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IT633 – KEAMANAN JARINGAN FTI – UKSW 2012 IRVAN ADRIAN K, S.T

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Page 1: IT633–KEAMANAN JARINGAN FTI –UKSW 2012 IRVAN …frdaus/PenelusuranInformasi... · Access from wifi , signal only in EEPIS campus Authentication from Proxy ... AUTENTIKASI MENCEGAH

IT633 – KEAMANAN JARINGAN

FTI – UKSW 2012

IRVAN ADRIAN K, S.T

Page 2: IT633–KEAMANAN JARINGAN FTI –UKSW 2012 IRVAN …frdaus/PenelusuranInformasi... · Access from wifi , signal only in EEPIS campus Authentication from Proxy ... AUTENTIKASI MENCEGAH

Penilaian� Tugas 10 %

� Pratikum 30 %

� TTS 25 %

� TAS 30 %

� Kehadiran 5 %

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SILABUS1. Introduksi

2. Pendekatan Analisis Sistem untuk Teknologi Informasi

3. Sekuriti sebagai sebuah Proses

4. Memahami Cara Sistem Network Berkomunikasi

5. Sekuriti Topologi

6. Firewall

7. TTS

8. Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

9. Otentikasi dan Enkripsi

10. Digital Signature

11. Virtual Private Networking

12. E-Mail Server Security

13. Wireless Security

14. TAS

PE

RT

EM

UA

N

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NETWORK SECURITY IN ACTION

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Network ServicesINTERNET

FIREWALL

E-MAIL

FILESERVER EIS

WWWDOMAIN

ROUTER

-GTW

Traffic Monitoring

CACTI

Http ://noc .eepis -its.edu

PROXY

LECTURER

, EMPLOYEE

STUDENTS

DMZ

E-Mail server

HTTPS , SPAM

(Spamassassin ), Virus

Scanner (ClamAV )

PROXY (Squid )

All access to Internet

must through Proxy

FIREWALL -IDS

Linux bridge , iptables

shorewall , snort ,

portsentry , acidlab

CISCO Router

Using acl , block malware

from outside

L3 Switch

Block malware on

physical port from inside

network

All Server in DMZ

Manage using SSH ,

Secure Webmin

SQL Database (MySQL )

Access only from

localhost (127.0.0.1)

EEPISHOTSPOT

Access from wifi , signal

only in EEPIS campus

Authentication from

Proxy

Managable Switchs

Block unwanted user from port ,

manage from WEB

NOC

MULTILAYERSWITCH

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WHY SECURE NETWORK ?

External

attacker

A network security design protects assets from threats and

vulnerabilities in an organized manner

To design security, analyze risks to your assets and create

responses

Corporate Assets

Internal

attacker

Incorrect

permissionsVirus

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SANS SECURITY THREATS

� SANS/FBI top 20 security threats� http://www.sans.org/top20/

� Goals attackers try to achieve� Gain unauthorized access� Obtain administrative or

root level� Destroy vital data

� Deny legitimate users service

� Individual selfish goals� Criminal intent

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SECURITY STATISTICS: ATTACK TRENDS

� Computer Security Institute (http://www.gocsi.com)� Growing Incident Frequency

� Incidents reported to the Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center

� 1997: 2,134

� 1998: 3,474 (75% growth from previous year)

� 1999: 9,859 (164% growth)

� 2000: 21,756 (121% growth)

� 2001: 52,658 (142% growth)

� Tomorrow?

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NETWORK ATTACKS – TRENDS

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TYPES OF ATTACKS

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ATTACK TARGETS

� SecurityFocus

� 31 million Windows-specific attacks

� 22 million UNIX/LINUX attacks

� 7 million Cisco IOS attacks

� All operating systems are attacked!

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HACKERS VS CRACKERS

� Ethical Hackers vs. Crackers

� Hacker usually is a programmer constantly seeks further knowledge, freely share what they have discovered, and never intentionally damage data.

� Cracker breaks into or otherwise violates system integrity with malicious intent. They destroy vital data or cause problems for their targets.

