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The Athenian Embassies to Sardis and Cleomenes' Invasion of AtticaAuthor(s): Richard M. BertholdSource: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Vol. 51, No. 3, (3rd Qtr., 2002), pp. 259-267Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436657Accessed: 18/08/2008 09:56

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THE ATHENIANEMBASSIESTO SARDIS AND CLEOMENES'

INVASIONOF ATTICA

Sometime

during

the archon

year 508/7 king

Cleomenes

of

Sparta

was

summonedback to Athensby a beleaguered sagoras,whose politicalposition

was crumbling efore hereform acticsof Cleisthenes.Failing n theirattempt

to establisha narrow

oligarchy, he two

men

and

their

supporters

were

driven

out of the city, and Cleomenesbegan organizing

a

three-pronged

nvasionof

Attica, inviting armiesfrom ChalcisandBoeotiain from the north,while he

gathered he Peloponnesianevy

in

the

south.

In

apparent esponse

o

this

threat

the Athenians

dispatched

n

embassy

o

Sardis,perhaps

n the

spring

of

507,

to

seek an

alliance from the Persiansatrap

Artaphernes,

who

demandedof

the

Athenians he usual tokens

of

submission o the empire,earthand water.

"On

theirown

responsibility"

he

envoys provided he

tokens

and

returned

o

Ath-

ens, where hey "themselveswere blamedgreatly"

or this

act.,

While the

intention

of

this

mission is perfectly clear

-

an

alliance with

Persia virtually verything lse about t has been the subjectof debate. t can

hardlybedoubtedhatCleisthenes,ust recalled o Athensafter he expulsionof

Isagoras ndCleomenes,

was

responsible or sending he embassy,2 nd tsgoal

is

clearly

stated

by Herodotus:o concludean alliancewithPersia.WhyPersia?

Because

no

potentialally of any significancewas available.The Peisistratid

Herod.

5.70.1-74.2:

ic't

aqpwv

ai)tiCov

ak6gevot;

wrUT6v

aidia;

"ydXa;

eiXov

(73.3);

as

C.

Hignett,

A

History

of

the Athenian

Constitutiono

the End

of

the

FifthCentury

B.C.

(Oxford 1952)

178

notes,

Herodotus

does

not

actuallysay

the submissionwas disavowed.

The events

leading

to the

embassy

can be no

later thanthe

end

of the

archon

year

in

late

June orearly July andwereprobably arlier n the spring;see pp. 262-265.

2

Actually, it hasbeen

doubtedby M.F.

McGregor,

"The Pro-Persian

Partyat Athens,"

n

Athenian

StudiesPresented o

W.S.

Ferguson

(Cambridge1940)

77-78, followed by

R.J.

Buck, "The

Reforms of 487

B.C. in the

Selection of

Archons," CP 60

(1965) 99.

McGregor's

suggestionthat the

Athenians

recalled Cleisthenesand

sent the

embassy

at

the same

time

perhaps

"does no

violence to

the

tenses of

Herodotus,"but

the

Greek

certainly mplies a

sequence:

Avhva^iot

i jeta

fai'a

KXAtoaOvea

..

gieaxeai6WEvot

1ic4uouat

d6yygXoo

;

dp8t;

(5.73.1).

McGregor's

objection that Persian

alliance

meant he

restoration

f

Hippias s

nonsense; here s no

evidence of Sardis

adopting hat

policy before Cleomenes'

second

failure

to

install

Isagoras, and

the fact is that

Arta-

phernesacceptedAthenian

ubmission

with

no

mentionof

Hippias.His second

objection,

that it

would have

been

political suicide

to propose

submission to

Persia, is an

entirely

subjective

conclusion drawn

from the reactionof

the Athenians

when the

embassy did

return.

