iss rp samuel bonda

7/30/2019 ISS RP Samuel Bonda

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Graduate School of Development Studies

A Research Paper presented by:

Samuel Kenha Bonda

(Ethiopia)

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of

MASTERS OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Specialization:

Governance and Democracy(G&D)

Members of the examining committee:

Dr Freek Schiphorst (Supervisor)

Dr Sylvia I. Bergh (Reader)

The Hague, The Netherlands

December, 2011

Impact of Ethnic Federalism in BuildingDevelopmental State of Ethiopia


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Disclaimer:

This document represents part of the authors study programme while at the

Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author andnot necessarily those of the Institute.

Inquiries:

Postal address: Institute of Social StudiesP.O. Box 297762502 LT The HagueThe Netherlands

Location: Kortenaerkade 12

2518 AX The HagueThe Netherlands

Telephone: +31 70 426 0460Fax: +31 70 426 0799


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Contents

List of Acronyms .............................................................................................................. vAbstract .......................................................................................................................... viChapter 1 Introduction 11.1 Background 11.2 Framing Research issue and problems 31.3 Relevance and Justification 51.4 Objective of the study 61.5 The Research Question 6

Sub-Questions: 61.6 Methodology 6

Method of data collection 61.7 Organization of the paper 7Chapter 2 Conceptual frame work: Ethnicity, Federalism andEthnic Federalism 82.1 Ethnicity 82.2 Federalism 92.3 Ethnic Federalism 102.4 Ethnic Federalism in the Ethiopian context 12

2.4.1 The politics of self-determination 132.4.2 Ethnic Federalism and Conflicts 14

Chapter 3 Theoretical Frame work and Literature Review:Conceptualization of developmental state 163.1 A Brief History of the debate in Developmental States 163.2 The developmental state 173.3 Features of Developmental State 193.4 Southeast Asian Experiences 203.5 Failed attempts at state-led development in Africa 22Chapter 4 Developmental State of Ethiopia 244.1 The making of developmental state in Ethiopia 244.2 Elite Commitment 26

4.2.1 Human resources in the bureaucracy: Case of Beninshangul-Gumuz regional state 27

4.3 Insulated Bureaucracy 294.4 Embedded Autonomy 304.5 Ideological Underpinning is Developmental 32Chapter 5 Conclusion 34References .......................................................................................................................... 1


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Acknowledgements

I am greatly indebted to my supervisor Freek Schiphorst whose great patience,understanding and constructive advices, have really made this paper is reality.Importantly, I owe a great deal to him not only for his intellectual guidance butalso for his understanding my problem which at one point nearly i stopped thisresearch paper. He was so patient with me at all the time that i was not able tomatch any deadlines. Let him stay blessed.


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List of Acronyms

BoFED Bureau of Finance and Economic Development

ENA Ethiopian News AgencyEPRDF Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front

FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

GDP Growth Domestic Product

GTP Growth and Transformation Plan

IMF International Monetary Fund

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

ML Marxism-Leninism

MoFED Ministry of Finance and Economic Development

NIE Newly Industrialized economiesOLF Oromo Liberation Front

PASDEP Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to EndPoverty

PDRE Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

SNNP Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples

TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia

TPLF Tigray Peoples Liberation Front

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade & Development

UNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

WB World Bank

Woreda District administration


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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of ethnic federalism in building successfuldevelopmental state of Ethiopia. The developmental state has twocomponents: one ideological and one structural. It is this ideology- structurenexus that distinguishes developmental states from other forms of state. Interms of ideology, a developmental state is essentially one whose ideologicalunderpinning is developmentalist in that it conceives its mission as that ofensuring economic development. The main force behind the developmentalistideology has usually been nationalism. On the other hand, the state-structureside of developmental state emphasis the capacity to implement economicpolicy sagaciously and effectively. The central to the activities of suchdevelopmental state is a highly competent and autonomous national

bureaucracy.However, as indicated in the finding the ethnic federalism in Ethiopia hasnegatively impact in establishing highly competent bureaucracy due to theethno-language criteria for recruitment and appointment of bureaucrat andtheir patron client arrangement. In addition, the creation of country widecitizenship has declined due to ethnic federal structure of the country.

Keywords

Developmental state, Bureaucracy, nationalism, ethnic, Federalism, EthnicFederalism.


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Chapter 1Introduction

1.1 BackgroundEthiopia contains about 85 million peoples and approximately about 80 ethnicand linguistic groups, and stands as the second populous country in sub-Saharan Africa. The main- stay of the economy is subsistent peasant agriculture

which accounts for about 42.9 percent of the GDP. Agriculture provides thelargest proportion of foreign earnings and employs more than 85 percent ofthe population (African Economic outlook, 2011). The country is confronted

with complex poverty, which is broad, deep and structural. The country hasone of the lowest per capita incomes- about 1000 USD and is categorized as

one of the poorest countries in the world (ibid.).Federal forms of government in any country result from unique political

and historical processes. In the Ethiopian case, the federal structure of thecountry relates to the problem of a failed nation-building project throughassimilation and centralization. Thus, the ethnic-federal experiment ofdevolving public power to ethnic groups goes against the centralized nation-building project of the previous regimes. The previous regimes gave muchemphasis to Ethiopian nationalism as a unifying concept and promotedcentralization rather than regional or ethnic autonomy (Asnake, 2006).

During the rule of the emperor Haile Selassie (1931-1974), which wasbased on absolutism and concentration of power on the king himself through a

patrimonial network of power, resource and privilege accumulation anddistribution system that benefits the rulers and their few collaborators at local,regional and central levels with very little ethnic references. The majororientation of the state was to use the state power for voracious appropriationof resources mainly from the peasantry in order to reward the few rulingnobilities and their clienteles that maintain the survival of the highly centralisedstate (Messay, 1995). Though the predatory state had showed inconsequentialfavouritism based on ethnicity, it promoted state nationalism and nationalintegration of course, with the perception of national identity as the mirror-image of the shoanruling elites ethnic and cultural manifestations such as

Amharic language and orthodox Christianity.

The project of building a highly centralised state was intensified during thereign of Emperor through his twin policies of centralisation and modernisation(Clapham, 1969). This project, however, faced several challenges fromdifferent corners of the country increasingly radicalised students who ralliedbehind land to the tiller, the nationalities question and armed insurgency inEritrea. The abrogation of the Ethio-Eritrea federation in 1962 led to a civil

war. In 1974, revolutionary upheavals rocked the country. The imperial regime,whose structures failed to handle the increasing demands for change comingfrom the various corners of the country, was overthrown by a popularrevolution in September 1974 (Clapham, 1988:32)


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After 1974, the military regime, repeatedly stressed that it preferred asocialist solution to the nationalities question but promoted militaristicnationalism by means of an authoritarian and strongly centralized politicalsystem. It initiated, however, few measures like broadcasting radio programmes

in Afar, Somalia, Oromiffa and Tigrigna language and drawing a new internalboundary based on ethno-territorial bases. Nevertheless, it did not make anyattempt to link ethnic rights with politics or governance issues. Rather withoutany regional or ethnic prejudices, it imposed its greatest centralisation andbrutal governance system, controlled at the core by junior military officersregardless of their ethnic affiliation or orientations. Militaristic statenationalism blended with socialism was promoted by hoping to obliterateregional and ethnic movements; however, excessive centralization backed byruthless coercion did not abate regional and ethnic movements. Rather, itexacerbated internal turmoil and massive resentment of the population, whichprovided a good opportunity for the expansion of ethno- nationalist

movements.The ethno-nationalist movements that took centre stage of opposition

after the 1974 revolution were vocal about their unqualified right to exerciseself-determination up to and including secession. The Tigray PeoplesLiberation Front (TPLF), for example, in its formative years claimed that it

was fighting for self-determination... which could result in anything fromautonomy, federation, confederation, up to and including independence(Markakis, 1987:254). The Eritrean separatist movements considered Eritrea asan Ethiopian colony and sought its independence. The Oromo LiberationFront (OLF), which emerged in 1974, also aimed at the creation of anindependent state for the Oromo. The situation led to decades of devastating

civil wars. The military regimes attempt to reorganize the countrys internaladministration after its establishment of Peoples Democratic Republic ofEthiopia (PDRE) in 1987 failed to create a new social and political basis forthe country (Clapham, 1994:34).

