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DAFTARISI

Pendahuluan

Dalam dua tahun terakhir, dunia menaruh perhatian yang sangat besarterhadap Indonesia terkait posisinya sebagai negara penghasil emisiketiga terbesar di dunia setelah Amerika Serikat dan Cina. ________ 1

Penlaan Uang REDD

Salah satu alasan mengapa pembicaraan yang berkaitan dengan REDD

berjalan pada kecepatan yang begitu cepat adalah jumlah uang yangdibicarakan. Angka-angkanya cenderung berubah-ubah dan sangat

tergantung pada metodologi yang digunakan. _ 5

Mekansme Pendanaan Yang Dajukan

Sebagian besar perdebatan REDD adalah tentang bagaimana skema

REDD dapat didanai. Ada perbedaan yang sangat signikan terhadapbentuk REDD dan cara pembiayaan yang paling diinginkan oleh setiapnegara. _____________________________________________________ 7


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Kekurangan d Peraturan Undang-undang danKebjakan Pemerntah Indonesa

Ada beberapa kekurangan yang mencolok dalam kebijakan Indonesia

yang mendiskriminasikan dan membahayakan hak masyarakat adatIndonesia. Yang paling menggelisahkan adalah denisi hutan adat yangdipakai. ___________________________________________________ 35

Ketdaktegasan Pemerntah Indonesa

Tujuan Pemerintah Indonesia mengenai perlindungan hutan yangdiumumkan sebenarnya jauh berbeda dari kebijakan pemerintah secara

resmi. ______________________________________________________ 40

Moraltas yang Dragukan

Model-model ekonomi memperkirakan bahwa kalau REDD diterapkanpada skala nasional, penduduk urban (kota) di Jawa dan Bali akanmenderita ketika harga bahan kayu meningkat, sementara penduduk

rural (pedesaan) di Kalimantan dan Sumatra menerima keuntungan daripembagian dana REDD (Resosudarmo, belum diterbitkan 2008) _ 44


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REDD danIndonesa1

1 Dokumen ini merupakanringkasan laporan tentangREDD terhadap masyarakatyang tinggal di dan sekitarhutan dan masyarakat lainnyayang rentan akibat perubahaniklim


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2I Lembar Fakta Hutan dan Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI

Deorestasi dan alih ungsi lahan di negara berkembang selama iniberkontribusi terhadap 18-20% emisi gas rumah kaca (IPCC 2007). DiIndonesia sendiri, penggunaan tanah dan alih ungsi lahan melepaskan

2-3 milyar ton CO2 setiap tahun (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008: 3). Sampaidisini, menjadi penting untuk dilihat kembali ungsi hutan sebagaisalah satu komponen kunci yang mengatur peredaran karbon duniadan memiliki keterkaitan erat dengan upaya-upaya penanggulangan

perubahan iklim. Untuk itu, Indonesia akan menjadi pemain kunci dalamperundingan yang akan datang mengenai masalah perubahan iklim.

Pada pertemuan Conerence o the Parties ketigabelas (COP-13) - Konerensi Internasional Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa tentang

Perubahan Iklim (UNFCCC) di Bali pada bulan Desember 2007,pengurangan emisi dari deorestasi dan degradasi hutan di negara-

negara berkembang (REDD) muncul sebagai komponen kunci dalamusaha mitigasi perubahan iklim. Diharapkan, REDD dapat menstabilkankonsentrasi CO2 di atmosr pada tingkat serendah mungkin melaluiskema pembayaran bagi negara yang mampu mengurangi atau

menghentikan laju deorestasi. Karena adanya kemungknan REDDdimasukkan dalam kesepakatan paska-Protokol Kyoto, banyak negarakemudian mengembangkan proyek REDD secara terburu-buru sebelumberlangsungnya COP-15 di Copenhagen, Desember 2009.


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Dalam laporannya kepada UNFCC,Blaser menghtung baya yang

dbutuhkan untuk menghentkandeorestas pada tahun 2030 dengan

memperbandngkan penyebabdeorestas dbeberapa regon


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Sebuah laporan lain ke UNFCCC oleh Trines memperkirakan hargapencegahan kehilangan 148 juta hektar hutan alam (primary orest) di40 negara-kunci antara $28 sampai $185 milyar per tahun (Trines, 2007:

43).

Disini terlihat jelas ketidak-konsekwenan antara perkiraan yang

tersedia. Walaupun demikian, pembicaraan REDD terus bertambahsemangat. Dan sebagaimana banyak perdebatan mengenai hargapelaksanaan program REDD, cara yang paling layak untuk membiayaiskema-skema REDD juga paling sering dibicarakan.


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memasukkan hutan lindung ke dalam REDD (CAN 2007). Kedua negaratersebut juga mengungkapkan kekhawatirannya terkait dana yangdisalurkan lewat Bank Dunia (FOEI 2008: 34).

Republik Demokratis Kongo dan beberapa negara lainnyamenyarankan adanya insenti pasar dan dana bantuan untuk pelestarian

wilayah hutan skala besar yang dalam sejarahnya tidak mengalami lajudeorestasi secara cepat (CAN 2007).

Meksiko dan beberapa negara yang lain mengusulkan pendirian Avoided Deorestation Carbon Fund di dalam UNFCCC. Untukmendapatkan dana ini, Meksiko mengusulkan diadakannya pajak atasemisi yang disebabkan oleh kegiatan yang ditentukan di Protokol Kyoto,

mirip dengan pajak atas emisi di bawah skema CDM (Clean DevelopmentMechanism) (Fry 2008).

Sampai saat ini Indonesia agak bungkam di panggung internasionalmengenai skema yang paling disukai dan, seperti biasa, tertarik akananeka macam mekanisme pembiayaan. Usulan Indonesia kepadaUNFCCC memokuskan pada isu baseline, dan bagaimana mengukurdeorestasi (Republik Indonesia 2008). Usulan tersebut menyatakan

bahwa skema REDD harus memasukkan peningkatan stok karbon danpengelolaan hutan secara berkelanjutan dan cenderung menggunakanpendekatan nasional (Angelsen 2008).


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10I Lembar Fakta Hutan dan Climate vol.1 2009.WALHI

Selama perundingan di UNFCCC, Bank Dunia muncul sebagai badanpembiayaan terkemuka untuk suatu skema REDD multilateral, danpada saat ini mengatur lebih dari 10 badan pembiayaan terkait dengan

perubahan iklim.

Di tengah kontroversi tersebut, pada akhir tahun 2007 di pertemuan

COP-13 di Bali, Bank Dunia mengajukan Forest Carbon PartnershipFacility (FCPF). Tujuan FCPF adalah sebagai katalis untuk merangsangpenanaman modal (secara publik dan swasta) di REDD dan mendukungdemonstration pilot projects (proyek uji coba) bagi pengembangan dan

pelaksanaan strategi REDD secara nasional (Dooley et al 2008: 6).

Suatu negara boleh ikut FCPF sesudah menyerahkan concept note

yang menjelaskan rencana persiapan untuk REDD, dan concept notetersebut disetujui oleh FCPF. Pada saat ini 23 negara telah terlibat dalamprogram FCPF dan diharapkan akan mencapai 30 negara ketika berjalanlengkap3.

Sampai sekarang, FCPF telah dijanjikan US$165 juta oleh sepuluhnegara donor dan The Nature Conservacy (TNC) (FOEI 2008: 30).Dana ini akan digunakan untuk membantu negara-negara ini untuk

turut dalam program REDD jika diterapkan. Sepertinya FCPF sangatcenderung menggunakan pendekatan pasar karbon dalam pendanaanREDD. Bukti awal menunjukkan bahwa banyak concept notes tidak

3 Argentina,Columbia,

Costa Rica,Guyana,Mexico,Nicaragua,Panama,Paraguay,Peru,Ghana,Liberia,Kenya,

Madagascar,Cameroon,DRC,Republic o Congo,Ethiopia,Lao PDR,Nepal, PNG,Vanuatu,

Vietnam (Dooley et_al_2008)


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Sementara FCPF dan UN-REDD mendukung kegiatan persiapan(readiness activities) dan mekanisme pembayaran pilot, FIP bertujuanuntuk memberikan dana untuk pelaksanaan reormasi dan penanaman

yang dibutuhkan di lapangan. FIP tidak hanya akan menggunakandana publik untuk membiayai kegiatannya, namun juga diharapkanakan memasilitasi pendirian pasar karbon (Griths 2008: 43). Beberapatulisan menyebutkan kecemasan tentang tujuan Bank untuk mendukung

pengelolaan hutan berkelanjutan dan aorestasi melalui FIP. Kalaupendekatan berdasarkan hak asasi manusia (rights based) dan berpusatmanusia (people centred) tidak diterapkan, dana FIP mungkin akandigunakan untuk menebang hutan dan mengembangkan perkebunan

skala besar (Griths 2008: 11).

Organisasi masyarakat sipil mengkhawatirkan kemampuan

Bank Dunia dalam mengelola dana perubahan iklim dengan baik.Dalam bentuk yang ada sekarang, dana Bank Dunia ini dimaksudkanuntuk memberikan dana bantuan (grant) dan pinjaman (loan). Adakemungkinan kita akan menghadapi situasi yang semakin tidak

menentu bila negara-negara berkembang meningkatkan utangnyauntuk menanggulangi masalah yang disebabkan oleh negara utara.

