Supreme Court has recognized several circumstances in which a private actor can be

held to have acted under color of law within the meaning of § 1983. In Gallagher, the Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeal summarized the relevant tests:

The Court has taken a flexible approach to the state action doctrine,

applying a variety of tests to the facts of each case. [1] In some instances, the Court has considered whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the

State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the

latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.9 [2] The Court has also inquired whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of

interdependence with the private party, that there is a symbiotic relationship

between them.10 [3] In addition the court has held that if a private party is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents then state action is

present.11 [4] Finally the court has rules (sic) that a private entitle (sic) that

exercises powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State is engaged in

state action.12

49 F.3d at 1447 (quotations omitted). The court refers to these four tests as (1) the nexus test, (2) the symbiotic relationship test, (3) the joint action test, and (4) the public function

test.

Gallagher concerned the interaction between public officers and private security

personnel. In Gallagher a group of individuals sued the University of Utah, a concert promoter and a private security corporation under section 1983 for violation of their Fourth

Amendment rights. The plaintiffs were subjected to pat-down searches by the private security

guards before entering the concert facility. University security officers observed but did not






LAMPIRAN 7

participate in the pat-down searches. After applying the four state action tests mentioned

above, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal held that (1) the observation of the pat-down searches by university officials failed to provide the required nexus for state action, (2) the

incidental benefits derived by the university from the concert was insufficient to satisfy the

symbiotic relationship test for state action, and (3) the joint action test for state action was not

satisfied due to plaintiffs failure to present any evidence that the university officers influenced or assisted the conducting of the pat-down searches. The holdings in Gallagher

are instructive in determining whether a factual predicate for state action exists in Beanal's

complaint. Notably, Gallagher involved a motion for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss, which means that the Gallagher court engaged in a more demanding

inquiry than is appropriate here.

The Nexus Test

Under the nexus test, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a sufficiently close nexus between the government and the challenged conduct such that the conduct may fairly be

treated as that of the State itself. Id. 1448. Governmental regulation, subsidy, approval of or acquiescence in the private conduct does not make the State responsible for the conduct. Id.

To satisfy the nexus test, the state must be significantly involved in or actually participate in

the alleged conduct. Id. at 1449, citing NBC v. Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1988), Wagner v. Metropolitan Nashville Airport Auth., 772

F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 1985), D'Amario v. Providence Civic Center Authority, 783 F.2d 1 (1st

Cir. 1986).

The D'Amario case bears some factual resemblance to this one. In D'Amario, both a

private concert promoter company and a municipally owned company were found to be state actors who abridged plaintiff's First Amendment rights. Civic center employees enforced a

so-called "no camera" rule at certain performances at the publicly operated Providence Civic

Center. Although the "no camera" policy stemmed from the contractual agreement between two private parties, the enforcement of policy by the civic center employees constituted state

action under the nexus test. D'Amario, 783 F.2d at 3.

By contrast, in Gallagher, the court found that the observation by public employees of the

pat-down searches performed by private security guards did not satisfy the nexus test for state action. Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1450. The nexus test would be met if appellant could

demonstrate that the pat-down searches directly resulted from the University's policies, but

the mere presence of police officers did not transform the conduct of private parties into state

action. Id. (citations omitted). The nexus test requirements of significant involvement and actual participation can be summarized as follows: where public officers enforce violative

policies, there is state action; where public officers merely observe the enforcement of

violative policies, there is no state action.

Beanal fails to allege facts sufficient to establish state action based on the nexus test. From the complaint it appears that Freeport's security personnel are distinct from the military

personnel. Beanal specifically states that the mine is "policed" by Freeport's paramilitary type

security personnel. Amended Complaint ¶ 8. He further alleges, "Additionally, upon

information and belief, the corporate defendants maintain a military presence . . . in order to assist its operations." Id. Beanal does not allege, however, what role those Indonesian troops


LAMPIRAN 7

played in the alleged violative conduct. Put simply, Beanal hasn't alleged whether the military

personnel helped enforce Freeport's policies or merely observed Freeport's private security guards engage in the violative conduct. Inferentially, the complaint seeks to link the troops to

the violations at hand. To draw that conclusion, however, would require the court to make up

facts not alleged in the complaint.

The Symbiotic Relationship Test

State action can be established under the symbiotic relationship test if the state "has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with a private party that "it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Burton, 635 U.S. at 725, 81 S.Ct.

at 862, cited in Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1450. To establish a symbiotic relationship, the state

and the private entity need be "physically and financially integral."

In Burton, the Court held a private restaurant to be a state actor. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723-24, 81 S.Ct. at 861. The Court found that by virtue of leasing its parking garage from a state

agency, the restaurant functioned as a "physically and financially integral and, indeed,

indispensable part" of the state's operation of its property. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723-24, 81

S.Ct. at 861. The parking structure was located on public property and maintained through public funds; its primary purpose was to lease parking space to commercial lessees. Compare

Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 175-177, 92 S.Ct. at 1972-1973 (finding no state action as to the

discriminatory practices of a private club located on private property to which the state had

granted a liquor license.)

The symbiotic relationship test from Burton is narrowly interpreted. The Court has held

that state regulation, state funding, state approval of challenged conduct do not necessarily

establish a symbiotic relationship between the state and a private entity. Gallagher, 49 F.3d at

1450 (citations omitted). Two salient facts from Burton remain critical: that the state profited from the restaurant's discriminatory practices and that restaurant was an indispensable part of

a state project.13 Id.

In Gallagher, the court found no symbiotic relationship existed based on the fact that the

pat-down searches took place on University property and the fact that the University profited from the concert. The two entities were not "functionally intertwined," long-term dependence

of one on the other was lacking, and the contractual benefits generated by the

unconstitutional contract and were not "indispensable" to the University's financial success.

Gallagher at 1452-1453. Payment under government contracts, government grants and tax benefits are insufficient to establish a symbiotic relationship between the government and a

private entity. Id. citing Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 830, 102 S. Ct. at 2765-66.

Beanal's complaint alleges a close link between Freeport and Indonesian government. The

complaint alleges that the Indonesian Government is a major shareholder in P.T. Freeport Indonesia, and a principle source of Freeport's corporate income. Amended complaint ¶ 11.

The complaint also refers to Freeport's "mining concession" throughout the complaint. It

appears that the Indonesian government granted Freeport long-term mining rights, although the terms of such agreement are not mentioned in the complaint. There are too few facts

alleged upon which to base a symbiotic relationship analysis for purposes of determining

whether state action is alleged. A government contract conferring a mining concession and



LAMPIRAN 7

government investment in the operation are insufficient facts, standing alone, to allege a

symbiotic relationship between Freeport and the Indonesian government.

The Joint Action Test

State action is present where a private party is a "willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents." Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. at 186. As the Gallagher court made

clear, the joint action test looks to whether the state officials and private parties acted in

concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights. Gallagher, 49 F.3d at

1453. The Fifth Circuit appears to require some actual participation or cooperation on behalf of the state and private actor in violating complainant's rights. See Sims, 778 F.2d at 1079

(Solicitation and grant of improper use of state power rendered private plaintiff a willful

participant in a joint action with the State or its agents.) As with the nexus test, state acquiescence or approval of the challenged conduct does not appear sufficient to satisfy the

joint action test. Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1455-1456. Rather, the presence of government

officers must have influenced or been an integral part of the challenged conduct. Id. In

Gallagher, the court found that there was no state action based on the joint action test because there was no evidence that the University shared with the private defendants the

common goal to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights by conducting pat-down searches, that

the University police influenced the decision to conduct the searches, or that the University

played any role in the promotion company's decision to hire the private security company.

Beanal's complaint is insufficient under the joint action test for the reasons discussed with

respect to the nexus test. Namely, the complaint fails to state what role, if any, the Indonesian

military personnel played in the challenged conduct. In order to state facts sufficient to satisfy

the joint action test, there must be some allegation indicating that the troops jointly cooperated in the conduct, jointly participated in the conduct, influenced the conduct or

played an integral part in the deprivation of human rights. The complaint merely alleges an

Indonesian military presence and obliquely refers to the participation of "third parties" who aided Freeport in the challenged conduct. The court finds that these allegations fail to make

out a claim for state action under the joint action test.

The Public Function Test

Finally, state action can exist where a private entity performs a function traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352, 95 S. Ct. at 454. Few public

functions have been found to satisfy this test. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 157, 157-58, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 1734 (1978). Among those activities which satisfy the public function test

is the operation of a company owned town, i.e. where the "streets, alleys, sewers, stores,

residences, and everything else that goes to make a town" are privately owned. See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 514, 516, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 1034 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-

09, 66 S. Ct. 276, 278-80. The management of a citypark is also deemed an exclusive public

function. Evans v. Newton, 392 U.S. 296, 298-302, 86 S. Ct. 486, 487-490 (1966).14

Again here, Beanal failed to allege facts which would satisfy the state action requirement under the public function test. Beanal alleges that Freeport operates the Grasberg Mine,

which encompasses an area of 26,400 square kilometers which site was "policed" by

Freeport's security personnel. Beanal further alleges the alleged human rights violations



LAMPIRAN 7

"occurred on FREEPORT buses, within FREEPORT workshops, at FREEPORT security

command centers, FREEPORT security stations, FREEPORT private roadways and containers owned by said corporate defendants." Amended Complaint ¶ 12. It is unclear from

the complaint whether Freeport actually operates or owns a town, controls the roads and

walkways, residences, markets, etc., or has taken over the functions of regulating local life.

The allegations create a picture, nonetheless, of Freeport's vast and draconian control over the

Grasberg Mine area.

In sum, Beanal has failed to allege state action. Beanal has failed to allege what role, if

any, that Indonesian military personnel played in committing the alleged conduct. More

importantly, Beanal has failed to allege facts which would convert Freeport's alleged conduct into official action. State action is required to state a claim for violation of the international

law of human rights. The court therefore dismisses without prejudice Beanal's claim for

human rights violations under the Alien Tort Statute for failure to state a claim, and grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint in order to more specifically allege facts which form

the basis for his state action argument, pursuant to Rule 12(e). Fed. R. Ci.v (sic) Proc. 12(e).

