building democracry on the sand
TRANSCRIPT
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2008Demos
Reportfromthe2ndDemosNationalExpertSurvey
[
DEMOCRACY
BUILDINGONTHESAND]AdvancesandSetbacksinIndonesia
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Title : DEMOCRACYBUILDINGONTHESAND
AdvancesandSetbacksinIndonesia
Editor : WillyPurnaSamadhiandNicolaasWarouw
Design/layout : SusantiJohana
Publishedby : Demos(Jakarta)andPCDPress(Yogyakarta).
Firstedition : December2008.
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TableOfContent
i
TableofContentTable
of
Content
Preface
Chapter1
Indonesias Held Back Democracy and Beyond Introduction and Executive
Briefing
OlleTrnquist
Chapter2
Approaching Democracy Some Brief Introductory Notes on Concepts and
Methods
OlleTrnquistandNicolaasWarouw
Chapter3
ADecadeofReformasi:TheFragilityofDemocracy
WillyPurnaSamadhiandSofianMunawarAsgart
Chapter4
ARoughRoadtoPoliticalCitizenship:UndertheShadowofCommunalism
WillyPurnaSamadhi
Chapter5
TowardstheConsolidationofPowerfulEliteDemocracy
NurImanSubonoandWillyPurnaSamadhi
Chapter6
PopulistShortcuttoProgress?
SyafaatunKaryadi
Chapter7
CraftingRepresentation
AttiaNur
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TableOfContent
ii
Chapter8
Summary
DEMOSteam
Chapter9
TheModelofPoliticalBloc
ArisArifMundayatandA.E.Priyono
Bibliography
Appendix
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Preface
iii
PrefaceThe year of 2008 marked the tenth anniversary of Indonesian
reformasi, which was enacted after the fall of Suhartoled New Order regime
throughprotestactionsbackedbyuniversity students.For tenyears,wehave
witnessed some promising changes. Yet, such a span of time is not sufficient
enoughtosolidifythefundamentalsofdemocracyandhumanrightspromotion.
Indonesiandemocracyremainedunsteady!
SowasthegeneraldescriptionofDemos2007SurveyonProblemsand
Options of Indonesian Democratisation. The Survey was the second one,
following the first conducted in 2003. Indeed, there had not been much
improvementduringthespanoftime,butweareconvincedthattheprocessof
democratisation cannot be left behind or stopped, as Demos surveys also
revealed some existing options that should be used to achieve a better,
meaningfuldemocracy.
This survey is based on the assesment of 903 informants from 13
frontlines inallprovinces in Indonesia, fromAcehtoPapua. Inordertogather
information from the informants, Demos gained incredible support from key
informants and research assistants in 33 provinces. Demos research team
involved in thissurveywereSyafaatunKariadi (coordinator),AEPriyono,AttiaNur, Nur Iman Subono and Sofian Munawar Asgart. Willy Purna Samadhi,
DemosDeputy forResearch,conducted internalsupervision.Contributionwas
also given by Antonio Pradjasto, Melanie Tampubolon, Gilang Desti Parahita,
DebbiePrabawati, InggridSilitonga,AmiPriwardhani,ChristinaDwiSusantiand
LaksmiPratiwi.
TheexecutivesummaryofthissurveywaspresentedinJakartaonMay
2008. The more regional based results were also presented in six cities in
Indonesia, namely Ambon, Palu, Mataram, Banjarmasin, Bandung andPalembang. We are glad and grateful at the same time, that the forums had
contributedusefulcomments,criticismandsuggestionstoimproveouranalysis
towardourempiricaldata.
This book is the result of cooperation between Demos and Gadjah
Mada University, in this case Center for Social and South East Asian Studies
(CESSAS). The cooperation is expected to produce a more critical empirical
studiesthatatthesametimealsomeetacademicstandard.
We are grateful to Professor Mohtar Masoed, Dr. Pratikno, Cornelis
Lay, M.A, Budi Irawanto, M.A, who have been playing great role to the
establishmentofDemosUGMcooperation.Theyhadalsocontributedimportant
comments, criticisms, and suggestions to this book. We are also especially
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Preface
iv
thankfultoDr.NicolaasWarouwthatprovidedhispreciousenergyandtimeto
becometheeditorforthisbook.
Also,wewould like to thankDr.OlleTrnquist,ProfessorofPolitical
andDevelopmentScience fromUniversityofOslo,Norway,whohasbeenvery
enthusiasticandconsistentingivingallhisattentiontothecooperation.
Also to theEmbassyofNorway for Indonesia,TheNorwegianAgency
for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and Swedish Development Aid
Authority (Sida), we are grateful for supporting our scientific integrity and
independenceinpromotingdemocracyinIndonesia.
Thesurveyresultdiscussedinthisbookdidrevealthatthesituationof
democracy in Indonesia remained critical. Yet, the fact that prodemocracy
actorsnowbelievedthatengagement inpoliticalprocesswasoneof importantwaystoattainpopularsovereignty isonepointworthofconsideration.Several
political attempts were promoted to strengthen democratic consolidation by
using the emerging of several national political communities. Unfortunately,
some prodemocracy actors took populist shortcut with somejustification to
their options; which called for harder work of prodemocracy actors to
strengthen consolidation among themselves. This became more important as
theelitesalsoconsolidatedthemselvesbyusingexistingdemocraticinstruments
butrefusingtopromotethem.Therefore,webelievethatthisbookwouldgiveimportantcontributiontothepromotionofIndonesiandemocracy.
Weinvitesuggestionsandcommentsforthisbook.
Yogyakarta,December2008
AsmaraNababan Dr.ArisArifMundayat
DemosExecutiveDirector CESSASUGMDirector
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IndonesiasHeldBackDemocracyandBeyond
1
ChapterOneIndonesiasHeldBackDemocracyandBeyond
IntroductionandExecutiveBriefing:
Advances,setbacksandoptions,20032007
OlleTrnquist(UniversityofOslo)
Thisbook isproducedjointlybyDemos researchers,coordinatedby
WillyP.SamadhiandateamofseniordemocracyscholarsatUniversitasGadjah
Mada (UGM) coordinated by Dr. Nicolaas Warouw, in cooperation with this
author.Itisdedicatedtotheendofthebeginningofthreeprocesses.
First,ismarkstheendofthebeginningofattemptstorebuildfruitful
relations between public academia and civil society. The book is rooted in
collective work in the early 1990s between scholars and activists on
democratisation;collectiveworkwhichsoonhowevermusttakerescue incivic
organisations because of the lack of academic freedom. The first book,Aktor
Demokrasi,(BudimanandTrnquist2001)wasresearchedandspreadindrafted
versionsduringthedismantlingoftheSoehartoregime.Thesecondbookonthe
PostSoeharto Democracy Movement (Priyono, Prasetyo and Trnquist 2003)
drewattentiontotheparadoxicalmarginalisationofprodemocrats inthethen
buildingofdemocracy.Thustheresultscalledformorecomprehensiveanalysis
ofthepoliticaldynamics.Thiswouldbetogeneratebetterknowledgeasabasis
for deliberation and improvement. The Organisation Demos was formed to
facilitate the work. The aim was to generate researchbased democracypromotionthroughparticipatorysurveys.Participatorysurveysofhowsome900
experiencedactivistsalongthefrontlinesofallcrucialeffortsatdemocracyinall
provincesassessed theproblemsandoptions.A rigorousanalytical framework
withhundredsoftheoreticallymotivatedquestionswasdevelopedandapplied.
However, while it is true that support was always there from a handful of
scholars,itisonlythejointworkwiththecurrentbookthatmarksthesuccessful
conclusionofafirstroundofbroaderandclosercooperation.Fortunately,the
writingofthebookhasthusalsoenabledthetransformationofthisauthorsco
direction and capacity building of Demos into more equal partnership. The
continuous academic guidance is now shouldered by a team of Indonesian
scholarswiththisauthorasasenioradvisoronly.
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IndonesiasHeldBackDemocracyandBeyond
2
Second, the book is also dedicated to the end of the beginning of
attemptstoestablishbothatheoreticallyandempiricallysolidbasisforanalysis
of Indonesian democracy. Most assessments of democracy are driven by the
needofgovernmentofficesandforeignsupporterstoprepareandevaluatetheir
policies and projects. The democracy movement, however, in addition to any
seriousscholarandstudent,needsmore theoreticallyandempirically inclusive
and impartialassessments.This istomake itpossibletoconsidertheprosand
cons of a wider spectrum of arguments as well as to extend the sources of
information beyond the established elite to the experienced democrats in the
field. While such a more solid foundation has now been generated through
Demossurveys, thisbookalso introducesaneffort toaddcrucial results from
scatteredbutalreadyexistingstudiesaswellasnewresearchofmajorproblems.Much of this work is conducted within a new international education and
research programme on Power Conflict and Democracy in theoretical and
comparative perspective. The founding partners are UGM with Demos,
UniversityofColomboandUniversityofOslo(UiO).Butothersarewelcometo
link up too including in the newelectronicpublication programme, the PCD
Press;theprimepublisherofthisbook.TheaimofthePCDPressistofosterthe
localneedsandprioritiesofstudentsandscholarsinSouth andSoutheastAsia
andtheirclosepartners. Inthefuture,finally,theacademicnodewithUGM incooperationwithDemosmayalsobetheimpartialandlegitimatepublicsphere
thatisneededtoalsodiscussandshareinatransparentwayresultsfromdonor
andgovernmentdrivenassessmentsofdemocraticchallenges;assessmentthat
maybothaddcrucialinsightsandbenefitfromindependentanalyses.