The incumbent party and government, Ethiopian Peoples RevolutionaryDemocratic Front (EPRDF), came to power by overthrowing the militaryregime in May 1991. The new ruling group in power, who had started theirmovement for the liberation of their ethnic region (TPLF) from the centralEthiopia administration, has advocated ethnic-federalism by stressing that itcould empower and equalize the diverse ethnic communities and reduceconflict. As a result, the overall centralized structure of the previous regime has

been replaced by a federal state.

The July 1991 Peace and Democracy conference that led to theestablishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) adopted a

Transitional charter that recognised Eritreas secession. According to thepreamble of the Transitional charter, self-determination of all the peoples shallbe the governing principles of political, economic and social life. It affirmedthe right of ethnic groups to self-determination up to and including secession(Article 2). Based on the charter, the countrys internal administration wasstructured in 14 regions along ethno-linguistic lines in 1992 (TGE, 1992).

The transitional government established a constitutional commission to

draft a constitution. The commission adopted the federal constitution which


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was ratified by the constituent Assembly in December 1994 and, which camein to force in August 1995. Accordingly, the 1995 constitution of the FederalDemocratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), Article 49, has created a federalgovernment with nine ethnic- based regional states and two federally

administered city-states (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa). The regional stateswere delimited on the basis of language, settlement pattern and identity. Theseinclude Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, SouthernNations, Nationalities and peoples (SNNPR), Gambella and Harari. Like the1991 charter, the constitution affirmed the unrestricted corporate right of allethnic groups: every nation, nationality and people shall have theunrestricted right to self-determination up to secession (Article 39). The act ofsecession requires a two-thirds vote in the legislature of the seceding ethnicgroup to be followed three years latter by a referendum in the seceding region.Obviously, the federal restructuring of the country brought several changes toethnicity and governance. The party in power (the EPRDF) contends that

ethnic federalism will be the basis for a reformed Ethiopian state structure andbring about a solution to ethno-nationalist conflict.

Since the beginning of 2000s, the EPRDF began to portray poverty as anexistential threat to the country. Presently, one of the development models

which are being promoted as a panacea for Africa is the developmental state.In recent years, Ethiopian government had shown its disregards for the othertheories, most importantly the neoliberal economic principles which faced itsdead-end in bringing development and hence adheres to the current economicparadigm, i.e. the developmental state model. Regarding this, the countryslong serving prime Minister; Mr. Meles Zenawi advocates the use of this modelnot only in Ethiopia but also across Africa (EPRDF, 1995). With the

agricultural sector at the forefront of the development agenda, the governmentcontinuously champions the idea of strong presence of the state in most partsof the economy. Meles Zenawi stressed that it had made a compelling case fora strong government presence in the economy to correct the pervasive marketinefficiencies. He cited the experience of Asian countries like Taiwan andKorea with the same growth strategy that they implemented (ibid.). Accordingto the governments Millennium Development Goal report, the double digitGDP growth rates which the country achieved since 2003/04 has boosted theconfidence of the government in its developmental path (FDRE, 2010:5).

Hence, the reconstitution of Ethiopia into an ethnic federalist state posessets of opportunities and challenges. This paper examines the impact of ethnic

federalism for building a successful developmental state of Ethiopia.

1.2 Framing Research issue and problems

In the literature, developmental state has two components: one ideological,one structural. It is this ideology-structure nexus that distinguishesdevelopmental states from other forms of states. The state-structure side of thedefinition of the developmental state emphasises capacity to implementeconomic policies sagaciously and effectively. Such a capacity is determined by

various factorsinstitutional, technical, administrative and political.(Mkandawire, 2001:290).In terms of structure, the essential features that

characterized successful developmental states are a strong core of state


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institutions with the capacity to promote economic growth without being captured by particular interests groups. This is what Peter Evans (1995) hascalled embedded autonomy. Thus, the developmental state establishes itsautonomy through the creation of a rationalised (core) bureaucracy

characterised by meritocracy and long-term career outlooks.The state-led model of development intends to bring about

industrialisation and entrepreneurship through intensive and deliberate effortand state intervention. The problem associated with state interventions wererooted in state capture: influential interest groups used the state to foster theirown interests and extract rents rather than to promote a developmental vision(Malloy, 1997). Very often, the perverse dynamics generated by large stateinvolvement in the economy enabled politicians and bureaucrats to build abasis of political support by manipulating markets (Bates, 1981).According toKhan (2005), state capture implies not only that benefits from stateinterventionism are diverted to private pockets, but more importantly that the

policies themselves no longer are driven by a logic to yield development butrather are intended to yield benefits for limited groups (Khan, 2005).

The civil service structures and other benefits generated by state-leddevelopment were frequently manipulated by the government apparatus andruling elites as a source of patronage. The state was captured by narrowinterests more concerned with building clientelistic networks than withfostering a transformation of the countrys economy (Van de Wall, 2001;Bayart, 1993). Eventually, this lead to a predatory state. As Evans, thepredatory state is the developmental state without bureaucratic competence. Asdevelopmental state, the predatory state also directs the trends of business andpicks the winner. However, the criteria for the intervention are not technical

competence based on assessment of expertise, but nepotism and corruption.Thus, government officials act as rent-seekers, giving government facilities andprotection to business people and getting personal benefit in return. The resultis the very antithesis of development.

Ideologically, a developmental state is essentially one whose ideologicalunderpinning is developmentalist in that it conceives its mission as that ofensuring economic development (Castells, 1992:55). At the ideational level, theelite must be able to establish an ideological hegemony, so that its develop-mental project becomes, in a Gramscian sense, a hegemonic project to whichkey actors in the nation adhere voluntarily (Mkandawire, 2001:290). In other

words, the main force behind the develop mentalist ideology has usually been

nationalism (ibid.). Similarly, the underlying requirements of the developmentalstate are thus the creation of a nation-wide public (Ghani et al., 2005). As such,a nation-wide public needs not be rooted in a unified sense of nation basedon linguistic lines, but in the form of a more civic identity. The importantissue is that all citizens see themselves as Ethiopians more than their ethnicline.

However, the ethnic federal structure of Ethiopia is still remain achallenge to bring ethnic tension and conflicts that emerged at local andregional levels on a range of issues such as self-determination/secession, thepolitics of resource sharing, political power, representation, identity, ethnic and

regional boundary and others(Asnake,2006). Hence it worsening ethnic relation


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and divides rather than unites peoples by creating mutual suspicions. Hence,the ethnic based socio-political structure declines nationalism to subordinatethe energy of the people behind a single national goal to the successful andsustainable developmental state of the country.

Despite, the ethnic federalism is granted regional states to administerthemselves and promote their language and culture (FDRE, 1995), theethnicization and politicization of staffing the bureaucracy is still problematic.In other words, the recruitment and appointment of bureaucratic staff ismainly ethno-language criteria rather than competitive meritocracy. As a result,state capacity and effectiveness is still a key bottleneck to implement the policy.Moreover, the ethnicization and politicization of state bureaucrats in thecountry is critical challenge which capture by influential groups. This paperexamines how the ethnic federal structure affects the recruitment of competentbureaucratic staff and also how it reduces nationalism by creating ethnictension and conflict.

1.3 Relevance and Justification

The debate about the nature of development is still important for Africa wheremyriads of developmental models failed. One of the development models

which are being promoted as a panacea for Africa is the developmental state.The Ethiopian government has explicitly committed it selves to build adevelopmental state. As a result, the country achieved consecutively double-digit GDP growth. Despite the continued economic growth, there is growing

discontent with the government ethnically defined state in fear of continuedethnic tension and conflict as a consequence of ethnic-based politics.Development is more of a political process; According to Leftwhich (1996),development in human societies always involves the organization,mobilization, combination, use and distribution of resources in new ways,

where the resources take the form of capital, land, human beings or theircombination. And because resource are to be used and distributed in new

ways, there will inevitably be disputes among individuals and groups abouthow such resources are to be used as they calculate who will win and who willlose as a result of different configuration. As such, when the political system isbased on ethnicity, partition and federalism forms a challenge for sustainable

developmental state.Furthermore, the empirical findings of Evans (1995) and Leftwich (1996)

about the common features of the developmental states in the history of manycountries include: highly competent economic bureaucracy that is wellinsulated from patronage and rent seeking networks; highly competentbureaucracy that enjoys embodied autonomy in the surrounding socialstructure and developmental elites and nationalism. Thus, the lack of capacityand effectiveness of the bureaucracy is detrimental to implement thedevelopmental policy. The establishment of such competent bureaucrat isbadly affected by the ethnic federal policy. Hence, the relevance of this studylies in making a contribution to the understanding of ethnic federalism and

developmental state in Ethiopia.