Historia,

Band LI/3 (2002)

i)

Franz

Steiner

Verlag

Wiesbaden

GmbH,Sitz Stuttgart

8/10/2019 Berthold 2002

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260 RICHARDM. BERTHOLD

alliance with Thessaly

had likely rested on a personal relationship, and in any

case it is improbable that the Thessalian cavalry could have provided decisive

support against armies of

hoplites.3 The Thessalians may well have been

thirsting for revenge

against the Spartans, but, burned once already, they were

not about to rush to

the

aid of

a city whose prospects must have seemed very

dim. Athens' failure

to

approach Argos,

the natural

ally

of

any enemy

of

Sparta,

is best explained by

the existence of a peace treaty between Argos and Sparta

and the Argives'

remarkableconsistency

in

adhering to such agreements.4

As

has long been recognized, the appeal to Persia

was

born of desperation.

The threat

from

Sparta

was

real

and

imminent,

and

with

nowhere else

to

turn

Cleisthenes followed the lines of his family's old connections to Sardis and

sought help from the

superpower across the Aegean.5

It

is simply inconceivable

that

Cleisthenes

did

not

know

that any relationship with the Persian empire

began

with an

unqualified recognition of Persian superiority through

the

surren-

der

of the tokens

of

earth

and water.

In

addition

to

Alcmaeonid connections

in

Asia Minor there

is

the fact thatthe Asian Greeks, including trading partnersof

Athens,

had

been under Persian

rule

for a

half

century.

Is

it

credible that

when

Cleisthenes and his

people

discussed

whether

to

turn to

Persia,

no

one

asked

what the nature of the alliance would be or

no

one could be found

who

had any

knowledge on the subject? What is known of Cleisthenes does not suggest a

man

who

would

take

a

complete leap

into

the

dark

on

such an

important

ssue

or

fail to

give

the

envoys

instructions

regarding

submission. It is

much

easier

to

believe

that

Herodotus' statement that

the

envoys

were

responsible

for

the

decision is

a

distortion

intended to

spare

the Alcmaeonids

a

further

charge

of

medism, particularly

n

view

of

his

later

enthusiastic defense of

the

family

after

Marathon.6

3 The victory

n 511

was clearlyagainst

a smallandpossibly

disorganized orce

(it came

by

sea, was

not commanded

by a king and seems

to have fought

immediately

after anding);

in contrast, he

Thessalianswere

easily driven off

by Cleomenes'

army;Herod.

5.63.2-

64.2; Arist.Ath.

Pol. 19.5.

4 See J.

Holladay,

"Medism

n Athens 508-480 B.C.,"G&R

25 (1978) 178-79,

who

points

out that

such a treaty

wouldalso explain

Cleomenes'

involvement n

Argos in

495/4.

5

Herod.

6.125.2-5.

6

So

G. Busolt, Griechische

Geschichte2Gotha

1894-1903)

11,441,

n. 9; W.W. How

&

J.

Wells, A Commentary

n Herodotus

(Oxford

1912) II, 40;

E.M. Walker,

"Athens.The

Reformof Cleisthenes,"

CAH

IV (Cambridge

1926) 157-58;

A.R. Burn,Persia

and

the

Greeks. The Defense of

the West,

c.

546-478

B.C.2 (London

1984)

187-88.

G.M.E.

Williams, "Athenian

Politics

5087-480

B.C.:

A

Reappraisal,"

Athenaeum60 (1982)

526-27 wonders f the Philaids,enemiesof PersiaandtheAlcmaeonids,hadanything o

do

with

Cleisthenes

sending

the embassy

to

Sardis,

but this seems extremelyunlikely;

he

external hreat

o

Athens was

clearly

a more compelling motivation

han some potential

domestic problem.

On

submission

to Persiasee L.L. Orlin,

"Athensand Persia

ca.

507

B.C.:

A

Neglected Perspective,"

n L.L.

Orlin,ed.,

Michigan

OrientalStudies

n Honor

of

G.C.

