korupsi dan investasi · 32,3 26,8 29,6 10 15 20 25 30 35 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977...
TRANSCRIPT
KORUPSIDANINVESTASI
FaisalBasri11Desember2019
*Q1-Q3(January-September).Source:BPS-StatisticsIndonesia.
-15
-10
-5
0
5
101976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
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1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
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2005
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2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019*
GDPgrowth,percent8% 7%
6%5%
Thedecliningtrendofeconomicgrowthinthelong-term,1976-2019
Source: BPS-StatisticsIndonesia.
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
5,5
6
6,5
7
Q1-09
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1-10
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1-11
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1-12
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1-13
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1-14
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1-15
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1-16
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1-17
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1-18
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1-19
Q2
Q3
QuarterlyGDPgrowth,percent
Notyetgainedmomentum:neednewenergy
Investasidipandangsebagaipenyebabpertumbuhanrendah
Sikapanasir“Istana”danKetuaUmumKadin
PertumbuhanPDBmenurutpengeluaran
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*Share
2018**
Privateconsumption 5.15 4.96 5.01 4.94 5.05 5.07 55.74
LNPRT***consumption 12.19 -0.62 6.64 6.93 9.08 13.15 1.22
Generalgovernmentconsumption 1.16 5.31 -0.14 2.13 4.80 4.69 8.98
Grossfixedcapitalformation 4.45 5.01 4.47 6.15 6.67 4.74 32.29
Exportsofgoodsandservices 1.07 -2.12 -1.66 8.91 6.48 -1.24 20.97
Lessimportsofgoodsandservices 2.12 -6.25 -2.41 8.06 12.04 -7.62 22.06
Grossdomesticproduct 5.01 4.88 5.03 5.07 5.17 5.04 100.00*Q1-Q3(January-September)**Notincludedchangeininventory.***LNPRTstandsforlembaganon-profityangmelayanirumahtangga(non-profitorganizationservingthehousehold).Source:BPS-StatisticsIndonesia.
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Percent
Brazil China Indonesia India Malaysia Vietnam SouthAfrica
Source:WorldBank,WorldDevelopmentIndicators.
Annualgrowthofgrosscapitalformation
32,3
26,8
29,6
10
15
20
25
30
35
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Grossfixedcapitalformation(%ofGDP)
Indonesia Lowermiddle income Uppermiddleincome
Source:WorldBank,WorldDevelopmentIndicators.
ShareofinvestmentinGDPinIndonesiaishigherthantheloweranduppermiddleincomecountries
42,6
32,3
28,926,8
22,825,0
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Grossfixedcapitalformation(%ofGDP)
China Indonesia India Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam
Source:WorldBank,WorldDevelopmentIndicators.
TheshareofinvestmentinGDPinIndonesiaishigherthanallASEANcountriesandIndia
Indeks persepsi korupsi membaik
Source: Transparency International.
19
27 27
20
17 1719 19 19
2022
2423
2628 28
3032 32
3436
37 3738
0,49
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,00
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
100=thecleanest(LHS);1.0=bottomrank(RHS)
Score-LHS Rank-RHS
7
BBB / Stable
Baa2 / Stable
BBB / Stable
Apr 2018, Rating Upgraded at Baa2/Stable“The upgrade to Baa2 is underpinned by an increasingly credible and effective policy framework conducive to macroeconomic stability. Together with a build-up of financial buffers, prudent fiscal and monetary policy strengthens Moody’s confidence that the sovereign’s resilience and capacity to respond to shocks has improved.”
May 2019, Rating Upgraded at BBB/Stable
“We raised the ratings to reflect Indonesia’s strong economic growth prospects and supportive policy dynamics, which we expect to remain following the re-election of President Joko Widodo recently.”
March 2019, Rating Affirmed at BBB/StableThe decision was supported by favorable GDP growth outlook on the back of resilient domestic demand and a small government debt burden compared with its peers. Indonesia’s sovereign credit fundamentals should be resilient to substantial exchange rate volatility.
BBB / PositiveApril 2019, Rating Affirmed at BBB, Outlook Revised to Positive
“The ratings mainly reflect Indonesia’s solid economic growth underpinned by domestic consumption, restrained level of budget deficit and public debt, and resilience to external shocks stemming from flexible exchange rate policies and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. The administration led by President Joko Widodo has formulated a large-scale infrastructure development plan and is vigorously promoting it to eliminate the infrastructure shortage. In addition, it has succeeded in expanding infrastructure expenditures and expenditures on human capital, and has been curbing the budget deficit by reducing fuel subsidies.”