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1.4 Objective of the study

The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of ethnic federalism inbuilding a successful developmental state of Ethiopia. As such the mainobjectives are:

To explore the possible linkages between ethnic federalism and statebureaucrat capacity and effectiveness in turn to assess its impact inbuilding developmental state in the country.

To investigate possible linkages between ethnic federalism and statenationalism.

1.5 The Research Question

To achieve this objective one main research question and three other relatedsub-questions were posed:

1. How does ethnic federalism affect the building of a successfuldevelopmental state in Ethiopia?

Sub-Questions:

To what extent do the state bureaucrats staffed in meritocraticprinciple? How is their political neutrality? How is their capacityand effectiveness to implement the policy?

How does ethnic federalism accommodate state nationalism?What are the possible implications for the developmental stateof Ethiopia?

1.6 Methodology

The research methodology largely employed qualitative approach byqualitatively examining and interpreting texts. It examines ethnic federalismdebate on developmental state in the country, along categories such as statecapacity and nationalism as its two key variables. The time frame for thisresearch is limited to political development in the country since 1991.

Method of data collection

The research is conducted by studying a wide array of documentary sourcesusing both published and unpublished materials. These include governmentand non-government report, books, journals, party documents (particularly theEPRDF), newspaper, magazine and internet sources are used.


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1.7 Organization of the paper

This paper is organized into five chapters. The first chapter presents theproblems that the paper aims to examine. In particular it provides an overviewof the research topic, the research problem, the research objectives andquestions. The second chapter is the examination of theoretical debates onethnicity, federalism and ethnic federalism. It also presents the historical andideological basis for ethnic federalism in Ethiopian context. Chapter threediscusses the concept of developmental state and also outlines the feature andcharacteristics of developmental state. It also examines the experience of SouthEast Asian Miracles. Chapter four aims at examining the construction ofdevelopmental state in Ethiopia and the impact of ethnic federal structure for asuccessful and sustainable development in the country. Hence, it discusses the

impact of ethnic politics in recruiting and appointment of state bureaucrat bytaking Benishangul-Gumuz region. It also discusses the debates on the impactof ethnic federalism on ethnic conflict which in turn affects the countrywidenationalism. The last chapter gives a conclusion.


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Chapter 2Conceptual frame work: Ethnicity, Federalismand Ethnic Federalism

Ethnicity and federalism have become the major factors in organizing thepolitical and territorial space in Ethiopia. Hence, this chapter is aimed toexplain the theories of ethnicity and federalism which help in setting up aframework for observation and examination of the actual working of ethnicfederalism in Ethiopia. It could help to clear up the ground for the study byindicating tensions in synchronising ethnicity and federalism at least intheoretical level.

2.1 EthnicityThere is no generally agreed definition or theory of ethnicity; scholars defineand describe the term in various ways, such as a modern cultural construct, auniversal social phenomenon, a personal identity, a peculiar kind of informalpolitical organization. According to Fukui and Mar- kakis, define ethnicidentities on the basis of genealogical or cultural criteria by claiming that acomplex pattern of fusion and fission among group is the reality. They arguethat ethnic identities are to be understood as essentially political products ofsocially defined and historically determined specific situation (Fukui and Markakis, 1994:6). Likewise, for Thomas Eriksen (1993) ethnicity simply refers torelationships between groups whose members consider themselves distinctiveand, these groups may be ranked hierarchically within a society. He thereforedescribes ethnicity in terms of the classification of people and grouprelationship that has a political, organizational aspects as well as a symbolicone (Eriksen, 1993:13).

Nabudere (1999), writing in the African context, notes that there aretwo aspects to ethnicity: positive and negative. The positive side ofethnicity, which he calls post-traditionalism is a a form of ethnicidentification that is forward looking in that it tries to cope withmodernity whilst also at the same time defining ones identity for needsof stability and self-definition(1999:90). The negative aspect of ethnicity

he describes as class manipulation and mobilization of the ethnicsentiments for purely narrow and self-serving interests of a smallminority of elites who continuously struggle for positions in the state(ibid.).

In the Ethiopian situation, ethnicity was associated with narrow-nationalism, tribalism or conspirators agenda by the previous regimes, whereas the new ruling elites as the emancipator and valuable asset to be protectedand promoted. As Markakis states that over-night, ethnicity became alegitimate and preferred principle of political organization, and provides thefoundation for a reconstructed Ethiopian state (Markakis, 1994). The mostrelevant situation for Ethiopia is the position that takes it as an ideology of

mobilized collectivises that may be used both as a weapon of resistance by the


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marginalized ethnic groups and as a political instrument for elites (Merera,2003:26).

2.2 Federalism

According to Elazar, one of the leading experts in field of federalism,federalism has to do with the need of the people and politics to unite forcommon purposes yet remain separate to preserve their integrity. Federalism isconcerned simultaneously with the diffusion of political power in the name ofliberty and its concentration on behalf of unity (Elazar, 1987:33). Here thebasic federal principle is concerned with the combination of self-rule andshared-rule. It is the framework that involves the linkage of individuals,groups and polities in lasting but limited union in such a way as to provide forthe pursuit of common ends while maintaining the respective integrities of all

parties. Accordingly, federalism is considered as a comprehensive system ofpolitical relationships which emphasis the combination of self-rule and shared-rule within the matrix of constitutionally dispersed power (ibid.).

According to Burgess (2000), federalism is an ideological, in the sense thatit can take the form of an overtly perspective guide to action, and asphilosophical, to the extent that it is a normative judgment up on the idealorganisation of human relations and conduct (2000:27). However he adds anoperational dimension by considering that federalism can also as loaded up onas empirical fact in its recognition of diversitybroadly conceived in its social,economic, cultural and political contexts- as a living reality, something thatexists independent of ideological and philosophical perceptions. This means

that in practice, authority should be divided and power should be dispersedamong and between groups in a society (ibid.).

On the other hand, Graham Smith questions the notion of consideringfederalism as an ideology. Rather than considering federalism as an ideologythat has developed and exists autonomously from the main tradition ofpolitical thought, he writes that federalism is best treated as traversing a broadrange of what we can more usefully call programmatic orientation (Smith,1995:4). In his opinion, the term federalism has been subjected to differentmeaning and applied to different situational contexts. He states that federalism as ideology is best considered as an amalgam of doctrines, beliefsand programmatic considerations reflect in the very paradoxes and tensionsinherent in thinking about the politics of modernity(ibid.).

In contrast, Riker understands federalism as a range of phenomena ratherthan a single constitutional things (Rikker, 1975:103). A federal arrangementdoes not always mean that the boundaries of power are clearly fixed on apermanent basis, but rather a continuous political bargain and process. It is nota static and fixed phenomenon (ibid.). Riker places federalism on a continuumscale with respect to centralisation and decentralisation. According to him,federalism is a political organization in which the activity of government aredivided between regional governments and a central government in such a waythat each kind of government has some activity on which it makes final

decision(ibid.). As John Agnew put federalism is an evolutionary political


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arrangement rather than a fixed formula for the territorial division ofgovernment powers. The balance of power between central and regional unitscould change over time (Agnew, 1995; 294).

2.3 Ethnic FederalismThough it remains difficult and complex to establish a federal arrangementbased on ethnicity, many scholars in the field argue that one of thecharacteristics of federalism is its aspiration and purpose to generate andmaintain both unity and diversity simultaneously (Watts, 1999:6). As Elazarargues that federal systems operates best in society with sufficient homogeneityof fundamental interests, he thought of Switzerland as the first modernfederation built on indigenous ethnic and linguistic differences that wereconsidered permanent and worth accommodating. Political integrationfederal or otherwise is likely to be more difficult in places in which strongly

rooted primordial groups continue to dominate political and social life (Elazar,1987:191). Nevertheless, in his view, federalism might be the best politicalframework in the existence of essentially permanent religious, ethnic, culturalor social groups around which political life must be organized. Besides, headded territorial divisions of power can also be used to protect minorities andminority communities by allowing them greater autonomy within their ownpolitical jurisdictions (ibid.).