Cameron

(Ann

Arbor

1976)

255-66,

who stresses

the

eternal

and cosmic

signifi-

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The AthenianEmbassies

o

Sardis

and Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica

261

A more

perplexing question

is

exactly

what

Cleisthenes

expected

from

the

Persian gambit. That the mission was connected to the threat from the Pelopon-

nesus is obvious and

accepted by all,

but it is

not

clear how

a

sudden

alliance

with Persia, whatever the

terms,

could thwart that

threat.

Could Cleisthenes

seriously expect that

Cleomenes would be scared off

by

the mere news of

an

alliance with Persia, a power with no presence

west

of the

Aegean?7 And

if

he

was counting on actual

Persian military aid,

how could he possibly expect to see

it in

time,

when

Cleomenes was

already collecting

his

forces

when

the

embassy

was

sent? Even assuming Artaphemes could

implement

a

major

development

in

Achaemenid foreign policy without reference

to

Darius, deploying

an effective

force to Athens would requirea significant amountof time for the collection of

ships, troops

and

supplies

and the

organization

of

a

fairly

complex amphibious

operation.

News

of these

preparations

was more

likely

to

spur

Cleomenes

to

more

aggressive action

than to

deter him,

and he

need only

employ

established

mechanisms

to

summon

the Peloponnesian allies.8 If the

Persians do decide to

send

a

force,

then

Cleomenes

has every

strategic

reason to

move even more

quickly

and

seize Athens

before they can arrive. It seems that

Cleisthenes was

grasping

at

Persian

straws,

and real help from

the east, whether in the form of

deterrence

or actual

military force, was

at

best

a

long shot. Simply establishing

a basis for possible futurePersian intervention was the only realistic hope.

Herodotussuggests

that upon their return

he

envoys were censured ("blamed

greatly") for

submitting the tokens to Artaphernes, but he

fails to explain

exactly why.

The

passage strongly implies that the

people were caught by

surprise

and

displeased, but was it the mission

itself

or

simply the terms it

accepted that offended them? A secret

embassy, sent only

on Cleisthenes'

orders,

is

certainly possible, since Athens was

only

now

departing an age when

foreign policy

was

essentially

the

preserve

of

aristocrats,9but

Herodotus says it

cance of the act; A.

Kuhrt,"Earthand

Water," n

A.

Kuhn

& H.

Sancisi-Weerdenburg,

eds., Achaemenid

HistoryIII: Methodand

Theory Leiden

1988) 87-99. If the tokens had

literally to

be

from the

submitting state, then

the Athenians

would

have had to

know

beforehand

what the terms

would

be, but an

understanding f

the

mythopoeticnature

of

the

tokenssuggests

that

any

earth

and waterwould

do;

see Orlin

(as

in

p. 260

n.

6)

265-

66.

My thanks

o

Jack Balcer

for

information

n

this.

7

The

alliance

as

a deterrence

s

implied by

many

scholars and

stated

explicitly

by

F.

Schachermeyr,

Athenals Stadt

des

GroBk6nigs,"Graz.

Beitr.

1

(1973) 217.

8

If Herod.

5.31.4-32.1

is

to be

believed,

Artaphernes eeded

royal approval or

the assault

on

Naxos.

Persian

preparations

or the Marathon

xpedition

began the

previous

year

(Herod.6.95.1), whereasSparta,Athens andPlataeawereableto prepare orces and get

them to

Marathon

n

a

matter

of

days rather

han

months;notealso

the rapid

Peloponne-

sian

mobilizationbefore

Plataea Herod.

9.9.1-11.3). On the

absolute

chronology

see pp.

262-265.

9

F.J. Frost,

"Politics n

Early

Athens,"

n

G.S.

Shrimpton& D.J.

McCargar,

ds.,

Classical

Contributions.

Studies

in

Honor

of

M.F.

McGregor (Locust

Valley,

NY

1981)

35.

8/10/2019 Berthold 2002

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262

RICHARD

.

BERTHOLD

was "the

Athenians"

who

sent the

mission.

Further, if it

had

been secret,

why

was it now revealed, only to be condemned?Could Cleisthenes, whose political

success

had

been

based on an

understandingof

the demos,

now so

thoroughly

misjudge

them?