Third, the book is of course dedicated to what one may hope is the
endofthebeginningofIndonesiastransitionfromauthoritariantomeaningful
democraticrule.Tenyearsago,SoehartosNewOrderbegantobereplacedby
the worlds largest New Democracy. It is time to evaluate advances and
setbacks,andtoidentifyoptionsforthefuture.
Inthepresentbook,theresultsfromtheallIndonesiaresurveywhich
wascarriedout in2007,areanalysed inviewofthedata from the firstsurvey
which was conducted in two rounds in 2003/2004 and which are available inPriyonoet.al
(2007
).Beinganewdemocracyinconstanttransformation,Indonesiacalls
forresurveysoftheproblemsandoptionsasfrequentlyasthegeneralelections.
The approach and framework is presented and discussed in detail in chapter
two. Ithasalsobeensubjecttoaseparateacademicallycriticalselfevaluation.
(Trnquist2008b).The fullquestionnaire isavailable in theappendix.The leadsponsors in addition to major sections of the democracy movement and
scholars at the UiO and UGM with associates is the Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs through its embassy to Indonesia, with Sida (the Swedish
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IndonesiasHeldBackDemocracyandBeyond
3
InternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency)andotherpartners, including
Ford Foundation. The commitment and support of the Scandinavian sponsors
butalsotheirpolicyofnoninterventionisminacademicmattershasbeencrucial
tothesuccess.
In brief, the resurvey and supplementary research reveal that in
between 2003/04 and 2007 Indonesia has developed into a consolidated top
downdemocracydominatedby itspowerfulelite.Thestandardofgovernance
related instruments of democracy (such as ruleof law, anticorruption and
accountability) has improved though from very low levels. A countrywide
politicalcommunity isevolvingasasubstitutefor thecrumblingJakartadriven
nationstate thoughthenewpolityremainsconstrainedbyelitistandlocalised
identitypolitics
and
economic
globalisation.
The
military
ison
the
retreat
from
politics,andamajorityofthewidenedandlocalisedestablishmentmakesuseof
formallydemocraticrulesofthegame thoughclearlytotheirownbenefitand
only at times infavour of the aims of democracy. Much of the comparatively
successfuldemocracybuildingisthusbuiltonloosefoundations.Ascomparedto
four years earlier, most of the relatively impressivefreedoms and rights are
stagnating and backsliding. The sections of thepowerful elite that rarely win
electionsseemtobe interested inapartialreturntotheold ideaofpromoting
stabilityand
economic
growth
ahead
of
popular
freedoms
and
sovereignty.
This
wasoncelabelledpoliticsoforder(Huntington1965)andusedtolegitimisethe
rise of the New Order. Now it is baptised sequencing democracy (e.g.
Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Most seriously, however, organised politics is
exclusionary. Most people are not integrated from below, only, at best,
incorporatedfromabove.Inspiteofattemptsbyprodemocratstothecontrary,
there is a lack of representation bypeople themselves and of basic issuesand
interests related to middle classes, women, labour,peasants andfisherfolks,
urbanpoorandindigenouspopulations.Whilevotingisfree,runninginelections
is
onlyfor
the
well
endowed
and
powerful.
Hence
the
worlds
largest
new
democracy isheldback.Andsincethepartysystem isclosedforactorswithout
economic and cohesivepower, and sincepopular organisation remains weak,
there isaneedforpopularandcivicorganisationstoformDemocraticPolitical
Blocks behind basicplatforms on local and central levels, to thusfoster and
control leastworstcandidateswhocanfacilitatemoremeaningfuldemocracy
bywhichpeoplecanimprovetheirsocialrelationsandstandardofliving.
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DesignversusStructure
The generally accepted meaning of democracy is popular control of
public affairs on the basis of political equality. How far has Indonesia moved
towardsthis ideal?Andhowmuch furtherwill itnowgo?Putdifferently:how
much of the old Soehartoera oligarchy remains in place, still governing, but
doing so via formally democratic elections? What, if any, are the chances to
advance towards more meaningful democracy, in terms of sufficiently
favourable means and capacities of ordinary people to really control public
affairsandthuspromotedevelopmentinaccordancewiththeirownpriorities?
There are two predominant and rather extreme kinds of answers to
these questions. The first comes from the designers. Beginning in the globalthird wave of democracy, from the late 1970s onwards, some concerned
scholarsandpractitionersplacedtheirfaithinthedesignofalimitednumberof
institutions.Getthe institutionsrights,suchpeopleargued,anddemocracywill
flourish.Theinstitutionstheyhadinmindrelatetocivilandpoliticalliberties,the
ruleof law, freeand fairelections,and goodgovernance. Internationally this
trend began with the eliteled transitions from authoritarian rule in southern
Europeinthe1970s,withSpainastheparadigmaticexample.Itthentravelledto
LatinAmerica,iteffectedthetransformationofSouthAfricaanditwasexportedto the rest of Africa south of the Sahara in addition to Eastern Europe. (E.g.
ODonnellandSchmitter1986,LintzandStepan1996,Grugel2002). Finally it
wastakenaboard inpartsofAsiatoo;andwiththeendgame inJakarta itwas
introducedtoIndonesiabyscholarssuchasBillLiddle(2001).Atpresent,much
ofthese ideasareapplied in internationalagencies fordemocracybuilding like
the National Democratic Institute and International IDEA. In this view and by
international standards among new but often poorly advancing democracies,
Indonesia isdoingfine,especiallygiventhetraumatichistoryoftheelimination
of the popular movements in 196566, and the more than thirty years of
militarised capitalism that followed. Hence, the achievements may testify to
whatispossibleevenunderharshconditions.
It is true that the designers acknowledge that the system poorly
representstherealneedsofordinarypeople,buttheybelievethatthisproblem
too can be improved through better institutional design. The measures they
propose include more direct elections of government executives, and
simplificationofthepoliticalpartysystem.Thelatterstepwouldresultinafew
major parties that, although topdriven, would at least be able to developpolicies,pickupdemandsfromsociety,recruitpeopleforgovernmentjobsand
supervise theexecutive.The designers think thatpopular representation from
belowisunrealisticandthattopdowndemocracydominatedbypowerfulelites
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willhavetodo. Inthisview, deepeningdemocracy is instead limitedtodirect
participationbyresponsiblecitizensincivilsociety,usually,defacto,excluding
themasses.(E.g.Catn2007)
Thesecondanswercomesfromstructuralistsonboththeleftandthe
right of the political spectrum. The structuralists use a similarly narrow
definition of democracy but are much more pessimistic. They say that the
structuralconditionsdonotpermitdecentdemocracy.Asaresult,theoligarchs
have retained their power and ordinary people their poverty. From a radical
political economy position, this is most forcefully argued by Vedi Hadiz and
RichardRobison(2004)andrecentlybyMaxLane(2008),advocatingtheneedto
return to extra parliamentary actions. According to some structuralists,
freedoms and elections have even generated worse identity politics, conflictsandcorruption,andlesseconomicgrowth(e.g.MansfieldandSnyder2005).
Thus, there is a new emerging international thesis: that enlightened
groups should sequence democracy. While major parts of the left focus on
fightingglobalneoliberalism,sayingitblocksrealdemocracy,therightwantsto
buildsolidinstitutions,goodgovernance,growthalliancesandorganisationsof
responsible citizens, before entrusting the masses with even the limited
freedom of electing topdown parties dominated by powerful elites. This
position is gaining ground in, for instance, many ministries for foreign affairs,conservativethink tanksanddevelopmentbodiessuchastheWorldBank.(C.f.
thereviewbyCarothers2007a,b)
AlternativeFocusonUniversalFactorsinContextualProcesses
Boththeseargumentsaretheoreticallyandpoliticallydubious.Thefirst
assumes that once the elites have agreed to the establishment of a few
democratic institutions, democracy has been achieved. This is, of course, as
nave as stating that basic capitalist or socialist institutions always generate
prosperity.Yet,mostdesigners,whomasalreadymentionedwereintroducedto
IndonesiabyscholarssuchasBillLiddle,haveat leastheldontotheirbelief in
democracy.
That is not always the case with the structuralists. They insist that
rather narrowly defined democracy is meaningful only if certain prerequisites
have already been met. For the conventional left, this usually means greater
social and economic equality, workers or the poor having strong bargaining
power,andthelike.Fortheright,itmeansstronginstitutions,goodgovernance,associations of responsible citizens and economic growth. As a result, the
structuralists by definition exclude the possibility of creating such conditions
through improved democracy. Instead, they become pessimistic about the
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IndonesiasHeldBackDemocracyandBeyond
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promiseofdemocracy,orargueorindicate likereportedlyvicepresidentJusuf
Kalla (e.g. Suwarni 2007, Simamora 2008) that it should be limited or even
postponed.
In between the two extremes (both applying a narrow definition of
democracybutoneengineeringelite institutions,theotherwaitingformassive
social change) democracy can be understood instead as a contextualprocess
where universal dimensions and intrinsic democratic institutions can only be
analysedinviewofcontendingactorsdemocraticwillandtheirpoliticalcapacity
touseandpromotetheinstitutionsovertime.