Accordingly, with the aim of accommodating ethnic diversity, Elazarspecified two forms of federal frameworks (1987:236). The first form is thestructure of a polity cutting across ethnic cleavages and thereby diluting themthrough the creation of a cross cutting civic community and, the second form

is structuring a comprehensive polity to give each people a primary means ofexpression through one or more of its constituent polities. Elazar, however,held the idea that federalism should transcend the recognition of differenceseventually by structuring relationships that permit the groups bearing thosedifferences to function together within the same political system. As a result,Elazar supposed that under certain circumstances, federalism offers thepossibility of creating a civic community that transcends the divisions amongethnic collectivises and thereby makes possible the establishment of civilsociety and workable political order (Elazar, 1987:232).

Federal arrangements could be structured on the basis of territoriallysegmented ethnic, linguistic or religious groups, but the trouble is associated

with institutionalising primordial entities in political organization. As a resultthe ethnic nationalism is probably the strongest force against federalism,because ethnic ideology could undermine power sharing arrangements andconsequently, ethnic federalism could degenerate in to civil war. Thus it ispreferred to promote political order based on non-primordial or civic ties

without disqualifying ethno-linguistic federal arrangements (Elazar, 1987:232).

If ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, federalism could offer anexcellent opportunity for group autonomy. Thus, by accepting the inevitabilityof drawing federal arrangements based on ethnic boundaries in case ofgeographically concentrated ethnic groups, the federal framework withrelatively many and small constituent units could make the federal dividing


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lines coincide as much as possible with the ethnic boundaries (Lijphart,2002:51). However, if ethnic groups are geographically dispersed andsynchronized, Lijphart (1997) recommends convocational democracy whichincludes four essential attributes: grand coalition, segmented autonomy,

proportionality and minority veto. Grand coalition entails power sharing of allsignificant groups in political power, particularly in executive power.Segmented autonomy entails a delegation of decision making power to everysignificant group. Proportionality entails that political representation, civilservice appointments and allocation of public funds, etc. should considerproportion of each significant group. Lastly, minority veto entails the powergiven for minority groups to veto any decision that can put their vital interestat sake due to majorities out votes.

Empirically, Lijphart enumerates a variety of more or less functionalpower-sharing models in deeply divided societies. Some of the models weresuch as executive power sharing in a form of grand coalition cabinet of ethnic

parties like in Malaysia and South Africa; equal representation of ethnolinguistic or other groups in government like in the Belgian cabinets; andproportional shares of ministerial positions to the different linguistic groups,states and regions like in India (Lijphart, 2002:46).

On the other hand, Donald Horowitz argues that federal managementbased on ethnic homogeneity is detrimental to the creation of inter-ethniccooperation. Horowitz recognises the importance of power-sharing andterritorial devolution, as he states that territorial compartmentalization withdevolution of generous power can have tranquillising effects in countries withterritorially separate groups, significant sub-ethnic divisions and seriousconflict at the centre (Horowitz,1985:164).

Moreover, Horowitz contends that a political framework that crystallizesand legitimises ethnic cleavages would be of limited utility to bring aboutcompromised power-sharing arrangement in states with desperate ethnicgroups, because elites of majority groups would not be so easily self-abnegatingas to give some of their political power and privileges to the minority groups.He maintains that both ethnic majority rule and ethnic minority rule are veryineffective and destructive type of arrangement in ethnically divided societies.Majority rule permits perpetual domination of the majority group or thetyranny of the majority ethnic group (Horowitz, 1994:46).

In severely divided societies, matters such as equal control of the state ,

the designation of official languages and educational issues, such as languagesof instruction, the content of curricula are very divisive question on whichgroups are not very willing to concede; they are more worried about who gets

what in a kind of zero-sum competition. As a result, approaches or modelsthat could crystallize or encourage ethnic entitlement may not be a viableoption to bring inter-ethnic compromise and cooperation, because of the factthat divisive issues are not easy to compromise and symbolic demands such aslanguage seem to be less compromisable than claims that can be quantified(Horowitz, 1985:566).

Related to federalism, Horowitz argues that in severely divided societies,such as in Nigeria, India and Malaysia, federalism has helped to reduce

conflicts at the centre because many contested issues become state-level issues


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within ethnic groups; it has dispersed the flow of conflict in linguisticallyhomogeneous states in to sub-ethnic channels; it provides career opportunitiesfor groups not well represented at the centre and it helps to restructureinstitutions so as to alter ethnic balances and alignment. He also observed that

ethnic federalism has mitigated or exacerbated minorities exclusion: a groupthat is a minority at the centre may be a majority in one or more states and maybe in a position to rule these states, at the same time it may also produce otherminority groups that feel exclusion and domination at the local areas(Horowitz, 1994:613).

Federal model or territorial autonomy could be worthwhile in maintainingunity while conceding claims of self-government by allowing ethnic or othergroups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs ofspecial concern to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise thosepowers which cover common interests (Ghai, 2002:155). In ethnic federalism,the normal tensions of federalism like resource distribution and regional

influence are likely to be aggravated by assuming ethnic dimensions. Inter-regional mobility is likely to be contentious and distinction between the privateand public spheres may be less sharp than in other types of federalism (ibid.).Furthermore, the federal arrangement need great administrative capacity,political skill, and abundant resources therefore narrow group or ethnicinterests alone may not create a desirable arrangement. It could producepoorly equipped provinces struggling to carry out new responsibilities whichthey neither understood nor wanted or producing less efficient bureaucraciesor with politicians not given to compromises (ibid.).

2.4 Ethnic Federalism in the Ethiopian context

Historically, the Russian revolutionaries who were forced to confront theplight of subordinate national groups and minorities in Tsarist Russiadeveloped what came to be known a Stalinist theory on nationalities. Initially,Russian revolutionarily leaders like Lenin were dismissive of the role ofnationalism in the Russian Empire (Hirsch; 2005:23). In 1905, Lenin evenopposed the idea that was proposed by the social democrats to provideterritorial and extra-territorial autonomy to the nationalities in a post-TsaristRussia (ibid.). But when the revolutionary upheavals began to gain momentum,he reversed his earlier position and came to embrace the concept of national

self-determination. This reversal of position was necessitated by the desire togain the support of non-Russian ethnic groups in the struggle against the

Tsarist regime and during the civil war that followed the 1917 revolution whichbrought the Bolsheviks to power. The principle of self-determination andfederalism were also used to build the soviet state (Duchacek, 1970:137).

The Soviet Nationalities policy which was on the main developed byJoseph Stalin incorporated Marxist Leninist ideas and sought to legitimize thevanguard role of the communist party (ibid.). This led to the creation of theSoviet Union as a multitier ethnic federation in which power was monopolizedby the unitary communist party. And the right of self-determination up to andincluding secession was incorporated in the constitution (ibid.). Similarly,


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almost all of the leftist political movements that emerged after the 1974revolution in Ethiopia accepted the ML ideology and Stalins theory ofnationalities (Young, 1997:154).Right after its assumption of state power in1991, the EPRDF began its project of reconstituting the country in an ethnic

federation. This process was highly influenced by Stalins principle of ethnicself-determination up to and including secession (ibid.).

Consequently, the Ethiopian ethnic federal system is significant in that itprovides for secession of any ethnic unit. Opponents of ethnic federalism fearthat it invites ethnic conflict and risks state disintegration (Ottaway, 1995). TheEthiopian state, they worry, may face the same fate as the USSR and

Yugoslavia (Solomon, 1993). Others, of an ethno-nationalist persuasion, doubtthe governments real commitment of self-determination; they support theethnic federal constitution per se, but claim that it has not been put in topractice (ibid.). Supporters of ethnic federalism point out that it has maintainedthe unity of the Ethiopian peoples and the territorial integrity of the state,

while providing full recognition to the principle of ethnic equality.According to the 1995 FDRE constitution, the federal arrangement of

Ethiopia had two levels of governments: The federal government at the centreand the regional governments at the regional level. The central government

was responsible for foreign affairs, national defence, economic policy,monetary and fiscal policies, Building and administrating major developmentinfrastructures and establishments. It was provided with a power for budgetingallocation to the regional governments. Likewise, the regional governments

were provided broad powers on all matters with in their territorial jurisdictionexcept for those assigned to the federal government. Some of the majorresponsibilities provided to the regional governments were:

Full power on matter related to language, culture and educationpolicies;

To establish a state administration that best advance self-government; To formulate and execute economic, social and development policies,

strategies

To enact and enforce laws on the state civil service (Article, 52).2.4.1 The politics of self-determination

Ethnic-based federalism is the most controversial EPRDF policy. Celebratedby some as the panacea for holding multi-ethnic Ethiopia together. It is decriedby others as a dangerous concept that will eventually dismember the country.For nationalists, the policy is a deliberate ploy to undermine national identity.