The dispatch

of the

embassy, if

not

the terms

it could

expect,

must

have been

public

knowledge.

The

condemnation of

the

embassy

clearly

resulted from

the terms

it

accept-

ed,

which

in

turn

means those

terms

-

submission to

Persia

-

were

refused by

the Athenians.10

Now,

it

is

possible that

upon the

envoys'

return

Cleisthenes

was

confronted

by an

unexpected

anti-Persian

sentiment

among the

people and

simply

abandoned the

embassy,

but such

a sudden

and

politically

decisive

outburstof anti-Persianfeeling seems a bit surprising for a state surroundedby

serious

foes

and

desperately

seeking allies.

The

rejection

of

the Persian

alliance

makes much more

sense

among

a

people

facing

no

immediate

threats and with

a

couple

of impressive

military

victories under

their

corselets, which

would

be

the case

had

Cleomenes'

invasion

already

failed when

the

envoys retumed.'1

With

Cleomenes at

least

temporarily

neutralized

and morale

boosted

by

the

energetic

defeat of

the Boeotians and

Chalcidians the

Athenians

in

their

enthu-

siasm

would

probably

have

rejected

any

deal

that

even

hinted

at

an

inferior

status.

Unfortunately,Herodotusdoes not provide a precise chronology for either

the

embassy

or

the

invasion,

but

the

evidence

strongly

suggests

the summer

of

507 for

Cleomenes'

failed

attack.12Both

Aristotle and

Herodotus

place

Isago-

ras'

political

problems and

thus his

appeal to Sparta

in

the archon

year

508/7,13

which means

Cleomenes' failed intervention

must have taken

place

in the same

10 H. Berve,

Miltiades.StudienzurGeschichtedes Mannesundseiner Zeit (Berlin 1937)

71,

n. 1; Schachermeyras in n. 7) 213-14; and R. Sealey,

"ThePit and the Well: the Persian

Heralds

of

491 B.C.," CJ 72 (1976/7) 17-18 all

believe the alliance was accepted;Berve

points to Herodotus' ilence and the notionthatwere it rejected,Artapherneswould have

no legal basis

for his later demand to restoreHippias. But Herodotussurely implies

rejection (censuring the envoys, but accepting their

deed, is difficult to believe), and

Artaphernes,f

indeedhe neededany legal basis, wouldconsider he submissionunilater-

ally

valid

regardless

of the

acts

of

the Athenian

assembly;

see note 29.

11

So Walker (as

in n. 6) 158-59; Burn (as in n. 6) 188; R. Thomsen, The Origins

of

Ostracism

Copenhagen1972) 125;

M.

Ostwald,"TheReform

of

the AthenianState

by

Cleisthenes,"

CAH2

V

(Cambridge1988) 308, 338.

12

With two exceptions every author places the

invasion in 506, but

no

one offers

the

slightest reason

or

evidence

for

doing

so. The

exceptions are Burn

(as

in n.

6)

188 and

J.M. Cook, ThePersian Empire London 1983) 92, who date it to

507;

four

authorshedge

with the date 507/6: D.W. Knight, Some Studies in Athenian Politics in the Fifth Century

B.C. (Wiesbaden 1970) 24;

R.D.

Cromey, "Kleisthenes'

Fate,"

Hist. 28

(1979) 133;

J.

Hart,Herodotusand GreekHistory (London 1982)

38, 71; L.H. Jeffery, "Greecebefore

the Persian

Invasion,"CAH2

V

(Cambridge1988) 360.

13

Herod.5.70.1-2; Arist. Ath.

Pol.

20.1-2. Ostwald as

in

n.

II)

306-8

places

the reforms

and Isagoras'

appeal n 507/6,

which

flies right

n the face

of

Aristotle.