Sekalipun dana ini tidak dipakai dalam skema loan, namun hal inidapat menempatkan negara yang menerima dana dalam hubungan


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Norwegia dan Bolivia berkomiment untuk membantu pendanaanprogram ini sebesar US$35 juta. Sementara itu, Republik DemokratisKongo, Indonesia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Tanzania,

Vietnam dan Zambia sudah diterima sebagai negara partisipan.

Program UN-REDD mendukung ketersangkutan REDD dengan pasar

karbon dan akan memadukan inisiati internasional lain seperti FCPF, FIPdan GEF (Griths 2008). Program UN-REDD berkomitmen melakukanpendekatan berdasarkan hak asasi manusia (rights based) dan dalamdokumentasinya menyebutkan Free, Prior and Inormed Consent4 dan

memperhatikan hak masyarakat adat (UN-REDD 2008). Program inimasih dalam tahapan persiapan dan belum ada proyek yang disahkan.

Suatu persoalan besar dengan UN-REDD adalah bahwa program ini akanmenggunakan denisi hutan FAO yang termasuk perkebunan (lihat

diskusi dibawah). Risiko lain yang harus diperhatikan adalah bahwaaparat PBB yang akan melaksanakan programnya memiliki kebijakanyang lemah mengenai masyarakat adat, dan belum ada rencana yang

jelas untuk menghadapi resiko sosial berkaitan dengan pelaksanaan

REDD (Griths 2008).

Penting juga dibicarakan skema bilateral yang muncul pada tahun-

tahun belakangan ini. Australia menjadi pendukung besar terhadapREDD dan upaya menanggulangi perubahan iklim di Indonesia dan

4 Free Prior and InformedConsent (FPIC) dapat

diartikan menjadi, hakmasyarakat untukmendapatkan informasi

sebelum sebuah program

atau proyek pembangunandilaksanakan dalam wilayah

mereka dan berdasarkaninformasi tersebut, mereka

secara bebas tanpatekanan menyatakansetuju atau menolak, atau

dengan kata lain sebuahhak masyarakat untukmemutuskan jenis kegiatan

pembangunan macam apayang mereka perbolehkanuntuk berlangsung dalam

tanah mereka (UN 2005)


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kesepakatan bilateral dengan Brasilia dan Tanzania dengan tujuanpokok untuk mengurangi deorestasi (Griths 2008: 14).

WALHI mengkritisi dukungan bilateral inisiati REDD di Indonesia,khususnya peranan besar yang dimainkan oleh Australia. Harusdipertanyakan apakan dukungan ini sekaligu sebagai strategi untuk

memasilitasi operasi perusahan ekstrakti yang dimiliki Australia diKalimantan dan Papua.

Di tengah perundingan mengenai skema bilateral atau multilateralyang paling cocok, dana dari sektor swasta melalui pasar karbon sukareladikembangkan dengan pesat. Sebagai jawaban terhadap dana yangcukup besar yang dibutuhkan untuk membiayai skema REDD, banyak

pihak mengusulkan bahwa REDD dikaitkan dengan pasar karbon.Pendukung pendekatan pasar mengatakan bahwa kalau pihak bisnistidak dilibatkan, hutan selalu akan dikalahkan kekuatan perusahaanekstraksi dan investasi. Padahal kritik terhadap skema karbon meragukan

angka ini, pasar karbon disebutkan mampu membangkitkan $30 milyarsetiap tahun dan diperkirakan akan mencapai ratusan milyar atau lebih(Schwartzman et al, 2007).

Beberapa negara berkembang berminat pada REDD semata-mata

berdasarkan pasar, dengan alasan negara industri sering mengingkari


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memasukkan REDDkedalam pasar karbontdak saja menjadmahal namun jugamenjad skema sa2


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maupun internasional, ada kemungkinan Indonesia akan menyaksikankehilangan kedaulatan atas sumberdaya alam, sementara pihak ketigasemakin mempengaruhi penetapan terhadap sumber daya alam.

Berkemungkinan besar nantinya para pembeli di negara utaralah yangakan menentukan kriteria mengenai pengelolaan lahan dan konservasi(FOEI 2008). Apalagi, konsep mata pencaharian berdasarkan uang yangdigunakan oleh negara utara kerap tidak layak bagi masyarakat setempat

(Fry 2008; Griths 2008). Insenti keuangan tidak akan pernah cukupuntuk menggantikan kehilangan ketahanan pangan dan keutuhanbudaya (Griths 2008: 21)

Sudah terbukti bahwa pasar karbon bukan saja rumit, tetapi

tergantung pada perubahan (volatility). Bila mana nilai karbon jatuh,dapat dibayangkan bahwa pembayaran kepada masyarakat adat dan

masyarakat yang bergantung pada hutan akan turun hingga menga ncamkehidupan, dan mendorong mereka untuk meneruskan kegiatan yangmenghancurkan sumberdaya alam itu sendiri (FOEI 2008: 18).


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05

Dens Hutan

Salah satu kelemahan dalam kebijakan REDD yang harus diperhatikanadalah denisi hutan yang digunakan oleh UNFCCC. Denisi hutanFAO5, yang juga digunakan oleh Clean Development Mechanism


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dipisahkan (Republik Indonesia 2008). Maka, meskipun sekiranyadenisi pemerintah Indonesia kurang tepat, namun jelas perkebunantidak masuk dalam denisi hutan.

Walaupun demikian, bila Indonesia menggunakan denisi FAO makaakan ada resiko dimana dana REDD akan dialihgunakan untuk mendanai

perluasan perkebunan kayu. Meskipun itu bertabrakan dengan Dratperaturan REDD yang dikeluarkan Menteri Kehutanan itu sendiri.

Seperti disebutkan diatas, Menteri Kehutanan menentukan dirinyasebagai aparat koordinasi utama untuk skema REDD di Indonesia.Otomatis, Menteri Kehutanan memiliki keterkaitan erat dengankepentingan di sektor pulp and paper dan perkebunan di Indonesia. Drat

Kebijakan REDD menyatakan bahwa siapa saja yang memegang izin dariMenteri Kehutanan (termasuk pemegang Izin Usaha Pemanaatan HasilHutan Kayu pada Hutan Alam (IUPHHK-HA) dan pemegang Izin UsahaPemanataan Hasil Hutan Kayu pada Hutan Tanaman (IUPHHK-HT))

dapat mengembangkan proyek REDD dan menyerahkan usulannya keMenteri Kehutanan (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008: 6). Memang tanda-tanda yang sangat membahayakan.


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Apakah deorestasi ini terjadi secara tidak sah di negara yang ikut skemaREDD atau hanya beralih ke negara yang tidak ikut REDD tergantungpada jenis proyek REDD yang dilaksanakan. Hal ini terungkap tuntas di

diskusi leakage di bawah.

Ada juga bahaya yang cukup besar dengan menerapkan kebijakan

REDD secara global ketika penyebab yang melatarbelakangi deorestasiberbeda-beda.

Pertanian misalnya, termasuk peternakan sapi skala besar adalah aktapenting di Amerika Latin dan Arika Utara, sedangkan ekstraksi kayu danproduksi biouel merupakan penyebab utama di Asia Tenggara.

Beberapa tulisan mengungkapkan kekhawatirannya mengenaipernyataan tertulis yang diserahkan ke FCPF dan UNFCCC yangmenyatakan pembukaan hutan dengan cara tebas, imas dan bakar

dan pencarian bahan bakar kayu adalah penyebab utama deorestasi(FOEI 2008; Griths 2008: 25; Angelsen 2008: 126).

Juga sama memprihatinkan bahwa beragam pertanian subsisten

seperti peladang gilir balik, pemanaatan hasil hutan non kayu (NTFPs),dan kehutanan berkelanjutan digabung dan disebut sama dampaknyaterhadap alih ungsi lahan (deorestasi). Meskipun terbukti selamaini bahwa pertanian gilir balikdan sistem agroorestry sebenarnya


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Masyarakat Adat danMasyarakat Yang BergantungPada Hutan

Dari 230 juta penduduk Indonesia, diperkirakan 40 juta antaranya

masyarakat adat yang tergantung pada hutan dan barang dan jasa sumber daya alam (CIFOR,2003). Otomatis, masyarakat adatIndonesialah yang paling berpotensi menerima dampak yang buruk

dalam pembicaraan REDD - karena perencanaan atau pelaksanaan yangtidak sempurna.

Mayoritas tanah yang disisihkan untuk REDD dianggap sebagai

hutan negara. Karena REDD akan meningkatkan nilai hutan, pemerintahberkemungkinan untuk tidak mengakui hak-hak masyarakat adatterhadap tanah mereka (Angelsen 2008: 115).

Uang yang beredar dalam REDD memungkinkan pejabat kehutanandan pihak-pihak yang terlibat didalam bisnis ini menakan penyelesaiankonfik mengenai hak milik atas tanah yang sedang berlangsung

(Griths 2008).

07


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Pengalaman dengan LSM konservasi pada masa lalu menyebabkanmasyarakat adat Indonesia mewaspadai janji tentang mempromosikancara kehidupan berkelanjutan alternati did an sekitar kawasan

lindung (Fry 2008: 177). Ada kekhawatiran besar mengenai partisipasimasyarakat adat dalam perencanaan program REDD. Usulan REDD tetapdikembangkan dalam cara top-down (atas ke bawah) dari pemerintah,organisasi internasional dan perusahan perdagangan karbon, danmasyarakat di tingkat lokal sering tidak mendapatkan cukup inormasi

(FPP 2009: 7).