BBB / Stable
April 2019, Rating Affirmed at BBB/Stable
“Indonesia’s economy is growing at a solid pace. The fiscal deficit to GDP ratio narrowed from a year earlier, and the government debt to GDP ratio remains low. While the CAD somewhat widened, foreign reserves are ample relative to short-term external debts. Its economic resilience to external shocks is maintained, supported by the government and central bank’s policies emphasizing macroeconomic stability.”
Indonesia is Now Fully Rated as Investment Grade Country
Source:BankIndonesia.
Indonesiaisnowfullyratedasinvestmentgradecountry
13
14
16
22
22
24
26
32
37
40
42
44
60
61
64
70
78
116
139
252
26
18
14
18
21
22
37
32
30
25
40
21
42
68
101
58
76
111
134
277
20.RussianFederation(20)
19.Korea,Republicof(14)
18.VietNam(21)
17.Israel(19)
16.Indonesia(18)
15.Italy(16)
14.Germany(11)
13.Mexico(12)
12.France(13)
11.Canada(15)
10.India(9)
9.Spain(17)
8.Australia(8)
7.Brazil(6)
6.UnitedKingdom(4)
5.Netherlands(7)
4.Singapore(5)
3.HongKong,China(3)
2.China(2)
1.UnitedStates(1)
USDbillions
Developedeconomies2018 2017
Source:United NationsConference onTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD),WorldInvestmentReport2019.
Developingandtransitioneconomies2018 2017
Indonesiaisinthetop-20hosteconomiesforFDI
22,5
25,2
26,3
31,9
32,1
34,2
36,4
36,4
38,5
39,2
39,8
48,1
48,7
58,3
23,5
47,1
42,4
37,1
50,4
41,7
41,3
36,4
38,5
49,2
31,9
31,0
22,2
24,2
2,9
4,2
5,1
2,6
4,6
3,3
5,0
9,1
3,3
3,8
2,7
3,9
2,6
6,1
51,0
23,5
26,3
28,4
13,0
20,8
17,4
18,2
19,7
7,7
25,7
17,1
26,5
11,4
MyanmarTaiwan
SouthKoreaPhilippinesHongKongMalaysiaAustralia
JapanThailand
SingaporeVietnamIndonesia
IndiaChina
How do you expect your firm’s investments in the followingeconomies to change during 2019? --percent
Wewillincreaseourlevelofinvestment Weareinthemarket,butwillnotinvestmore
Wewillreduceourinvestmentinthismarket Wehavenoplanstoinvest
Source:TheEconomist, AsiaBusinessOutlookSurvey2019.
China,India,andIndonesia arethemostdesirablecountriestoincreaseinvestmentin2019
Source:EconomistIntelligenceUnit(EIU).
2017(n=59) 2015(n=65) 2013(n=58)Singapore 1 2 2UnitedStates 2 1 1HongKong 3 7 3Malaysia 4 20 18Australia 5 3 5Switzerland 6 5 7SouthKorea 7 8 28Canada 8 4 6Chile 9 29 22Russia 10 24 9Israel 11 17 31Kazakhstan 12 51 38Taiwan 13 14 12Japan 14 6 4Norway 15 9 8CzechRepublic 16 n/a n/aDenmark 17 10 14Thailand 18 38 35Iran 19 52 57Germany 20 13 10Finland 21 15 16Poland 22 33 36Hungary 23 n/a n/aSaudiArabia 24 23 15Ireland 25 n/a n/aIndonesia 26 44 44France 27 16 20Philippines 28 39 39Sweden 29 11 13Vietnam 30 40 41
ChinaGoingGlobalInvestmentIndex:Indonesia'srankingrosesharply
PromisingcountriesforoverseasbusinessoperationbyJapaneseManufacturingcompaniesoverthemediumterm(next3yearsorso)
Source: JapanBankforInternationalCooperation(JBIC),“SurveyReportonOverseasBusinessOperationsbyJapaneseManufacturingCompanies,”variousissues.