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The AthenianEmbassies o Sardisand Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica

263

period. The king brought with him only a small "band"of soldiers,14 who were

easily overwhelmed, and collecting such a tiny force and marching to Athens

could hardly have taken more than a week or two. It is unknown precisely when

in the archon year Isagoras' appeal and expulsion took place, but even

if

they

are dated to the very end of the year

-

and there is no particularreason to believe

this so15

-

Cleomenes would be back in the Peloponnesus collecting his army

by early August

at the

absolute latest.16

It is far more

likely, since

Aristotle

has

Cleisthenes undertaking his reforms "during the archonship of Isagoras," that

these events were earlier, perhaps in the spring of 507 or even in late

508.17

How long

it

took to mobilize the

forces

of the Peloponnesian

alliance

cannot be determined with any precision and undoubtedlythis varied with the

scale of the expedition, but numerous examples indicate

that it cannot have

taken so many months that the expedition would be delayed until

the

following

year. The Spartanarmy could

be

mobilized virtually overnight,

as

demonstrated

by the lead-up to Plataea in 479, when

the

Peloponnesian levy appears

to have

gathered at the Isthmus within weeks of the Spartan decision

to

march.18

During the great war with Athens the Peloponnesian army regularly invaded

Attica in the spring, and while it is true these expeditions were expected and

involved no political wrangling, they demonstrate that

it was

certainly physical-

ly possible for the levy to be collected and rushed north in less than a month.

And in 507 there appears to have been little or no diplomatic dithering, since the

allies were in the dark about Cleomenes' true aims, suggesting they had simply

automatically heeded the call to mobilize. For Thucydides the campaigning

season runs from March or April until at least the beginning of November,19

which means that even if Isagoras' ouster is set at the latest possible moment,

early July, Cleomenes still had at least four months to collect his troops and

march to Eleusis. If this was insufficient time, then it is difficult to understand

14

Herod.

5.72.1: ou

avv

jsey6kqi

Etpi;

Arist. Ath.

Pol. 20.3: jsei

okiywv.

15

A. Andrewes,

"Kleisthenes' Reform

Bill," CQ 71 (1977)

246-47 suggests that since

Isagorasgave

his name to the archon

year he must

have served most of

his

term.

Even

if

this

supposition s true,

which is not at all clear,

Isagorascould

still have been out of

office in the

early spring.

16

In theory the first month

of the Athenianyear,

Hecatombaeon,

began with the first new

moon

after

the

summer

olstice, so

an

archon's ermcould begin

anywhere

rom

lateJune

to very early

August.Itcannotbe

calculatedexactly

when

the

year 507/6 began,but it was

very

probably n mid or late July; see

W.B.

Dinsmoor,The AthenianArchon

List in the

Light of Recent

Discoveries (NY 1939)

205-10.

17 Arist. Ath.Pol. 21.1: en i'Iaay6poudpxovto;. Therelativeorderof Cleisthenes' reform

proposalsand

Isagoras'appeal s

unimportant ere,but see Knight

as

in

n. 12)

13-24 for

a

reasonablechronology;

putting

he

reforms nto practice,which

must take some time,

should

be

distinguished

rom

simply voting for them.

18

Herod.

9.9.1-11.3; some troopswere

already hereworkingon the

wall.

19

See A.W.

Gomme, A Historical

Commentary on

Thucydides III (Oxford

1956) 699-715.

8/10/2019 Berthold 2002

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264

RICHARD

M.

BERTHOLD

how much of fifth and fourth

century military history could have happened

as it

did.

Of

course, just because something could be done in

a certain period of time

does

not

mean it was,

especially

in

the typically plodding world of politics

and

diplomacy.