Konsultasi dengan masyarakat lokal sering hanya sejauh sosialisasi

sesudah konsep dan objek sudah diputuskan. Free Prior and InormedConsent hampir tidak pernah disebutkan dalam kebanyakan usulan


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Ancaman REDDterhadap hakmasyarakatIndonesamenjad perhatanbeberapa LSMnasonal maupunnternasonal.


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kecemasan mengenai kegiatan persiapan REDD Indonesiayang gagal memenuhi kewajibannya di bawah UNDRIP (UNDeclaration on the Rights o Indigenous Peoples)6.

Drat Peraturan REDD seperti yang diacu diatas jugamemberikan tata pedoman bagi keterlibatan masyarakat

hukum adat dalam suatu skema REDD. Seperti dinyatakan didokumennya, persyaratan untuk hutan adat adalah:

a. Memiliki Surat Keputusan Menteri sebagai pengelolahutan adat

b. Memperoleh rekomendasi untuk pelaksanaan REDD dariPemerintah Daerah

c. Memenuhi kriteria dan indikator lokasi untuk pelaksanaan

REDD

d. Memiliki rencana pelaksanaan REDD

Peraturan ini dengan jelas menempatkan penguasaanREDD di tangan Menteri Kehutanan. Memandang sikapMenteri terhadap masyarakat adat Indonesia sejauh ini,

ada ancaman berat bahwa masyarakat adat akan tetap

6 Submisi tersebut juga

menunjukkan prosedur

untuk pengakuan hak ulayatyang diterapkan oleh Badan

Pertanahan Nasional melaluiPeraturan No.5 tahun 1999.Peraturan mengandung

beberapa kekuranganmengenai pengakuan hakmasyarakat adat terhadap

tanahnya. Untuk inormasilebih lanjut,pembaca

didorong untuk membacasubmisi FPP,AMAN, dan SawitWatch


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Ketdaktegasan PemerntahIndonesa

Tujuan Pemerintah Indonesia mengenai perlindungan hutan yangdiumumkan sebenarnya jauh berbeda dari kebijakan pemerintah secararesmi. Sementara Pemerintah Indonesia mengatakan akan mengurangi

kerusakan hutan, namun kenyataannya, dalam dua belas bulan terakhir,pemerintah Indonesia mengeluarkan peraturan dan kebijakan yang

justru menuju ke arah sebaliknya.

Pada tanggal 4 Februari 2008 pemerintah Indonesia mengeluarkanPeraturan Pemerintah (PP) No. 2 tahun 2008 tentang PenerimaanNegara Bukan Pajak Yang Berasal Dari Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan

Untuk Pembangunan Diluar Kegiatan Kehutanan. Peraturan ini semakinmemberikan hak kepada perusahan tambang dan membenarkanpembukaan kawasan lindung dan hutan produksi. Kemungkinan besarperaturan ini akan dimanaatkan oleh perusahaan tambang untuk

menggunakan kawasan lindung dan hutan produksi untuk kegiatanpertambangan. Perusahaan tambang tinggal membayar Rp 300 per

09


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Moraltas yang Dragukan?

Model-model ekonomi memperkirakan bahwa kalau REDD diterapkan

pada skala nasional, penduduk urban (kota) di Jawa dan Bali akanmenderita ketika harga bahan kayu meningkat, sementara pendudukrural (pedesaan) di Kalimantan dan Sumatra menerima keuntungan daripembagian dana REDD (Resosudarmo, belum diterbitkan 2008).

Pada tingkat internasional ada keprihatinan yang sama bahwa selamaREDD memberikan penghargaan terhadap pencemar , ada kemungkinan

akan menyebabkan kehilangan niat bagi negara dengan laju deorestasinol atau rendah untuk menanggapi ancaman deorestasi yang akandatang (Griths 2008: 11). Negara yang memiliki laju deorestasi sejarahyang rendah mungkin akan dilarang mengakses dana REDD. Akibatnya,

penetapan garis dasar untuk mengukur deorestasi menjadi topik yangcukup panas dalam perundingan REDD.

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dihadapi atmosr jauh lebih banyak (Fry 2008: 173). Leakage adalahsalah satu kekhawatiran terbesar dengan REDD, dan akan tetap menjadimasalah, khususnya kalau penyebab akar deorestasi tidak ditangani.

Pengakuan terhadap risiko ini menyebabkan beberapa pihakmengusulkan agar REDD diterapkan secara nasional. Pendekatan

nasional diyakini akan mengurangi risiko leakage dan mampumemasilitasi penanganan secara terpadu terhadap penyebab deorestasisekaligus (FOEI 2008: 21, Angelsen 2008: 114). Oleh karenanya, Indonesiacenderung mendukung pendekatan ditingkat nasional. Walaupun

demikian, jikalau REDD dilaksanakan pada skala nasional, tidak akanmungkin mencegah deorestasi

di tingkat internasional. Kegiatandeorestasi akan beralih dari

negara partisipan REDD kenegara yang tidak turut REDD.Menyarankan agar bahwa REDDdiadopsi pada skala nasional

adalah solusi yang terlalusederhana, dan tidak mungkinterjadi (Fry 2008: 175).


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persen deorestasi di Indonesia pada tahun 2006 (WALHI 2007). REDDpasti juga akan meningkatkan harga kayu, dan secara bersamaan akan

meningkatkan tekanan untuk melakukan pembalakan liar. Maka,akan sangat penting untuk mempertanyakan mengapa REDD akandapat berhasil di Indonesia, ketika pemerintah Indonesia tidak mampumemberantas pembalakan liar yang sudah ada - kalau mereka tidak

bisa menegakkan hukum mengenai kerusakan hutan, bagaimanamereka akan menegakkan hukum agar tidak terjadi kerusakan hutan?(Fry 2008: 175).

WALHI dan beberapa organisasi Indonesia lain juga mencatatbanyaknya kasus korupsi di sektor kehutanan, khususnya dalamalih ungsi lahan dan pemberian izin untuk memasilitasi peluasan

perkebunan (WALHI 2007). Terdapat 15 karakteristik korupsi padapemegang IUPHHK hutan alam dan 8 karakteristik korupsi padapemegang IUPHHK Hutan Tanaman Industri (Greenomic & ICW, 2004).

kalau mereka tdak bsa menegakkan hukum mengenakerusakan hutan, bagamana mereka akan menegakkanhukum agar tdak terjad kerusakan hutan?


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Lagi pula, baseline menurut sejarah tidak mungkin menjadi perkiraanyang akurat bagi deorestasi di masa depan, karena laju deorestasiakan melambat sesuai dengan ketersediaan hutan yang tersisa untuk

ditebang (Angelsen 2008: 55). Indonesia mungkin mau mempergunakanlaju historisnya yang cepat, karena Indonesia pernah mengatakan inginmenggunakan baseline yang menggunakan kecenderungan sejarahuntuk menaksirkan laju di masa depan.

Soal ketepatan juga sangat penting - kalau menciptakan baselineyang terlalu tinggi, ada risiko system REDD yang dibangun tidak akan

menghasilkan pengurangan deorestasi (FOEI 2008). Isu-isu teknisterkait dengan pengukuran baseline juga penting. Ada perbedaan yangcukup besar berdasarkan metologi yang digunakan. Modeling seringberdasarkan rekaan dan tergantung pada akta seperti laju deorestasi

historis dan laju deorestasi yang diperkirakan akan terjadi, ketepatanpeta yang tersedia, tanah kosong dan seterusnya ( Harris et al 2007)6.Model-model ini seringkali mengandalkan data hutan yang diterbitkanoleh FAO. Patut dipertanyakan apa nilai data ini kalau perkebunan masih

dimasukkan ke data FAO (FOEI 2008).

Beberapa tulisan menyoroti kenyataan bahwa hutan tidaklah

permanen, dan REDD tidak akan memperhatikan kerusakan hutan yangterjadi secara alami misalnya karena kebakaran atau kematian alami

8 Lihat Angelsen A 2008 untukdeskripsi modeling terperinci.


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tersebut mungkin akan menjadi hambatan besar di kawasan hutanterpencil, dimana akses internet pun juga jarang (Dooley_ et_al_ 2008).Walaupun akhir-akhir ini kita menyaksikan kemajuan yang cukup pesatmengenai aspek teknis akutansi karbon, prasarana teknis dan kapasitas

untuk melakukan analisa dan mengelola data tetap jadi kekhawatiran(Angelsen 2008: 96). Kalau degradasi hutan dimasukkan ke skema REDD,pengawasan satelit saja tidak mungkin cukup. Lagi pula, pasti sangatmahal untuk memperoleh nilai-nilai degradasi dan kemungkinan besar

nilai-nilai tersebut tidak akan akurat (Fry_2008:_171).

Masalah pengawasan mengungkap satu isu lagi yang sangat

menggelisahkan. Upaya-upaya untuk mencegah degradasi hutanmungkin akan mengakibatkan pendekatan manusia versus hutanyang kuno dan eksklusi terhadap konservasi hutan. Bukti menunjukkanbahwa kebijakan perlindungan hutan seringkali menjadikan kelompok


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REDD dalam bentuk yang penuh dengan bahaya. Adarsko akan semakn memnggrkan masyarakat adatdan komuntas yang bergantung pada hutan , danmemasltas kehancuran hutan


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harus berkomitmen untuk melakukan pengurangan emisi yang eektidan nyata di negara mereka sendiri.