A framework for such an analysis was developed and applied in our
two national surveys of Indonesias democracy. At each point of time Demos
askedsome900experiencedcampaignerscumexpertsondemocratisationinallprovincesabouttheextenttowhichtheexistinginstitutionsandthethreeactors
that they found to most powerful and the three alternative actors that they
deemed to be most important in their own contexts really supported the
universallyacceptedaimsandmeansofdemocracy.Thetheoreticalframework
and method are presented and discussed in detail in Chapter 2, but the first
focus was thus on the performance, spread and substance of the 32 intrinsic
instruments to promote and apply democracy that we had identified in
accordance with mainstream theories. (These instruments included the majordimensionsofequalcitizenship,internationallawandhumanrightsconventions,
ruleof lawandjustice,civilandpoliticalrights,economicandsocialrights,free
and fair elections, good political representation, democratic and accountable
government, freedomofmedia,pressandacademic freedoms,additionalcivic
participation, direct participation). Second, questions were asked about the
extent to which the most important actors that the informants had identified
actuallypromoted,usedorabusedandevenavoidedtheintrinsicinstrumentsof
democracy. Third, attention was directed at the capacity of the actors to
promoteandusethe instruments.Themajordimension inthisrespectwasthe
extenttowhichtheactors(a)wereincludedorexcluded inpoliticsat large;(b)
hadrelevantsourcesofpowerandabilitytotransformthem intoauthorityand
legitimacy; (c)wereable toput theirmain issuesand interestson theagenda
(i.e. politicise them), (d) could organise and mobilise collective action in
democratic ways, and (e) had the capacity to approach decision making and
executiveinstitutionsofgovernance,directlyandorbymeansofrepresentation.
Thecombinedresultsfrombothsurveysmakeitclearthattheextreme
institutionalist and structuralist arguments are notjust theoretically but alsoempiricallymistaken.Letusturntoageneraloutlineofthefindings.
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EightMajorConclusions
(1)DeterioratingFreedom
A first conclusion from these surveys is that while many civil and
political rights are being upheld which is in contrast to most other new
democracies the advances have somewhat deteriorated since 2003/04. By
thenthegeneralstandardofthefreedomswereoutstandingascomparedtothe
other institutionaldimensionsofdemocracy. Informantssaythat inadditionto
majorproblemsofthefreedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevel(or
teamsof independentcandidates)thatcanrecruitmembers,andparticipate in
electionstowhichweshallreturn thefreedomsofreligion,belief,language
and culture, freedomof speech,assemblyandorganisation, freedomof thepress,artandacademicworld,citizensparticipationinextensiveindependent
civil associations and public access to and the reflection of different views
within media, art and the academic world have also backslided. (For an
overviewofthedetails,seetheindexinChapter3.)
(2)ImprovedGovernance
Thesecondconclusion is that therehasbeenageneral improvement
since 2003/04 in topdown efforts by government institutions to improve themiserableperformanceoftheruleoflaw,particularlythecontrolofcorruption.
These improvements are particularly noticeable with regard to the
subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law, the
equality before the law, the transparency and accountability of elected
government and the executive, governments independence from strong
interestgroupsandcapacity toeliminatecorruptionandabuseofpower,and
the capacity of thegovernment to combatparamilitarygroups,hoodlumsand
organisedcrime.It istruethatthe improvementsarefromvery low levelsand
that most of these crucial problems remain, but the advances remain
commendable.
(3)CountryWidePoliticalCommunity
Third, thedisintegrationof the centralisticNewOrderhasnot led to
thebalkanisation,characterisedbyseparatismandethnicandreligiouscleansing
thatmanyobserversandpoliticianshadpredicted.Whathasemergedinsteadis
a unitary political (rather than ethnonationalist) community with extensive
spaceforlocalpolitics.Itistruethatthisspaceimplieshugeinequalitiesamongthe provinces and regions, and that it has often been occupied by powerful
groups.Theattemptstodevelopdemocraticpoliticsonthebasisofreal issues
andinterestsonthegroundareunderthethreatbyelitistandlocalisedidentity
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politicsandeconomicglobalisation.But inAceh,where foreigndonorshaveso
farcontainedthemilitaryandbigbusinessandwhereseparatistshavebeenable
to substitute political participation for armed struggle, decentralisation also
paved the way for peace and potentially fruitful democracy. This part of the
frameworkfordemocratictransition isnowatstakeandweshallreturntothe
challenges.
(4)TheRelativeStabilityofDemocracyRestsWithElitistInclusionofPeople
Atthesametime,politics ingeneralcontinuetobedominatedbythe
powerful elite. Yet, the dominant elite groups are more broadlybased, more
localised and less militarized than under Soeharto. Hence the surveys and
associatedresearchqualifiesthegeneralthesisthatthepowerfulelitefromtheNew Order has simply captured democracy. (C.f. Robison and Hadiz 2002)
Remarkably, it is rather an extended elite that have adjusted to the new
institutions that are supposed to promote democracy. This is not to say that
there are no abuses, but decentralisation and elections have enabled more
diversesectionsofIndonesiaselitetomobilisepopularsupport.Ofcourse,elites
oftenmobilisesuchsupportbymakinguseof theirclientelisticnetworks,their
privileged control of public resources and their alliances with business and
communal leaders.Yet, the interestof suchelitegroups inelections isbothacrucialbasisoftheactuallyexistingdemocracyanditsmajordrawback.Without
thiselitesupport, Indonesiandemocracywouldnotsurvive;with thepowerful
elite support, it becomes the domain of rotten politicians who prosper and
entrenchthemselvesthroughcorruption.(TheresearchprogramsRenegotiating
Boundaries and In Search of Middle Indonesia at the KITLV institute in the
Netherlands(www.kitlv.nl)andCenterforLocalPoliticsandRegionalAutonomy
StudiesatGadjahMadaUniversityareprovidingcomprehensivecasestudies in
thisarea.)
In short,beyonda numberof freedoms,democratic institutionsand
peoplescapacitiesremainweak.Yet,muchoftherequiredinfrastructureisnow
inplace,andinspiteoftheirweaknessesandbiases,Indonesiasinstitutionsare
solidenoughtoaccommodatepowerfulactorsand,atleastpartially,alternative
actors as well. Theoretically, this is the bottom line. It is the reason why
Indonesiamaybecalledanemergingdemocracy.Inalltheserespects,Indonesia
maythusbegintoresembleIndia,themoststabledemocracyintheglobalSouth
which is dominated primarily by politically oriented powerful elites that
incorporatevulnerablepeople intopolitics,winelectionsandofcoursebenefitin various ways from the powers thus gained and therefore also sustaining
certainprocedural fundamentalsofdemocracy whilethemore modernand
cosmopolitanaffluentmiddleclassesincreasinglyoftenoptforprivatesolutions
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totheirproblems.(e.g.CSDS2007,Chatterjee 2004,HarrissandCorbridge2000,
HarrissWhite2003)
(5)Monopolisation
of
Representation
Sowhatwould ittaketomakethemostofthisdemocraticpotential?
The major problem as compared to India is that Indonesias system of
representationandelectionsisnotevenopenenoughforthepossibleinclusion
of major interests among the people at large and also erects high barriers to
participation by independent players. Indonesiasdemocracy is thusheld back
even inaverybasicandproceduralsense.Civicandpopularorganisationsare
preventedfromgetting intoorganisedpolitics.Moreover,andtoa largeextent
due to decades of repression and the continuous monopolisation ofrepresentation but also because their own mistakes, these groups remain
hamperedbytheirownfragmentationandweakmassorganisation.Moreover,
supplementary research indicate clearly that these weaknesses in turn are
relatedtoproblemsofrepresentation,eveninbasictermsofbeingresponsiveto
theprimedailyproblemsandaspirationsofpeopleonthegroundindeveloping
policiesandstrategies. Inthisrespect Indonesiastillseriously lagsbehind.This
underdevelopmentofdemocracyisthuswithregardtoboththepeopleandthe
issuesandintereststhatareexcluded.First, thesurvey reveals that thepowerfulactors insocietydominate
politics and the political economy. Politics (including the executive) and good
contacts are their primary sources of power; pure economic bases are less
crucial.Alliancesaremainlywithinthesepowerfulsectionsoftheeliteinabroad
senseoftheword(thusalso implying ifcoursethattherearealsootherelites,
alternativepolitical, cultural intellectual with less powers). Legitimacy of the
powerful elite is mainly related to the ability to connect people and gain
authoritativepositions.Themajor issueson theagenda includehard issuesof
governance and economic development. Ordinary people are brought into
politics primarily through clientelism and populism; and in this context the
controlanduseofmassmediaisgettingincreasinglyimportant.Comprehensive
organisation, however, including several levels and issues towards aggregated
agendas, remains insignificant; and attempts to build from below are the
weakestofall.
Second, theeverresourcefulelitespreventordinarypeopleand their
smallparties(butnotthepettypartiesoftheresourceful)fromenteringpolitics.
Independent localpartiesareonlyallowedandfunctionalinAceh.Participationin elections in other parts of the country (even of local parliaments) calls for
nationalpresencewithbranchofficesvirtuallyalloverthecountry.Hence,itis
almost impossible to build more representative parties from below without
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10
havingaccess tohuge funds. (For thosewith such funds,however, it is rather
easy tosetupaneligiblepartyandget represented, thuscausingproblemsof
efficient governance among squabbling elite politicians with special vested
interests.) Further, only big parties or extensive coalitions may nominate
candidatesforelectionsofgovernors,mayorsanddistrictheads.Asidefromthe
elections of individual representatives from the provinces to an insignificant
nationalassembly (DPD), independent candidateshavebeenprohibited and
thenewlyannouncedopeningscallagainforhugeresourcesonthepartofthe
candidates.Inaddition,candidatestovariouspositionsmusthavecomparatively
advanced formal schooling, thus excluding leaders from the labouring classes.