But

there are good reasons to believe

Cleomenes

acted as

expedi-

tiously as possible. First, there

is

the king himself, by any account a

headstrong

and

supremely energetic

individual, not given

to

caution

and

hesitation.20

A

man

willing to bribe Delphi and play fast and loose with

Sparta's constitutional

practices

to

obtain

his ends was not likely to dawdle,

especially when the issue

was not

just political, but very personal. Besieged on

the acropolis and forced to

retire, Cleomenes had been personally humiliated by the Athenians,andwhat is

known

of

his

career

strongly suggests an individual

particularly eager to take

action

when

so

injured.2'

Second, even a more

cautious man would have

compelling reasons to move

promptly. The longer the

delay, especially into the next year, the more

the

military and

political situation would from his

point of view

deteriorate.

Cleomenes, having already been involved with

Athens

and now

presumably

accompanied by Isagoras,

must have been aware of

the sorry state of Athenian

hoplite forces

in the

wake of

the tyranny,22and he could hardly have failed to

conclude thatthe less time Athenshad to prepare heeasierhis job would be. The

longer he delayed, the longer

his client's enemies,

the Alcmaeonids, would also

have to

solidify their domestic political position,

rendering

his

political task that

much

harder.Further, hathe was

apparently aken by surpriseby the

last

minute

defection of Damaratus

and the

Corinthians

suggests

-

but

only

that

-

an

operation

thrown

together

with

some haste.

Finally,

whether Cleomenes

knew of

the

Athenian

embassy

to Sardis

is

unknown,

but if

he

did,

this

might

be

another,

if

minor, spur

to

action,

since

though

he

might suspect

it

would

take

some

time to

get the

ponderous

Persian

military

machine

moving,

he

could

not be

sure.

All the evidence, circumstantial though it may be, thus points to the sum-

mer of

507

for

Cleomenes' invasion

of

Attica.

The failed attack could

conse-

20

So much

so that

many in antiquityand in the present

have thoughthim insane; see

A.

Griffiths, "Was Cleomenes

Mad?," in A. Powell, ed., Classical Sparta.

Techniques

Behind

Her Success (Norman,Okl.

1988)51-78.

21 Herod.

5.72.1-4; Arist.Ath.Pol. 20.3.

Herod.5.74.1

in fact speaksof Cleomenes'actions

in terms of insult and

personal revenge:

KkeogvIq

be

icrcxatdevo;

reptuppia0cat

xicetat

Kai epyOWat

6

A0A"vaiov

...

reiacaa0ai

Te s0eowv T6v 8i,ov t6v'AOivaxiv.

Cleomenes' subsequent

proposal to

restore Hippias (Herod. 5.90.1-91.3;

Plut. Mor.

860f.) certainlysuggestsa man willingto go to any lengthsto gain revenge.

22

Athens

apparently

ad not employed

a citizen

army

foralmost

forty years,

and Peisistra-

tus may well have disarmed

he populace,seemingly relyingexclusively on

mercenaries;

Arist. Ath.

Pol.

15.3-4 (Thuc.

6.58.1-2 hardlyseems

evidencefor Hippiasdisarming

all

the hoplites, though

hatmay

have

followed);

see most

recently

F.J. Frost,

"TheAthenian

MilitaryBefore

Cleisthenes,"

Hist.

33 (1984)

283-94.

8/10/2019 Berthold 2002

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The

Athenian

Embassies

o SardisandCleomenes' Invasion

of

Attica

265

quently

easilyprecede he return f the

envoys,

especially

f as

representatives

of a low statusstatethey werekeptcoolingtheirheels in Sardisby thesatrap.

And

since

Cleomenes'failure

and

the Athenianvictories n the north

provide

the only

compelling

explanation or

the sudden

repudiation f the Persian

alliance,

t must be concluded

hat

the

embassy

did in fact

return fter

Athens

was

saved.

Cleisthenes

disappears

rom

history

about

his

time,

and some have

linked

that

disappearance

o

the

embassy,

suggesting

hathe fell from

power,ruined

by

his

connectionwith the

unpopular

mission.23This

is

difficult

to

support,

especially

if

one

accepts

thatthe

embassy

retumed

afterthe crisis had

passed.