Impact of Torture Victim Protection Act on § 1350

The court rejects Freeport's contention that the Torture Victim Protection Act provides the sole cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing brought under § 1350. The legislative

history of the TVPA and recent case law stand for the contrary proposition that the TVPA codifies and expands the remedies available under § 1350. The court has failed to uncover a

legislative intent to repeal or limit the kinds of claims redressable under § 1350.

The court focuses on the statutory text, the legislative history and recent case law. The text

of the TVPA does not indicate that the statute provides the exclusive set of remedies for

torture and extrajudicial killings. Congress unambiguously indicated that the Alien Tort Statute "has other important uses and should not be replaced." H.R. Rep. 367 (I), 102nd

Cong., 1st Sess. 1991, 1992 U.S.S.C.A.N. 84, 1991 WL 255964. In addition to codifying an

"unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action that has been successfully maintained

under the existing law," Congress stated:

The TVPA . . . would enhance the remedy already available under section 1350

in an important respect: While the Alien Tort Claims Act provides a remedy to

aliens only, the TVPA would extend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who

may have been tortured abroad. Official torture and summary executions merit special attention in a statute expressly addressed to those practices. At the same

time, claims based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of

actions that may appropriately be covered [by] section 1350. That statute should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may

ripen in the future into rules of customary international law.

Id. From this passage, it appears that Congress did not intend for the TVPA to impinge on the scope of § 1350 or change the "law of nations." Congress clearly meant for "other norms" and future rules of international customary law to be redressable under § 1350. Congress did

not indicate whether the court meant for the TVPA to become the exclusive remedy for

torture and extrajudicial killings. Considering that the TVPA "enhances" rather than shrinks


LAMPIRAN 7

the scope of remedies under § 1350, there is no reason to conclude that by enacting the

TVPA Congress took away causes of action for torture and extrajudicial killings under §

1350.

The Kadic court reached the same conclusion. In Kadic, the court reviewed the legislative

history and concluded, "The scope of the Alien Tort Statute remains undiminished by

enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act." 70 F.3d at 241. The court went on to

address plaintiff's claims for torture and summary execution § 1350, noting that torture and

summary execution are redressable under customary international law. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243.

The court declines to find that TVPA repealed by implication the Alien Tort Statute, either

in whole or in part. The doctrine of repeal by implication is disfavored. Radzanower v.

Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154, 96 S.Ct 1989, 1993 (1976). The Court recognizes

certain appropriate circumstances:

There are, however, two well-settled categories of repeals by implication--(1)

where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the

extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if

the later act covers the whole subject matter of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act.

But, in either case, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and

manifest. . . ." Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).

Id. In applying this test, the court repeats the relevant points discussed above. First, there appears no clear and manifest intent to repeal any portion of § 1350. Second, there is no

irreconcilable conflict because the TVPA does not appear to limit any cause of action under

section 1350. Recent case law recognizes that a cause of action for extra-judicial killing and

torture may lie under section 1350 based on both the TVPA and customary international law. Third, the TVPA was not intended to replace section 1350; the legislature did not change the

text of § 1350 or seek to give it a particular meaning. In sum, the TVPA does not supersede

or curtail the scope of § 1350 which permits a cause of action by an alien for a tort in

violation of the law of nations.

Torture Victim Protection Act

With respect to Beanal's claims brought under the Torture Victim Protection Act, Freeport asserts that Beanal (1) failed to plead the requisite elements of the TVPA, and (2) that the

TVPA does not apply to corporations.

The Torture Victim Protection (sic) provides an explicit cause of action for torture and

extrajudicial killing. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1350, note, § 2. The TVPA provides:

(a) Liability -- An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color

of law, of any foreign nation--

(1) Subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for

damages to that individual; or


LAMPIRAN 7

(2) Subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action,

be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any

person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.

(b) Exhaustion of remedies--A court shall decline to hear a claim under this

section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the

place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.

Id. The terms "torture" and "extrajudicial killing" are defined by the statute. To state a

claim under the TVPA, plaintiff must allege (1) that the individual defendant acted under color of law, (2) that defendant subjected an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing, and

(3) that plaintiff has exhausted "adequate and available remedies" where the violative conduct

occurred. Freeport alleges that Beanal has failed to allege the first and third elements.

By its terms, the TVPA only holds "individuals" liable. Id. The court must determine whether the term "individual" includes a corporation for the purposes of the TVPA. The Fifth

Circuit recently iterated the following approach to discern the meaning of a word as used in a

statute:

As with any question of statutory meaning, we begin with the language of the

statute. In determining a statute's plain meaning, we assume that absent any contrary definition, "Congress intends the words in its enactments to carry their

ordinary contemporary, common meaning."

U.S. v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). The statute is the sole source of congressional intent where the statute is clear and does not demand an absurd result. In re Abbott Laboratories, 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995). In the same vein, the

Supreme Court stated with respect to interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code: "The plain

meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in rare cases in which the literal

application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters. In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language controls."

United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-42, 109 S. Ct. at 1030-31

(1989), cited in Jove Engineering, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1550 (11th Cir. 1996).

The text of the TVPA does not define the term "individual." Before resorting to the legislative history, the court notes that the plain meaning of the term "individual" does not

typically include a corporation. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines "individual" as

"a particular being or thing as distinguished from a class, species, or collection . . . a single

human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 581 (8th ed. 1979), cited in Jove, 92 F.3d at 1551. Black's Law Dictionary defines

"individual" to mean "a single person as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very

commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association . . . it may, in proper cases, include a corporation. Black's Law Dictionary 773

(6th ed. 1996), cited in Jove, 92 F.3d at 1551. Like the Jove court, this court finds that the

plain meaning of the term "individual" does not ordinarily include a corporation. Id.

A finding that the TVPA does not apply to corporations is not at odds with congressional

intent. To give the term "individual" its plain meaning under the TVPA means that the Act


LAMPIRAN 7

does not apply to corporate entities. There is no legislative history as to whether corporations

could be held liable under the Act. The House Report accompanying the TVPA bill states, "Only "individuals", not foreign states, can be sued under the bill." H.R. Rep. No. 367 (I),

102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1991, 1992 U.S.S.C.A.N. 84 1991 WL 255964, *4. The Senate Report

states, "The legislation uses the term "individual" to make crystal clear that foreign states or

their entities cannot be sued under this bill under any circumstances: only individuals may be sued." S.Rep. No. 249, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1991, 1991 WL 258662, *6. These comments

confirm that use of the term "individual" was not inadvertent. Congress purposefully chose

the term so as to circumscribe foreign state liability under the Act. Congress does not appear to have had the intent to exclude private corporations from liability under the TVPA.

Nevertheless, the Act clearly applies only to "individuals" and this court understands that

term to plainly mean natural persons, not corporations. By use of the term "individual" the drafters may have unintentionally excluded corporations from liability under the Act. Even

so, this court's interpretation that the TVPA only applies to natural persons is not at odds with

the drafters apparent intentions, and indeed, gives deference to Congress' particular word

choice.

The court concludes that because Freeport as a corporation is not an "individual" for purposes of the TVPA, Freeport cannot be held liable under the TVPA. Plaintiff has no cause

of action under the TVPA because he cannot satisfy the first element required to state a claim

under the Act. The court need not reach the issue of whether Beanal satisfied the exhaustion

of remedies requirement.

C. ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS

Freeport contends that Plaintiff's environmental claims should be dismissed on at least five different grounds; the court reaches only the first. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for

environmental violations upon which relief can be granted under § 1350 because Freeport's

alleged environmental practices do not appear to have violated the law of nations.

As set forth in the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Freeport's mining operations and drainage practices have resulted in environmental destruction with human costs to the

indigenous people. The mine itself has hollowed several mountains, re-routed rivers, stripped

forest and increased toxic and non-toxic materials and metals in the river system. Amended Complaint ¶ 29. Another culprit is discharged water containing tailings from Freeport's

mining operations, for it is from this discharge that a stream of environmental and human

problems flow, including:

1) pollution, disruption and alteration of natural waterways leading to

deforestation, Id. ¶ 26;

2) health safety hazards and starvation, Id. ¶ 27;

3) degradation of surface and ground water from tailings and solid hazardous

waste, Id. ¶ 28). (sic)


LAMPIRAN 7

Beanal alleges that the tailings drainage is mismanaged. Beanal further alleges that acid

mine drainage is equally devastating, due to resulting sulfide oxidation and leaching, and also

inadequately managed. In summary, Plaintiff complains:

Plaintiffs specifically allege that defendant corporations have failed to engage in

a zero waste policy, unacceptable enclosed waste management system, have

failed to maximize environmental rehabilitation, have failed to engage in an

appropriate acid leachate control policy, have failed to adequately monitor the destruction of the natural resources of Irian Jaya (West Papua) and have

disregarded and breached its international duty to protect one of the last great

natural rain forests and alpine areas in the world.

Id. ¶ 40.

The court next determines whether any of these allegations, if true, amount to a violation of the law of nations. Plaintiff has not alleged that Freeport violated a specific treaty

provision. As discussed above, in order to state a claim for violation of the law of nations

under § 1350, plaintiff must establish the existence of a cognizable international tort. "These

international torts, violations of current customary international law, are characterized by universal consensus in the international community as to their binding status and their

content. That is, they are universal, definable, and obligatory international norms." Forti, 672

F. Supp. at 1540. To determine whether such a norm exists, the court may consider the works of jurists, general usage and practice of nations and judicial decisions recognizing and

enforcing that law. In this instance, the court reviewed case law, the Restatement, and a

recent treatise on international environmental law. Having done so, the court discerns no

claim of action against Freeport based on an international tort.

As a preliminary matter, courts have recognized that § 1350 may be applicable to international environmental torts. See Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y.

1994); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Neither of

these cases, however, found a cause of action for environmental torts in violation of the law of nations. Aquinda referenced the possible application of § 1350 for environmental practices

"which might violate international law." Aquinda, 1994 WL 142006, *7. That suit was

subsequently dismissed on grounds of comity, forum non-conveniens, and failure to join a necessary party. Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Amlon

involved the shipment of allegedly hazardous copper residue to a purchaser in England for

metallic reclamation purposes. Among its claims, the purchaser sought recovery in tort under

the Alien Tort Statute. The court rejected plaintiff's reliance on the Stockholm principles to support a cause of action under the § 1350 because "those Principles do not set forth any

specific proscriptions, but rather refer only in a general sense to the responsibility of nations

to insure that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environment beyond their borders." Amlon, 775 F. Supp. at 671. This point is well taken with respect to

Beanal's complaint.