They see the constitutional granting of self-determination to ethnic group asdeliberate step backward from the nation building process. Many describeethnic federalism as a malicious TPLF tactic to plant divisions among ethnicgroups so as to facilitate rule by the Tigrayan minority. The allegation that the

TPLF manipulates ethnic identities and conflicts to stay in power is made bymost opposition supporters. Critics decry worsening ethnic relations as a resultof ethnic based competition. In their view, the political system divides rather


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than unites people, by creating mutual suspicion and rancour and institutingtribal dynamics that could easily spiral out of control. The constitutional clausethat gives nationalities the right to seceded is touted as proof of the EPRDFsanti-Ethiopian stance. Eritreas independence, which turned Ethiopia in to a

landlocked country, is viewed as evidence of a desire to dismember. Arecurrent claim that the EPRDF has unduly privileged its Tigray base andregional state to the national detriment (Paulos, 2007:378-380).

Proponents of ethnic federalism, however, acclaim the recognition ofgroup rights, seeing creation of ethnic-based administrative entities as the onlymeaningful approach for defusing ethnic discontents. According to this view-actively propagated by the government- Ethiopians ethnic and minoritygroups have suffered centuries of domination by a central state that forced

Amharic language and culture up on them. Granting nationalities theirculture, ethnic, and political aspirations is necessary to redress historic injustice.

Thus, it brought important recognition of their culture and language to many

groups.

2.4.2 Ethnic Federalism and Conflicts

Though there is no necessary connection between ethnicity and conflict asHorowitz argues, the basic for confrontation may emerge due to the inclusionof two or more ethnic communities within a single or adjacent territory of astate characterized by discriminatory and uneven status and resource allocation(Horowitz, 1985:148). As Ted Gurr (1994) in his cross-national study ofcommunal based conflicts, shows that in many instances ethnic tensions and

conflicts are more likely when certain groups perceive discrimination orexploitation in the context of state formation. Ethnic conflicts are usuallycentred on three general issues: the desire for exit or independence from thestate, the demand for greater autonomy within the state or the recognition andprotection of minority interests within a plural society (Gurr, 1994:111). Healso adds that ethnic identity and interests per se do not risk unforeseen ethnic

wars rather; the danger is hegemonic elites who use the state to promote theirown peoples interests at the expense of others (Gurr, 2000:64).

In the Ethiopian case, the most noticeable change regarding ethnicconflicts after the formation of the ethnic federal structure has been theemergence of localised violent conflicts involving several of the ethnically

constituted regions (Abbink, 2006). At the same time, there are secessionistmovements engaged in low-level armed guerrilla warfare (ibid.). The EPRDFsconception of ethnicity did not always match the multi-ethnic makeup of manycities and areas. The southern region, Gambella, Benishangul- Gumuz andHarari are inhabited by multiple ethnic groups. Tigray, Amhara, Oromo andSomali states are dominated by one ethnic group but host others (International Crisis Group, 2009). Granting self-administration to dominantethnic groups thus created new minorities. In some case this minorities didntspeak the language of the new administration. The principle was interpreted bysome groups as an opportunity to claim exclusion rights over land by evictingsettlers and other newcomers. These tensions have often been nurtured by


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politicians from local indigenous groups. Examples include the conflictbetween the Berta and Oromo settlers in Asosa zone the exploded during the2000 federal elections. Sometimes the conflicts take on the character of ethniccleansing; non-natives have been chased away in Arussi, Harar and Bale

(Abbink, 2006:153).Beginning in the first half of the 1990s, a wave of local conflicts gripped

the country as groups were incited by the transitional charter to settle olddisputes or claim territory they felt was rightfully theirs. Some of the mostsevere were between Amhara settlers and Anuak in December 2003 inGambella. In Somali after 2000, several hundreds were killed in repeatedfighting between the sheikash, a small clan that sought to establish its owndistrict, and Ogaden sub-clans. A border dispute between the Guji and Gedeoexploded in to large-scale fighting in 1998 over control of Hagere Mariamdistrict. Land disputes triggered by administrative boundary changes incited aconfrontation between the Guji and Borena in June 2006, causing at least 100

deaths and massive displacement. Some 70,000 fled the border area betweenOromiya and Somali after conflict erupted. By a very conservative estimate,several thousand peoples were killed in inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopiabetween 1991 and 2005 (Abbink, 2006:408).


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Chapter 3Theoretical Frame work and Literature Review:Conceptualization of developmental state

3.1 ABrief History of the debate in Developmental States

The role of the state in promoting economic growth and social progress in thedeveloping world has been a subject of contestation among internationaldevelopment experts and policy analysts for the past 50 years. After the end of

World War ll, with the emergence of newly independent states in Africa andAsia, the international community embraced a state-led model of developmentintended to bring about industrialisation and entrepreneurship throughintensive and deliberate effort and state intervention. By the late 1970s,

however, the state-led model of development had come under strain in Africa,as well as in Eastern Europe and Latin America. State intervention in theeconomy in many of these countries was often wasteful (Fritz and RochaMenocal, 2007).

Many of the problems associated with these failed state interventionswere rooted in state capture: influential interest groups used the state to fostertheir own interests and extract rents rather than to promote a developmental

vision. In Latin America, for example, state intervention nurtured- and becamedependent on- a particular kind of populist politics (Malloy, 1997). Very often,the perverse dynamics generated by large state involvement in the economyenabled politicians and bureaucrats to build a basis of political support bymanipulating markets (Bates, 1981). At the same time, protectionist policiesdeprived states of imports often without stimulating domestic production ofsufficient quantity and quality (Lockwood, 2005).

By the early 1980s, a growing coalition of reform-minded academics,policymakers and political elites was calling for the abandonment of the state-led model of development and a return to a market-based economy. Theinternational assistance community, led by the IMF and the World Bank,embraced a set of neo-liberal economic policies that converged in what cameto be known as the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990). At the core ofthis thinking was an insistence that aid-recipient countries adopt structural

adjustment programmes designed to reduce the size and reach of the state.Instead, these countries should relay on the market as the most effectivemechanism for allocating resources and promoting economic growth (ibid.).

As put forth in 1991 by the World Bank in the World Development Report,government intervention should be used sparingly and only where mostneeded. Put simply, the report argues, governments need to do less in thoseareas where markets work, or can be made to work, reasonably well (1991:9).

Since the mid-1990s, however, another shift in understanding the role ofthe state in development has become perceptible. This new thinking is based inlarge part of the recognition that there has been a very different experience ofstate-led development in a number of Asian countries, especially in East Asia

(Deyo, 1987; Haggard, 1990; Johnson, 1982; and Wade, 1990). Over a period


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of 30 years, the so-called Asian tigers, which include Hong Kong, Singapore,South Korea and Taiwan, underwent rapid economic growth and a radicalsocioeconomic transformation, moving from being poor agrarian societies orcity states in the 1960s to producers of high technology, high value-added

goods by the 1990s (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007).The 1997 World Development Report was thus dedicated to rethinking

the state, and reaffirmed the position that the state is central to economic andsocial development. Since then, there has been a growing awareness amongdevelopment practitioners as well as academics of what this means- namely;that the orientation and effectiveness of the state is the critical variableexplaining why some countries succeed whereas others fail in meetingdevelopment goals. In 2005, the report of the Commission for Africa reflectedthis thinking, recognising state capacity and effectiveness as a key bottleneck in

Africas ability to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Fritz andRocha Menocal, 2007).

Hence, Asias sudden emergence as an economic colossus stimulatedscholars and policy makers alike to begin a grail-like quest for what Meredith

Woo-Cummings has called the regional solipsism of an Asiandevelopmental model (1991:5). One of the most powerful and persuasiveattempts at a political explanation for East Asian success has been the conceptof the developmental state (Johnson, 1982). The East Asian states, it isargued, have been successful because governments there have acquired controlover a variety of things presumed critical to economic success. Initially andmost forcefully articulated by Chalmers Johnson with specific reference to

Japan (and subsequently to South Korea and Taiwan), the developmental stateis seen as one of the three ideal types of states, all categorized by the states

relationship to the domestic economy (ibid.).