Those running in village elections usually even have to share the substantial
administrativecosts.Similarly,therearenoefficientmeasurestocountervestedinterestsandprivatepoliticalfinancingortopromoteinternalpartydemocracy,
and theguidelines to fosterequalgender representationhavegenerated little
result.
Third, there are no substantive efforts to foster direct democratic
representation inpublicgovernance through local representativesandpopular
organisationsbasedoninterestandspecialknowledgesuchastradeunionsand
environmentalmovementsonlyprivilegedcontactsandtopdownselectionof
figures and groups. Hardly anywhere in Indonesia can we see substantiverepresentation of crucial interests and ideas of the liberal middle classes,
workers,peasants,theurbanpoor,women,orhumanrightsandenvironmental
activists.
Inshortsofar,Demossurveysandsupplementaryresearchrevealthat
the fundamental problem of Indonesian democracy is weak popular
representation. Many freedoms are at hand, and the rule of law and public
governance are at least improving. But democratic political relations between
stateandpeople remainpoor.Typically it isdifficult foractors and ideas that
reflectfundamentalsocialandeconomiccleavagestoengageinpublicaffairs.In
the absence of effective popular control over public affairs, economic and
political power rests instead with actors related to the state and private
businesses. The leverage of these dominant actors has increased with the
hollowing out of the public resources and institutional capacities that were
vestedwiththestate.
Inthiscontext,thepostcentralistandauthoritarianrelationsbetween
state and people (the demos) are instead increasingly mediated on the one
hand by market institutions and on the other by communal, patronage andnetwork based groups, including alternative patronage via civil associations.
Neitherofthesemediatorsissubjecttodemocraticcontrol,(Figure1).Inspiteof
rhetoriccompetition,moreover, the reductionof thepublicspace in favourof
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religious and ethnic communities is not incompatible with neoliberal
perspectives.Rather thecommunalperspectivesare in linewith thehollowing
outofpublicresources.Thereductionofpublicsocialsecurityandeducation,for
instance,generatebothprofitableprivatehospitalsandschools fortherichon
theonehandandmorecommunitariancharityandschoolsforthepoor,onthe
other;ironicallyattimesfosteringextremeidentitypolitics.
Figure1:Thechallengesofdemocraticpopularcontrolofpublicaffairs
(6)TheRisk:Returntopoliticsoforder
Thedefunct representation isnotonlybad fordemocracyas such. It
also undermines ordinary peoples chances to use it to foster their views andinterests and the possibilities to alter the unequal division of power that
preventsociallyandenvironmentallyresponsibledevelopment. Inaddition,the
monopolisationofrepresentationnourishesagenerallackoftrustindemocracy.
Most worrying, upper and middle class groups who rarely manage to win
elections may well use this discontent with powerfulelite democracy to gain
wide support for alternatives to democracy and to promote better
preconditions through politics of order. Supporters of middle class coups
typically
say
that
they
aim
to
prevent
disruptive
populist
rule
and
to
build
strongerpreconditions fordemocracy.Theirviews findanecho insomeofthe
previously mentioned international support for proper sequencing of
democracy.Indonesiahasbeendownthispathoncebefore,inthe1960s,andit
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gave rise to Soehartos New Order regime; and similar dynamics has more
recently been at work in the Thai metropolitan middle class who fail to win
broad popular support but take to the streets, call for rule of the educated
citizensand linkupwith theKingand thearmyagainstnodoubt corruptand
probably cheating but anyway politicians with wide electoral support. In
contemporary Indonesia, Vice President Jusuf Kallas statements on Poso and
similarlydisturbedareasarealsocasesinpoint.Themessagewasthattooearly
democratic elections were behind the conflicts and that profitable business
drivendevelopmentwouldbethebestwaytohandlethem.Other illustrations
includethequestforpresidentialismandstrongerexecutives,thestreamlining
of the party system towards a majoritarian twoparty system, and general
admiration for Singapore andChinas attempts to introduce,promote stabilityand economic growth ahead of excessive democracy. Meanwhile religious
activistsarguefortheneedtoreducethepublicsphere,butthistimeinfavour
ofreligiousvalues,communitiesandleaders.
The empirical evidence from Demos survey and supplementary
researchspeakquiteagainstthisthesisthatrootofIndonesiascurrentconflicts
andproblemsof corruptionaswell aseconomic development is the new civil
andpolitical freedoms.On thecontrary the resultsshow that it is thedefunct
instrumentsofdemocracy andespeciallythepoorpopularcapacitiestofosterthem thathavemade itdifficulttousethefreedomstoaltertherelationsof
power, prevent the abuse of them and thus improve law, policies and
governance. There is a shortage of institutionalised channels for interest and
issuegroupparticipation,beyondclientelismandgoodcontacts.Evenpopular
representationinformalgovernmentisheldbackbyelitistcontrolofparty and
electoralsystems.Theparty andelectionsystemssustainelitismonpartofthe
powerful. The separate issue and interest group representation is weak and
undemocratic;andsoisdirectpopularparticipation.
(7)TheChallenge:Overcomingtheconstraintsofpopularrepresentation
Itisimperative,therefore,thatcivicandpopularorganisationsbeable
toscaleuptheirideasandalliances.Byconnectingcommunitiesandworkplaces,
andlocalandcentrallevels,itispossibletochallengeelitecontroloverpolitics.
Demos survey and case studies suggest, however, that the scaling up into
organisedpolitics isnotonlyhamperedbyelitistmonopolisationofpoliticsbut
alsobycivicgroupsandpoliticalactiviststhemselves.
First, the surveyand supplementary studies reveal thateven ifmanyalternativeactorsnow try toenter intopolitics tonotjustbeconfined tocivil
society activities, many challenges still remain ahead. There are few decisive
improvements as compared to the first survey. One problem is the poor
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presence within state, politics and business as well as in related workplaces.
Another is that the sources of power and the ways of gaining authority and
legitimacyremainfocusedonknowledgeandpublicdiscourseattheexpenseof
organisation,attemptstogainpublicmandatesandwinelections.Moreover,the
issues that are put on the agenda typically focus on specific rights and
complaints, neglecting broader perspectives of how to promote better
governance, developmentandpublicwelfare.Finallyand inspiteofadvances,
civic groups remain poorly connected to social movements and popular
organisations (and vice versa); collective action is mainly based on individual
networking, popular leaders or alternative patronage as against broad and
representative organisation; and attempts to approach elections, parliaments
and the executive remain primarily by way of media, NGOs and pressure andlobbygroups.
Second, comparative case studies show that the problems in these
respectsare typicallyaddressed insteadbyeitherbringing togetherpeopleon
the grassroots level or by topdown organising or by attempts to facilitate
issuespecificdirect connectionsbetweenpeopleand the executive or leading
politicians.Inmanyinstances,theseeffortsarequiteimpressiveandstimulating.
Tomentionbutone,thelocalpeasantsorganisationsinBatang inCentralJava,
haveralliedbehindbroaderagendasandwonanumberofvillageelections.Theynow wish to scale up to the regional level, but one problem is sufficiently
democraticselectionofcandidatesandofcoursethelackoffunds.However,so
far,theonlymajoropeninghasbeeninAceh,thankstotheuniquepossibilityof
buildingpartiesfrombelowandof launching independentcandidatesafterthe
peacetreaty.Yet,thesepartiesareshortofwellorganisedconstituentsbeyond
oldactivistgroups,activistnetworksandinfluentialleaders.
Moreover, the results point to a number of problems. Unity from
belowhasproveddifficultbecauseofthemyriadofspecific issues,approaches
and contending projects and leaders. Politics aiming at majorities behind
common platforms calls for ways of combining different specialisations and
interests, such as among peasants and plantation labourers. There must be
convincingagendasfornecessaryalliancesandequalcitizenbasedgovernance.
Loose networking and polycentric action the methods favoured by most
IndonesiasNGOsandprodemocracyactivistsarenotenough.
However,attemptstocompensateforthisbywayofsocialistorother
ideologies,centrally coordinatedneworestablishedorganisations (somewith
charismaticfiguresatthehelm),orsimplythecreationofajointpoliticalvehicleor individual candidates offering support in return for popular votes, tend to
preserve topdownstructuresandgeneratedivisionsamongsocialmovements
andpopularandcivicorganisations.
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Thealternativeattemptstobypassdirtypoliticsbyfacilitatingdirect
linkages between people and the executives (inspired by, for instance,
participatorybudgeting)arenodoubt importantsupplementsbuthave littleto
say on how to coordinate different sections of the people, scale up the
operationbeyondthelocalandfacilitatefairrepresentation.Elsewhere, infact,
thelatterhascalledfortopdownmeasuresthrough,forinstance,theofficeofa
governorormayor.
(8)TheRecommendation:DemocraticPoliticalBlocks
Hence, there are two major lessons: First, basic popular and civic
groupsmustcoordinateinsteadonanintermediatepoliticallevel,betweenthe
specific grassroots issues and the toplevel perspectives. This is in order todefine joint platforms, wide support and alliances, and control genuine
politicians rather than being the victim of fragmentation and dominated by
variouspartiesorpoliticalactors.Second,thismayalsobethelevelonwhichitis
possibletocombineparliamentaryandextraparliamentaryactivities,aswellas
representativeanddirectparticipation.
It is no news that both old and new democracy driven organisations
sufferfrominsufficientlinksbetweencivicandmorepopularorientedgroupson
theonehandandproblemsof relating toorganisedpoliticson theother.Thiswasmadequiteclearalreadybefore1998(c.f.Trnquist2002).Itwasexpanded
intheanalysisofthepostSoehartomovement(Priyono,PrasetyoandTrnquist
2003),where theblamecouldno longerbeputonexcessiveauthoritarianism.