Terkait dengan masalah ini, diperlukan sebuah upaya untukmenanggulangi penyebab deorestasi pada sisi permintaan (demand).Sementara penyebab langsung di Indonesia adalah peluasan

perkebunan dan ekstraksi kayu, masalah ini tidak dapat dipisahkan daripola konsumsi di negara utara. Kalau kita tidak menyelesaikan masalahpermintaan negara industri untuk produk kayu, kertas dan bubur kertas,kemungkinan besar kita akan menciptakan skema yang leaky dan pada

pokoknya tidak berarti.

Penolakan WALHI terhadap skema REDD bukan berarti WALHI

tidak sadar pengurangan deorestasi adalah hal yang penting. WALHImengajukan moratorium logging dan konversi hutan pada tahun 2001dan mengulangi tuntutan ini pada tahun 2007. Untuk menanggulangilaju deorestasi, penting dimulai dari proses perbaikan tata kelola

pemerintah dan penegakan hukum di sektor kehutanan. Pelaksanaanmoratorium logging dan konversi hutan akan memberikan ruang untukmelakukan reormasi yang penting ini. Kalau REDD diterapkan sebelummasalah ini diselesaikan, kita semua akan menghadapi bencana.


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Proyek Ujcoba REDD dIndonesa

Pada saat ini sebanyak dua puluh insiati REDD sedang dikembangkandi Indonesia. Masih agak sulit untuk mencari inormasi yang akuratmengenai proyek-proyek tersebut. Kebanyakan inisiati bertujuan untukmenjual kredit yang dihasilkan proyek ke pasar karbon sukarela tetapi

juga mengharapkan REDD akan diterima sebagai bagian kesepakatanpasca-2012. Padahal inisiati sukarela tengah dikembangkan, TachrirFathoni, kepala Research and Development Menteri Kehutananmengatakan pemerintah pusat tidak akan memberikan izin sebelum

adanya regulasi ( Jakarta Post 2009). Bagian ini akan menguraikanbeberapa proyek besar yang diajukan di In donesia.

12


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energi renewable dan perdagangan karbon di kawasan Leuser Ecosystem(Anderson & Kuswardono 2008).

Rau:

Perkebunan kayu Riau Andalan Pulp dan Paper (RAPP) mengajukan

usulan untuk mengelola semenanjung Kampar di Sumatera Tengahsebagai hutan lindung. Usulan tersebut akan membangun kawasanlindung inti yang dikelilingi oleh 200,000 ha perkebunan kayu. RAPPdiketahui memiliki catatan sosial dan lingkungan yang buruk di Riau dan

bertahun-tahun terlibat dalam konfik dengan masyarakat setempat.

Proyek RAPP akan menggunakan sistem bending dan saluran yangsangat kompleks, dan beberapa pihak meragukan kemampuan proyekini untuk menghasilkan pengurangan emisi (Anderson & Kuswardono

2008).


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Kalmantan Tengah:

Sejuta hektar hutan gambut terdegradasi di situs mega-proyek

beras di Kalimantan Tengah diusulkan sebagai proyek ujicoba REDD.Skema ini didukung oleh Kalimantan Forests and Climate PartnershipPemerintah Australia yang bernilai AU$30 juta. Tahapan pertama akan

melibatkan rehabilitasi 100,000 hektar yang berdampingan denganhutan gambut (Gubenur Kalimantan Tengah 2009). Pengukuran karbontelah dilakukan tetapi rencana induk belum dikeluarkan. Beberapatulisan menyebutkan JP Morgan Stanley tertarik untuk memberikandukungan nansial (Griths 2008; Down to Earth 2008). Kritik terhadap

proyek ini menuturkan bahwa proyek REDD ini bertentangan denganrencana pemerintah Kalimantan Tengah untuk terkait lahan sejutahutan gambut di kawasan Kalteng lainnya yang diperuntukkan untukdijadikan perkebunan sawit (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008).


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PAPUA:

Pemerintah Papua mengungkapkan keinginannya untuk mengurangideorestasi dan degradasi hutan di propinsinya dan berencanauntuk menata ulang sektor kehutan. Dalam rencananya, Papua akan

mengurangi jumlah izin diatas hutan produksi, melakukan pengukuranstok karbon, mengatur industri kayu, dan memajukan pengelolaanhutan berbasis masyarakat. Beberapa proyek ujicoba REDD sudahdikembangkan tetapi pelaksanaannya masih terhambat oleh pemerintah

pusat (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008 ).

Pegunungan Cyclops:

FFI bersama Pemerintah Propinsi Papua tengah mengembangkanusulan skema REDD di Pegunungan Cyclops dekat Jayapura. MoUsudah ditandatangani oleh Pemerintah Papua dan FFI, tetapi proyek

masih menanti persetujuan dari pemerintah pusat.


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Carbon Conservation sendiri pernah menjalankan proyekpembatasan deorestasi di New South Wales di Australia. Sepertidisebutkan di Dokumen Perencanaan Proyek, proyek tersebut akan

melibatkan perdagangan karbon sekitar satu juta ton CO2, terutama keRio Tinto Aluminium. Kita mesti mempertanyakan kepantasan CarbonConservation untuk mejalankan skema REDD di Indonesia mengingatRio Tinto pernah beroperasi di Indonesia dan memiliki catatan buruk

terkait kerusakan lingkungan dan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia10.

Kira-kira 130,000 jiwa mendiami kawasan proyek Ulu masen dan

sekitarnya, dan sekitar 61 mukim akan dipengaruhi oleh proyek. Proyekini disebutkan akan menyumbang langsung terhadap pembangunanekonomi dan sosial yang berkelanjutan dan konservasi keanekaragaman

hayati melalui perencanaan penggunaan dan klasikasi tanah,peningkatan pengawasan dan penegakan hukum, reorestasi, pemulihandan penebangan hutan secara berkelanjutan berbasis masyarakat.

Pemerintah Aceh berharap akan menata ulang hukum dan kegiatandi daerah tersebut sekaligus melibatkan masyarakat setempat dalampengambilan keputusan. Proyek ini juga bertujuan untuk membukapartisipasi secara penuh terkait perubahan ungsi lahan dan akan

membuat tatabatas lahan dan sistem penggunaan tanah yangdiputuskan secara bersama-sama. Proyek juga akan menerapkan sistem

10 Lihat laporan WALHItahun 2003:Undermining

Indonesiauntuk diskusilengkap mengenai catatansocial dan lingkungan Rio

Tinto di Indonesia.


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yang memiliki hak adat atas tanah (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2008 :

2). Proyek Ulu Masen menyatakan FFI menyelenggarakan konsultasisecara extensi dengan masyarakat sebelum penandatangananperjanjian. Meskipun demikian, dari dokumentasi yang tersedia,cakupan luasnya konsultasi tersebut kurang jelas. Apakah masyarakat

setempat mengetahui apa yang ditandatangani atas nama mereka, danapakah mereka mengerti cara pembagian keuntungan?

Kalau Perjanjian Penjualan dan Pemasaran diselidiki secara rinci, adabeberapa kekhawatiran lagi mengenai pembagian dana. DokumenPerencanaan Proyek menyatakan bahwa masyarakat hukum adat,masyarakat setempat dan organisasi masyarakat sipil akan didorong

dan didukung untuk diikutsertakan secara penuh dan akti dalammembangun mekanisme pembagian untuk dana PembatasanDeorestasi , melalui dialog stakeholder yang kolaborati (Ulu MasenProject Design Note 2008: 55). Inormasi awal yang tersedia di Dokumen

Rancang Proyek cukup lengkap mengenai stakeholders di proyektersebut. Stakeholders yang diidentikasikan oleh proyek termasuk


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Kekhawatiran lainnya adalah masalah perwakilan dalampenyelesaian sengketa. Perjanjian menyatakan bahwa sengketaakan dirujuk ke arbitrase dalam bahasa Inggris di bawah peraturan

Singapore International Arbitration Centre (Pusat Arbitrase InternasionalSingapura). Perjanjian Penjualan dan Pemasaran menyatakan dengan

jelas bahwa Pemerintah Aceh bertanggungjawab untuk semua biayaberhubungan dengan penasihat hukum atau nansial Ulu Masen Sales

and Marketing Agreement 2008: 25). Pihak yang terlibat dalam sengketajuga bertanggungjawab atas semua biaya arbitrase - termasuk ongkosperjalanan ke Singapura. Kecemasan mengenai bahasa resmi yangdigunakan sudah diungkapkan dalam konteks REDD dan masyarakat

adat. Masalah biaya mungkin akan menjadi isu yang lebih penting lagi.

Kalau sengketa terjadi, akan menjadi sulit untuk memastikan bahwamasyarakat adat diwakili dengan adil ketika biaya yang sangat besardibutuhkan.