3.2 The developmental state

The developmental state is back at the centre of the international policy debate.Policy thinking shows an increasing willingness to abandon value-ladenprescriptions about governance and to adopt approaches rooted incomparative history and evidencebased analytical theory. The concept of thedevelopmental state serves as a marker of this trend. Although the language

was hardly new even in the 1980s when the first flood of studies of East Asianindustrialisation brought it into currency, the idea of the developmental state

has enduring value as an anchor for discussions among researchers and policy-makers on how to bring evidence from history to bear on todays policychallenges (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007:531).

Drawing on the work of Johnson (1982), Deyo (1987) and Evans (1995)among others, we understand a developmental state to exist when the statepossesses the vision, leadership and capacity to bring about positivetransformation of society with a condensed period of time. The transformationcan also take various forms. In the classical East Asian examples, it was aimedat speeding up growth, while at the same time enhancing opportunities toparticipate in the modern economy---most commonly through the expansionof public services such as education, health care and agricultural extension. The


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state was associated with rapid processes of industrialization and/or theadoption of new technologies--- that is, moving in to higher value-addedactivities relative to the starting point. Typically, there was a shift fromsubsistence agriculture to more commercial, export- oriented farming, or to

textile processing, or to tourism, or a mixture of these.Developmental states are marked by a combination of capacities, visions,

norms and/or ideologies. They are not associated with specific policies; atdifferent times and in different places, very different policies have ushered insocial and economic transformation (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007:534). Atmost, as Woo-Cummings explains, the developmental state is neithersocialist... nor free-market... but something different: the plan-rational capitalistdevelopmental state... (Which links) interventionism with rapid economicgrowth (1999: 1-2). Similarly, according to Bollesta, developmental stateposition between free market capitalist economic system and centrally plannedsocialist economic system makes it neither capitalist nor socialist in texture

(2007: 106).According to Castells, a state is developmental when it establishes as its

principle of legitimacy, its ability to promote and sustain development,understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of growthand structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in itsrelationship to the international economy (Castells, 1992:55). As Chalmers

Johnson contends that, developmental state was one that determined toinfluence the direction of and pace of economic development by directlyintervening in the development process, rather than relying on theuncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate economic resources(Johnson, 1982).

There is of course a major problem of defining states simply from itseconomic performance: not all countries with good growth rates aredevelopmental state (Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005:45). According to Mkandawire,the definition of developmental state runs the risk of being tautological, sinceevidence that the state is developmental is often drawn deductively from theperformance of the economy (Mkandawire, 2001:290). This arises because astate is defined developmental if the economy is developing, economic successis equated to state strength and the latter is measured by the presumedoutcomes of policy (UNCTAD, 2009:28).

It is possible to avoid this tautological view, in which outcomes are used as

explanations of phenomenon in question, by recognizing that the governmentsin developmental states are certainly develop mentalists in their vision, theirpriorities and their ideology, but they may fail to achieve their objectives (ibid.).From this perspective, developmental state as a state in which the political eliteaim at rapid economic development and give power and authority to thebureaucracy to plan and implement efficient policies. It aimed at rational anddeliberate development and implement state driven industrialisation policies,

with co-operation between the government and private (Abe, 2006:8-9).

According to Mkandawire developmental state has two components: oneideological, one structural. It is this ideology-structure nexus that distinguishdevelopmental state from other form of states. In terms of ideology,

developmental state is essentially one whose ideological underpinning is


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develop mentalist in that it conceives its mission as that of ensuring economicdevelopment (Mkandawire, 2001:290). At the ideational level, the elite must beable to establish an ideological hegemony, so that its developmental projectbecomes, in a Gramscian sense, a hegemonic project to which key actors in

the nation adhere voluntarily (ibid.). The main force behind the developmentalist ideology has usually been nationalism. The centrality of ideology alsopoints to the naivet of the de-politicised quest for technocratic governance(Mkandawire, 2001:291). Supporting Mkandawire, Bagchi argues that:

Developmental state puts economic development as the top priority ofgovernmental policy and is able to design effective instrument to promotesuch a goal. The instruments would include a forging of new formal networksof collaboration among the citizens and officials and the utilization of newopportunities for trade and profitable production (Bagchi, 2000:398).

Mkandawire defined the structural side of developmental state as the capacity

to implement economic policy sagaciously and effectively. Such capacity isdetermined by various factorsinstitutional, technical, administrative andpolitical. Undergirding all these is the autonomy of the state from social forcesso that it can use these capacities to devise long-term economic policyunencumbered by the claims of myopic private interest (Mkandawire,2001:290). Developmental state act as a facilitator by steering, assisting andinducing the private firms to attempt new production challenges in areas whichare of high priority by allocating credit, limiting import competition, or even byproviding subsidies(M. Cipher and L. Dietz, 2009:215).

According to Pempel, developmental state defines their mission primarilyin terms of long-term national economic enhancement. They actively and

regularly intervene in economic activities with the goal of improving theinternational competitiveness of their domestic economies. Rather thanaccepting some predefined place in a world divided on the basis ofcomparative advantage, such states seek to create competitive advantages.I n this sense, the developmental state is a logical descendant of the Germanhistorical school with its emphasis on economic nationalism andneomercantilism. Central to the activities of such developmental states is ahighly competent and autonomous national bureaucracy (Pempel, 1999:139).

3.3 Features of Developmental State

Recent writing on developmental states has emphasized the importance ofboth infrastructural powers and political commitment. According to MichaelManns, infrastructural powers defined as the capacity of the state to actuallypenetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisionsthroughout the realm. The extraction of resources (human or material) fromsociety is a key element of such infrastructural power (Manns, 1993). Leftwichemphasises commitment; an ideal-type developmental state is one thatdemonstrates a determination and ability to stimulate, direct, shape andcooperate with the domestic private sector and arrange or supervise mutuallyacceptable deals with foreign interests (Leftwich, 2000:167-8). Similarly, adevelopmental state project must possess at least two essential attributes. First,

the state must have the capacity to control a vast majority of its territory and


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possess a set of core capacity that will enable it to design and deliver policies;secondly, the project must involve some degree of reach and inclusion (Ghaniet al., 2005).

Hence, a common factor among developmental states appears to be a

committed leadership that is embedded in the right context of demands. Theleadership should strongly commit to developmental goals, and which placesnational development ahead of personal enrichment and/or short-termpolitical gains (Ghani et al., 2005; Leftwich, 2000).

Another key characteristic of the developmental state is embeddedautonomy. According to Evans, the developmental state is autonomous in sofar as it has a rationalised bureaucracy characterized by meritocracy and long-term career prospects, traits that make civil servants more professional anddetached from powerful rent-seeking groups (Evans, 1995:12).Embeddedness he defined as good communication and ties with the privatesector. But this factor was bound up with autonomy which would

simultaneously allow state officials to make policy professionally andindependently of special private sector interests (Evans, 1995:45). Anembedded state possesses a variety of institutionalized channels where in thestate apparatus and the private sector continually interact in a constructivemanner via Joint project of fostering economic development (Cypher andDietz, 2004:213).

Therefore, embeddedness is not enough, for there is always the dangerthat state apparatus can be captured by the very interests and sectors it seeks toguide promote and control. In order to guard against the risk of capture, thestate apparatus must have integrity, loyalty and cohesiveness. In short, statemust also exhibit the characteristics of autonomy (Cypher and Dietz,2004:213). For embedded autonomy to work, Evans observed the state mustcreate a meritocratic bureaucracy of highly skilled people who can freelycombine their close contacts with the private sector with their independentunderstanding of the global market to help steer economic planning indirections good for the national economy as a whole (Evans, 1995). Theinterdependence of these factors was crucial, social embeddedness withoutpolitical autonomy would leave state officials vulnerable to private pressure,leading to corruption and cronyism. Autonomy without embeddedness wouldleave state officials isolated from real events, prone to bad decision-makingand, in the worst scenarios, ruinous miscalculations (Evans, 1995).

Another of the underlying requirements of the developmental states isthus the creation of nation-wide public (Ghani et al., 2005). A nation-widepublic need not be rooted in a unified sense of nation based on cultural andlinguistic unity, but may well take the form of a more civic identity. Theimportant issue is that all citizens see themselves as Nigerians or Tanzanians asmuch as or more than as Igbo or Nyamwezi.