AnditwasconfirmedonagenerallevelinthefirstallIndonesiasurvey(Priyono,
SamadhiandTrnquist2007).However,themorerecentresultsforthesecond
surveyandespeciallysupplementaryresearch(c.f.Priyonoet.al2009,Trnquist
et.al2009)alsoidentifiesquiteclearlythatthecrucialproblemoffosteringsuch
linkagesrelatestodemocraticrepresentation,(Figure2).
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Figure2:Thechallengesofpoliticisingthedemocracymovement
In other words, the major challenge along each of the axes is to
developimproveddemocraticrepresentation.Thisistoenablethescalingupof
issues,groups,communitiesandworkplaces.Sincestructuralconditionscannot
bealteredimmediately,peopleneedtogettogetherandactcollectively.Ifthis
shallbeattemptedatdemocratically, it calls for trustworthy representation in
terms of solid chains of popular sovereignty. This includes authorisation,
mandates,responsiveness,transparencyandaccountability.Andthisinrequires
clear definitions of what demos are supposed to control what parts of public
affairs toavoidpolycentricconfusionbetweenfactionsofthedemos.
To facilitate scaling up through democratic representation, Demos
recommendation is that democratic social movements, popular and civic
associationswishingtoengage inpoliticsshouldbuildcoordinatedDemocratic
PoliticalBlocksatlocalandcentrallevels.
Suchpoliticalblockscallforleadershipandcommitmenttothebuilding
of democracy through popular mandates and accountability, both within and
between organisations and in relation to elections. Unfortunately, many
democracy activists are unlikely to become involved in democratic
representation and electoral politics so long as it remains easier for them to
lobbyandnetwork.Similarly there isa recentargument thatoneshould recall
the tradition of the many scattered militant groups during the anticolonial
liberation struggle and prioritise extraparliamentary action in the streets. (Cf.
Lane2008)Organisingconstituenciesandwinningmajoritiesinelectionsimplieshardwork.Further,partypoliticalactivistsneedtorealisethattherewillnever
beonepartyonlyamongprodemocrats.Hence,theyneedtoavoiddominating
anddividingbasicsocialmovementsandpopularorganisations.Politiciansand
CivilAssociations
Organisedpolitics
Po ularor anisations
Counterbyscalingup
throughdemocratic
representation
Counterbyscalingup
throughdemocratic
representation
Counterbyscalingup
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politicalgroupsmaywellparticipateinbuildingPoliticalBlocks,butpreferablyas
members of the movements and associations, and anyway not in dominant
positions. The negative international experiences from unfortunate party
politicisationofcivicandsocialmovementscannotbeoverstated.
While the task of building Democratic Political Blocks is thus next to
impossible there are options. Historically, of course, this was the way
Scandinavian popular and civic organisations build broad political movements,
parties and rights based economic development. At present, the Labour Party
with civic and popular organisations in Brazil has tried similar roadmaps,
includingbyfacilitatingparticipatorybudgeting.TheAcehneseevenprovedthat
some advances are feasible in spite of very poor conditions. The alternative
frameworkforchangewerethatthepartysystemwasdemonopolisedtoallowfor local parties and independent candidates, and that the civic and political
organisationswerewillingandsufficientlywellorganisedtowinvotesandthus
takeadvantageofthedemocraticopenings.Neitherofthisisathandelsewhere
inthecountry.ItistruethatAcehatpresentsuffersfromthelackoffirmlyand
democraticallyorganisedinterestandissuebasedmovementsthatcanputvital
issuesontheagendaandkeeppartiesand leadersaccountable.There isarisk,
therefore, that clientelist and populist means of political inclusion (and
associated favouritismandcorruption)willdominatewhile referring to specialneeds during a quite unspecified period of transition, which may rather take
Acehrightdownthesamedrainofprimitiveaccumulationofcapital(bywayof
coercivemeans)asmanyotherprovinces.Thismustbecounteredbycreating
broaddemandsfrombelowforpoliticalfacilitationbythenewlyelectedleaders
(andsupportivedonors)ofparticipatorydemocraticinstitutions.
Furthermore,itdeservestoberepeatedthusthatthesituationbeyond
Aceh is less favourable. The chances of building political representation from
below have been blocked. According to the recent legislation, participation in
elections in other parts of the country (even of local parliaments) calls for
national presence with branch offices in 60% of the provinces, 50% of the
districtsandmunicipalities,and25%ofthesubdistricts.Eventheheroicattempt
bysocialandpoliticalactivistsinPPR(PartaiPerserikatanRakyat)tomeasureup
tothedemandshasfailed.Andunfortunatelysomeoftheleadersnowthinkthat
there isnootherway toenter intopolitics than tosubordinate themselves to
bossesandretiredgeneralsinnewpartieswithhugeresourcesandintemporary
need of activists. Similarly, the demands on the mobilisation of signatures of
independentcandidates indirectelectionsare sohigh thatoneneeds tobealocalequivalentofItalysBerlusconitostandachance.Inaddition,women,still
tendtobesubordinatedandnoordinaryworkers,peasantsandfisher folkscan
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run even in village elections because of lack of supposedly sufficient formal
educationanddemandstopayforthebasicadministrativecosts.
Conclusion
ThereisacommonexpressionamongdemocracybuildersinIndonesia
thatthe infrastructure isathandand thatmostactorsadjust totheserulesof
thegamebutthatitremainstobuildademocraticcultureandfostersocialand
economicgainswhichmaysatisfyordinarypeople.Thisismisleadingandpartly
wrong! It is true thatmostactorseven thepowerfuladjust to theactually
existing rules and regulations. But giving priority to the outcome and general
habits (culture) is to neglect that the democratic infrastructure is far fromsufficientandthattosomeextent it isnotevenexistent.A largeportionofthe
contextual rulesand regulationsdo not really support the32universalmeans
towards democracy. The alternative actors in particular are short of sufficient
capacitytouseandpromotethemeansofdemocracy.Organiseddemocracyand
especiallythesystemofrepresentationismonopolisedbythepowerfulelite.
Inshort,democracyisheldback.Itistruethatallpeopleareallowedto
vote, but women (who are not well connected) and poor and subordinated
people, especially migrant labourers, are defacto prevented from standing as
candidates and sometimes even from voting, thus trying to develop popular
representation. Basic issues of equal civic rights and political equality thus
representsasimilarchallengebutalsoopportunityasdidthemovementforthe
rightstovoteintheolddemocracies.
Hence the immediateneed todevelopwellorganisedandnonparty
dominated Political Blocks to foster independent popular influence within
organised politics inspite of elitist monopolisation; to enable, moreover,
ordinary people to use and promote democracy; to alter, thus, the current
relations of power through more popular representation and participation; to
improve,also,theefficiencyofdemocraticgovernance;andto increase,finally,
bargaining power to foster compromises towards rights based sustainable
development.
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ApproachingDemocracy
18
ChapterTwoApproachingDemocracy:
Somebriefintroductorynotesofconceptsandmethods
OlleTornquist(UniversityofOslo)
With
NicolaasWarouw(GadjahMadaUniversity)
Democracyassessmentshavebecomenext toan industry,parallel to
that of measuring economic development in countries around the world.
InternationalIDEA,thehighprofileinternationalorganisationfordemocracyand
electoralassistance,saysthattherearesixmajorassessmentframeworks.(IDEA
2008)One framework focusesonmoreor lesscomprehensivehuman rights in
variouscountries. It istypicallycarriedoutbygovernmentssuchasthatofthe
United States and organisations and institutes like Amnesty and the Freedom
House. A second type gives priority to governance, including elections but
primarilytheruleoflawandaccountability.Thesestudiesareoftenpropelledbygovernments, aid agencies and their associates such as the Indonesian
PartnershipforGovernanceReformsinordertoevaluatesupportforinstitution
building. Third, the democracy indices generated by researchers who relate
democratic rights and elections to independent factors such as development
and conflict. Fourth, the socalled democracy audits. These have been carried
outbygovernments,academeandcivicorganisationsintheglobalNorthtofind
out and lay the foundation for public discussion about the strength and
weaknesses
of
various
dimensions
of
democracy.
Fifth,
the
economic
and
social
assessments by governments and international organisations to evaluate the
outcomeofdemocracyandguidesupportforbetterstructuralconditions.Sixth,
IDEAs own framework. This has been implemented by its associates among
governments,internationalorganisations,relatedNGOsandscholars.Theaimis
similartothatofthedemocraticauditsintheolddemocraciesbuttheambition
istofacilitateapplication intheglobalSouthtoo.Theprimefocushasbeento
assess the quality of the democratic institutions through expert panels and
various indicators and resources in addition to surveys of public opinions and
attitudes.Oneshouldalsoaddtheassessmentsbyassociationsandscholarsof
the democratic quality of civil society, social movements and socalled social
capitalintermsofinterpersonaltrusttofacilitatecollectiveaction.
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Interestingly, our own alternative framework for participatory
researchbaseddemocracypromotionisalsonotacknowledged.Thisframework
is rooted in surveys with experienced expertpractitioners on the ground. It
focuses on political identity, the standard of institutions and actors will and
capacity to use and promote that infrastructure. It has been developed and
proved feasible since 2002 in cooperation between reflective activists and
scholars in the pilot case of Indonesia. Why was this perspective needed and
whatarethedetailsofthemajorcharacteristics?Thesimpleansweristhatmost
oftheotherframeworksdidnotseemtobeveryhelpfulasjudgedbytheneeds
of the concerned scholars and activists in this the worlds largest new
democracy.