Rank 1997 2003 2005 2006 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
1st CHN CHN CHN CHN CHN CHN CHN CHN IDN IND IND IND CHN CHN
2nd USA THA IND IND IND IND IND IND IND IDNIDN2nd CHN IND IND
3rd IDN USA THA VNM VNM VNM THA IDN THA CHNCHN2nd IDN VNM THA
4th THA VNM VNM THA THA THA VNM THA CHN THA THA VNM THA VNM
5th IND IND USA USA RUS BRA IDN VNM VNM VNM VNM THA IDN IDN
6th VNM IDN RUS RUS USA IDN BRA BRA BRA MEX MEX MEX USA USA
7th PHL KOR KOR BRA BRA RUS RUS MEX MEX BRA USA USA MEX MEX
8th MYS TWN IDN KOR IDN USA USA RUS MMR USA PHL PHL PHL PHL
9th BRA MYS BRA IDN KOR KOR MYS MMR RUS RUS BRA MMR MMR MMR
10th TWN RUS TWN TWN TWN MYS TWN USA USA MMR MMR BRABRA & KOR MYS
Firsttimeclimbingtothetopin2013,IndonesiabeatChinainJapaneseFDI,butthenfellto5th in2017-18
Source:WorldBank,WorldDevelopment Indicators, downloaded fromhttps://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS onJuly19,2019.
10,7
22,2
8,8
50,3
62,1
34,2
47,2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Domesticcreditprovidedbyfinancialsector(%ofGDP)
Indonesia:kreditterhadapPDBjugameningkat
• Allmanufacturingindustries:~70percent
• Cementindustry:~68percent
• Automotiveindustry:~50percent
• Textiles:~50percent
• Biodiesel:~35percent
Kalau pemanfaatan kapasitas masih rendah,buatapainvestasibarumenggebu?
Korupsidaninvestasi
• Korupsimenimbulkanancamanterhadapinvestasikarenasejumlahalasan:mengikisefisiensisektorpublikdanswastayangmemungkinkanorangmengambilposisikekuasaanmelaluipatronaseketimbangkemampuan;mendistorsilingkungankeuangandanekonomi;dan,sampaibatastertentu,meketidakstabilandananarkikedalamprosespolitik.(Everhart,Martinez-Vazquez,danMcNab,“Corruption,Investment,andGrowthinDevelopingCountries,”Proceedings,AnnualConferenceonTaxationandMinutesofAnnualMeetingofNationalTaxAssociation,Vol96(2003):84-90).
• Theempiricalresultsshowthatcorruptionhasarobustnegativeeffectontherateofprivateinvestment.(Al-Sadig,“CorrupomesticInvestment:evidencefromdevelopingcountries,”InternationalJournalofEconomicPolicyinEmergingEconomies(IJEPEE),Vol.3,No.1,2010.
PengalamanTimReformasiTataKelolaMigas
• KamimenerimarombongandarihampirsemuatraderminyakbesaryangberkantordiSingapura.MerekamemaparkanpraktiktenderolehPESS,anakperusahaanPertamina.Bolehdikatakanmerekatidakpernahmenangtender,namunmerekasecararutintetapmemasokminyakkeIndonesialewatpihakketiga.
• Mengapamerekasecaraterbuka(dantidakmemintaketerangannyadirahasiakan)?KarenamerekasangattidaknyamandanLelahbatinmelakukanpraktikdagangkotoryangdilakukanolehPertaminaEnergyServicesPteLimited(PES) danMafiaMigas.UraianlebihrincibisadilihatdalamLaporanTimyangbisadiunduhdisini:https://faisalbasri.com/2015/05/16/rekomendasi-final-tim-reformasi-tata-kelola-migas-memperkokoh-kelembagaan-sektor-migas-indonesia/
Unfortunately,ICORhasrisensince2010:Markup?Inefficiency? Corruption?
IndonesiapalingrestriktifterhadapFDI
0,31
0,260,26
0,210,19
0,14
0,090,090,070,060,060,06
0,030,010,0
FDIRRI,2018
TheForeignDirectInvestmentRegulatoryRestrictiveness Index(FDIRRI)measuresfourtypesofstatutoryrestrictionsonforeigndirectinvestment:(i) foreignequityrestrictions,(ii) screeningandpriorapprovalrequirements,(iii) rulesforkeypersonnel, and(iv) otherrestrictionsontheoperationofforeignenterprises.TheFDI RRIisacompositeindexwhichtakesvaluesbetween0and1,with1beingthemostrestrictive.Source:OECD, FDIRegulatoryRestrictivenessIndex.