3.4 Southeast Asian Experiences

The current thinking about the developmental state has been strongly shaped

by research into the experience of the East Asian tigers. Although there is


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some disagreement in the literature regarding the core set of policies thatenabled the original Asian tigers (and now others) to achieve high levels ofdevelopment and economic growth, there is a general consensus about theessential features that characterized these successful developmental states.

Most of all, a strong core of state institutions with the capacity to promoteeconomic growth without being captured by particularist interests is regardedas having been essential (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007;8). This is what PeterEvans (1995) has called embedded autonomy.

Two factors are assumed to have enabled such a bureaucracy embodyingembedded autonomy and the developmental orientation of the state to arise inthe East Asian cases: a political leadership that was committed to developmentand, in most case, the uprooting of traditional elites. In Asia, politicalleadership committed to development was often motivated by regionalcompetition, nationalism and the desire to catch up with the west. As a result,development was regarded as a national project of the first priority. Such

determined political elites were either relatively uncorrupted or limited personalgains to non-predatory corruption which did not impede investments and theexpansion of national productivity (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007:8-9).

Subsequent analysis has shown that neoclassical reading of experiences ofdevelopment in Asia had downplayed the role of the state in the successstories. Mounting evidence showed that the state had been the key agentbehind the spectacular success of the East Asian Four Tigers. This has led notonly to a re-reading of the role of the state in the development process, but ithas also raised the question of the replicability of their policies and experiencein other developing countries (Mkandawire, 2001:292). The market failure isso prominent in development economics is still a problem that warrants

government intervention and that, since such failure differ in intensity, scopeand location, a selective set of interventions is required. The most significantlesson has been the central role played by a developmental state in the processof development (ibid).

The role of government in East Asia also went beyond the autonomousbureaucracy to one of close partnership between government and business: inthe successful Southeast Asian developmental state, a positive relationshipexists between the business community and the government. In these countries

where the government may directly influence the conduct of private enterprisefor the benefit of public good, and in turn, government is expected to assistand protect the private enterprise. The incentives and resources provided bygovernment also included the creation of rent. That is, policies were devised toensure that private companies would secure profit above normal marketconditions. Such rents were particularly important for inducing newinvestments and innovative activity. The management of rent-seeking is thusan essential part of governance in successful developmental states. In thismodel, rent-seeking was not in itself bad. But the key governance issues was toensure that rent were derived through activities that had social as well asprivate returns that the rent, when earned as profits, were raised in a way thatsupported national development(UNCTAD, 2009:34).


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3.5 Failed attempts at state-led development in Africa

Many African countries experienced some sort of big push for developmentduring the early independence years. However, subsequently governance

deteriorated due to clientelistc and/or neopatrimonial social structuresstrangled the potential of promising economic sectors and underminedattempts at state-led industrialisation. Efforts to spread education stalled, interaliawhen increasingly authoritarian leaders found that those with someeducation, but lacking good employment opportunities (due to the clientelisticthrottling of the economy), become politically dangerous. National armiesdiscredited themselves through bloody coups and internal divisions alongethnic lines. The project of national integration failed (Fritz and RochaMenocal, 2007:535-536).

In many African countries, benefits generated by state-led developmentwere turned in to rents for small elites and clientelistic networks who captured

the state- making investments successively less productive (Van de Walle, 2001;Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bayart, 1993).Hence, the difference betweensuccessful and failed attempts at state-led development does not appear to beprimarily attributable to corruption-which was generally present in both- butrather to the problem of state capture(Hellman et al., 2000; Khan,2005). Akey ingredient in avoiding state capture and other forms of predatorybehaviour is a competent, meritocratic and result-oriented core bureaucraticsystem. In a majority of African countries, a committed and competent civilservice failed to emerge or was eroded (often despite repeated attempts todevelop it) (Rocha Menocal, 2004). Civil service structures and other benefitsgenerated by state-led development were frequently manipulated by the

government apparatus and ruling elites as a source of patronage. The state wascaptured by narrow interests more concerned with building clientelisticnetworks than with fostering a transformation of the countrys economy (Vande Wall, 2001; Bayart, 1993).

Political leadership is crucial because of the way it affect the quality andautonomy of the bureaucracy in developmental states. Importantly, politicalleadership in Africa has not been uniformly poor since independence.However, even development-oriented post-independence leaders failed tobuild a sustained embedded autonomy of the state (Fritz and Rocha Menocal,2007). The tendencies militating against successful state-led development-leadership which lacks a motivation to prioritise development and the dearth

of a competent and efficient civil service- are perhaps most evident andperverse in sub-Saharan African states. While unfavourable geographical andeconomic factors have certainly had a detrimental impact on developmentprospects (Sachs, 2005), the dynamics embedded in a political system rooted inneopatrimonialism have played a central role in engendering and reproducingunderdevelopment. No African country- with South Africa, Botswana andMauritius- has truly achieved an encompassing and sustained developmentalorientation; the underlying reason increasingly identified by academic scholarsand other observers is the neopatrimonial character of many African states(Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Van de Walle, 2001).


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One argument often advanced, sometimes by Africans themselves, relatesto the lack of an ideology of development anchored in some form ofnationalist projects. Fanons (1967) tirades against the ideological numbness ofthe emergent ruling classes in Africa remain among the most sustained

statements of this position. Many other political leaders and analysts haveelaborated on this lacuna. Onimode (1988) talks of the ideological vacuumthat he attributes to petty bourgeois commitment to their class interests andtheir fear of revolutionary pressures.

For some, the lack of ideology is inherent in personal rule under whichloyalty is not to some overriding societal goals but to individuals, often holdinghighly idiosyncratic ideologies that they themselves flout with impunity and

with no moral qualms (Sandbrook, 1986). Consequently, such leaders are saidto have no moral basis on which they could demand enthusiastic andinternalised compliance to whatever national project they launched. ASMkandawire explained that, the quest for an ideology to guide the development

process inspired African leaders to propound their own idiosyncratic and oftenincoherent ideologies to rally the masses for national unity and development.

The centrality of development was such that it acquired the status of anideology (developmentalism) that provided the ideological scaffolding ofdevelopment plans (Mkandawire, 2001:295).


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Chapter 4Developmental State of Ethiopia

4.1 The making of developmental state in Ethiopia

Ethiopia was a quasi-feudal, one-partysocialists state with virtually noexperience with representative democracy or capitalism. The coming to powerof EPRDF, which is a coalition of different ethnic-based groups, witnessed a

wide range of policy reforms in the social, economic and political spheres. Thesocialist-oriented command economy has given way to a market-based type ofeconomic system, albeit under the ideological guise known as revolutionarydemocracy. Its preferred conception of democracy has not been the liberalbourgeoisie variety, based on individual participation, a diversity of interests

and views, and plural representation. Rather the revolutionary democracy isbased on communal collective participation, based on consensus forgedthrough discussion led by the vanguard organisation (Vaughan and Trouville,2003:15). Under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the country has become

Africas donor darling: still one of the poorest countries in the world, itreceives billions of dollars in aid annually. At least partially as a result, thegovernment has embarked on gradual and limited liberalisation of theeconomy- it retains ownership of key sectors and all land, but an embryonicindependent private sector has begun to emerge. This has been accompaniedby high levels of economic growth and substantial advances in the humandevelopment of its largely rural population (UNDP, 2010:3).

The year 2001 saw a division within EPRDF members. Among others, a majorone centred on ideological differences, and divergence of development strategies. Af-ter a complex debate that took the party close to disintegration, the party came upwith a declaration that expressed its commitment to building a developmental statein the country (EPRDF, 2006). Since 2003/2004, the Ethiopian Economy achieveda double-digit growth (see table 1.1 below). However, the country has been strug-

gling with the twin macroeconomic challenges of high inflation and very low inter-national reserve since 2007/2008 (African Economic outlook, 2011). The govern-ment argues that its success is fundamentally related to its rejection of the neo-liberal economic policy, following its own indigenous ideology of revolutionarydemocracy, and above all the government attributes this growth success to its em-

brace of the idea of a developmental state. Ethiopias growth and developmental

trajectory that was adopted after the 2001 tehadso/ resuscitation movement is avery much contested issue. There is no consensus among different elites of thecountry as to whether the government is truly developmental or not, and the ar-gument goes even to extent of questioning the growth success achieved.