Basicallyprodemocratswerenothappytoworkwithframeworksthatreflectedthepreconceivedvalues,politicalinterestsanddevelopmentpriorities
ofthedonorsandtheircloseassociates.There isofcoursenothingwrongwith
donors needs to evaluate their democracy support (which many democrats
were anyway dependent on). Similarly, the politicalpatronsof the democracy
support must be able to identify and foster likeminded partners; that is the
basicsofinternationalrelations.Andrelatedscholarsshouldtestandfostertheir
theoriesand recommendations.But what the Indonesiandemocratsasked for
was an instrument to evaluate their problems and options and related
arguments. Actually, they were confused and divided and wanted tojudge to
whatextentdifferenttheoriesandrecommendationsmademoreor lesssense,
notjustoneortheotherfavouriteargumentbythisorthatdonororscholaror
activist. In addition they were in large need of more reliable data and
information. Academically critical research after decades of authoritarianism
remained weak, the various case studies were scattered and the rapidly
expanding opinion surveys were driven by political and commercial interests.
Also, the prodemocrats were quite rightly disturbed by the preoccupation in
mostexistingassessmentswithstaticdescriptionsof thequalitiesof rulesand
regulations without payingmuch attention to dynamic relations of power and
strategiesamongvariousactors.Moreoversomealsorealisedthattheopposite
obsessionwithstructures,culture,rights,civicactivismandpopularmovements
was not related to the new democratic institutions including parties and
elections. Inaddition theprodemocratsasked concerned scholars to consider
theinsightsoftheactivistsonthegroundandtocommunicateexperiencesfrom
otherpartsof theworld. In fact,while the Indonesianactivistshad fought for
democracy since several years, the powerful elite and experts that suddenlydominatedtheassessmentsofdemocracyhadusuallybeenquite indifferentor
evenontheothersideofthe frontline.Similarly,the internationalexpertshad
mainly brought in elitist donor perspectives on crafting of institutions and
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ApproachingDemocracy
20
consensusamongthepowerfulactors.Meanwhiletheexperiencesand insights
oftheprodemocrats in Indonesiaandelsewherehad largelybeen ignoredand
theythemselveshadnotfoundtimetowriteuptheirstoriesandfindings.Finally
severaldemocratsdidnotliketojustwritereportsandtalkinseminarsbutalso
wantedtogofromfindingstorecommendationsandconsortedeffortstofoster
implementationofthem.
In order to develop an alternative framework we added therefore
theseexplicitneeds to the coreelements in the theoreticallymost convincing
andflexiblepartsofthemainstreamframeworks,primarilytobefoundamong
the democratic audits and International IDEAs conceptual apparatus.
Meanwhile,however,wealsohadtokeepinmindthatsuchanalternativemust
bepossibletoimplementquiteswiftly(sincethedemocraticoptionswerefadingaway) and without access to huge funds (since that would have called for
compromises).
BasicDefinitionsandVariables
Onecrucialpointofdeparturewassimilar to thatof themainstream
audits and IDEAs framework: the separation of the aims and the means of
democracy. This made it possible to focus on the extent to which the means
reallypromotedtheaims.Moreover,asDavidBeethamhadarguedconvincingly,
thedisagreementsondemocracywereprimarilyaboutthemeansofdemocracy
while there seemed to be general agreement on the aim in terms ofpopular
controlofpublicaffairsonthebasisofpoliticalequality.(Beetham1999).
That said, one had to ask what people (demos) that would control
publicaffairs?Whowouldbe the citizens?Would thedemosbebasedon for
instancereligiousorethnicorpolitical identity?Whilenotbeingabletogo into
thedetailsofhowsuchidentitieshadbeenformed,onemustbeabletodiscuss
if and how they could be combined, especially in a multi cultural society like
Indonesia.
Second,whatconstitutesthepublicaffairsthatpeopleshouldcontrol
and what is rather deemed to be private matters to be handled within the
family,variousnetworks,onthemarketorbyreligiousorethniccommunities?
Again, indepth analyses of the construction of public affairs would be
impossible,butonehadtoanalysethesubstanceofdemocracyintermsofwhat
matterswereincludedandwhatweresetaside.
Third,what ismeantby controland politicalequalityandhowcantheybeachieved?FollowingBeethamand IDEA(2002),thefollowingprinciples
are intrinsic: the right and ability toparticipate and authorise representatives
and their executives; representatives (and their executives) who in turn shall
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ApproachingDemocracy
21
representthemaincurrentsofpopularopinionandthesocialcompositionofthe
people, be responsive to peoples opinions and interests and accountable to
peopleforwhattheydowhichcallsfortransparencyandsolidarity.Inaddition,
while it isobviousthattheprinciplespresupposeHumanRights(includingcivil,
politicalsocial,economicandcultural rights), theshapingandpracticingofthe
Rights in turn are also vested with the implementation of the democratic
principles.
What would be the necessary means, then, to enable and promote
democraticconstitutionof thedemosand thepublicaffairsaswellas thejust
mentioned principles to foster popular control and political equality? IDEAs
frameworkandmostauditsfocusondemocratic institutionsandrelatedvalues
among people at large. While this was in accordance with standard politicalscienceofdemocracyanddemocracybuilding,andtheviewsofmostdonors,it
was insufficient to the Indonesiandemocrats.First, theywanted tobeable to
evaluateawidersetoftheoriesandargumentsaboutthenecessarymeans,to
thusdiscuss inamorefruitfulwaywhatseemedtobemostvalid in Indonesia.
Further, theyneeded togobeyondassessmentsof fixed rulesand regulations
towards a more dynamic perspective. Hence they wanted to consider the
possibilitiesofchangebyalsoincludinginformalinstitutionsandpowerrelations
among various actors in politics, the political economy, civic associations and
socialmovements.Third,itwasobviouslyunfruitfultoonlycomeupwithsome
kind of national assessment in a country where despotic central rule was
dismantled and politics was becoming increasingly localised. Similarly, the
definitionofthedemosaswellasofpublicaffairscalledforadditionalindicators.
Hence the conclusion that one had to go beyond previous perspectives by
consideringthreebasicmeansofdemocracy.
TheBasicMeansofDemocracy:Institutions,willandcapacity
The first major type of democratic means were of course the
conventional focus on the standard of a number of democratic institutions
related to (a) constitutionalism (citizenship, law and rights), (b) popular
sovereignty (elections, political representation and the responsiveness and
accountability of public governance) and (c) civic participation (through
associations, media, academic life and direct participation). However, by
contrast tootherassessment schemesone shouldnotonlyask for formalbut
also informal institutions.Furtheronemustsupplement theassessmentof theperformancebyaddingspecificquestionsaboutthegeographicalspreadandthe
thematicsubstanceofthe institutions(i.e.howmanymattersthatwerewithin
thedemocratic frameworkandhowmuchwasbeingprivatised).Whileadding
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22
these crucial concerns, Demos framework has begun by drawing on IDEAs
ratherwidelyacknowledgedthoughextensivelistofinstitutions.Thishasbeena
pointofdepartureforrelevantrevisionsandsimplifications.Forthedetails,see
Box1.
Thesemeansareuniversallyvalid.Thisisbecausetheyaretheoretically
derivedbyaskingwhatmeansarenecessary topromote theequallygenerally
valid aim of democracy. The specific rules and regulations, however, vary of
coursewithcontextualfactors.Hence,themajorpointistoassesstheextentto
which such contextual formal and informal rules and regulations promote the
institutionalfoundationsofdemocracy.Indoingso,thefundamentaldimension
ofcivicandpoliticalidentityisseparatedfromtheothersasthelatterhavebeen
possibleto include inan indexonthequalityofdemocratic institutions.Outof100 index points, the relative importance of formal as compared to informal
institutions isestimatedtobe70versus30.Further,therelative importanceof
performanceascomparedtospreadandsubstanceisestimatedtobe50,25and
25respectively.(Withinthe50pointsforformal institutions,the importanceof
positivescoresisofcoursereducedifinformantsdeemsomeoftheinstitutions
to hardly even exist.) All attempt to weight however the various intrinsic
institutions (whichusually restanywaywithsomekindofexpertestimate)are
howeversetasideinfavouroftransparentdiscussionofvarioustheories.
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Box1:Basicinstitutionsofdemocracy.
Towhatextentaretheyeffective,wellspreadandinclusive(inclusiveofvitalmattersinsociety)?
Institutionsoutsidetheindex
The People (demos): the constitution of the demos through political/civic, ethnic and/or religious
identityandengagementregardingpublicissues.
Institutionsconsideredinindex
1 Citizenship (Equalstatecitizenship;Therightsofminorities,migrantsandrefugees,Reconciliationof
horizontalconflicts)
2 GovernmentsupportofinternationallawandUNhumanrights
3 Subordinationofthegovernmentandpublicofficialstotheruleoflaw
4 Theequalitybeforethelaw(Equalandsecureaccesstojustice;Theintegrityandindependence ofthe
judiciary)
5 Freedomfromphysicalviolenceandthefearofit
6
Freedom
of
speech,
assembly
and
organisation
7 Freedomtocarryouttradeunionactivity
8 Freedomofreligion,belief;languageandculture
9 Genderequalityandemancipation
10 Therightsofchildren
11 Therighttoemployment,socialsecurityandotherbasicneeds
12 Therighttobasiceducation,includingcitizensrightsandduties
13 Goodcorporategovernance
14 Freeandfairgeneralelections(Freeandfairgeneralelectionsatcentral,regionalandlocallevel;Free
andfairseparateelectionsofe.g.governors,mayorsandvillageheads)
15 Freedomtoformpartiesonthenationalor locallevel(orteamsofindependentcandidates)thatcan
recruitmembers,andparticipateinelections
16 Reflectionofvitalissuesandinterestsamongpeoplebypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates
17 Abstentionfromabusingreligiousorethnicsentiments,symbolsanddoctrinesbypoliticalpartiesand
orcandidates.