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PRINSIP KEAMANAN JARINGAN

� Confidentiality

Protecting information from exposure and disclosure

� Integrity

Decrease possible problems caused by corruption of data

� Availability

Make information always available

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EXPLOIT� What is an Exploit?

� Crackers break into a computer network by exploiting weaknesses in operating system services.

� Types of attacks� Local

� Remote

� Categories of exploits� 0-day ( new unpublished)

� Account cracking

� Buffer overflow

� Denial of service

� Impersonation

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EXPLOIT � Categories of exploits (cont.)

� Man in the middle

� Misconfiguration

� Network sniffing

� Session hijacking

� System/application design errors

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TIPE SERANGAN

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MACAM - MACAM SERANGANAttacks

Physical AccessAttacks

--Wiretapping/menyadap

Server HackingVandalism/perusakan

Dialog Attacks--

Eavesdropping(Mendengar yg tdk boleh)

Impersonation(meniru)

Message AlterationMerubah message

PenetrationAttacks

(Usaha menembus)

Social Engineering--

Opening AttachmentsPassword Theft

Information Theft

Scanning(Probing)

Break-inDenial ofService

Malware--

VirusesWorms

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SOCIAL ENGINEERING� Definisi Social enginering

� seni dan ilmu memaksa orang untuk memenuhi harapan anda ( Bernz ),

� Suatu pemanfaatan trik-trik psikologis hacker luar pada seoranguser legitimate dari sebuah sistem komputer (Palumbo)

� Mendapatkan informasi yang diperlukan (misalnya sebuahpassword) dari seseorang daripada merusak sebuah sistem(Berg).

� Tujuan dasar social engineering sama seperti umumnya hacking: mendapatkan akses tidak resmi pada sistem atau informasi untukmelakukan penipuan, intrusi jaringan, mata-mata industrial, pencurian identitas, atau secara sederhana untuk mengganggusistem atau jaringan.

� Target-target tipikal termasuk perusahaan telepon dan jasa-jasapemberian jawaban, perusahaan dan lembaga keuangan dengannama besar, badan-badan militer dan pemerintah dan rumah sakit.

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BENTUK SOCIAL ENGINEERING� Social Engineering dengan telepon

� Seorang hacker akan menelpon dan meniru seseorang dalam suatu kedudukanberwenang atau yang relevan dan secara gradual menarik informasi dari user.

� Diving Dumpster � Sejumlah informasi yang sangat besar bisa dikumpulkan melalui company

Dumpster.

� Social engineering on-line : � Internet adalah lahan subur bagi para teknisi sosiaal yang ingin mendapatkan

password

� Berpura-pura menjadi administrator jaringan, mengirimkan e-mail melaluijaringan dan meminta password seorang user.

� Persuasi� Sasaran utamanya adalah untuk meyakinkan orang untuk memberikan

informasi yang sensitif

� Reverse social engineering � sabotase, iklan, dan assisting

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PENETRATION ATTACKS STEPS

� Port scanner� Network enumeration� Gaining & keeping root / administrator access� Using access and/or information gained� Leaving backdoor� Attack

� Denial of Services (DoS) :Network flooding� Buffer overflows : Software error� Malware :Virus, worm, trojan horse� Brute force

� Covering his tracks

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SCANNING (PROBING) ATTACKS

Probe Packets to172.16.99.1, 172.16.99.2, etc.