Beanal has failed to articulate a violation of the international law. Plaintiff states that the

allegations support a cause of action based on three international environmental law

principles: (1) the Polluter Pays Principle; (2) the Precautionary Principle; and (3) the Proximity Principle. None of the three rises to the level an international tort. Principles of


LAMPIRAN 7

International Environmental Law I: Frameworks, Standards and Implementation 183-18

(Phillipe Sands ed., 1995) (hereinafter "Sands"). Sands includes the three principles mentioned by Plaintiff in a list of general rules and principles "which have broad, if not

necessarily universal, support and are frequently endorsed in practice." Id. at 183. Also listed

are (1) the good-neighborliness and international co-operation principle and (2) the following

rule, regarded the cornerstone of international environmental law: "[T]he obligation reflected in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, namely

that states have sovereignty over their natural resources and the responsibility not to cause

environmental damage." Id. Sands concludes:

Of these general principles and rules only Principle 21/Principle 2 and the good neighborliness/international co-operation principle are sufficiently substantive at

this time to be capable of establishing the basis of an international cause of

action; that is to say, to give rise to an international customary legal obligation the violation of which would give rise to a legal remedy. The status and effect of

the others remains inconclusive, although they may bind as treaty obligations or,

in limited circumstances, as customary obligations.

Id.

The three principles relied on by Plaintiff, standing alone, do not constitute international

torts for which there is universal consensus in the international community as to their binding status and their content. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 186. More to the point, those principles

apply to "members of the international community" rather than non-state corporations. Id. at

629-630, 652. Plaintiff alleges that Freeport's environmental practices reflect corporate

decisions, rather than state practices. A non-state corporation could be bound to such principles by treaty, but not as a matter of international customary law. See Id. Consistent

with this conclusion, the Restatement mentions only state obligations and liability in the area

of environmental law. Restatement §§ 601- 602.

In sum, Beanal has failed to allege an international environmental tort. The court dismisses Beanal's environmental claims for failure to state a cause of action for violation of

international environmental law. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Beanal has failed to articulate a

substantive claim. In addition, Beanal alleged no facts that would establish, if proven, that Freeport's environmental practices constitute state action. Even assuming for the purposes of

this motion that Beanal's allegations are true, Freeport's alleged policies are corporate policies

only and, however destructive, do not constitute torts in violation of the law of nations.

Having so concluded, the court finds it unnecessary to rule on Freeport's remaining defenses

to the environmental allegations lodged against it.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Beanal's claims brought under § 1350 for cultural genocide, human rights violations and international environmental torts are dismissed without prejudice. Fed.

R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint in order to more specifically allege his claims for genocide and human rights violation. Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

12(e).


LAMPIRAN 7

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Freeport McMoRan, Inc. and Freeport-McMoRan

Copper & Gold, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and that Plaintiff Tom Beanal's claims brought under § 1350 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to amend

his complaint.

Obscure signature, presumably Judge Duval's.

Footnotes

Note 1. To satisfy the jurisdictional threshold under § 1350, a plaintiff must state a tort in violation of the law of nations. Courts have, accordingly, engaged in a more searching preliminary review of the merits than is required, for example, under the more flexible

"arising under" formulation. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2nd Cir.1980).

Note 2. The following claims are made on behalf of others and disregarded for purposes of

this motion: (1) Wendy Tambuni was stabbed and shot to death while being transported on Freeport bus, Amended Complaint ¶ 13; (2) Three unnamed civilians were killed after being

tortured, Id. ¶ 14; (3) Four unnamed civilians were arbitrarily arrested at their homes,

imprisoned in Freeport containers and then disappeared, Id. ¶ 15.

Note 3. The court also found that service of process was proper; that the court has personal

jurisdiction over the defendant; that the case was justiciable under the Baker v. Carr political question analysis, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); and that the act of state doctrine seemed

inapplicable.

Note 4. The previous Restatement (Second) included only piracy and the reporter's notes

of the Restatement (Third) reference additional offenses, such as apartheid and hostage

taking. Id., note 1. "International law is not static, but an evolving body of directives which

courts must interpret in a contemporaneous fashion." Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. at 180.

Note 5. In Kadic, the court stated:

[A]t this threshold stage in the proceedings it cannot be known whether

appellants will be able to prove the specific intent that is an element of genocide

. . . It suffices to hold at this stage that the alleged atrocities are actionable under the Alien Tort Act, without regard to state action, to the extent that they were

committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes, and otherwise may be pursued

against Karadzic to the extent that he is shown to be a state actor.

70 F.3d at 244.

Note 6. The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988)

criminalizes acts of genocide perpetrated by all persons, if committed in the United States or by a U.S. national. The Act provides, "Whoever commits genocide shall be punished"

without regard to whether the offender is acting under color of law. This court agrees with the

court in Kadic which found that the Act did not repeal by implication the Alien Tort Statute


LAMPIRAN 7

with respect to genocide, because there was no legislative intent to do so and the statutes are

not repugnant to each other. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242.

Note 7. Genocide is a specific intent offense. Cf. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244. To prove genocide Beanal must demonstrate that certain acts were "committed with the intent to destroy, in

whole or in part" an ethnic group. Intent may be averred generally. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 9(b).

Note 8. Official torture violates international customary law whether committed against a

state's own citizens of (sic) the citizens of another state. H.R. Rep, No 367(I), 102nd Cong.,

1st Sess. 1991, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 1991 WL 255964, *3. With the enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act, Congress expressly approved the holding in Filartiga, 630

F.2d at 884-885, that official torture is prohibited by the law of nations. In Filartiga, the court

permitted Paraguayan citizens to sue a Paraguayan state official for official torture under § 1350. Id. at 878. Congressional approval of Filartiga should quell any doubt that the Fifth

Circuit would now also recognize a claim under § 1350 for official torture against the

claimant's own state. See Carmichael, 835 F.2d 109, 113. In Carmichael, the Fifth Circuit

assumed without deciding, "that the Alien Tort Statute does confer subject matter jurisdiction over private parties who conspire in, or aid and abet, official acts of torture by one nation

against the citizens of another nation." Id. at 113-114. The court also stated:

Official torture has been recognized as an actionable tort under the Alien Tort

Statute in some jurisdictions and not in others. Compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980), and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d

774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S. Ct.1354, 84 L. Ed. 2d

377 (1985). Assuming the Supreme Court and the Congress continue to be silent

on the issue, this circuit may be called upon at some point to join sides in this debate. This case, however, does not require that we stand up and be counted.

Id. at 113. Now that Congress has spoken, the Fifth Circuit may reevaluate its position in

Carmichael.

Note 9. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349, 95 S. Ct. at 453.

Note 10. Burton v. Wilmington Park Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725, 81 S. Ct. 856, 861-62;

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,175, 92 S. Ct. 1965, 1972-73 (1972).

Note 11. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. at 27, 101 S. Ct. at 186.

Note 12. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352, 95 S. Ct. at 454.

Note 13. See Milo v. Cushing Mun. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1988) (Finding state

action on behalf of two doctors who were suspended from a municipally owned hospital that was managed by a private corporation whose representatives sat on the board of the public

hospital trust); Jatoi v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford Hosp. Auth., 807 F.2d 1214, 1220-1221 (5th

Cir.), opinion modified on denial of rehearing, 819 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010, 108 S.Ct. 709 (1988). In Jatoi, the court found state action based on the facts that

the Hospital Authority was created by statute, located on public land and maintained by


LAMPIRAN 7

public funds; the Authority derived direct financial benefit from its private lessee, formerly

ran the hospital itself and continued to control the purse strings. Id. at 1221.

Note 14. The Court has rejected the public function test with respect to several other activities. Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1456. See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011-12, 102 S.Ct. at

2789-90 (nursing home care), Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842, 102 S.Ct. at 2771-72

(education of children), Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161-64, 98 S. Ct. at 1735-38 (enforcement

of statutory lien by a private warehouse).


LAMPIRAN 8

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

BEANAL v. FREEPORT McMORAN INC

Tom BEANAL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Tom Beanal, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FREEPORT-McMORAN, INC., and Freeport McMoran

Copper and Gold, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-30235.

-- November 29, 1999

Before KING, Chief Judge, and SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

Martin E. Regan, Jr. (argued), Regan, Manasseh & Boshea, New Orleans, LA, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.John Charles Reynolds (argued), Michael Richard Schroeder,

Virginia W. Gundlach, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, John

S. Keller, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants-Appellants.J.Martin Wagner (argued),

Earth Justice Legal Defense Fund, San Francisco, CA, for Sierra Club and Earthrights

Intern., Amicus Curiae.Richard Herz, Earthrights Intern., Lake Oswego, OR, for

Earthrights Intern., Amicus Curiae.Jennifer M. Green, New York City, for The Center

for Constitutional Rights, The Center for Justice and Accountability and The Four

Directions Council, Amicus Curiae.Beth Stephens, New York City, for The Center

for Constitutional Rights, Amicus Curiae.Susan Shawn Roberts, Beth Van Schaack,

San Francisco, CA, for The Center for Justice and Accountability, Amicus

Curiae.Russell Barsh, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada, for The Four Directions Council,

Amicus Curiae.

Tom Beanal (“Beanal”) brought suit against the defendants in federal district court

for alleged violations of international law. The district court dismissed Beanal's

claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6). After a careful review of Beanal's

pleadings, we affirm the district court.

I.

Factual & Procedural History

This case involves alleged violations of international law committed by domestic

corporations conducting mining activities abroad in the Pacific Rim. Freeport-

McMoran, Inc., and Freeport-McMoran Copper & Gold, Inc., (“Freeport”), are

Delaware corporations with headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana. Freeport


LAMPIRAN 8

operates the “Grasberg Mine,” an open pit copper, gold, and silver mine situated in

the Jayawijaya Mountain in Irian Jaya, Indonesia. The mine encompasses

approximately 26,400 square kilometers. Beanal is a resident of Tamika, Irian Jaya

within the Republic of Indonesia (the “Republic”). He is also the leader of the

Amungme Tribal Council of Lambaga Adat Suki Amungme (the “Amungme”). In

August 1996, Beanal filed a complaint against Freeport in federal district court in the

Eastern District of Louisiana for alleged violations of international law. Beanal

invoked jurisdiction under (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1332, (2) the Alien Tort Statute, 28

U.S.C. § 1350, and (3) the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, sec. 1, et seq., 28

U.S.C. § 1350 note. In his First Amended Complaint, he alleged that Freeport

engaged in environmental abuses, human rights violations, and cultural genocide.