18 Independenceofmoneypoliticsandpowerfulvestedinterestsbypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates
19 Membershipbasedcontrolofparties,andresponsivenessandaccountabilityofpartiesandorpolitical
candidatestotheirconstituencies
20 Partiesandorcandidatesabilitytoformandrungovernment
21 Democraticdecentralisationofgovernmentofallmattersthatdonotneedtobehandledoncentral
levels.
22 Thetransparencyandaccountability ofelectedgovernment,theexecutive,(bureaucracies),atalllevels
23 Thetransparencyandaccountability ofthemilitaryandpolicetoelectedgovernmentandthepublic
24 Thecapacityofthegovernmenttocombatparamilitarygroups,hoodlumsandorganisedcrime25 Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable
internationallaw)
26 Governments independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and
abuseofpower
27 Freedomofthepress,artandacademicworld
28 Publicaccesstoandthereflectionofdifferentviewswithinmedia,artandtheacademicworld
29 Citizensparticipationinextensiveindependentcivilassociations
30 Transparency,accountabilityanddemocracywithincivilorganisations
31 Allsocialgroupsincludingmarginalisedgroupsextensiveaccesstoandparticipationinpubliclife
32 Direct participation (Peoples direct access and contact with the public services and governments
consultationofpeopleandwhenpossible facilitationofdirectparticipation inpolicymakingandthe
executionofpublicdecisions)
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Second and in addition to most other frameworks one should add a
dynamic perspective by identifying main actors and then ask if and how they
relatetothemoreorlessdemocraticinstitutions.Twocrucialstepsareinvolved.
Thefirstisthespecificationofthemainactors.Allactorscannotbeincludedina
viableassessment.Given the localisationofpolitics thisshouldprimarilybeon
the provincial level. Further, one needs to include powerful actors as well as
crucial alternative ones. In the alternative assessment framework, the local
informants are asked to identify the three most powerful and the three most
important alternative actors in their context. A number of problems are of
courseassociatedwiththeidentificationoftheseactorsbutthestumblingblocks
restmainlywith the identificationandthequalityofthe informants,whichwe
shall return to.The second step is toenquire then into ifand how theactorsrelatetothedemocraticinstitutions.Dotheinstitutionsmakesensetothem?To
whatextentisdemocracytheonlygameintown? Moreprecisely withregard
toeachtypeof institution:dotheactorspromoteandusethe institutions?Do
theyonlyusethem?Ordotheyuseandabuseorevenavoidthem?
Low figures mean that democracy is not meaningful because the
standardof the institutions is too lowand/orthecapacityoftheactors touse
andpromote them (whichweshall return toshortly) is insufficient.Additional
negative conditions are set aside. This is not because such conditions are
unimportant but because of a crucial assumption about the minimum
requirementsofdemocracy.Thealternativeframeworkrefutesargumentsthat
democracy calls for extensive social and economic rights, equality,
modernisation, prodemocratic culture etc. Actually the framework only calls
forsufficientlymeaningfulinstrumentsaslistedaboveandforsufficientcapacity
oftheactorstouseandpromotetheinstitutions(whichweshallsoondiscussin
more detail). Given that these conditions are present, the actors can use
emergingdemocracytopromotemoresocialandeconomicrights,amongother
things.Ofcourse, firmjudicial institutions,economicmodernisationand social
andeconomicequalityare likely tocontribute tohighscoreson the indicesof
democracy. But if more rights, equality, modernisation, favourable culture etc
were included as necessary conditions for democracy, they would have to be
createdbynondemocraticmeans.This isnotnecessary. Ithasprovedpossible
tocreatethembywayofgradually improveddemocracy.Therearedegreesof
democracy;anddemocracyisaprocess.
Hencetheargumentthatthere isaneedto sequencedemocracyby
somehowintroducingfavourable institutionsaheadofpopularsovereignty(e.g.Mansfield/Snyder 2005) as well as Samuel Huntingtons (1965) old thesis that
strong institutionsmustbeathand topreventmodernisation fromgenerating
popularupheavalsarerefuted.(AsmanyIndonesiansknow,thelatterargument
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wasusedtolegitimisetheeliminationofpopularmovementsin1965/66aswell
as the rise and existence of the New Order regime.) The same applies for a
number of related theses too. One is that a certain level of economic
development isamust;another istheoldextreme leftthesisthatequalityand
radicallydifferentpowerrelationsmustbecreatedbymoreorlessrevolutionary
meansaheadofpeoplesdemocracy.Itistruethattheoftenratherdepressing
fateoftheglobalthirdwaveofdemocracythroughtopdowninstitutionbuilding
and elitist compromises is rather depressing. But given that nondemocratic
introduction of favourable structural conditions is not necessary, the crucial
matter is insteadwhatkindofspecificandconcretepoliticsofdemocratisation
thatvariousactorsandtheirinternationalsupportersoptfor.
If this is accepted, the growing critique of the liberal democraticemphasisoncraftingthe institutionalproceduresofdemocracyonthebasisof
agreementsbetweenalreadydominantactorsdoesnot implythatalldesigning
ofdemocraticinstitutionsisinvane.Theimplicationisonlythatpriorityshould
be given to institutions that open up for enhanced capacity among ordinary
people to foster additional institutions for more political equality and popular
control.Ifthepredominanttrendsofarhasbeeninfavourofliberaldemocracy,
thisconclusionseemstopointthusinasocialdemocraticdirection.
Thethirdmeansofdemocracyisthattheactorsarenotjustwillingbut
also capable of promoting the institutional infrastructure. Consequently the
alternativeassessmentframeworkconsidersanumberofkeyfactorsrelatedto
power,resourcesandmovement.However,this isonlydonetotheextentthat
suchfactorsarecrucialforthepeoplescapacitytoactasdemocraticcitizensin
civil as well as politic society. Hence we have combined three analytical
approaches:one that focuseson institutions,asecond thatdrawsattention to
theactorsandathirdthataddressespowerincollectiveaction.
It ismorecomplicatedtooperationaliseactorspoliticalcapacitythan
democratic institutions. Previous studies and theories about political power,
movements and other actors point to five clusters of parameters. These have
been discussed elsewhere in more detail (Trnquist 2002, Harriss et.al. 2004,
Trnquist2008,Trnquist,StokkeandWebster2009).Thefirstvariablesareto
indicate iftheactorsarepresentratherthanmarginalisedoncentraland local
levelsandinpartsofthepoliticallandscapesuchasthebusinesssector,interest
and issue groups, self management (including cooperatives), parties,
parliaments,andexecutivepublicinstitutions.Theseindicatorsrelatetotheories
about exclusion and inclusion, differences between new and old movements,sectoral fragmentation,centreversusperiphery,and theopportunitystructure
in terms of the relative openness and closeness of politics in general.
Alternatively one may analyse similar factors by drawing on Pierre Bourdieus
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(Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002, Stokke and Selboe 2009) concept of fields of
interrelatedactorsandrelationsofpower.
A second cluster of variables relate more exclusively to Bourdieus
focusonhowtheactorswithinthejustmentionedfieldsareabletotransform
theirdifferentsourcesofpowerintermsofeconomic,socialandculturalcapital1
into legitimacy and authority to thus gain symbolic power and political
influence(ibid).
Thethirdtypeof indicators istoanalysewhetherandhowactorsare
abletopoliticisethoseoftheirconcernsandaspirationsthatarenotpersonal,
i.e. to put their issues, interests and ideologies on the political agenda. This
relates to theories inspired by for instance Jrgen Habermas about the public
sphere, Antonio Gramsci about hegemony, Pierre Bourdieu about habitus(internalisednorms,understandingsandpatterns)and thegeneral importance
of culture. But the same indicators connect also to analyses of increasingly
fragmentedprioritiesandagendas,especiallyamongactors incivilsocietyand
relateddifficulties togeneratecommonplatforms (e.g.Trnquist2002,2008a,
Trnquist,TharakanandQuimpo2009)
The fourth cluster of parameters is to capturewhetherand how the
actors are able to organise and mobilise support. This is directly linked to
theoriesofpower,politicsandmovementssuchasadvocatedbyNicosMouzelis
(1986) and Sydney Tarrow (1994), distinguishing between incorporation into
politicsbywayofelitistpopulism,clientelismandalternativepatronageand
related political financing or more integrated by way of networks and or
comprehensiveorganisationfrombelow.But itrelatesalsotoanalysessuchas
byMahmoodMamdani(1996),ParthaChatterjee(2004),Houtzageret.al(2007)
and Harriss (2006) of different inclusion of citizens, subjects and denizens
withoutcapacitytousemostotherrightsthanthattorallybehindandvotefor
oragainstleadingpoliticians.
Fifththeroadmapstoanalysewhetherandhowtheactorsareableto
approachvariousgovernanceinstitutions.Themajorsourceofinspirationisthe
growing consensus that the key problem of democracy in the global South in
particularisthedominanceofpowerfulelitesandthepoorstandardofpopular
representationinspiteofexcitingattemptstoinitiatenewroutes.Thiswasalso
1
While
the
meaning
of
economic
capital
may
be
self
evident
(and
may
well
be
expanded
by
more
qualified
analysisof thepoliticaleconomybetweenneoliberalismand state sponsoredbusinessunderglobalisation;
seee.g.HarrissWhite2003,Kohli2004andKhan2005),socialcapital inmainlyaboutgoodcontacts,and
culturalcapitalinvolvesinformationandknowledge.InDemossurveyyetanothercategoryhasbeenaddedto
cover the power by wayof coercion, including bymilitary force but alsomass demonstrations such as the
peoplepowerphenomenoninthePhilippines.