Satu masalah lainnya adalah berkaitan dengan penggunaan RekeningProyek terkait pengawasan dan perlindungan hutan. Sebagian besar

biaya proyek akan dihabiskan untuk pengawasan. Proyek Ulu Masenyang akan menggunakan gambar radar, pesawat, gambaran oto danpengawasan di lapangan untuk me -monitor degradasi hutan (Ulu MasenProject Design Note 2007: 35). Perjanjian Penjualan dan Pemasaran juga


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74

Dokumen Perencanaan Proyek juga mengakui bahwa sengketa mungkinakan terjadi, meskipun tidak jelas disebutkan bagaimana masalah iniditangani. Pembicaraan sengketa yang utaman juga berkaitan dengan

migrasi ke dalam proyek yang mungkin akan terjadi ketika masyarakattetangga berusaha mencari keuntungan dari pembagian dana Proyek(in-migration). Namun lagi, konfik orisontal dalam komunitas yangmenerima keuntungan dari Proyek Ulu Masen pasti akan menjadi

masalah. Ada kemungkinan bahwa hanya komunitas adat lah yang akanmenerima keuntungan. Sangat penting agar Proyek Ulu Masen memilikisystem yang kuta dalam penyelesaian sengketa. Sementara DokumenPerencanaan Proyek juga menyebutkan pernyataan yang meragukan

ini :norma-norma sosial di daerah dan kohesi sosial yang berada di

kampung cukup kuat untuk mencegah migrasi dari luar kawasan proyek(Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2007: 49), namun potensi munculnyakonfik akibat pembagian keuntungan tidak dibicarakan.

Dokumen Ulu Masen juga mengakui leakage adalah masalah utamadalam Proyek ini. Dokumen Perencanaan Proyek juga menyebutkan

adanya pengembangan pengelolaan hutan secara lestari danmenyeluruh, termasuk produksi kayu akan memadai untuk mencegahleakage. Moratorium logging (penebangan hutan) yang disahkan olehPemerintah Aceh mengartikan bahwa leakage yang disebabkan oleh


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76

DAFTARPUSTAKA


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Dilworth A, Baird N & Kirby (Eds.) (2008) Losing Ground, Friends o the Earth, Lie Mosaic and Sawit Watch,

[online]: www.oe.co.uk/resource/reports/losingground.pd

Dooley K, Griths T, Leake H, Ozinga S (2008) Cutting Corners, FERN/Forest Peoples Programme, [online]:

www.ern.org/media/documents/document_4312_4313.pd

Down to Earth No. 79 (2008) The pressure or REDD, Down to Earth, [online], http://www.dte.gn.apc.

org/79are.htm

Down to Earth No. 76-77 (2008) Debates around REDD, indigenous rights and control over unding, Down to

Earth, [online]: http://dte.gn.apc.org/76cde.htm

Down to Earth No. 76-77 (2008) How are climate change developments being played out in Indonesia?, Down

to Earth, [online]: http://dte.gn.apc.org/76dde.htm

FAO (2000) Forest Resources Assessment 2000: Denitions o Forest, other land uses, and Trees outsideorests, [online]: http://www.ao.org/docrep/006/ad665e/ad665e03.htm#P199_9473

Flora and Fauna International (FFI) (2008) Emisi Gas Rumah Kaca dari Degradasi dan Konversi Hutan

Gambut, powerpoint presentation

Forest Peoples Programme (2009) Views on issues relating to indigenous peoples and local communities

or the development and application o methodologies, Submission to UNFCCC Subsidiary

Body or Scientifc and Technical Advice, Forest Peoples Programme, Feb 2009

Friends o the Earth International (FOEI) (2008) REDD Myths, [online]: www.oei.org/en/publications/pds/

redd-myths/view


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Jakarta Post (2007) Indonesia could net US$2 billion rom orest conservation, 30th November 2007,

[online]: http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?leid=20071130.L01&irec=0

Jakarta Post (2006) President Admits Indigenous People Mistreated, 10 August 2006

Kalimantan Tengah Regional Government (2009) REDD dalam perspective daerah, presented by Governor

o Kalimantan Tengah, presented at National Workshop: Membangun Kesiapan Indonesia

Melaksanakan REDD, 25th Feb 2009

Kemp N (2009) Tahapan Pengembangan Proyek Karbon di Mamberamo, conerence proceedings,

presented at National Workshop: Membangun Kesiapan Indonesia Melaksanakan REDD,

25th Feb 2009

Lovera S (2007) The impacts o market-based biodiversity conservation on indigenous peoples, local

communities and women, presented at 5th Trondheim Conerence on Biodiversity, [online]:

www.globalorestcoalition.org/img/userpics/File/publications/Trondheimpaper.pd

Mongabay (2006) Indonesia to spend a massive US$22 billion by 2010 to promote biouels, [online]: http://

news.mongabay.com/bioenergy/2006/07/indonesia-to-spend-massive-us-22.html

Republic o Indonesia (2008) Reducing Emissions rom Deorestation in Developing Countries (REDD),

Submission to UNFCCC, [online]: www.cior.cigar.org/NR/rdonlyres/4E81DB28-410F-4885-

ACB6-6CA802603A32/0/indonesia.pd

Republic o Indonesia (1999) Departmen Kehutanan Republik Indonesia, Undang Undang RepublikIndonesia Nomor 41 Tahun 1999 Tentang Kehutanan, [online]: www.dephut.go.id/index.php?q=id/node/247


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Tauli-Corpuz V & Tamang P (2007) Oil Palm and Other Commercial Tree Plantations, Monocropping: Impactson Indigenous Peoples Land Tenure and Resource Management Systems and Livelihoods,United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, [online]: www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpi/documents/6session_crp6.doc

Trines (2007) Investment fows and nance schemes in the orestry sector with particular reerences todeveloping countries, a report to the Secretariat o the UNFCCC, 24th July 2007, [online]:http://unccc.int/iles/cooperation_and_support/inancial_mechanism/application/pd/trines.pd

Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project Design Note (2007) Reducing Carbon Emissions rom Deorestation in theUlu Masen Ecosystem, Aceh, Indonesia, [online]: www.climate-standards.org/projects/les/Ulu_Masen_CCBA_Project_Design_Nov1.pd

Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project Sales and Marketing Agreement (2008), Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project Sales

and Marketing Agreement, The Provincial Government o Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam,Carbon Conservation Pty Ltd, Blake Dawson, Canberra

UN (2005) UN Workshop on Free, Prior and Inormed Consent: An Overview o the Principle o Free, Prior andInormed Consent and Indigenous Peoples in International and Domestic Law and Practices,Presented by Tamang P, January 2005, [online]: www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpi/documents/workshop_FPIC_tamang.doc

UN-REDD (2008) UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions rom Deorestation and Forest

Degradation in Developing Countries, FAO, UNDP, UNEP, [online]: www.undp.org/mdt/un-redd/docs/Annex-A-Framework-Document.pd


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v

Execut Summary

Indonesia and REDD ____________________________________________ vii

Introducton

Indonesia has been the ocus o much international attention over recent years

due to its increasingly prominent role in creating greenhouse gas emissions.

It has emerged the third highest carbon dioxide emitting country in the world

ater the United States and China. _________________________________ 1

Potental Cost o REDD

One o the major reasons that REDD discussions are progressing at such a rapid

pace is the large sums o money being discussed. Figures tend to vary greatlyand are highly dependent on the methodology used. ________________ 5

Fundng Mechansms Proposed

A substantial portion o the debate over REDD has ocused on how any uture

scheme might be unded. Recent years have seen a blossoming o multilateral

unds dedicated to addressing climate change mitigation. ____________ 7

CONTENT


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v

Indgenous and Forest Dependent Communtes

O Indonesias 216 million people it is estimated that 100 million, o which 40

million are indigenous peoples, depend mainly on orests and natural resource

goods and services (Request or Consideration 2007: ______________ 26

Defcences n Indonesan Law and Polcy

There are a number o striking deciencies in current Indonesian law and policy

that seriously discriminate against and endanger the rights o Indonesias

indigenous orest dependent peoples. ____________________________ 33

Further Government Inconsstences

There is signicant inconsistency between stated government aims regardingorest protection and ocial government policy. While the government publicly

declares its intentions to eectively tackle climate change and reduce orest

destruction, it just the last 12 months it has established a number o damaging

regulations which seek to do just the opposite. _____________________ 37

Msleadng Outcomes?

Several papers have questioned the dubious morality o REDD unds rewarding

the most obvious polluters (those with a history o orest destruction), while

ailing to reward indigenous and local orest dependent people who have

managed the orest sustainably (Griths 2008: 2). __________________ 40

y


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v

Indonesa andREDD1

ExecutveSummary

1 This document is intendedas a summary report onREDD or people wholive near and within theorest and all the ragilecommunities caused by


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x

appropriate unding scheme. In order to provide the large sums omoney required, many parties have advocated linking REDD to carbonmarkets. I this were to occur, however, serious consequences may

result. Incorporating REDD credits in carbon markets runs the risk oooding existing markets, reducing national sovereignty over naturalresource management decisions and most undamentally, allowingNorthern countries to eschew responsibility rom taking meaningul

steps towards reducing emissions in their own countries.

A major deect with REDD is the denition o orests currently

employed in UNFCCC documentation. I this denition is ormallyaccepted into UNFCCC REDD policy, we may actually see countriesutilising REDD unds to nance ongoing plantation expansion. Not only

would this be incredibly harmul or local communities and biodiversity,plantations are acknowledged as only storing 20% o the carbon thatintact natural orests are capable o retaining.