Granted,hedemoswould aterbeveryfickleinthetreatmentf its leaders,but

it is very

hard o

believethat

n

theflush

of military

ictory he

popularity f

the

man

recognized

as

the

architect f the

government

esponsible

or

the

triumph

would

beunable o

weather

anassociation

withthe

discredited mbassy. n

any

case,

his

bias

towards

he

Alcmaeonids

otwithstanding,

ven

Herodotuswould

have trouble

glossing over what

would

have been a

very

dramatic all

from

power.

Theembassy

would aterreturn o

haunt he

Alcmaeonids,

ut tcertain-

ly doesnot

providea

reliablebasis

forremoving

Cleisthenes

or his

familyfrom

the

centerstage in

Athenian

politics.The most

likely

explanation,

particularly

in view of thefact thatHerodotusypicallydoesnot recorduneventful eaths, s

that

as a

relativelyold man,he

simplydied

or

retired nthe

years

following the

reforms.24

The

first

embassy

o

Sardis

has

beenseen as

an actof

medismon the

partof

the

"pro-Persian"

lcmaeonids,25

utthis

conclusionis

based in

parton the

mistaken

ssumption

hat here

existed n

Athens

definableparties

withconsist-

ent

policies.

Instead,politicsremained

at the turnof

the century

a

timocratic

gameof

individual ristocrats

peratingwithin

a

network f family

connections

and

competing or

temporary

dvantage n

powerand

prestige,

all of which

conspired

against he

emergenceof

partiesand

long-termpolitical

programs.26

It

is

thus

impossible

to

draw

any

conclusions

aboutthe

official

Alcmaeonid

position

regarding

Persiaor

whether, or that

matter,

heyeven

had one. That

23

How

& Wells

(as in n.

6)

11,

40;

Walker as

in

n.

6)

167-68; C.W. Fornara

&

L.J.

Samons

HI,

Athens

rom

Cleisthenes o

Pericles

(Berkeley/Los

Angeles

1991)

10, n.

38.

24

McGregor as

in n. 2)

79, n.

3; J.K.

Davies, Athenian

Propertied

Families

600-300

B.C.

(Oxford

1971)

375;

among

others.The

objections

of

Cromey

(as in n.

12)

133-47

make

absolutely

no

sense, and

his

argument

that

Cleisthenes

went into

voluntary

exile

is

ingeniousbutunconvincing.Cleisthenes s the secondchild of parentsmarried ometime

before

570;

see Davies

(as in n.

24) 372.

25

Walker

(as in

n. 6)

158,

168;

Hignett

(as in

n. 1)

180;

C.A.

Robinson,

Jr.,

"Athenian

Politics

510-486

B.C.,"AJP

66

(1945)

247-48

seems to

imply

this.

26

See

esp. F.J.

Frost,"Tribal

Politics and

theCivic

State,"

AJAH

1

(1976) 66-75

(as

in

n. 9)

Class.

Contr.

33-39.

8/10/2019 Berthold 2002

9/10

266 RICHARD

M.

BERTHOLD

the mission was clearly undertaken in response to an external crisis also

undermines any conclusions about domestic politics; are Roosevelt and the

American Congress to be considered "pro-Communist"because they made an

alliance with the Soviet Union during the Second World War? Moreover, an

unqualified accusation of medism is at this date completely inaccurate, since it

is only after the

Ionian

Revolt and Marathon and especially after Xerxes'

invasion that dealings with Persia take on the aura of treason and betrayal

generally associated with the term.27

Sometime close

to

the end of the century the Athenians sent a second

embassy to Sardis, this time to deal with the problem of Hippias.28 When

Cleomenes' bizarre scheme to restore him to power fell through, Hippias had

headed for the satrapalcourt, which almost certainly took up his cause because of

Athens' repudiationof the alliance of 507. From the Persian point

of

view

that

submission to Ahura-Mazdaand the Great King was permanent,and Artaphemes

was inclined to support whatever Athenian government

-

in

this case the exiled

tyrant endorsed

this

arrangement.29

While

Herodotus states

that

the

purpose

of

the

embassy

was

to dissuade

Artaphernes

rom

supportingHippias,

it cannot

have

had even

the least

expectation of success,

since

the

satrap

was

hardly likely

to

prefer

the defiant

republic

to the

compliant tyrant.