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aprime result fromDemos firstallIndonesia survey.Hence there isa special
needforcloserstudieswithinthisfield.
TheFundamentalProblemofRepresentation
Suchanalysesinturncallforfruitfulanalyticaltools.Representationis
acomplexandcontentedconcept.Thealternativeframeworkdrawsonarecent
attempttodevelopaninclusiveperspectiveonthebasisoftheoryandempirical
studies of efforts to counter the demise of popular politics (Trnquist, Stokke
andWebster2009).
As outlined by Pitkin (1967), representation presupposes a
representative, the represented, something that is being represented and apolitical context. The dynamics is primarily about authorisation and
accountability,whichpresuppose transparencyandresponsiveness.Thatwhich
is represented may be substantive, descriptive and/or symbolic. Substantive
representation is when the representative acts for the represented, for
instancealeaderadvancingtheinterestsofworkers.Descriptiverepresentation
iswhenanactor stands fortherepresentedbybeing objectivelysimilar.For
instance,awomanrepresentswomenandaresidentinavillagerepresentsthe
othervillagers.Symbolicrepresentation,finally,iswhenanactorisperceivedby
therepresentedtoonceagainstandforthem,butnow,forinstance,interms
ofsharedcultureandidentities.However,symbolicrepresentationmayalsobe
understood with authors like Bourdieu (Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002) and
Anderson(1983) inthewidersenseofconstructingthedemos,thegroupsand
the interests that are being represented and claiming to be a legitimate
authorityasarepresentative.
Therearetwomajorapproaches.Thefirstmaybecalledthechainof
popularsovereigntyapproach. It is typicallyadhered tobystudentsofpolitical
institutions, focusing on formally regulated politics, government and public
administration. The second is what will be labelled the directdemocracy
approach.Thisismorecommonamongpoliticalsociologists,anthropologistsand
students of rights and law. They emphasise the importance of informal
arrangements and the need for alternative participation through popular
movements and lobby groups as well as civic action in for instance
neighbourhoodgroupsandassociationsforselfmanagement.
Therearetworelatedtendenciestowardsdeterioratedrepresentation
withinthechainofpopularsovereignty.Oneisthatpublicmattersandresourceshave been reduced and fragmented under neoliberalism and globalisation
beyonddemocraticrepresentation.Theothertendency isthatalmostallofthe
links in the chain itself are tarnished. This is especially with regard to the
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intermediary representative institutions from civic organisation to political
parties.Massbased interestorganisationshavebeenradicallyweakened,most
severely those based on class. While public resources and capacities are
shrinking, politicians and political parties lose firm and independent popular
roots. The privatisation, informalisation, depoliticisation and weakening of the
intermediarypolitical institutionsgenerate furtherdistrust in theauthorisation
of representatives and their mandates. Representative politics is often looked
upon as a particularly dirty business characterised by money and personality
oriented politics, nonprogrammatic organisational machines and crooked
politicians. This in turn has generated alternative routes. But the various
supplementary forms of democracy by taking matters to court and to
institutions in civil society for self financed self management and directparticipation, pressure and informal contacts are largely detached from the
chainofpopularsovereignty.Thecivicorganisationsandactiviststhemselvesare
rarelysubjecttobasicprinciplesofdemocraticrepresentation,authorisationand
accountability.Moreover, communalethnicand religiousorganisationsaswell
as families and clans cater to an increasing number of popular worries and
needs,typicallyamongsttheweakersectionsofthepopulationwithinsufficient
capacitiestomakeuseofcivicrights.Whennotclaimingequalcivic,politicaland
socioeconomic rights for all but specific communal privileges, these
organisations and solidarities tend to fragment the demos and to undermine
democracy.
Whiletheadvantageofthechainsofpopularsovereigntyapproach is
precision and conceptual consistency in relation to democratic theory, one
drawback isthatpracticesoutsidetheformallyrecognisedchaintendtobeset
aside such as attempts at participatory governance and struggles over public
affairsthathavebeenprivatisedorinformalised.
Unfortunately however the directdemocracy approach does not
provideagoodalternativebut rather focuson theneglectedothersideof the
coin. Interestingly, this isdone from twodirections,onewhich ismoremarket
oriented, supportedbye.g. theWorldBank (1997)and in favourofuser and
consumer participation (rather than citizenship and popular sovereignty);
another advocated by critics of globalisation like Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri (2000) who argue that state and power has been so dispersed and
localised that there isno decisiveunit left to fight and that increasinglymany
producersareregulatingsocialrelationsthemselves,sothatstrongpartiesand
representativedemocracyareunnecessaryandeven irrelevant.Bothpositionssupport thus the position of Robert Putnam (1993) and others that the real
demosdevelopsorganicallyfrombelowamongselfmanagingandcooperating
citizens (thereby developing social capital), not in relation to ideologies,
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institutions and political engagement. Hence, representation becomes
redundant since the people act directly through the same contacts and
associations thathave constituted thepeople in the firstplace. In theprocess
almostwhatevercivicorganisationbecomespartsofthepeople itself.Hence
thereisnoneedtoanalyse,forinstance,differencesbetweenorganisationsthat
relate to rightsbearing citizens and people who lack sufficient capacity to
promotetheirownrights.Further,onedoesnotneedtodiscusstheimportance
of intermediary variables such as politics and ideology. The fact that
Scandinavian democracy and welfare states as well as contemporary
participatory budgeting, for instance, have all been politically facilitated and
thensustainedisconvenientlyforgotten.
However,manycivilsocietyactivistsarenowmoreanxiousthanbeforeto legitimate their work in terms of whom they try to represent (Houtzager
2007). Moreover, the new institutions for direct participation such as
participatory planning are (just like previous Scandinavian experiences of
combining liberal political democracy and interest based representation and
cooperationbetweengovernmentandassociations)attempts to initiateanew
layerofrepresentationbetweenelectoralchainsofpopularsovereigntyonthe
onehandandassociational lifeandpopulismon theother. (C.f.Avritzer2002,
Baiocchi2005,EspingAndersen1985,Berman2006)Yet,anumberofquestions
remain to be answered such as how to guarantee authorisation and
accountability,andevenmoredifficult,howtoidentifyandagreeonwhatparts
of the demos should control what sections of public affairs on the basis of
politicalequality.
Against thisbackdrop, the finaldimensionofactorspoliticalcapacity
that isconsidered in thealternativeassessment frameworkdrawsona recent
attempt to develop a conceptual model to combine the two approaches, one
focusing on the chainsof popularsovereignty and the other on direct
democracy.Thekey
is
to
apply
theprimacy
of
popular
sovereignty
also
within
collectiveeffortstowidendemocracybeyondtheformalpublic institutions.This
may be done by situating political practices in formal public as well as other
institutions within a comprehensive conceptual frame where it is possible to
mapandanalysehowactorsrelatetoeachotherandtotheinstitutionsinview
ofthebasicprinciplesofdemocraticrepresentation.
Ifthisisacceptedtherearethreebasicpillars:(1)thepeople(demos),
(2) the public matters, and (3) the different intermediary ways of exercising
popular control of the input as well as output sides of democracy; i.e.policymaking and implementation. Democratic policy making (input) and
implementation(output)needtoberepresentativeby,first,beingbasedonthe
principles of political equality and impartiality and, second, subject to
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authorisation with mandate and to accountability with transparency and
responsiveness. The actual content of what is thus being decided and
implemented is due to the will of the demos but must not be up against the
principles of democracy and the absolutely necessary means to develop and
applythem.Figure1presentsapreliminaryintegratedframeworkforthestudy
ofdemocraticrepresentation.
Figure1.Amodelforthestudyofdemocracyorientedrepresentation
A number of crucial problems may be addressed within this model.
(Trnquist2009)Inthealternativeassessmentschemeweshallalsobenefitfrom
relatedresearchintheserespects(PCD2008),buttheverysurveyfocusesonthe
actors strategies in the political system and related forms of representation.
First,towhatgovernanceinstitutionsdothemostimportantactorsturnatfirsthand? Second, how do the most important actors reach and affect the
governanceinstitutions? Directand/orbywayofsomemediatinginstitutions?
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Therearetwoparticularlysignificantclustersofproblemsthatmaybe
analysedinviewofthesequestions.
The first cluster relates to the general tendencies of less public and
more polycentric governance,a particularly crucial issueare theprospects for
democratic regulation of more or less privatised institutions of governance
ratherthanreclaiming these institutions,whichmaynotbe feasible.Along the
top row in Figure 1, privatised collective transportation, schools, or health
services,forinstance,wouldthusbesubjecttodemocraticallydecidedrulesand
regulations.2Another basic question is whether or not democratic governance
would be conducive to fight corruption and promote environmentally and
socially responsible economic growth. There is an urgent need to analyse
democratic alternatives to the resurgence of the thesis about the need topromote firm institutions, rule of law and economic development ahead of
popular sovereignty by supposedly enlightened authoritarian rule. The same
holdstruefordemocraticalternativestoaccommodaterebelslikethoseinAceh,
ratherthanbydivisiveclientelismandspecialfavours.(Trnquistet.al2009a)In
the figure on representation,