The example of East Asia is inspiring Ethiopian governmental elites toplace double-digit growth at the forefront of their national developmentstrategy; this would certainly be consistent with much of the literature on theEast Asian Model and Beijing consensus. The East Asian Model putseconomic growth and the fulfilment of the material needs of majority at theheart of government policy (Gore, 2000:796), often becoming the main source


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of governmental legitimacy (Peerenboom, 2002:245). In Suhartos Indonesia,for example, economic recovery and material expansion.... became an ideologyin the strongest sense of the term, describing the purpose of political activity,the method used to achieve that goal, the attitudes which public figures should

express, as well as serving as an effective ideological weapon against opponentsof the regime or proponents of alternative visions (Chalmers, 1997:3). Theemphasis is on productivity and competitiveness rather than on welfare, andother economies are used as reference points which bureaucrats can emulateand use to measure their progress (Johnson, 1982). The strong parallel betweenEthiopia and East Asias drives for economic growth thus seem rooted, at leastpartially, in processes of emulation.

The other and related lesson from East Asia is the strong role that thestate is perceived to play in the economies.Ethiopian elites saw East Asia asan alternative to the neo-liberalism they so decried in the west and itsconditionalities, Elsje Fourie (2011:14). State intervention in the economy is

the other very visible role the government is still playing. The state needed tointervene because it has a firm belief that market failures would make thedevelopment of rural areas unprofitable and unfeasible for the countrysnascent, particularly in the sector of physical infrastructure (ibid:15). Thus,State intervention in the economy in Ethiopia is so pervasive to the extent thatrecently the government has fixed the price of certain commodities, devaluedthe value of the currency and manipulates exchange rate in response to thechanges in the economy (EPRDF, 2006). According to the prime Minister ofEthiopia, Meles Zenawi, one of the lessons that development draws fromSouth Korea and Taiwan is their alleged ability to free rural communities fromrent-seeking private landlords and to build developmental structures through

selective government intervention(2006).This thinking has carried over into policy as well, primarily by preventing

from liberalising the economy at the speed that donors would prefer. Thegovernment continues to practice import substitution, impose control onforeign exchange, and protect and promote key industries from outsidecompetition. All land remains public, and key sectors such as banking andtelecommunications are wholly government-owned. Regarding to this, theBertelsmann Transformation Index, which assigns countries a score from oneto ten depending on the extent of market liberalisation, accords Ethiopia ascore of 4.11( Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009:1).

Although most countries in East Asia experienced a degree of stateintervention during their periods of rapid growth, South Koreas government isoften seen as having been most interventionist of the Asian Tigers (Lairran and

Vergara, 1993:257): government banks fuelled the countrys large corporations,strict import controls and export quotas were in place. Ethiopias emulationfrom South Korea is significant. According to (MoFED, 2010a), importsubstitution policies, government directed private sector developmentprogrammes, institutions established by the ministry of industry to promoteexports in certain key sectors--- all were expressly cited as being influenced byobservation of East Asia.

The Ethiopian government overwhelming emphasis on economic growth

has manifested itself in official documents and in practice as well. The


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governments highly ambitious five-year plans are the clearest example of this:in 2005, the plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development To End Poverty(PASDEP) made a massive push to accelerate growth the second of its centralpillar, and aimed to achieve an annual average of 7-10% growth in real GDP

for the five years to follow (MoFED, 2006:165).The lowest of this numbers issaid to come directly from the best experience of Eastern and Southern Asiacountries that have registered accelerated growth (ibid.). The even moreoptimistic Growth and Transformation plan (GTP) in 2010) aims to doublethe countrys GDP by 2015 and achieve middle-income status by 2025(MoFED, 2010b).

4.2 Elite Commitment

In the literature, a developmental states leadership is strongly committed todevelopmental goals, and which places national development a head of

personal enrichment and/or short-term political gains (Ghani et. al, 2005).EPRDF sources (EPRDF, 2011:39) stress on Taiwan and South Korea asbeing typical East Asian models that the government strives to emulate. Thesegovernments, it claims, were committed to developing their economies andtook the issue as a matter of life and death. Similar to them as one feature of adevelopmental state, the government considers itself committed totransforming the country to a middle-income country within a short period oftime. Not only this, the government also views ensuring development as anissue that determines regime-survival (EPRDF, 2011: 67). During the time ofthe resuscitation movement which was also the time the Eritrean governmentinvaded Ethiopia, government sources further claimed, there had been conflict

between the develop mentalist and rent-seeker leaders of the party whichthe former was able to win. Expressing it in other ways, it also rests itspremises on the nature of the region (Horn of Africa) the country is placed in,saying, taking the question of development as a matter oflife and death andachieving fast development and structural change does not require deepknowledge in a region where majority of nations are either failed or in a crisis(EPRDF, 2006:72). Political leaders in Ethiopia, Aaron Tesfaye (2010) claims,envision a break from the past leading to rapid economic growth whileguaranteeing political autonomy to ethnic regions (Aaron, 2010).

As it is the case to many issues in the country, however, there are differentviews reflected regarding the nature of the elite. Supporting the governments

position, there are some who conceive of the leaders as truly committed to theprocess of re-building the country with the Prime Minster Meles Zenawiemerging as unchallenged intellectual and ideological guide of the party andgovernment especially after the tehadso movement (Medhane and Young,2003:401). Foune (2011) said, Elites [in Ethiopia] viewed economic growth asimportant for its impact inside a country, but also as crucial for achievinginternational independence and gaining the respect of others. While forothers, elites in Ethiopia are regarded as dictators and tyrants owingto thepolitics of exclusion which the government purposefully uses (Merara,2003:146).

Thus, according to Evans (1995), the state must be embedded in society,

that is connected to concrete set of social ties that bind the state to society. In


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the case of south East Asian, political leadership was committed todevelopment and in most case the uprooting of traditional elites. The politicalelites were either relatively uncorrupted or limited personal gains to non-predatory corruption (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). However, in Ethiopia

scholars Mesay, echoed that the state are used to marginalized and exclude rivalelites. The practice of exclusion instead of integration or coalition denotes thelack of development-oriented elites and the preponderance of rent-seeking andpredatory elites (Mesay, 2010).

On the other hand, the degree of political stability is a preconditionsustainable development. For multi- ethnic societies, as argued byLijphart(2002), a grand coalition of power sharing of all significant groups inpolitical power is contributed to the stability of the country. For instance, asSebudubudu (2009) argued that Botswana national elite to form a successfulgrand coalition which in turn contributed to political, social and economicstability (2009). Moreover he noted that one of the factors to Botswanas

developmental state was the absence of a dominant ethnic group (ibid.). As aresult, the elite in Botswana has forged a grand coalition since independence,and this inclusion of different groups in society, including the traditional chiefs,has granted a stake for all groups to take part in the politics of the new nation

which in turn promoted the goals of a Developmental State to be achieved,granting legitimacy for state policies (ibid.).

In Ethiopian case, as stated by Mesay, should not be cited as an exampleof grand coalition, given the hegemonic position of the TPLF (Mesay, 2010).

This is the feature that lacked Ethiopia when the new state/TGE was formed,failure to have consensus and national reconciliation across elites that werestruggling to bring the downfall of the military regime has been one factor

inhibiting the success of government policies, until recently where we havedifferent associations and leagues that carry the objective of participatingdifferent sections of the society (particularly the youth and women) in togovernment agendas. Thus,Mesay stressed that, the only way by which thepresent ruling elite can be begin its transformation is through the establishmentof a grand coalition materialized a power sharing arrangement among variouselite groups(ibid.). Therefore, this impacts on the subsequent political andeconomic developments in the country and puts its own limit on succeedingthe goal of a developmental state.

4.2 Bureaucracy

4.2.1 Human resources in the bureaucracy: Case of Beninshangul-Gumuz regional state

In accordance to the 1995 constitution of Ethiopia article 49, Benishangul-Gumuz isacquired the status of the member states of Ethiopia. It has located in the western partof Ethiopia. It has a population of 939,000 and composed of different ethnic groupsincludes Benishangul, Gumuz, Amhara, Oromo and others of which Benishangul andGumuz accounts the majority. According to BoFED, the main economic activity ofthe region is agriculture and cattle breeding which account 90% of the livelihood of


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the population. The region has a huge fertile land with abundant water resource todevelop advanced agricultural production. In addition, the region is rich in miningresource like gold, copper, zinc, base metal and marble resources (BoFED, 2003).Despite its potential, it lacks industrial activities.

Benishangul- Gumuz suffers from shortage of trained and educatedmanpower. In 1999, the regional state had about 9063 civil servants, of whichonly 167(2 percent) were profes

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