Serious aws in Indonesian drat REDD policy and current orestry lawmean that Indonesias indigenous and orest dependent communitiesare particularly vulnerable in the context o REDD. The vast majority oIndonesias indigenous and orest dependent peoples lack secure land

tenure agreements. As REDD will undoubtedly result in the value oorests being increased, there is a major risk that Indonesias indigenous


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xI Fact sheet Forest and Climate vol.1 2009.WALHI


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2I Fact sheet Forest and Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI

It is now recognised that deorestation and land use change,particularly in developing countries such as Indonesia, are responsibleor between 18-20% o global greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2007).

In Indonesia alone, land use and land use change results in the releaseo 2-3 billion tonnes o CO2 annually (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008:3). Forests are thus an essential component o world carbon cycles andwill undoubtedly be included in any uture measures to combat climate

change. Accordingly, Indonesia will be a key player among thesediscussions.

During the meeting o the 13th Conerence o the Parties (COP-13) tothe United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)in Bali in 2007, Reducing Emissions rom Deorestation and Forest

Degradation in Developing countries (REDD) emerged as a prominentcomponent o any uture eorts to mitigate climate change. REDD aimsto stabilise the atmospheric concentration o CO2 at as low a level aspossible through a system o nancial reward or halting or slowingrates o deorestation. As REDD is likely to be included in any post-Kyoto

deal, there is currently much haste to develop REDD programmes priorto the COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009.


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Blasers report to the UNFCCCcalculated the cost o stoppng

deorestaton by 2030 by comparngthe drvers o deorestaton n

varous regons


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There is thus signicant inconsistency between the various

estimates utilised. Despite this variabili ty however, REDDdiscussions continue to gain considerable momentum. And just asthere has been much debate on the possible cost of instituting anREDD programme, discussions continue on the most appropriateway to fund any future REDD scheme.


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I Fact sheet Forest and Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI

China want to be compensated or maintaining carbon stocks and arepressing or the inclusion o protected orests in REDD (CAN 2007).

They have also expressed deep concern about any unding channelled

through the World Bank (FOEI 2008: 34).

The Democratic Republic o Congo and others have suggested

market incentives and aid or conserving large areas o orest that havenot had historically high rates o deorestation (CAN 2007).

Meanwhile, Mexico has suggested the establishment o an AvoidedDeorestation Carbon Fund within the UNFCCC. To source money orthis und, Mexico suggests that a levy be placed on emissions generatedby activities dened under the Kyoto Protocol, similar to the levy placed

on emissions under the Clean Development Mechanism (Fry 2008).

To this point Indonesia has been rather quiet internationally regarding

its preerred unding scheme and seems keen to engage with a varietyo REDD unding mechanisms. Indonesias submission to the UNFCCCseems mainly concerned over baseline issues and how deorestationmight be measured (Republic o Indonesia 2008). It states that a REDDscheme should include carbon stock enhancement and sustainable

orest management and avours a national approach to REDD, with theForestry Ministry having ultimate control over granting or withholdinglicences or REDD activities (Angelsen 2008).

The GlobalEnvronmentFaclty (GEF)s the ofcalfnancng bodyunder theUNFCCC


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10I Fact sheet Forest and Climate vol.1 2009.WALHI

REDD programme, and currently manages at least 10 unding bodiesassociated with climate change (Grifths 2008).

In the midst o some controversy, at the COP-13 meeting in Bali, itlaunched the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). The statedaim o the Facility is to act as a catalyst to promote public and private

investment in REDD and to support demonstration pilot projects ordeveloping and implementing national REDD strategies (Dooley et al2008: 6).

A country may become involved in the programme ater they havesubmitted a concept note o their preparation plans or REDD, and theconcept note is approved by the FCPF. The programme currently has

twenty-three participant countries, and is expected to include up to 30when ully operational3.

It has received US$165 million in pledges rom ten donor countriesand The Nature Conservancy (TNC) (FOEI 2008: 30) and aims to use theseunds to assist the selected countries participate in any uture REDDschemes. The FCPF seems to be strongly geared towards promotingcarbon markets in the nancing o REDD. Early evidence has suggested

that many o the initial concept notes submitted by participatingcountries pay scant attention to recognition o land tenure and ownershiprights (Dooley et al 2008). In response to growing criticism over the

3 Current participant countries

include:Argentina, Columbia,Costa Rica,Guyana, Mexico,Nicaragua,Panama,Paraguay,

Peru,Ghana, Liberia,Kenya,Madagascar,Cameroon,DRC,Republic o Congo,Ethiopia,

Lao PDR,Nepal, PNG,Vanuatu,Vietnam (Dooley et al 2008)


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o carbon markets (Grifths 2008: 43). Some authors have expressedconcerns over the Banks stated aims to support sustainable orestmanagement and aorestation through the FIP. The concern is that

unless a strong rights-based and people-centred approach is adopted,FIP unds may be used to urther promote large scale plantation andlogging operations (Grifths 2008: 11).

Several major concerns exist among civil society groups about theWorld Banks ability to adequately manage climate change unds. Intheir current ormulation these unds are designed to provide loans as

well as grants. We could thus be conronted with the absurd situationwhereby developing countries increase their debt burden in order todeal with a problem caused by Northern countries.

Even i they are not used to provide loans, these unds will placerecipient countries in a donor-recipient relationship rather than trulyreecting developed countries ecological debt to the South (Down to

Earth 76-77 2008).

One must also consider the Banks inclination towards a market-basedapproach has been well demonstrated in the past. While language is

slightly vaguer in FCPF documents, this is also a key goal o the FCPF(Dooley et al 2008). Finally, it is important to seriously question the


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other international initiatives including the World Banks FCPF and FIPand the GEF. The programme is committed to a rights-based approach,and language on Free, Prior and Inormed Consent 4 is strong (UN-REDD

2008). The program is still in preparatory mode and no projects havebeen ofcially approved. A major problem with the UN-REDD programis that it will utilise the FAO denition o orests that includes plantations(see discussion below). Further risks identied are that the UN agencies

lack or possess only weakly binding policies with regards to indigenouspeoples and current plans do not possess clear measures to address socialrisks associated with the implementation o REDD (Grifths 2008 ).

It is important to briey touch on the number o bilateral schemesthat have emerged over recent years. Australia has become a major

supporter o REDD and climate change eorts In Indonesia, recentlypromoting the Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership thatencompasses the $30 million market-oriented Kalimantan Forests andClimate Partnership. It has promised a urther $10 million dedicatedmainly to the development o national carbon accounting systems and

a national policy ramework or REDD (Grifths 2008: 15). Australiasprimary support is or the development o a REDD pilot project indegraded peat swamp in Central Kalimantan, although it has shown akeen interest in developing REDD projects in Papua province.

4 The concept o ree,prior and

inormed consent recognizesindigenous peoplesinherent

and prior rights to their landsand resources and respects

their legitimate authority torequire that third parties enterinto an equal and respectul

relationship with them,basedon the principle o inormedconsent (UN 2005)


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In the midst of discussions on the most appropriate bilateralor multilateral funding scheme, private sector funding throughthe voluntary carbon market is rapidly being developed. Thevoluntary approach linking REDD pilot programs to existing marketshas emerged as probably the most dominant funding scheme inIndonesia, despite Indonesias preference for a national approach.There are currently close to twenty initiatives at varying stages ofdevelopment (Jakarta Post 2009). The initiatives tend to involveagreements between local district governments and northerncarbon nance companies, often acting in conjunction with large

conservation NGOs. By far the most advanced of these voluntaryinitiatives is the Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project, discussed in detailbelow.

While it has yet to be conrmed, many of these preparatoryprojects are banking on REDD credits eventually being included incarbon markets.

In response to the large sums of money required to nance any

future REDD scheme, many parties have advocated linking REDDto carbon markets. Proponents of a market based approach claimthat unless business is involved, forests are always going to loseto the power of predatory investment and extractive companies.


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Lnkng REDD tomarkets rsks creatnga very expensve butessentally meannglessscheme


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(FOEI 2008). There remains the very real chance that northern buyerscould impose their own land management and conservation criteriaon local communities (Fry 2008; Grifths 2008). Furthermore, their

utilisation o money based concepts o local livelihoods may not alwaysbe appropriate or the communities with which they interact. Financialincentives are unlikely to ever truly be able to compensate or the losso ood security, involvement in the subsistence economy and cultural

integrity (Grifths 2008: 21).

Carbon markets have already proven to be not only complex, but

also subject to signicant volatility. I the price o carbon were tocollapse, payments to local orest dependent communities could quiteconceivably plunge below subsistence levels. I this occurred the

livelihoods o local communities would be placed under serious threat,resulting in increased pressure to resume destructive orest activities.(FOEI 2008: 18). A urther concern over linking REDD to carbon marketsis that REDD credits could ood existing carbon markets, signicantlyreducing their value (Fry 2008). This would have the additional outcome

o reducing the incentive or emission reductions, as reduction targetscould be cheaply met by purchasing REDD credits (WWF 2008: 10).


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5 FAO Forest Denition:

Forests are lands o more than

0.5 hectares,with a tree canopycover o more than 10 percent,

which are not primarily underagricultural or urban landuse.Forests are determinedboth by the presence o

trees and the absence oother predominant land uses.