Specifically, he alleged that Freeport mining operations had caused harm and injury

to the Amungme's environment and habitat. He further alleged that Freeport

engaged in cultural genocide by destroying the Amungme's habitat and religious

symbols, thus forcing the Amungme to relocate. Finally, he asserted that Freeport's

private security force acted in concert with the Republic to violate international

human rights. Freeport moved to dismiss Beanal's claims under

Fed.R.Civ.Proc.12(b)(6). The district court in April 1997 issued a thorough forty-

nine page Opinion and Order dismissing Beanal's claims without prejudice and with

leave to amend. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F.Supp. 362

(E.D.La.1997). Pursuant to Rule 12(e), the district court instructed Beanal to amend

his complaint to state more specifically his claims of genocide and individual human

rights violations. In August 1997, the district court granted Freeport's motion to

strike Beanal's Second Amended Complaint because Beanal inappropriately

attempted to add third parties. At the motion to strike hearing, the court again

instructed Beanal to plead facts sufficient to support his allegations of genocide and

individual human rights violations. In March 1998, the district court granted

Freeport's motion to strike Beanal's Third Amended Complaint and dismissed his

claims with prejudice. Beanal now appeals the district court's rulings below.1

II.

Standard of Review

We review the district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted de novo. See Lowrey v. Texas A & M University

System, 117 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir.1997). A motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6)

“is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales v.

Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.1982). The complaint must be

liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the complaint

must be taken as true. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th

Cir.1986). The district court may not dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6)

“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-

46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Blackburn, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th


http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-5th-circuit/1082269.html#footnote_1

LAMPIRAN 8

Cir.1995). This strict standard of review under rule 12(b)(6) has been summarized

as follows: “The question therefore is whether in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid

claim for relief.” charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure 1357, at 601 (1969).

III.

Discussion

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Pursuant to

Rule 8(a), a complaint will be deemed inadequate only if it fails to (1) provide notice

of circumstances which give rise to the claim, or (2) set forth sufficient information to

outline the elements of the claim or permit inferences to be drawn that these elements

exist. See General Star Indemnity, Co. v. Vesta Fire Ins., Corp., 173 F.3d 946, 950.

(5th Cir.1999). If a complaint is ambiguous or does not contain sufficient

information to allow a responsive pleading to be framed, the proper remedy is a

motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). See 5 wright & Miller, Fed.

Practice & Procedure: Civil § 1356 at 590-591. Finally, a complaint, which

contains a “bare bones” allegation that a wrong occurred and which does not plead

any of the facts giving rise to the injury, does not provide adequate notice. Walker v.

South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d, 275, 277 (5th Cir.1990). Because the claims

raised in Beanal's First and Third Amended Complaints overlap, we address them

together.2

A.

Alien Tort Statute

Beanal claims that Freeport engaged in conduct that violated the Alien Tort Statute

(the “ATS” or “§ 1350”). Under § 1350:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a

tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.

Section 1350 confers subject matter jurisdiction when the following conditions are

met; (1) an alien sues, (2) for a tort, (3) that was committed in violation of the “law

of nations” or a treaty of the United States. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238

(2d Cir.1995). Beanal does not claim that Freeport violated a United States treaty.

Thus, the issue before us is whether Beanal states claims upon which relief can be

granted for violations under the “law of nations,” i.e., international law.



LAMPIRAN 8

We observed in 1985, “[t]he question of defining „the law of nations' is a confusing

one which is hotly debated, chiefly among academics.” Carmichael v. United

Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir.1985). However, in Cohen v.

Hartman, 634 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir.1981)(per curiam), we “held that the standards

by which nations regulate their dealings with one another inter se constitutes the „law

of nations.‟ ” These standards include the rules of conduct which govern the affairs

of this nation, acting in its national capacity, in relationships with any other nation.

See id. (quoting Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F.Supp. 324

(E.D.Pa.1966)). The law of nations is defined by customary usage and clearly

articulated principles of the international community. One of the means of

ascertaining the law of nations is “by consulting the work of jurists writing

professedly on public law or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by

judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.” See Carmichael, 835 F.2d at

113 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 160-61, 5 L.Ed. 57

(1820)), see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d

Cir.1980). Courts “must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it

has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.” Kadic, 70 F.3d at

238; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. Although Beanal's claims raise complex issues of

international law; nonetheless, the task before us does not require that we resolve

them. We are only required to determine whether the pleadings on their face state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Although the day may come when we will

have to join other jurisdictions who have tackled head-on complex issues involving

international law, “[t]his case, however, does not require that we stand up and be

counted.” Carmichael, 835 F.2d. at 113. Beanal's allegations under the ATS can be

divided into three categories:(1) individual human rights violations; (2)

environmental torts; and (3) genocide and cultural genocide. We address each in

turn.

1.

Individual Human Rights Violations

First, Beanal claims that his pleadings sufficiently state claims for individual human

rights violations. Essentially, Beanal complains that Freeport engaged in the

following conduct; (1) surveillance; (2) mental torture; (3) death threats; and (4)

house arrest. See Third Amended Complaint ¶ 25. However, Freeport argues that

Beanal's allegations fail to give adequate notice under the federal pleading

requirements. Also, Freeport claims that Beanal failed to plead the requisite state

action to support his claims under the ATS. The district court found that Beanal

merely made nominal changes to his Third Amended Complaint in an attempt to

comply with its order to provide a more definite statement of what had happened to

him individually. As such, the district court ruled that Beanal's complaint failed to

provide a more definite statement of his claims.


LAMPIRAN 8

After reviewing Beanal's pleadings de novo, we agree with the district court's

ruling. Beanal's complaint merely makes conclusory allegations. Beanal's claims

are devoid of names, dates, locations, times or any facts that would put Freeport on

notice as to what conduct supports the nature of his claims. Furthermore, after

comparing Beanal's Third Amended Complaint with his Second Amended Complaint,

we agree with the district court's observation in that, “Beanal has made a superficial

effort to personalize his complaint in order to comply with the court's April and

August Order.” 3 Although Beanal argues that the district court inappropriately

subjected his complaint to a heightened pleading standard, nonetheless, the notice

requirements under Rule 8 require more than “bare bone allegations that a wrong has

occurred.” See South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d, at 277. Because we affirm the

district court's dismissal of Beanal's claims of individual human rights violations

under the ATS on the ground that his complaint fails to provide adequate factual

specificity as to what had happened to him individually,4 we need not address

whether state-action is required to sustain an action for individual human rights

violation under the ATS.

2.

Environmental Torts and Abuses

Next, Beanal argues that Freeport through its mining activities engaged in

environmental abuses which violated international law. In his Third Amended

Complaint, Beanal alleges the following:

FREEPORT, in connection with its Grasberg operations, deposits approximately

100,000 tons of tailings per day in the Aghwagaon, Otomona and Akjwa Rivers.

Said tailings have diverted the natural flow of the rivers and have rendered the natural

waterways of the plaintiff unusable for traditional uses including bathing and

drinking. Furthermore, upon information and belief, the heavy metal content of the

tailings have and/or will affect the body tissue of the aquatic life in said rivers.

Additionally, tailings have blocked the main flow of the Ajkwa River causing

overflow of the tailings into lowland rain forest vegetation destroying the same.

Third Amended Complaint ¶ 13.

FREEPORT in connection with its Grasberg operations has diverted the aforesaid

rivers greatly increasing the likelihood of future flooding in Timika, the home of the

plaintiff, TOM BEANAL. Id. ¶ 14.

FREEPORT, in connection with its Grasberg mining operations has caused or will

cause through the course of its operations 3 billion tons of “overburden” to be

dumped into the upper Wanagon and Carstensz creating the likely risk of massive

landslides directly injurious to the plaintiff. Furthermore, said “overburden” creates




LAMPIRAN 8

acid rock damage which has created acid streams and rendering the Lake Wanagon an

“acid lake” extremely high in copper concentrations, ․ Id. ¶ 15.

However, Freeport argues that Beanal's allegations of environmental torts are not

cognizable under the “law of nations” because Beanal fails to show that Freeport's

mining activities violate any universally accepted environmental standards or norms.

Furthermore, Freeport argues that it would be improper for a United States tribunal to

evaluate another county's environmental practices and policies. The district court

conducted a thorough survey of various international law principles, treaties, and

declarations and concluded that Beanal failed to articulate environmental torts that

were cognizable under international law.

Beanal and the amici refer the court to several sources of international environmental

law to show that the alleged environmental abuses caused by Freeport's mining

activities are cognizable under international law. Chiefly among these are the

Principles of International Environmental Law I: Frameworks, Standards and

Implementation 183-18 (Phillip Sands ed,. 1995) (“Sands”),5 and the Rio

Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.

15 1/515 rev.1 (1992) (the “Rio Declaration”).

Nevertheless, “[i]t is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that

the wrong is of mutual and not merely several, concern, by means of express

international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law

violation in the meaning of the [ATS].” Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888. Thus, the ATS

“applies only to shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized principles

of international law.” See Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir.1983)(per

curiam). Beanal fails to show that these treaties and agreements enjoy universal

acceptance in the international community. The sources of international law cited

by Beanal and the amici merely refer to a general sense of environmental

responsibility and state abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or

discernable standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute international

environmental abuses or torts. Although the United States has articulable standards

embodied in federal statutory law to address environmental violations domestically,

see The National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.) and The

Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. § 1532), nonetheless, federal courts should

exercise extreme caution when adjudicating environmental claims under international

law to insure that environmental policies of the United States do not displace

environmental policies of other governments. Furthermore, the argument to abstain

from interfering in a sovereign's environmental practices carries persuasive force

especially when the alleged environmental torts and abuses occur within the

sovereign's borders and do not affect neighboring countries.6 Therefore, the district

court did not err when it concluded that Beanal failed to show in his pleadings that

Freeport's mining activities constitute environmental torts or abuses under

international law.