The mission must

be viewed

as

a diplomatic statement,an assertion to the Persians and anyone else (including

opponents

in

Athens itself)

of

the

legitimacy

of

the

new

government.30

Flush

with

confidence

in the wake of their

military victories,

the Athenians

shrugged

off

Artaphernes' hreatsand accepted

Persian

hostility

as the

price

of

independence.

27 See esp.

Holladay as

in n.

4) 174-91;

also A.W. Gomme,

"Athenian

Notes.

1.

Athenian

Politics

510-483

B.C.,"

AJP 65

(1944)

321-22

(= More

Essays

in

Greek

History

and

Literature

Oxford 1962] 19-20);

J. Wolski,

"MT8tcsa6q,"

list.

22

(1973)

3-5.

28 Herod.5.96.2. For no apparent eason(it appears o go back to R.W.Macan,

Herodotus.

The

Fourth,Fifth

and

SixthBooks

[London

18951

, 245) c.

504 is

the datemost

often given

for the

embassy

e.g.,Walker

as in n. 6])

163, n. 2; Thomsen

asin n. 11 126;

Ostwald

as

in

n.

111

338), but Herod.

5.97.1

(ev

co-i6u

i1T'

catpCo

6

MtAoto;

'Aptaray6p...)

suggests

a

date

closer to

498; could

it be that

the new threat

contributed

o the

military

reformof

501/0?

29 Herod.

5.96.1. On the

permanence

of

submission

see Orlin

(as

in n. 6) 257-65;

by

supporting

Hippias

Artaphernes

was

not attempting

o create

a new alliance with

Athens,

but

was

simply

interfering

n the affairs

of

a

statealready

considered

a vassal.

On

the

Persian

relationship

with

tyranny

see esp.

D.F. Graf, "Greek

Tyrants

and

Achaemenid

Politics,"

in J.W. Eadie &

J. Ober,eds.,

The

Craft of

the Historian.

Essays

in Honor

of

C.G.Starr(Lanham,MD 1985)79-123.

30 Thomsen

as

in

n.

I

1)

126 andOstwald as

in n.

I

1)

338 see

the

purpose

of the

embassy

as

counteringHippias,

but

only

Walker

as

in n.

6)

168 recognizesthe hopelessness

of this,

wrongly

concluding,

however,

that there

is

a problem

with Herodotus'

account.

The

Alcmaeonids

would

certainly

support he embassy

as a way

to counteract

any

negative

publicity

romthe

previous

mission.

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The AthenianEmbassies o Sardisand

Cleomenes' Invasion

of Attica

267

The second

embassy and Artaphernes'

acceptance

of

the tyrant's claim

mark something of a turning point in the domestic affairs of Athens. Hence-

forth, any suggestion

of

rapprochement

with

Persia

meant supporting

a restora-

tion

of the

tyranny,

a

development

that

could

only

make

medizing politically

unacceptable

to

all but

a

handful

who

might benefit from

Hippias'

return.31

Conversely, tyranny, whose popular support was

undoubtedly already rapidly

evaporating with the successes of the new

government,

was

now further tainted

by

its

clear

association

with submission to

a

foreign power. Whatever the

details

of Athenian domestic

politics

in

this

period,

Persian

support

of

Hippias

makes it extremely difficult to accept the

presence

in

the city of any sizable

or

influential group of either medizers or tyrannists. Stepping on to the shore at

Marathon

a

decade

later, Hippias might believe there was such a faction,

but

Miltiades would know otherwise.

University of New

Mexico, Albuquerque

Richard M. Berthold

31

Walker

(as in n.

6) 168

recognizes

this, but

incorrectly believes in the

continued

existence

of

a

"party

of

Hippias"

in

Athens.