Indonesiatermasuk10negaradenganhambataninvestasiterbesardisektorhulumigas
No Country Policy Perception Index
1 Venezuela 00.00
2 Yemen 13.23
3 Tasmania 26.11
4 Victoria 31.52
5 Libya 35.09
6 Iraq 38.48
7 Ecuador 39.35
8 New South Wales 40.37
9 Bolivia 45.03
10 Indonesia 47.16
10jurisdictionswiththegreatestbarrierstoinvestment,theleastattractivefirst
Comments about conditions in the jurisdiction:• “Indonesia regularly flip-flops on
government and ministerial regulations regarding the oil and gas industry, which deters investment. Recent actions related to signature bonuses on PSC extensions is one example.”• “Indonesia’s gross split production
sharing contract (PSC) system is poorly designed and is discouraging for investors.”• “Regulatory processes are uncertain
and biased.”Sumber: Fraser Institute, Global Petroleum Survey 2018Catatan: Policy Perception Index (PPI), is a composite index that measures the overall policy attractiveness of the 80 jurisdictions in the survey.
The index is composed of survey responses to policy factors (the administration of current regulations, environmental regulations, regulatory duplication, the legal system and taxation regime,uncert ainty concerning protected areas and disputed land cl aims, infrastructure, socioeconomic and community development conditions, trade barriers, political stability, labor regulations,quality of the geological database, security, and labor and skills availability) that affect investment decisions. Policy factors examined include uncertainty concerning
Pemilu2019:distribusisuarasah
19,3
12,6
12,3
9,7
9,1
8,2
7,8
6,8
4,5
2,7
2,1
1,9
1,5
0,8
0,5
0,2
PDIP
Gerindra
Golkar
PKB
Nasdem
PKS
Demokrat
PAN
PPP
Perindo
Berkarya
PSI
Hanura
PBB
Garuda
PKPI
%SuaraSah
DistribusikursiDPR:partaipendukungpemerintah74%,partaidiluarpemerintah26%
22,26
14,78
13,57
10,26
10,09
9,39
8,70
7,65
3,30
PDIP
Golkar
Gerindra
Nasdem
PKB
Demokrat
PKS
PAN
PPP
%KursiDPR
DistribusikursiDPR:partai-partaididalampemerintahanvspartai-partaidiluarpemerintahan
22,26
14,7813,57
10,26 10,09
3,30
9,398,70
7,65
PDIP Golkar Gerindra Nasdem PKB PPP Demokrat PKS PAN
%KursiDPR
Didalampemerintahan=74% Diluarpemerintahan=26%
Merawatdemokrasi
Mentransformasikandari• Extractivepolitical
institutionmenjadiinclusivepoliticalinstitution
• Extractiveeconomicinstitutionmenjadiinclusiveeconomicinstitution
Sumber:DiadaptasidariDaronAcemogludanJamesA.Robinson,TheNarrowCorridor:States,Societies,andtheFateofLiberty,London:PenguisPress.
Politicalcorruption:definitions
• Politicalcorruptionadalahkorupsiyangmelibatkanpembuatkeputusanpolitikdenganmenyalahgunakankekuasaanpublikyangdimilikinya.
• Politicalcorruptionistheuseofpowerbygovernmentofficialsforillegitimateprivategain.–https://www.sciencedaily.com/terms/political_corruption.htm
• Politicalcorruptionis“thebehaviorof(elected)publicofficialswhichdivergesfromtheformalcomponents- thedutiesandpowers,rightsandobligations- ofapublicroletoseekprivategain”(Kramer,1997).
• Politicalcorruptionmeanstheabuseofpoliticalpowerbythegovernmentleaderstoextractandaccumulateforprivateenrichment,andtousepoliticallycorruptmeanstomaintaintheirholdonpower.–https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/political-corruption/
Korupsimusuhperadaban• Korupsimembuatalokasisumberdayamenjauhdarikepentinganpublik,kepentinganbersama,kepentinganrakyat.
• Kekayaansumberdayaekonomi,termasuksumberdayaalam, tidakbisamenyejahterakanrakyat,bahkansebaliknyamemarginalkankekuatanrakyat.
• Pemusatanpenguasaansumberdayaekonomiberadaditangansegelintirorang,yangsenantiasaberupayamelanggengkanpenguasaannyadenganmencariperlindunganataudukunganpolitik,bahkansekarangsudahlangsungmasukkegelanggangpolitikdenganmendirikanataumenguasaipartaipolitik.