LAMPIRAN 8

3.

Genocide and Cultural Genocide

Beanal claims that Freeport engaged in acts of genocide and cultural genocide. In

his First Amended Complaint, Beanal alleged that Freeport's mining operations

caused the Amungme to be displaced and relocate to other areas of the country. He

also alleged that Freeport's mining activities destroyed the Amungme's habitat. As

such, Beanal asserted that Freeport purposely engaged in activity to destroy the

Amungme's cultural and social framework. However, Freeport attacked Beanal's

allegations claiming that cultural genocide is not recognized as a discrete violation of

international law. The district court relying chiefly on the express language of

Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (the “Convention on Genocide”), concluded that cultural

genocide was not recognized in the international community as a violation of

international law. The district court then instructed Beanal to amend his complaint

to allege genocide. Specifically, the court instructed Beanal to allege facts that

would demonstrate that “he [was] the victim of acts committed with the intent to

destroy the people of the Amungme tribe․” Consequently, the district court found

that Beanal's Third Amended Complaint failed to comply with its express

instructions.

A review of Beanal's Third Amended Complaint reveals that his claim of genocide

suffers from the same pleading defects that plagued his other claims of individual

human rights violations. Beanal's complaint is saturated with conclusory allegations

devoid of any underlying facts to support his claim of genocide. Although the

pleading requirements under Rule 8 are to be liberally construed in favor of the

plaintiff, nevertheless, the rule requires more than “bare bone allegations.” See

Walker 904 F.2d at 277.

Notwithstanding Beanal's failure to allege facts to support sufficiently his claim of

genocide, Beanal and the amici in their respective briefs urge this court to recognize

cultural genocide as a discrete violation of international law. Again, they refer the

court to several international conventions, agreements, and declarations.

Nevertheless, a review of these documents reveals that the documents make

pronouncements and proclamations of an amorphous right to “enjoy culture,” or a

right to “freely pursue” culture, or a right to cultural development.7 They

nonetheless fail to proscribe or identify conduct that would constitute an act of

cultural genocide. As such, it would be problematic to apply these vague and

declaratory international documents to Beanal's claim because they are devoid of

discernable means to define or identify conduct that constitutes a violation of

international law. Furthermore, Beanal has not demonstrated that cultural genocide

has achieved universal acceptance as a discrete violation of international law. Thus,

it would be imprudent for a United States tribunal to declare an amorphous cause of



LAMPIRAN 8

action under international law that has failed to garner universal acceptance.8

Accordingly, we find that Beanal's claims of genocide and cultural genocide are

facially insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b).

B.

Torture Victim Protection Act

Beanal claims that his allegations of individual human rights violations are also

actionable under the TVPA. The TVPA provides an explicit cause of action for

torture and extrajudicial killings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note, § 2. In pertinent part,

the statute declares that any individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or

color of law, of any foreign nation subjects an individual to torture or extrajudicial

killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages. Id. § 2(a)(1), and (2).

Freeport argues that the TVPA does not apply to corporations. In other words, an

“individual” is not a corporation under the TVPA. The district court applied a plain

language interpretation of the statute and reviewed the legislative history and ruled

that the TVPA does not apply to corporations.

Beanal's allegations of individual human rights violations under the TVPA are

essentially predicated on the same claims of individual human rights violations under

the ATS. Because we find that Beanal fails to state with the requisite specificity and

definiteness his claims of individual human rights violations under the ATS, we find

that his allegations under the TVPA also suffer from the same pleading defects.

Beanal fails to provide sufficient underlying facts to support his claims. Thus, we

affirm the district court's dismissal of Beanal's claims under the TVPA on the ground

that his allegations fail to provide the requisite factual specificity and definiteness to

survive a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. Therefore, we need not reach the question

of whether a cause of action for individual human rights violations is actionable

against a corporation under the TVPA.

IV.

Conclusion

We acknowledge that the district court exercised considerable judgment, discretion,

and patience below. In light of the gravity and far ranging implications of Beanal's

allegations, not only did the court give Beanal several opportunities to amend his

complaint to conform with the minimum requisites as set forth in the federal rules,

the court also conscientiously provided Beanal with a road-map as to how to amend

his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss assuming that Beanal could marshal

facts sufficient to comply with the federal rules. Nevertheless, Beanal was unable to

put before the court a complaint that met minimum pleading requirements under the

federal rules. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court.



LAMPIRAN 8

AFFIRM.

FOOTNOTES

1. Amici Curiae have submitted briefs to support Beanal's claims. They include

the Sierra Club, Earthrights International, Center For Constitutional Rights, Center

for Justice and Accountability, and the Four Directions Council.

2. Because Beanal does not challenge on appeal the district court's order to strike

his Second Amended Complaint for lack of standing to assert third party claims, we

need not address the sufficiency of the Second Amended Complaint.

3. A comparison of Beanal's complaints reveals that Beanal attempted to

personalize his Third Amended Complaint by merely substituting the plural subject,

“Plaintiffs,” with his name. As such, we agree with the district court in that “it is

apparent that Beanal has peppered his own name throughout these paragraphs without

averring facts giving rise to the claim.”

4. Ironically, allegations made in Beanal's Second Amended Complaint, which

were stricken by the district court, provide the requisite factual specificity. For

example, in Paragraph 46 of his Second Amended Complaint, Beanal alleged that,

“On April 6, 1996, Bagua Kogoya was severely beaten by Freeport Security guards

which resulted in Mr. Kogoya being permanently brain damaged.” In paragraph 47,

he alleged that, “On December 25, 1994, on Freeport bus # 44, while being operated

on the road from Timika to Tembagapura, Wendy Tambuni was stabbed and shot to

death while being transported on said bus.” Beanal's Second Amended Complaint

contains several similar fact-specific allegations regarding other victims. However,

the district court granted Freeport's motion to strike these allegations because Beanal

lacked standing to assert them.

5. Sands features three environmental law principles: (1) the Polluter Pays

Principle; (2) the Precautionary Principle; and (3) the Proximity Principle.

6. Although Beanal cites the Rio Declaration to support his claims of

environmental torts and abuses under international law, nonetheless, the express

language of the declaration appears to cut against Beanal's claims. Principle 2 on

the first page of the Rio Declaration asserts that states have the “sovereign right to

exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental

policies,” but also have “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their

jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment or other States or

areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Beanal does not allege in his

pleadings that Freeport's mining activities in Indonesia have affected environmental

conditions in other countries.


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LAMPIRAN 8

7. Examples of the documents cited by Beanal and the amici are the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 27,999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (140

parties)(entered into force 1976)(ethnic minorities “shall not be denied the right ․ to

enjoy their own culture.”); International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural

Rights, Art. I(1); ICESCR: Art. I(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (138 parties) (entered into force

1976)(all peoples enjoy a right to “freely pursue their ․ cultural development.”);

Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Art. 22, G.A. Res. 217(III)(A)(Dec. 10,

1948) reprinted in Ian Brownlie, ed. Basic Documents on Human Rights 21 (3rd ed.

1992)(all persons are entitled to cultural rights indispensable for dignity).

8. In earlier drafts of the Convention on Genocide, there were proposals to

incorporate cultural genocide into the definition of genocide. However, after much

debate, the concept of cultural genocide was explicitly excluded. See Ronald C.

Slye, Apartheid As A Crime Against Humanity: A Submission to the North African

Truth And Reconciliation Commission, 20 Mich.J. Int'l L. 267, 298 (Winter 1999);

Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime

of Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 415, 437 (Spring 1998).

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:




LAMPIRAN 9

Draft Principles On Human Rights And The Environment,

E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, Annex I (1994).

Draft Declaration of Human Rights and the Environment:

Preamble

Guided by the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Vienna Declaration and Program of

Action of the World Conference of Human Rights, and other relevant international

human rights instruments,

Guided also by the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the

Human Environment, the World Charter for Nature, the Rio Declaration on

Environment and Development, Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable

Development, and other relevant instruments of international environmental law,

Guided also by the Declaration on the Right to Development, which recognizes that

the right to development is an essential human right and that the human person is the

central subject of development,

Guided further by fundamental principles of international humanitarian law,

Reaffirming the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights,

Recognizing that sustainable development links the right to development and the

right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment,

Recalling the right of peoples to self-determination by virtue of which they have the

right freely to determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and

cultural development,

Deeply concerned by the severe human rights consequences of environmental harm

caused by poverty, structural adjustment and debt programmes and by international

trade and intellectual property regimes,


LAMPIRAN 9

Convinced that the potential irreversibility of environmental harm gives rise to

special responsibility to prevent such harm,

Concerned that human rights violations lead to environmental degradation and that

environmental degradation leads to human rights violations,

THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES ARE DECLARED:

Part I

1. Human rights, an ecologically sound environment, sustainable development and

peace are interdependent and indivisible.

2. All persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment.

This right and other human rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political and

social rights, are universal, interdependent and indivisible.

3. All persons shall be free from any form of discrimination in regard to actions and

decisions that affect the environment.

4. All persons have the right to an environment adequate to meet equitably the needs

of present generations and that does not impair the rights of future generations to

meet equitably their needs.

Part II

5. All persons have the right to freedom from pollution, environmental degradation

and activities that adversely affect the environment, threaten life, health, livelihood,

well-being or sustainable development within, across or outside national boundaries.

6. All persons have the right to protection and preservation of the air, soil, water, sea-

ice, flora and fauna, and the essential processes and areas necessary to maintain

biological diversity and ecosystems.

7. All persons have the right to the highest attainable standard of health free from

environmental

8. All persons have the right to safe and healthy food and water adequate to their

well-being.

9. All persons have the right to a safe and healthy working environment.

10. All persons have the right to adequate housing, land tenure and living conditions

in a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment.


LAMPIRAN 9

11 . All persons have the right not to be evicted from their homes or land for the

purpose of, or as a consequence of, decisions or actions affecting the environment,

except in emergencies or due to a compelling purpose benefiting society as a whole

and not attainable by other means. All persons have the right to participate effectively

in decisions and to negotiate concerning their eviction and the right, if evicted, to

timely and adequate restitution, compensation and/or appropriate and sufficient

accommodation or land.