The trees should be able to

reach a minimum height o5 meters in situ.Areas under

reorestation which have yetto reach a crown density o 10percent or tree height o 5 m

05Defnng Forests

One o the undamental aws that must be addressed prior to any

uture REDD deal is the FAO denition o orests currently utilised inUN documentation. FAOs denition o orests5, which has also beenadopted by the Clean Development Mechanism, allows or the inclusiono plantations. I this denition is ormally accepted into UNFCCC

REDD policy, this serious deect could actually see countries utilisingREDD unds to nance ongoing plantation expansion. Aside rom theobvious devastating impacts upon local communities and biodiversity,plantations are acknowledged as only storing 20% o the carbon that

intact natural orests are capable o retaining (FOEI 2008: 23).

Brazil has already sought to take advantage o this haziness by

promoting incentives or reductions in net deorestation. Were asituation like this to eventuate, it would essentially allow Brazil tocontinue to obtain revenues rom logging its orest, while expandingits plantations and also beneting rom REDD unds (FOEI 2008: 23).

It remains to be seen whether Indonesia also aims to take advantageo this signicant loophole. Formal Indonesian government policy,


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REDD does not Address theCauses o Deorestation

It is essential to place the REDD debate in its wider global contextand reect on the underlying causes o deorestation in tropicalcountries. The problem o deorestation in developing countries cannot

be divorced rom discussions on international trade and Northernpatterns o consumption. Without addressing industrialised countriesdemand or timber, pulp and agricultural products produced in theSouth, REDD will always remain a awed concept (Daviet et al 2007).

Demand or timber rom the USA, Japan and China is staggering. In2003, China alone imported 42 million cubic metres o timber productsand 52 million cubic metres o pulp and paper, with Indonesia beingone o its largest suppliers (Fry 2008). I demand concerns are ignored,

it is highly likely that REDD will lead to an increase in timber prices, andthus increase the incentive or deorestation (FOEI 2008). Whether thisdeorestation occurs illegally in participating countries or simply shitsto non-participating countries may simply depend on the type o REDD

project implemented (see discussion on leakage below).

06


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Indigenous and ForestDependent Communities

O Indonesias 216 million people it is estimated that 100 million, owhich 40 million are indigenous peoples, depend mainly on orests andnatural resource goods and services (Request or Consideration 2007:

7). Indonesias indigenous and orest dependent peoples are central toany discussion on REDD as poor design or implementation o REDD hasthe potential to seriously impact upon their rights and livelihoods.

The majority o the land currently earmarked or REDD is classied asstate orest. As REDD increases the value o orests, governments maybe discouraged rom conceding customary land rights to Indonesias

indigenous orest dependent peoples (Angelsen 2008: 115).

REDD payments may actually work as a disincentive or orest and

conservation authorities rom resolving existing disputes over landtenure (Grifths 2008).

As most indigenous orest dependent people lack secure landtenure arrangements, REDD runs the risk o inciting land grabbing as

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In many cases local indigenous communities do not possess thebureaucratic or legal knowledge required or negotiations over REDDdeals. I REDD were implemented on a project-basis we may see

communities engaged with large predatory investors or conservationNGOs with no particular moral obligation towards local communities.

Previous experience with exclusionary conservation organisationshas let indigenous peoples very wary o promises o identiying andpromoting alternative sustainable livelihoods near protected areas (Fry2008: 177). Signicant concerns remain over adequate participation o

local communities in the ormulation o REDD programs. REDD proposalscontinue to be developed in a top-down manner rom governments,international agencies and carbon nance companies, and communities

at the local level are oten poorly inormed (FPP 2009: 7).Consultation with local communities tends to be limited to

socialisation activities ater basic concepts and objectives have already

been determined. Language on Free, Prior and Inormed Consent iscurrently lacking rom most REDD documentation and examinationo Indonesian drat REDD policy reveals some grave concerns. In thecontext o oil palm development, companies strategically co-opt local

agents and local government ofcials to encourage communities totranser their lands (Colchester et al 2006: 171). In much the same way


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capture benets at the expense o poorer and vulnerable households.Several other glaring questions remain around the process o unddistribution. Will those without ormal land title receive benets? Wouldcommunity members not engaged in destructive deorestation activities

also receive benets? The production o new inequities with regards tobenet distribution carries a major risk o inciting horizontal conicts.Experience rom the plantation sector indicates that compensationpayments are highly liable to capture by local elites and are a requent

cause o conict (Colchester et al2006).

Signicantly, there is a gendered nature to the potential rights abuses

that may occur in the implementation o REDD. While many orestdependent communities do not have ormal title over their land, when


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The state thus reserves the right to challenge the very existence oIndonesias indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples customary landrights are hereby relegated to a tenuous position whereby they are

highly open to interpretation, and easily reuted in the name o nationalinterest. The Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has evenacknowledged that indigenous peoples rights have been sacriced orthe sake o national development in the past (Jakarta Post 2006). There

are grave concerns that REDD will simply replicate this pattern.

The threat REDD poses towards the rights o Indonesias indigenous

peoples has recently been recognised by a number o internationaland local NGOs. In February 2009, a group o nine Indonesian andone International organisation requested that the Committee on

the Elimination o Racial Discrimination reconsider the situation oIndonesias indigenous peoples under its early warning and urgent actionprocedures. The communication, which was a ollow up to a previouscommunication, submitted in 2007, expresses deep concern aboutIndonesias preparatory REDD activities ailing to meet its obligations

under the UN Declaration on the Rights o Indigenous Peoples6.

The drat REDD policy reerred to above also provides guidelines

or the involvement o customary orest communities in any utureREDD Scheme. As stated in the document, the REDD requirements orcustomary orests are:

6 The submission also points to a

procedure or the recognitiono customary land rights which

was adopted by the NationalLand Board through RegulationNo.5 o 1999. This regulation

has a number o additionaldeciencies with regards to

recognition o indigenousrights to their lands andterritories. For urther detail

the reader is reerred to the FPP,AMAN,Sawit Watch submission.


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There is a signicantchance thisregulation couldbe exploited bymining companies

to use protectedand plantationorest or miningactivities. Miningcompanies needonly pay Rp 300,000/m2 per year or theright to establishmining operations inprotected orest


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Still in the mining sector, on the 16th o December 2008,the government approved the Minerba (Coal and Mineral)bill. Inherent in this law is a serious weakness in the degree o

participation given to local communities in determining thetype and degree o natural resource exploitation occurring ontheir land. The law establishes highly repressive regulationswith regards to the rights o local communities whenever they

are considered to be obstructing mining eorts. Furthermore,the regulation does not contain any assurances or theprotection o community living spaces and protected areas.Despite stating that mining activities are orbidden rom

community living spaces, important livelihood sources andprotected areas, based on this policy mining activities may

still be allowed to go ahead in these regions (WALHI 2007).

Finally, in February 2009, the Agriculture Ministry issueda decree allowing businesses to convert millions o hectareso peatlands into oil palm plantations. Opening up these

peatland areas risks releasing huge amounts o CO2 into theatmosphere. The decree has been conditionally approvedby the Environment Minister and is expected to go into orcelater this year.


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Misleading Outcomes?

Several papers have questioned the dubious morality o REDD

unds rewarding the most obvious polluters (those with a history oorest destruction), while ailing to reward indigenous and local orestdependent people who have managed the orest sustainably (Grifths2008: 2). A similar potential or distortion exists at the community level.

One wonders whether local community members who had not beeninvolved in active deorestation will still be entitled to benet rom REDDunds. Several authors have questioned this inversion o the polluterpays principle (Grifths 2008). As discussed, this distorted reward

system risks creating new inequities and generating conicts betweenlocal communities. Signicantly there is a urther risk that inequities mayemerge between provinces. Economic modelling has suggested thatwere REDD to be implemented on a national scale, urban populations in

Java and Bali will suer as the price o timber products rises while ruralpopulations in Kalimantan and Sumatra may benet rom REDD unddistribution (Resosudarmo, unpublished 2008).

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As REDD involves such enormous sums o money it could simply

become a new avenue or corruption. So long as patterns o distributionto local communities are not clearly dened, there is a proound dangerthese unds could be liable to capture rom government ofcials andlocal elites. Any REDD scheme in Indonesia would need to be serious

about tackling governance concerns in the orestry sector and involvea concerted eort to address illegal logging - including measures toreduce demand.


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method used. Modelling may be highlyspeculative and dependent on actorssuch as historical and predicted uture

rates o deorestation, accuracy o mapsavailable, terrain and so on (Harris et al2007)8. Furthermore, models oten relyon orestry assessment data provided

by FAO. One must question the value osuch data when it continues to includeplantations (FOEI 2008).

Tied into baseline concerns is the issueo permanence. Most REDD proposalshighlight the act that orests are

impermanent, and REDD will not accountor natural orest loss associated with re

or orest dieback (Fry 2008, FOEI 2008). There is thus signicant potentialor misleading or incorrect outcomes. The challenge o ensuring

reductions in deorestation will be permanent is one o the majorconcerns proponents o carbon markets have with REDD (Fry 2008).Consequently there has been signicant debate over the timing opayments or the establishment o reserve accounts to saeguard against

this risk.

8 See Angelsen A 2008 ora detailed discussion omodeling techniques.


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Monitoring

Even once a baseline has been established, the issue o monitoringemerges as a rather problematic one. Several countries have expressedconcern over the high quality images required or satellite monitoring.