• Partai-partaiyangkuatbukankarenamemilikiideologiyang cristalclear,programnyayangbagusdankadernyayangkredibel,melainkanyangmemilikikekuatanlogistikmelimpahyangmengalirdariparapengendalisumberdayaalamdanrenteekonomi.MartinWolfmenyebutnya“rentiercapitalism,”yangiamaknaisebagaisuatusistemyangmanapasardankekuatanpolitikmemberikanindividu-individudanpengusaha-pengusahayangdiistimewakanuntukmengerukrenteyangbesardarioranglain.
Pembangunantakakanberkelanjutan=rapuh• Praktikkorupsitidakakanmembuatpembangunanmenjadisehat,
berkualitas,danberkelanjutan.Rencanapembangunanjangkapanjangyangterukurtidakmenjadikepeduliankoruptor.Yangmerekainginkanadalahmeraupsegalasumberdayasecepat-cepatnyadansebanyakmungkinuntukmemperkokohcengkeramanpolitiknyademimemperbesarkekuatanlogistik.Merekalahyangakanterusberjayadipanggungpolitik.
• Akibatnya,fondasipembangunanrapuh.Kondisisepertiitulahyangterjadisekarang.Investasicukupbanyaktetapihasilnyahanyapertumbuhansekitar5%.Semuayangkitabangunmembutuhkandanalebihbesar,sekitar50persenlebihbanyakketimbangdinegara-negaratetanggadandimasaOrdeBarusekalipun.
Merambahkesegalapenjuru
• DanaAPBNdiselewengkan,mulaidariprosesditingkatperencanaan.• BUMNdijarah,dikerdilkan,diisiolehpetinggi-petinggiyangtidakkompeten
• Lisensidiperjualbelikan• Undang-undangmenghambakepadavestedinterest• Kebijakantidakmengutamakankepentinganpublik.
Theworld’smostunequalcountries
Source:CreditSuisseGlobalWealthDatabook2019.
82,7
76,6
75,9
75,3
74,3
74,1
70,3
68,0
67,5
67,2
1.Russia
2.Thailand
3.UnitedStates
4.Sweden
5.India
6.Indonesia
7.Turkey
8.Netherlands
9.SouthAfrica
10.Israel
Top-10%,2019, percent
58,2
50,4
44,6
42,5
42,5
37,7
37,4
37,2
36,1
35,4
1.Russia
2.Thailand
3.Indonesia
4.Turkey
5.India
6.Chile
7.Sweden
8.Israel
9.CzechRepublic
10.UnitedStates
Top1%,2019,percent
WealthconcentrationinIndonesia,2010-19
Source:CreditSuisseGlobalWealthDatabook2018.
31,5
43,245,6
47,950,3
53,549,3
45,4 46,644,6
66,8
72,6 73,8 7577,2 77,9
75,7 74,8 75,3 74,1
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Percent
Top1% Top10%
Thecrony-capitalismindex
3,8 2,0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
RussiaMalaysia
PhilippinesSingaporeUkraineMexico
IndonesiaTurkeyIndia
TaiwanChina*
ThailandSouthAfrica
BritainBrazil
UnitedStatesArgentina
FranceJapan
SouthKoreaPoland
Germany
Cronysectors Non-crony sectors
Billionairewealthasa%ofGDP,rankedbycrony-sectorwealth,2016
Indonesia’srank(%ofGDP):2007 18th2014 8th(5.2)20167th(5.8)
WherethelivingiseasyRent-seekingsectorsincludedintheindex•Casinos•Coal,palmoilandtimber•Defense•Deposit-takingbankingandinvestmentbanking•infrastructureandpipelines•Oil,gas,chemicalsandotherenergy•Ports,airports•Realestateandconstruction•Steel,othermetals,miningandcommodities•Utilitiesandtelecomsservices
*Includesterritories.Source: TheEconomist,Dailychart:Comparingcronycapitalismaroundtheworld(http://econ.st/24zXocy).
Classificationofcorruptionbasedonsourcesandinstruments
INSTRUMENTS
SOURCESELITEHEGEMONY INTEREST-GROUPPOWER
POWERABUSE
ManipulationandBribery:• Obtaininggovernmentbenefits• Avoidinggovernmentcosts• Sidepayments,leakage,theft
MafiaandFactionalism:• Manipulationofpoliticalaccess• Exploitationofeconomicopportunities
• Dangerofhand-over-fistcorruption
POLITICALPATRONAGE
CollusionandNepotism:• Blurboundariesbetweenstateandsociety,privateandpublic
• Nouveaurichebehavior• Chronic,hyper-corruptionspiral
• OrganizedandsystemicCorruption:Elite-controlledgovernment
• Exploitationofeconomicinterests• Monopolyoverpatronage
Sources:ModifiedfromstudiesbySusanRose-AckermanofYaleUniversity(1997),MichaelJohnstonofColgateUniversity(1997).