Internet

Attacker

Corporate Network

Host172.16.99.1

No Host172.16.99.2 No Reply

Reply from172.16.99.1

Results

172.16.99.1 is reachable

172.16.99.2 is not reachable

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DENIAL-OF-SERVICE (DOS)

FLOODING ATTACK

Message Flood

ServerOverloaded ByMessage Flood

Attacker

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CONTOH D O S

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DIALOG ATTACK

� Eavesdropping, biasa disebut dengan spoofing, cara

penanganan dengan Enkripsi

� Impersonation dan message alteration ditangani dengan

gabungan Enkripsi dan autentikasi

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EAVESDROPPING ON A DIALOG

Client PCBob

ServerAlice

Dialog

Attacker (Eve) interceptsand reads messages

Hello

Hello

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PASSWORD ATTACK BY EXAMPLE

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SNIFFING BY EXAMPLE

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KEYLOGGER

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MESSAGE ALTERATION

Client PCBob

ServerAlice

Dialog

Attacker (Eve) interceptsand alters messages

Balance =$1

Balance =$1 Balance =

$1,000,000

Balance =$1,000,000

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MENGAMANKAN TIPE SERANGAN

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INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM

1.Suspicious

Packet

Internet

Attacker

NetworkAdministrator

HardenedServer

Corporate Network

2. SuspiciousPacket Passed

3. LogPacket

4. Alarm IntrusionDetectionSystem

Log File

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ENKRIPSI UNTUK KERAHASIAAN

Client PCBob

ServerAlice

Attacker (Eve) interceptsbut cannot read

“100100110001”

EncryptedMessage

“100100110001”

OriginalMessage

“Hello”

DecryptedMessage

“Hello”

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AUTENTIKASI MENCEGAH

SPOOFING

Client PCBob

ServerAlice

Attacker(Eve)

I’m Bob

Prove it!(Authenticate Yourself)

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HARDENING HOST COMPUTER� The Problem

� Computers installed out of the box have known

vulnerabilities

� Not just Windows computers

� Hackers can take them over easily

� They must be hardened—a complex process that involves

many actions

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HARDENING HOST COMPUTER� Elements of Hardening

� Physical security

� Secure installation and configuration

� Fix known vulnerabilities

� Turn off unnecessary services (applications)

� Harden all remaining applications

� (more on next page)

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HARDENING HOST COMPUTER

� Elements of Hardening (continued)

� Manage users and groups

� Manage access permissions

� For individual files and directories, assign access permissions

specific users and groups

� Back up the server regularly

� Advanced protections

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� Security Baselines Guide the Hardening Effort

� Specifications for how hardening should be done

� Different for different operating systems

� Different for different types of servers (webservers, mail

servers, etc.)

� Needed because it is easy to forget a step

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INSTALLATION AND PATCHING

� Installation Offers Many Options, Some of Which Affect

Security

� For example, in Windows, the NTFS file system is better

for security than FAT32

� Need a security baseline to guide option choices during

installation

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� Known Vulnerabilities

� Most programs have known vulnerabilities

� Exploits are programs that take advantage of known

vulnerabilities

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� Fixes

� Work-around: A series of actions to be taken; no new

software

� Patches: New software to be added to the operating

system

� Upgrades: Newer versions of programs usually fix older

vulnerabilities.

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� Upgrades

� Often, security vulnerabilities are fixed in new versions

� If a version is too old, the vendor might stop offering fixes

� It might be good to wait to upgrade until after the first

round of bug and security fixes

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TURNING OFF UNNECESSARY SERVICES

� Unnecessary Services

� Operating system vendors used to install many services

by default

� This made them easier to use. When use changes,

services do not have to be turned on.

� Attackers have found flaws in many of these rare services

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� Unnecessary Services

� Vendors now install fewer services by default—lock down

mode

� Turn to security baseline to see what services to turn on

and off

� Easier to install too few and add than to install too many

and remove unwanted services

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MANAGING USERS AND GROUPS

� Introduction

� Every user must have an account

� There can also be groups

� Can assign security measures to groups

� These measures apply to the individual group members

automatically

� Faster and easier than assigning security measures to

individuals

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MANAGING PERMISSIONS

� Principle of Least Permissions: Give Users the Minimum

Permissions Needed for Their Job

� More feasible to add permissions selectively than to start

with many, reduce for security

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ADVANCED SERVER HARDENING

TECHNIQUES

� Reading Event Logs

� The importance of logging to diagnose problems

� Failed logins, changing permissions, starting programs, kernel messages, etc.

� Backup

� File Encryption

� File Integrity Checker