12. All persons have the right to timely assistance in the event of natural or

technological or other human-caused catastrophes.

13. Everyone has the right to benefit equitably from the conservation and sustainable

use of nature and natural resources for cultural, ecological, educational, health,

livelihood, recreational, spiritual or other purposes. This Includes ecologically sound

access to nature.

Everyone has the right to preservation of unique sites, consistent with the

fundamental rights of persons or groups living in the area.

14. Indigenous peoples have the right to control their lands, territories and natural

resources and to maintain their traditional way of life. This includes the right to

security in the enjoyment of their means of subsistence.

Indigenous peoples have the right to protection against any action or course of

conduct that may result in the destruction or degradation of their territories, including

land, air, water, sea-ice, wildlife or other resources.

Part III

15. All persons have the right to information concerning the environment. This

includes information, howsoever compiled, on actions and courses of conduct that

may affect the environment and information necessary to enable effective public

participation in environmental decision-making. The information shall be timely,

clear, understandable and available without undue financial burden to the applicant.

16. All persons have the right to hold and express opinions and to disseminate ideas

and information regarding the environment.

17. All persons have the right to environmental and human rights education.

18. All persons have the right to active, free, and meaningful participation in planning

and decision-making activities and processes that may have an impact on the

environment and development. This includes the right to a prior assessment of the

environmental, developmental and human rights consequences of proposed actions.


LAMPIRAN 9

19. All persons have the right to associate freely and peacefully with others for

purposes of protecting the environment or the rights of persons affected by

environmental harm.

20. All persons have the right to effective remedies and redress in administrative or

judicial proceedings for environmental harm or the threat of such harm.

Part IV

21. All persons, individually and in association with others, have a duty to protect and

preserve the environment.

22. All States shall respect and ensure the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically

sound environment. Accordingly, they shall adopt the administrative, legislative and

other measures necessary to effectively implement the rights in this Declaration.

These measures shall aim at the prevention of environmental harm, at the provision of

adequate remedies, and at the sustainable use of natural resources and shall include,

inter alia,

collection and dissemination of information concerning the environment

prior assessment and control, licensing, regulation or prohibition of activities

and substances potentially harmful to the environment;

public participation in environmental decision-making;

effective administrative and judicial remedies and redress for environmental

harm and the threat of such harm;

monitoring, management and equitable sharing of natural resources;

measures to reduce wasteful processes of production and patterns of

consumption;

measures aimed at ensuring that transnational corporations, wherever they

operate, carry out their duties of environmental protection, sustainable

development and respect for human rights; and

measures aimed at ensuring that the international organizations and agencies

to which they belong observe the rights and duties in this Declaration.

23. States and all other parties shall avoid using the environment as a means of war or

inflicting significant, long-term or widespread harm on the environment, and shall

respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed

conflict and cooperate in its further development.

24. All international organizations and agencies shall observe the rights and duties in

this Declaration.

Part V


LAMPIRAN 9

25. In implementing the rights and duties in this Declaration, special attention shall

be given to vulnerable persons and groups.

26. The rights in this Declaration may be subject only to restrictions provided by law

and which are necessary to protect public order, health and the fundamental rights

and freedoms of others.

27. All persons are entitled to a social and international order in which the rights in

this Declaration can be fully realized.

The Draft Declaration will evolve and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund therefore

invites comments.

Please send comments to:

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM

SIERRA CLUB LEGAL DEFENSE FUND

180 Montgomery Street, 14th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94104-4230, USA

Telephone: (415) 627-6700

Facsimile: (415) 627-6740

email: [email protected]


LAMPIRAN 10

Distr.

GENERAL

E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 26 August 2003

Original: ENGLISH

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Sub-Commission on the Promotion

and Protection of Human Rights

Fifty-fifth session

Agenda item 4

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and

Other Business Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights*

Preamble

Bearing in mind the principles and obligations under the Charter of the United

Nations, in particular the preamble and Articles 1, 2, 55 and 56, inter alia to promote

universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Recalling that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims a common

standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that Governments,

other organs of society and individuals shall strive, by teaching and education to

promote respect for human rights and freedoms, and, by progressive measures, to

secure universal and effective recognition and observance, including of equal rights

of women and men and the promotion of social progress and better standards of life

in larger freedom,

Recognizing that even though States have the primary responsibility to promote,

secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights,

transnational corporations and other business enterprises, as organs of society, are


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LAMPIRAN 10

also responsible for promoting and securing the human rights set forth in the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Realizing that transnational corporations and other business enterprises, their officers

and persons working for them are also obligated to respect generally recognized

responsibilities and norms contained in United Nations treaties and other international

instruments such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime

of Genocide; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment; the Slavery Convention and the Supplementary

Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and

Practices Similar to Slavery; the International Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination against Women; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the

Convention on the Rights of the Child; the International Convention on the Protection

of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; the four

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and two Additional Protocols thereto for the

protection of victims of war; the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of

Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally

Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the Rome Statute of the

International Criminal Court; the United Nations Convention against Transnational

Organized Crime; the Convention on Biological Diversity; the International

Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage; the Convention on Civil

Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment; the

Declaration on the Right to Development; the Rio Declaration on the Environment

and Development; the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable

Development; the United Nations Millennium Declaration; the Universal Declaration

on the Human Genome and Human Rights; the International Code of Marketing of

Breast-milk Substitutes adopted by the World Health Assembly; the Ethical Criteria

for Medical Drug Promotion and the “Health for All in the Twenty-First Century”

policy of the World Health Organization; the Convention against Discrimination in

Education of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization;

conventions and recommendations of the International Labour Organization; the

Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees; the African Charter on

Human and Peoples’ Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights; the

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; the Convention

on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business

Transactions of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and

other instruments,

Taking into account the standards set forth in the Tripartite Declaration of Principles

Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy and the Declaration on

Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of the International Labour Organization,


LAMPIRAN 10

Aware of the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Committee on

International Investment and Multinational Enterprises of the Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development,

Aware also of the United Nations Global Compact initiative which challenges

business leaders to “embrace and enact” nine basic principles with respect to human

rights, including labour rights and the environment,

Conscious of the fact that the Governing Body Subcommittee on Multinational

Enterprises and Social Policy, the Governing Body, the Committee of Experts on the

Application of Standards, as well as the Committee on Freedom of Association of the

International Labour Organization have named business enterprises implicated in

States’ failure to comply with Conventions No. 87 concerning the Freedom of

Association and Protection of the Right to Organize and No. 98 concerning the

Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively, and

seeking to supplement and assist their efforts to encourage transnational corporations

and other business enterprises to protect human rights,

Conscious also of the Commentary on the Norms on the responsibilities of

transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights,

and finding it a useful interpretation and elaboration of the standards contained in the

Norms,

Taking note of global trends which have increased the influence of transnational

corporations and other business enterprises on the economies of most countries and in

international economic relations, and of the growing number of other business

enterprises which operate across national boundaries in a variety of arrangements

resulting in economic activities beyond the actual capacities of any one national

system,

Noting that transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the

capacity to foster economic well-being, development, technological improvement and

wealth as well as the capacity to cause harmful impacts on the human rights and lives

of individuals through their core business practices and operations, including

employment practices, environmental policies, relationships with suppliers and

consumers, interactions with Governments and other activities,

Noting also that new international human rights issues and concerns are continually

emerging and that transnational corporations and other business enterprises often are

involved in these issues and concerns, such that further standard-setting and

implementation are required at this time and in the future,

Acknowledging the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness

of human rights, including the right to development, which entitles every human

person and all peoples to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social,


LAMPIRAN 10

cultural and political development in which all human rights and fundamental

freedoms can be fully realized,

Reaffirming that transnational corporations and other business enterprises, their

officers - including managers, members of corporate boards or directors and other

executives - and persons working for them have, inter alia, human rights obligations

and responsibilities and that these human rights norms will contribute to the making

and development of international law as to those responsibilities and obligations,

Solemnly proclaims these Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational

Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights and urges

that every effort be made so that they become generally known and respected.

A. General obligations

1. States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect,

ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as

national law, including ensuring that transnational corporations and other business

enterprises respect human rights. Within their respective spheres of activity and

influence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the

obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect

human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including the rights

and interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.

B. Right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment

2. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall ensure equality of

opportunity and treatment, as provided in the relevant international instruments and

national legislation as well as international human rights law, for the purpose of

eliminating discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political

opinion, national or social origin, social status, indigenous status, disability, age -

except for children, who may be given greater protection - or other status of the

individual unrelated to the inherent requirements to perform the job, or of complying

with special measures designed to overcome past discrimination against certain

groups.

C. Right to security of persons

3. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall not engage in nor

benefit from war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, forced

disappearance, forced or compulsory labour, hostage-taking, extrajudicial, summary

or arbitrary executions, other violations of humanitarian law and other international

crimes against the human person as defined by international law, in particular human

rights and humanitarian law.


LAMPIRAN 10

4. Security arrangements for transnational corporations and other business enterprises

shall observe international human rights norms as well as the laws and professional

standards of the country or countries in which they operate.

D. Rights of workers

5. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall not use forced or

compulsory labour as forbidden by the relevant international instruments and national

legislation as well as international human rights and humanitarian law.

6. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall respect the rights of

children to be protected from economic exploitation as forbidden by the relevant

international instruments and national legislation as well as international human

rights and humanitarian law.

7. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall provide a safe and

healthy working environment as set forth in relevant international instruments and

national legislation as well as international human rights and humanitarian law.

8. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall provide workers

with remuneration that ensures an adequate standard of living for them and their

families. Such remuneration shall take due account of their needs for adequate living

conditions with a view towards progressive improvement.

9. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall ensure freedom of

association and effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining by

protecting the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization

concerned, to join organizations of their own choosing without distinction, previous

authorization, or interference, for the protection of their employment interests and for

other collective bargaining purposes as provided in national legislation and the

relevant conventions of the International Labour Organization.

E. Respect for national sovereignty and human rights

10. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall recognize and

respect applicable norms of international law, national laws and regulations, as well

as administrative practices, the rule of law, the public interest, development

objectives, social, economic and cultural policies including transparency,

accountability and prohibition of corruption, and authority of the countries in which

the enterprises operate.

11. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall not offer, promise,

give, accept, condone, knowingly benefit from, or demand a bribe or other improper

advantage, nor shall they be solicited or expected to give a bribe or other improper

advantage to any Government, public official, candidate for elective post, any


LAMPIRAN 10

member of the armed forces or security forces, or any other individual or

organization. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall refrain

from any activity which supports, solicits, or encourages States or any other entities

to abuse human rights. They shall further seek to ensure that the goods and services

they provide will not be used to abuse human rights.

12. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall respect economic,

social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights and contribute to their

realization, in particular the rights to development, adequate food and drinking water,

the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, adequate housing,

privacy, education, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and freedom of

opinion and expression, and shall refrain from actions which obstruct or impede the

realization of those rights.

F. Obligations with regard to consumer protection

13. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall act in accordance

with fair business, marketing and advertising practices and shall take all necessary

steps to ensure the safety and quality of the goods and services they provide,

including observance of the precautionary principle. Nor shall they produce,

distribute, market, or advertise harmful or potentially harmful products for use by

consumers.

G. Obligations with regard to environmental protection

14. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall carry out their

activities in accordance with national laws, regulations, administrative practices and

policies relating to the preservation of the environment of the countries in which they

operate, as well as in accordance with relevant international agreements, principles,

objectives, responsibilities and standards with regard to the environment as well as

human rights, public health and safety, bioethics and the precautionary principle, and

shall generally conduct their activities in a manner contributing to the wider goal of

sustainable development.

H. General provisions of implementation

15. As an initial step towards implementing these Norms, each transnational

corporation or other business enterprise shall adopt, disseminate and implement

internal rules of operation in compliance with the Norms. Further, they shall

periodically report on and take other measures fully to implement the Norms and to

provide at least for the prompt implementation of the protections set forth in the

Norms. Each transnational corporation or other business enterprise shall apply and

incorporate these Norms in their contracts or other arrangements and dealings with

contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees, distributors, or natural or other legal

persons that enter into any agreement with the transnational corporation or business


LAMPIRAN 10

enterprise in order to ensure respect for and implementation of the Norms.

16. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall be subject to

periodic monitoring and verification by United Nations, other international and

national mechanisms already in existence or yet to be created, regarding application

of the Norms. This monitoring shall be transparent and independent and take into

account input from stakeholders (including non-governmental organizations) and as a

result of complaints of violations of these Norms. Further, transnational corporations

and other business enterprises shall conduct periodic evaluations concerning the

impact of their own activities on human rights under these Norms.

17. States should establish and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative

framework for ensuring that the Norms and other relevant national and international

laws are implemented by transnational corporations and other business enterprises.

18. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall provide prompt,

effective and adequate reparation to those persons, entities and communities that have

been adversely affected by failures to comply with these Norms through, inter alia,

reparations, restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for any damage done or

property taken. In connection with determining damages, in regard to criminal

sanctions, and in all other respects, these Norms shall be applied by national courts

and/or international tribunals, pursuant to national and international law.

19. Nothing in these Norms shall be construed as diminishing, restricting, or

adversely affecting the human rights obligations of States under national and

international law, nor shall they be construed as diminishing, restricting, or adversely

affecting more protective human rights norms, nor shall they be construed as

diminishing, restricting, or adversely affecting other obligations or responsibilities of

transnational corporations and other business enterprises in fields other than human

rights.

I. Definitions

20. The term “transnational corporation” refers to an economic entity operating in

more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more

countries - whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of

activity, and whether taken individually or collectively.

21. The phrase “other business enterprise” includes any business entity, regardless of

the international or domestic nature of its activities, including a transnational

corporation, contractor, subcontractor, supplier, licensee or distributor; the corporate,

partnership, or other legal form used to establish the business entity; and the nature of

the ownership of the entity. These Norms shall be presumed to apply, as a matter of

practice, if the business enterprise has any relation with a transnational corporation,


LAMPIRAN 10

the impact of its activities is not entirely local, or the activities involve violations of

the right to security as indicated in paragraphs 3 and 4.

22. The term “stakeholder” includes stockholders, other owners, workers and their

representatives, as well as any other individual or group that is affected by the

activities of transnational corporations or other business enterprises. The term

“stakeholder” shall be interpreted functionally in the light of the objectives of these

Norms and include indirect stakeholders when their interests are or will be

substantially affected by the activities of the transnational corporation or business

enterprise. In addition to parties directly affected by the activities of business

enterprises, stakeholders can include parties which are indirectly affected by the

activities of transnational corporations or other business enterprises such as consumer

groups, customers, Governments, neighbouring communities, indigenous peoples and

communities, non-governmental organizations, public and private lending

institutions, suppliers, trade associations, and others.

23. The phrases “human rights” and “international human rights” include civil,

cultural, economic, political and social rights, as set forth in the International Bill of

Human Rights and other human rights treaties, as well as the right to development

and rights recognized by international humanitarian law, international refugee law,

international labour law, and other relevant instruments adopted within the United

Nations system.

____________________

*Adopted at its 22nd meeting, on 13 August 2003.

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Narasumber : Bapak Rino Subagyo, S.H.Jabatan/Lembaga : Direktur Indonesian Center for Environmental

LawWaktu/Tempat : Rabu, 04 Januari 2011

1. Terdapat beberapa pandangan dalam hukum lingkungan internasional mengenai irisan antara lingkungan hidup dengan hak asasi manusia, setidaknya: (1) pendekatan bahwa isu lingkungan berada pada kategori HAM; (2) HAM sebagai bagian dari perlindungan alam semesta (lingkungan hidup) secara keseluruhan; dan (3) HAM dan hukum lingkungan sebagai dua bidang yang terpisah namun beririsan dalam tujuan tertentu yang sama. Bagaimana teman-teman ICEL melihat hal ini, dan bagaimana signifikansi hal ini terhadap pembentukan hukum terkait dengan hal tersebut?

2. Bagaimanakah "hak atas lingkungan hidup" dilihat sebagai suatu hakasasi manusia?

a. Dalam hukum internasional: Dalam hukum perjanjian internasional, sebagai kebiasaan internasional, dan sebagai prinsip-prinsip hukum umum

b. Dalam hukum Indonesia, bagaimanakah bentuk implementasinya?

3. Bagaimana suatu TNCs dapat mempengaruhi hak asasi manusia masyarakat yang tinggal dalam daerah operasinya tersebut?

4. Bagaimana hukum dapat meregulasi TNCs tersebut dalam kaitannya dengan perlindungan hak atas lingkungan hidup? Apakah hambatan yang ditemui dalam regulasi tersebut?

5. Dalam kaitannya dengan TNCs, apakah hak atas lingkungan hidup tersebut secara prosedural telah memiliki mekanisme pemaksa sehingga dapat dicari pemenuhannya dalam hal terjadi pelanggaran, baik dalam hukum nasional maupun hukum internasional?

6. Salah satu mekanisme yang paling visible untuk digunakan dalam hal terjadi pelanggaran hak atas lingkungan hidup oleh TNCs adalah dengan gugatan perdata dengan instrumen hukum nasional. Bagaimanakah hal ini dijamin di Indonesia, mengingat kerumitan struktur dan ciri khas pertanggungjawaban terbatas pada TNC?

7. Kecenderungan lain yang ada dalam permasalahan gugatan-gugatan pelanggaran hak atas lingkungan hidup kepada TNCs adalah dengan memasukkan gugatan di negara asal korporasi. Bagaimanakah kecenderungan yang ditemukan dalam praktek? Bagaimana kecenderungan ini dapat mempengaruhi kebijakan negara-negara dan perkembangan hukum secara keseluruhan?


8. Apakah terdapat perbedaan substansial antara akuntabilitas dan pertanggungjawaban dalam pengaturan hukum internasional terkait TNCs dan hak atas lingkungan hidup sekarang ini? Bagaimanakah kecenderungannya?

9. Bagaimanakah hak atas lingkungan hidup berkembang dalam hukum internasional? Apakah ada kecenderungan bahwa hak ini akan menjadi lex feranda atau hukum di masa yang akan datang?

MQ Bagaimana pandangan ICEL mengenai posisi hak asasi manusia sebagai bagian dari hak asasi manusia?

RS Di NGO, setidaknya di ICEL, kita menganggap bahwa hak atas lingkungan hidup adalah bagian dari hak asasi manusia, dan ini harus diperjuangkan dan direcognize dalam konstitusi kita, walaupun di UUD juga tidak secara tegas menyatakan itu, tapi dalam eksekusinya selalu kita kaitkan hal itu. Kita sebenarnya tidak terlibat secara khusus dalam perdebatan apakah ini menjadi irisan, atau bagian, atau induk; karena bagi kita yang penting adalah ini menjadi hal yang penting untuk dilindungi, dimiliki.

Mengapa? Karena ini bagian dari perjuangan panjang, karena dalam konteks NGO ini yang lebih eksis duluan adalah isu HAM. Ketika tren berubah bahwa konflik SDA ini mulai muncul dan menjadi tren secara internasional, baru muncul kesadaran: Apakah cukup hak atas lingkungan ini menjadi isu lokal saja dan tidak dikaitkan dengan isu ham internasional advokasinya. Berangkat dari situ, mulai ada kesadaran, di mana keterlibatan rezim internasional semakin banyak (baik NGO maupun TNC), sehingga advokasinya digeser, sehingga kita harus kaitkan, bahwa hak atas lingkungan hidup itu sejajar dengan isu HAM. Kenapa? Karena kalau bicara kasus, kasus lingkungan itu extraordinary, bukan kasus kriminal biasa kalau dalam konteks kriminal. Dampaknya ke masyarakat, lingkungan, sosial, dan isu HAM selalu extraordinary crimes. Dan inilah yang mendorong NGO untuk mengaitkan isu ini dengan isu HAM, agar nilai advokasinya lebih sistematis dan bisa menggunakan perangkat dalam rezim HAM. Karena kita nggak cukup untuk bicara lingkungan dalam konteks

Lingkungan hidup yang baik dan sehat sendiri adalah Yang dapat mendukung nilai kehidpan seseorang, artinya ketika seorang bayi laihir dapat membuat dia berkembang sebagaimana harusnya sebagai manusia tanpa kemudian harus ada gangguan-gangguan dari lingkungannya.

