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BOOSTING RESILIENCE THROUGH INNOVATIVE RISK GOVERNANCE Catherine Gamper Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate Storm Surge, Norfolk, United Kingdom, December 2013

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BOOSTING RESILIENCE THROUGH

INNOVATIVE RISK GOVERNANCE

Catherine Gamper Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate

Storm Surge, Norfolk, United Kingdom, December 2013

• Past decade: USD 1.5 trillion in economic damages from man-made disasters (industrial accidents, terrorist attacks) and natural disasters (primarily storms and floods)

Why boosting resilience matters

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150

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1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

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billio

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Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, Université catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium, www.emdat.be (accessed 14 November 2013).

Economic losses due to disasters in OECD and BRIC countries, 1980-2012 (USD Billion)

• Driven by significant increase in intensity and complexity: o Increased concentration of populations , especially elderly, more vulnerable

groups, and economic assets in risk prone areas o Accelerated urbanisation o Increased global economic integration, facilitated by transport mobility and

communication o Deteriorating environmental conditions coupled with climatic changes

Why boosting resilience matters

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Source: OECD (2009), OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics.

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Global value chain participation index

Source: Mirdoudot, S. and K. De Backer (2012), “Mapping Global Value Chains”.

OECD countries have made substantial progress in achieving resilience…

Source: Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.emdat.be - Université catholique de Louvain - Brussels - Belgium". Data for OECD and BRIC countries (1980-2012). Figures are shown true to the year of the event. OECD Stat National Accounts GDP per capita in US$, constant prices, reference year 2005

Australia

Bangladesh

Bolivia Chile

Costa Rica

Egypt

Estonia

Ethiopia

Fiji Finland

France Germany

Greece

Haiti

Honduras India

Indonesia Iran

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Kenya Madagascar Malawi

Mexico

Mozambique

Nepal Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Pakistan

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Slovenia

Thailand Turkey

United Kingdom United States

Venezuela

Yemen

0.5

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Real GDP per Capita, Year 2010 (log)

Significant decrease in fatality rates from disasters with increasing income 1980-2013

OECD Non-OECD

… but considerable economic damages challenge even highest income countries

Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.emdat.be - Université catholique de Louvain - Brussels - Belgium; OECD (2013), “Gross domestic product (GDP) MetaData : GDP per capita, US$, constant prices, reference year 2005”, National Accounts OECD Statistics Database, accessed on 14 November 2013, http://stats.oecd.org/

• Some disasters caused economic losses in excess of 20% of GDP (Chile, NZ), with local economies especially affected

• Shocks propagate across economic sectors and geographic boundaries through interconnected economies

• Considerable uncertainty challenges good policy making for resilience

Why boosting resilience matters

• Disasters can be even more disruptive if they occur in times of economic difficulties (e.g. Fukushima, Japan 2011)

• Governments need guidance on prioritising resilience under fiscal constraints

• Optimal risk reduction level under constrained resources:

Prioritising resilience under fiscal constraints?

Source: Ammann, W. et al. (2006), “Risk concept, integral risk management and risk governance”, in RISK21 – Coping with Risk due to Natural Hazards in the 21st Century, Taylor & Francis Group, London.

Collective risk (EUR) risk baseline

cost-benefit value of the optimal measures

marginal costs criteria (1 : 1)

Costs of risk reduction measures

1 EUR risk reduction = 1 EUR investment costs

• Past disasters questioned whether governments pursued a high enough level of resilience

• Citizens prosecuted their governments for failing to protect them (e.g. Austria after 2003 floods)

• „ZERO RISK“ neither technically possible, nor financially feasible • So: what residual risk is society choosing to accept? • Decision support systems (e.g. CBA, MCA, etc.) can help making

trade-offs:

Can governments define “optimal” resilience levels?

Source: Hochrainer-Stigler, S. et al. (2010), “The Costs and Benefits of Reducing Risk from Natural Hazards to Residential Structures in Developing Countries”, Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center.

• The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) determines acceptable levels of risk with regard to work related hazards based on the criteria elaborated by the HSE

• Iceland includes definitions of acceptable risk levels for snow avalanches and landslides in national law (The Ministry of the Environment, 2000)

• Liu and Xie (2008) propose different acceptable earthquake risk levels in China based on city size and probable earthquake intensity

How have countries used concepts of acceptable risk levels?

• Improved disaster risk management framework conditions: o General level of social and economic welfare o Facilitating institutional environment

• Concrete and successful disaster risk management measures: o Increased understanding of risks o Central government leadership o Mainstreaming of disaster risk management across public

policy areas o High level of risk awareness and information sharing

OECD countries have made substantial progress in achieving resilience…

… In protective infrastructure and its maintenance (e.g. dam breaks during floods in 2002/13 in Europe; great infrastructure destruction during Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011) … Lagging regulatory reforms (e.g. building codes that are not adapted to new housing design - in Italy L’Aquila 2009; rigidity in air safety regulations during volcanic eruption in Iceland 2010) … Lagging enforcement of regulations (e.g. significant increase in population around the Vesuvius despite known hazard exposure; informal construction of houses in Mexico in risk-prone areas)

But gaps are persistent…

… Private sector–gaps in business continuity planning (e.g. large bankruptcy rate during Great East Japan Earthquake 2011; UK floods 2007 – average of 9 days of interruption); … Individual households do not invest in self-protection (e.g. 84% of population affected by UK floods 2007 believe nothing they can do to protect better; only a fifth of population of Istanbul took protective action after the Marmara EQ in 1999; in Germany only 25% of HH insured against flood risk) … Low levels of international collaboration (e.g. lack of incentives to share information; lack of appreciation of benefits of joint investments; diverging capacity levels across borders)

… but also among non-governmental stakeholders

… undermining trust in government

Source: BP (2014), "BP ADS Share Price History", British Petroleum, http://ir2.flife.de/data/bp/hpl_us.php (accessed 8 April 2014); McDermott, M. (15 November 2012), “BP will pay biggest criminal fine in US history for Gulf oil spill”, Treehugger, www.treehugger.com/energy-disasters/bp-will-pay-biggest-criminal-fine-u-s-history-gulf-oil-spill.html.

Trust in government put to particular test during disasters: o previous neglects in resilience measures

has disproportionately negative effects on trust in government

o Governments and also companies have to react with drastic measures to restore trust (e.g. resignation of government officials in charge)

o and implement expensive spending measures, e.g. bank liquidity injection after 9/11; clean-up costs and compensation funds after Deepwater Horizon

• Shortcomings in risk governance may be an important and often overlooked cause

→ Risk governance mechanisms determine whether an actor participates in putting resilience measures in place; for example:

o Households may decide not to self-protect in expectation of governments doing so for them

o Local governments may not build protective measures as result of other jurisdictions benefiting but not contributing to the costs

o Central government actors reluctant to invest in resilience – ex-ante investments not visible and levels of rewards low

o Countries may not collaborate because of disincentives for data-sharing

Why do resilience gaps persist?