The cost o implementing such technology is likely to be a major obstaclein remote orested areas where even internet access is lacking (Dooley

et al2008). While there has been signicant progress on the technicalaspects o carbon accounting, issues o technical inrastructure and

capacity or data analysis and management remain concerns (Angelsen2008: 96). I orest degradation is included in any uture REDD schemethen satellite monitoring is unlikely to be sufcient and ground basedmonitoring will be required. Moreover, values on degradation are likely

to be highly inaccurate and expensive to obtain (Fry 2008: 171).The problem o monitoring exposes another thorny issue. There is

serious concern that eorts to prevent orest degradation could resultin an outdated and exclusionary people vs parks approach to orestconservation. Evidence suggests that orest protection policies tendto target vulnerable and poorer indigenous and orest dependent

communities (Grifths 2008: 22).


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Conclusions

REDD in its current ormulation is raught with danger. I t risks urthermarginalising Indonesias indigenous peoples and orest dependentcommunities and even acilitating ongoing orest destruction. While

there are some serious ideological aws with REDD, the presenceo several urther methodological problems means that there is asignicant risk o ailure. The rapid pace at which REDD negotiationsare taking place means that REDD programmes may be approved

prior to these serious concerns being addressed. The complexity ounding mechanisms proposed and the multiplicity o stakeholders onlycomplicates matters.

While the inclusion o REDD in carbon markets may seem like a

oregone conclusion, WALHI absolutely rejects REDD so long as it remainsconnected to markets. The linkage o REDD to markets risks allowing

Annex-1 countries to avoid responsibility or reducing emissions intheir own countries and could even increase net emissions o CO2 tothe atmosphere. Carbon osetting and the inclusion o REDD creditsin carbon markets will do nothing to address the underlying causes o

climate change. Northern countries must commit to making real andeective emission reductions in their own countries that adequatelyreect their ecological debt to the south.


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The ollowng secton detals some o thelarger, more advanced schemes proposed


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Current REDD Projects inIndonesia

There are currently up to twenty REDD related initiatives at varyingstages o development in Indonesia. It remains quite difcult to obtainaccurate inormation on all o them. Most initiatives intend to sell creditsgenerated on existing voluntary carbon markets, and are banking on

REDDs inclusion in any post-2012 agreement. While voluntary initiativesseem to be being developed at a rapid pace, the Forestry Ministrys Heado Research and Development Tachrir Fathoni, has recently stated thatthe central government will not issue permits until we have regulations

in place (Jakarta Post 2009). The ollowing section details some o thelarger, more advanced schemes proposed.

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Riau:

The pulpwood plantation company Riau Andalan Pulp and Paper (RAPP)has put orward a proposal to manage the Kampar Peninsula in centralSumatra as a protected orest. The proposal would establish a coreprotected area surrounded by a ring o 200,000 hectares o pulpwood

plantations. RAPP has a poor social and environmental record in Riauand has a long history o conict with local communities. The RAPPproject involves a complex system o dams and drainage canals andthere are serious doubts as to whether this project would actually result

in reduced emissions (Down to Earth 2008; Anderson & Kuswardono2008).

KALIMANTAN:

West Kalimantan:

Flora and Fauna International (FFI) has developed proposals or REDDpilot projects in Sungai Putri and Kapuas Hulu. The project aims to protectdeep peat swamp orests rom conversion to palm oil plantations and will

involve the reclassication o areas zoned or plantation development to


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Kalimantan 2009). Initial carbon monitoring work has been completed,although the master plan or the project has yet to be released to thepublic. Several sources have stated that JP Morgan Stanley is said to be

a potential investor in this scheme (Grifths 2008; Down to Earth 2008).Critics o the project have highlighted the inconsistency between CentralKalimantan provincial and district government involvement in the REDDscheme and their publicly released plans or conversion o a ur ther one

million hectares o peat swamps (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008).

Malinau:

In late 2008 a MoU was signed between Swiss company Global EcoRescue (GER) and state owned orestry company PT Inhutani II with the

goal o implementing a major REDD project in the Regency o Malinauin East Kalimantan. The project will take place on 225,000 hectares o PTInhutanis concession, and hopes to produce one million carbon creditsper year to be sold on the voluntary carbon market. The project willinvolve reducing illegal logging and agricultural encroachment intoPT Inhutani IIs orest concession areas, the implementation o reduced

impact logging techniques and the development o other ecosystemservices (GER 2009).


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o orest resources (including baseline carbon measurements),restructuring the timber industry and promoting community basedsustainable orestry among many other activities. While several REDD

pilot projects have been developed or Papua, the national orestrydepartment continues to delay their implementation (Down to Earth2008; Anderson & Kuswardono 2008).

Cyclops Mountains: FFI has developed a proposal with the Papuanprovincial government or a REDD scheme in the Cyclops Mountainsnear Jayapura. An MoU has been signed between FFI and the Papua

government but the project is still awaiting central governmentapproval.

Timika and Mamberamo:

An Australian nancial rm, New Forests, in conjunction with EmeraldPlanet have developed a pilot REDD program in the regions o Mimika,Memberamo and Merauke. Planned payments will be generated rom

the voluntary carbon market. The project is currently assessing thecarbon reserves in the region and appears to be waiting or conrmationrom the central government prior to implementation (Down to Earth2008; Grifths 2008)


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Carbon Conservation has previously operated an avoideddeorestation project in New South Wales, Australia. As stated in theProject Design Note, the project involved trading around 1 million tons

CO2e o carbon credits, principally to Rio Tinto Aluminum. One mustquestion the appropriateness o Carbon Conservation operating such aREDD scheme in Indonesia when it has been so closely engaged with Rio

Tinto, a company with such a poor record with regards to environmental

destruction and human rights in Indonesia10.

Approximately 130,000 people live in and immediately adjacent

to the Ulu Masen project area, and around 61 mukims (villages) willbe aected by the project. The project claims it will contribute tosustainable economic and social development and biodiversityconservation through the use o land use planning and reclassication,

increased monitoring and law enorcement, reorestation, restorationand sustainable community logging.

The Government o Aceh aims to restructure orestry law and practicesin the region, and involve the local communities in making land usedecisions. The project aims to be ully participatory in land use reormand will establish jointly agreed boundaries and land use patterns and

develop a multi-stakeholder management structure. Land use changewill involve the reclassication o areas zoned or logging as protection

10 See WALHIs 2003 report

Undermining Indonesiaora comprehensive discussiono Rio Tintos social and

environmental record inIndonesia.


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available, however, the extent o these consultations remains unclear.One questions how many o the local communities knew what wasbeing signed on their behal and whether they are ully aware o how

the prots will be distributed.

Examining the Sales and Marketing Agreement in urther detail, there

are several additional concerns over the distribution o unds. The ProjectDesign Note states that indigenous people, local communities and civilsociety organizations must be encouraged and supported to participateully and actively in the development o distribution mechanisms or

avoided deorestation nancesthrough a collaborative stakeholderdialogue (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2008: 55). Initial inormationprovided in the Project Design Note is strong with regards to undsdistribution. Stakeholders identied by the project include private sector

actors, representatives rom mukims and other customary organisations,under-represented and vulnerable groups (including womensorganisations), government agencies, civil society organisations, eventhose critical o the project, and national and international groups as

appropriate (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2008: 56).

However, the MoU signed in July 2008 states that the distribution

o Project Account Funds will be managed by a Steering Committeeconsisting o the Governor o Aceh, 1 member appointed by Carbon


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signicant one. It may thus prove difcult to ensure communities haveadequate representation were disputes to occur with such signicantoutlays o capital required.

Another signicant concern related to the Project Account is theemphasis placed on monitoring and orest protection. A considerable

proportion o the project costs will be spent on monitoring. The projectaims to utilise radar imagery, light aircrat, photographic imaging andground monitoring to measure orest degradation (Ulu Masen ProjectDesign Note 2007: 35). The Sales and Marketing agreement states that

Carbon Conservation is liable or costs related to validation, monitoringand verication activities. Meanwhile, the Project Account to be managedby the government o Aceh is responsible or unding operations or thepreservation o rainorests. There is thus some haziness as to how much

the Project Account would be contributing to orest protection. This isnot the only concern with the emphasis placed on monitoring however.While the Project Design Note mentions that orest enorcement ofcerswill not carry weapons, Dorjee Sun, the CEO o Carbon Conservation, has

publicly stated that the orest will be guarded by 1000 heavily-armedormer Free Aceh rebels (ABC 2008). A detailed monitoring plan wasexpected to be released in December 2008. Perhaps these concerns willbe addressed with the release o the ormal monitoring plan.


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(Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2007: 49) there is no discussion on thepossibility or conict arsing rom the distribution o benets.

The documentation provided recognises that leakage is a majorconcern with the project. It claims that developing sustainablecommunity orest management, including possibly timber production,

would be sufcient to prevent leakage. The moratorium on loggingenacted by the Aceh provincial government means that state drivenleakage is unlikely to occur within the province, although this doesnot address concerns o increased logging in the neighbouring North

Sumatra province, or illegal logging outside o the project area. Theproject states that while it is near impossible to accurately measureexpected leakage, it does not expect leakage to be greater than 10%.As discussed above, project level leakage may approach 100% when

deorestation is driven by demand or timber (one o the primary driversin Indonesia). The project promises to conduct monitoring outside o theproject area to address leakage concerns, and use the Risk ManagementBuer to cover any detected leakage. It does not however detail the

area o orest that would be monitored. Current recommendationssuggest that an area 5 to 7 times the size o the project area should bemonitored to address leakage concerns (Angelsen 2008: 7 2).

CES


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74

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