MQ Bagaimana dasar hukum internasional dalam advokasi hak atas lingkungan hidup? Dan apakah pernah didapatkan pengalaman nyata dalam kasus internasional?

RS Ada beberapa dasar hukum internasional:


Stockholm Declaration Rio Declaration Rapporteur untuk Isu HAM dan Lingkungan

Berarti semuanya softlaw? Kalau advokasi umum, tatarannya isu. Kalau kasuistis, kebanyakan instrumen hukum nasional.

Pernah ngequote dari hukum internasional? Kasusnya di Indonesia, digugat di Jepang. KASUS KUTO PANJANG. Kasus pembangunan HAM yang dianggap merusak satwa dan lingkungan di situ, yang didanai sama badan bantuannya Jepang. Tergugatnya: Pemerintah Jepang dan lembaga donor di Jepang (JBIC). Dimasukkan juga isu kerugian masyarakat, tapi yang jadi standing adalah lingkungan hidupnya, dan itu diterima di Jepang. Sekitar tahun 2002, pertama kali di sana lingkungan hidup punya legal standing.

Itu salah satu contoh. Kalau kaitannya dengan TNC, kalau dia beroperasi ga mungkin mem. Yang bisa jadi instrumen hukum untuk menggugat itu instrumen hukum nasional. Yang dapat digunakan itu adalah prinsip-prinsipnya, misalnya Kasus Montara, itu kan prinsip internasionalnya harus ada pertanggungjawaban negara Pencemar untuk memastikan bahwa wilayah tetangganya tidak akan terdampak negatif. Tapi secara prinsip internasional, pemerintah Australia punya tanggung jawab untuk memastikan perusahaannya akan comply.

MQ Bagaimana hubungan antara implementasi hak atas lingkunganhidup dalam level nasional?

RS Bahwa hak atas lingkungan hidup sebagai bagian dari HAM itu belum dinyatakan secara tegas seperti itu, tapi hak atas lingkungan diakui. Nah maka itu masih kita perjuangkan, karena ini terkait dengan hak sipil-politik dari seseorang. Kalau di UU Nasional, misalnya UU Lingkungan Hidup juga tidak secara tegas dinyatakan seperti itu. Intinya adalah pengakuan bahwa Hak atas LH sebagai bagian dari HAM dalam regulasi kita tidak cukup terakui. Kalo hak atas lingkungannya sih jelas itu diakui, bahkan sampai UU-nya pun merincikan hak atas lingkungan hidup itu apa aja? Tapi apakah keterkaitannya dengan HAM diatur, menurut saya, tidak secara tegas ada statement/pasal yang menyatakan itu.

MQ Apakah signifikan untuk mendalilkan hak atas lingkungan hidup sebagai bagian dari HAM dalam advokasi?

RS Kalau kita lihat tren-nya, siapa sih yang berkontribusi besar dalam masalah lingkungan? Trennya kan kebanyakan korporasi internasional. Kalau kemudian kita hanya berkutat pada hukum nasional, ga akan cukup. Makanya kemudian penting untuk menggunakan instrumen hukum internasional dalam advokasinya. Pertanyaannya adalah dalam ranah apa itu digunakan? Kan gini, kalau kita bicara advokasi itu


rangkaian kegiatan mulai dari membentuk public opinion, melakukan lobby, tekanan pinlik, sampai melakukan litigasi. Kita mau tekanannya di litigasi atau publik, itu pilihan. Nah, kepentingannya adalah bukan dua strategi yang terpisah antara advokasi umum dan khusus ini. Ini complimentary. Yang ditujukan di tingkat umum adalah perubahan kebijakan. Ini akan mempengaruhi di litigasinya. Kalau ini bisa diadvokasikan bahwa hak atas lingkungan hidup bisa dijadikan konstitusi, ini suatu kemenangan. Karena ketika itu dijadikan advokasi di tingkat nasional, ini akan menjadi dasar hukum. Kalau kita lakukan ini, ini untuk meyakinkan kepada negara bahwa di tingkat di tingkat internasional ada hal itu.

Yang kedua, terkait dengan tren tadi, pelaku perusak lingkungan ini b ukan lagi pelaku yang sifatnya konvensional. Misalnya illegal logging, apakah bisa disamakan antara keluarga yang menebang 5 pohon dengan satu perusahaan menebang 5000 Ha. Itu akan lebih gampang untuk menuntut pelaku konvensional. Tpai kalau perusahaan yang melakukan, pertanyaannya apakah ini dilakukan sendiri atau bagian dari operasi yang sistematis? Bicara sistematis adalah management dari eprusahaan -> siapa yang paling berkuasa -> Siapa pemodal utamanya? Kalau misalnya seperti tadi, TNC tidak akan bisa beroperasi di Indonesia dengan badan hukum asingnya, maka yang menentukan yang di sana. Ketika itu terjadi di Indonesia,

Kita mendorong teman-teman NGO yang akan mengajukan gugatan, kita mulai bantu dari drafting dst. Untuk gugatan di luar negeri kita belum pernah, tapi pernah itu di Kuto Panjang itu.

Operasi Perusahaan Code of Conduct -> pertanyaannya: Kenapa ketika sampai di Indonesia kenapa bisa sampai bermasalah? Newmont misalnya, ketika dipraktekkan kenapa bisa jadi bolong banget, ga ada pelaksanaan code of conduct-nya? Sebenarnya kan ini sangat dipengaruhiperliaku dari orang, baik dari aparaturnya selaku pengawasnya maupun perilaku dari management-nya secara fungsional, dalam pengertian kadang-kadang perilaku inividu dari perusahaan ini kalau dibiarkan lama-lama akan jadi perilaku management karena fungsinya. Misalnya saya melakukan tindakan yang bisa dikatakan melanggar, tapi karena saya tidak pernah ditegur -> omisi dari atasan. Kenapa? Karena hasil perbuatan saya lebih menguntungkan perusahaan, artinya sangat dipengaruhi itu. Jadi kalau kita hanya menganggap atau kita menerima saja bahwa aturannya sudah jelas, bahwa sudah tegas, tapi kalau kemudian tidak diawasi secara ketat, maka itu akan percuma. Itu satu ya.

Kedua, keterkaitan TNC dengan pelaksanaan HAM. Secara prinsip saya yakin TNC normatif, aturan operasionalnya tidak akan melanggar HAM? (Kenapa?) Karena TNC itu tiap dokumennya diawasi oleh badan-badan yang berwenang, jadi tiap operasinya akan diawasi secara ketat oleh negara asalnya; harusnya itu dapat diterapkan di negara host-nya. Kenapa


bisa di sini? Karena ada peluang, karena ada faktor aparat pengawasnya, misalnya aparat di Indonesia tidak pernah mengawasi secara rutin dan benar. Misalnya ini sudah sesuai izin atau belum. Apakah ini pernah di-confirm di tingkat lapangan. Nah ini yang kemudian menjadi berbeda, antara yang di home dan host state.

Kemudian yang ketiga, ada juga karakter perusahaan yang eksploitatif. Secara dokumen mereka baik-baik saja, tetapi secara karakter dari perusahaan induknya memang eksploitatif. Dan kebijakan ini tidak selalu muncul dalam bentuk dokumen. Ini yang kemudian sangat berpengaruh di Indonesia banyak kemudian berkonflik.

MQ Bagaimana hukum Indonesia telah mengakomodasi hak atas lingkungan hidup sebagai bagian dari hak asasi warga negaranya?

RS Terkait pertanggungjawaban, perusahaan-perusahaan yang menggunakan entitas hukum Indonesia, yang digugat itu Freeport-nya Indonesia. Setahu saya kita belum pernah menguji untuk menggugat TNC yang induknya banget di Indonesia kita belum pernah. Saya sempat dorong untuk gugat ATP di Indonesia.

Strateginya: Kejadiannya di wilayah hukum Indonesia. Dengan putusan pengadilan Indonesia, kita bawa di tempat entitas hukum perusahaan tersebut, gugat di Pengadilannya, dengan modal putusan Indonesia. Yang diharapkan, perusahaan ini tidak comply, tidak hormat terhadap hukum. Di luar substansi, ya. Contohnya, ketika kasus gugatannya Soeharto terhadap Times yang di Hongkong gugatnya di Indonesia dulu.

Ini kenapa ini ga muncul, karena kita masih awareness bahwa hak atas lingkungan hidup adalah bagian dari HAM, kalo gitu itu bagian dari hukum internasional, kesadaran kita belum sejauh itu. Mengenai how to do it itu kita belum sampai ke sana. Maka seringkali ketika ada perkara

Problem di Indonesia: belum pernah nemuin. Kalau secara pertanggungjawaban pidana, kita mengakui tindak pidana korporasi, yang sebenarnya tidak ada batasan bahwa itu harus badan hukum Indonesia doank.

MQ Mengenai akuntabilitas dan liabilitas?

RS Kalau kita flashback dari 1990 sampai tahun 2000, perjuangan kita itu untuk sampai batas pengakuan. Seringkali kita tidak begitu aware bahwa the real legal battle nya itu adalah tentang pokok perkaranya. Seringkali


habis energi di standingnya. Mulai tahun 2000, orientasinya mulai berubah. Pertama, mulai selektif karena biayanya banyak juga kan, Kedua, mulai sistematis. Isu standing tidak lagi persoalan. Tidak perlu diperjuangkan lagi. Yang perlu diperjuangkan adalah bener gak dia melakukan PMH? Sekarang udah mostly substansi sih, dan ini kan trennya udah semakin berat, kasus lingkungan itu sama perusahaan sendiri dianggap sepele, ternyata ini menjadi tren. Dan tuntutan secara internasional juga begitu tinggi kan. Kemudian ini menjadi suatu ladang buat private lawyer yang kemudian mengambil ladang itu. Karena perusahaan-perusahaan ini banyak yang diperkarakan dan mereka juga gak mau kehilangan perkara besar. Sementara, untuk public interest-nya masih setahap demi setahap.

MQ Baiklah, sekian pertanyaan-pertanyaannya. (Salam penutup)