Corruption&typesofgovernmentresourcesCorruptionType
TypeofGovernmentResource
Examplesofcorruption
Holder(s)ofDirectControl
Holder(s)ofIndirectInfluence
Legislative - Governmentpoliciesandregulation
- Paymentsforfavorablelegislation
- Presidents/Ministers/Legislators
- Topdepartmentbureaucrats
- Bureaucratswithcontroloverimplementation
Contracting - Allocationoflicenses/contracts(naturalresources,schools,roads,etc.)
- Kickbacksonlicenses/contracts
- Bureaucratsatlevelofcontract/project
- Politicianswithpoweroverbureaucrats
- Middlemen
Employment - Governmentjobs - Bribesorfavorsforjobs
- Politiciansandbureaucratswithhiringandtransferringauthority
- Middlemen
Services - Provisionofindividualbenefits(forexample,IDs,welfare)orsanctions(forexample,trafficviolations)
- Bribesfor‘speedy’services
- ’Street-levelbureaucrats - Politicianswithpoweroverbureaucrats
- Localpoliticians- Middlemen
Source: JenniferBussell,“TypologiesofCorruption: aPragmaticApproach,”September2015.
CategoriesofcorruptionCategoriesofcorruption Description
Bribery Theactofdishonestly persuadingsomeonetoactinone’sfavourbyapaymentorother inducement.Inducementscantaketheformofgifts,loans,fees,rewardsorotheradvantages(taxes,services,donations,etc.).Theuseofbribescanleadtocollusion(e.g.inspectorsunder-reportingoffencesinexchangeforbribes)and/orextortion(e.g.bribesextractedagainstthethreatofover-reporting).
Embezzlement Tosteal,misdirectormisappropriatefundsorassetsplacedinone’strustorunderone’scontrol.Fromalegalpointofview,embezzlementneednotnecessarilybeorinvolvecorruption.
Facilitationpayment Asmallpayment,alsocalleda“speed”or“grease”payment,madetosecureorexpeditetheperformanceofaroutineornecessaryactiontowhichthepayerhaslegalorotherentitlement.
Fraud Theactofintentionallyanddishonestly deceivingsomeoneinordertogainanunfairorillegaladvantage(financial,politicalorotherwise).
Collusion Anarrangementbetweentwoormorepartiesdesignedtoachieveanimproperpurpose, includinginfluencingimproperlytheactionsofanotherparty.
Extortion Theactofimpairingorharming,orthreateningto impairorharm,directlyorindirectly,anypartyorthepropertyofthepartytoinfluenceimproperlytheactionsofaparty.
Patronage,clientelism,andnepotism
Patronageatitscoremeansthesupport givenbyapatron.Ingovernment,itreferstothepracticeofappointingpeopledirectly.
Source:UKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment, “Whycorruptionmatters:understandingcauses,effectsandhowtoaddressthem–Evidencepaperoncorruption, January2015.https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/406346/corruption-evidence-paper-why-corruption-matters.pdf.
Semakintidakberdikari• Sementaraitukemampuannegara(pemerintah,duniausahadan
sektorkeuangankhususnya)untukmembiayainyatumbuhmerayap.Untukmemacupertumbuhan,takadapilihanlainkecualiberutang.Porsiutangataudanaluarnegerisemakinbesar.Sementaraitu,kemampuannegaramenghasilkandevisatidakmeningkat,sehinggakitakianrentanmenghadapigejolakeksternal.
• Penerimaanpajakjalanditempat.Bukankarenapotensipajakkitarendah,melainkankarenapenggelapanpajakmasihmerajalela.Parakoruptormengamankanuangnyadiluarnegeri,membuatkitasemakinkekurangan“darahsegar”untukmenggerakkanpembangunan.
References
Amundsen,Inge.1999.“PoliticalCorruption:AnIntroductiontotheIssues.”CMIWorkingPaperWP1999:7.–https://www.cmi.no/publications/1040-political-corruption
Rose-Ackerman,S.,andPalifka,B.2016. CorruptionandGovernment:Causes,Consequences,andReform.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.